



EMERGENCE OF INDIA AS REGIONAL POWER IN SOUTH ASIA

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
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
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A B S T R A C T



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The end of the global cold war has resulted in a fluidity in South Asian relations and regional adversaries are trying for areas of convergence. There was a time when except India and Vietnam, the Soviet had no friends in Asia now, we have no Soviets as our friends to fall back to. China has emerged as a major player on the Asian stage with the potential to effect the global balance of power. The geo-strategic location of South Asian sub-continent between the two distinct but, of significance regions of West Asia and South-East Asia, has figured as decisive factors in America's foreign policy calculations. The South Asian region has, consequently been a collateral factor in this regard. After the emergence of cold war, United States tried to design India to contain the communism, but, India not only spurned all US advances, it also acted contrary to United States interest. The military alliances between the America and Pakistan was based on different expectations and aims from the two sides. The America give military aid to Pakistan in the context of its problems of security and defence vis-a-vis India. But, America consider India as the largest of the non-aligned countries. The emergence of 'Uni-polar world with United States as the only surviving super power, posed vital new challenges to our decision makers.

With the rupture of the bipolar system and the emergence of new centres of power, and like any other region in the world, South Asia has started experiencing the realities of a new polycentric world. In the new polycentric world, South Asian countries would be guided by new paradigms and parameters as compared to what we have been used to in the past. South Asia is one such region in which the variable of regional security problems are autonomous and indigenous but the inclination of extra-regional powers for increasing interdependence and

cooperation in various fields would pave the way of stability and socio-economic development, ultimately leading to the peace and tranquillity in the whole region. However, a poly-centre international order would undoubtedly make interstate relations in this region more complicated, because all the seven nation states of South Asia - India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives are developing countries and are passing through different stages of development and nation-state building.

There is a deep-seated element of contention between the largest but, continental power, India and its smaller neighbours. India is motivated by both its historical impulses and contemporary perceptions to continue its drive for hegemony to maintain peace in the region. As a response, the smaller powers would naturally make efforts to ensure their survival as a sovereign states. While other countries of the region are too weak economically and militarily to stand up to India. Pakistan is the one regional power which has persisted in resisting the Indian drive for hegemony. Notwithstanding the India pressure by itself, Pakistan has had to conduct an active diplomacy, and also entered into an alliance relationship with the west at the height of the cold war, not so much out of a genuine fear of communist expansion, as out of a desire to political and military leverage in the face of Indian threat. Pakistan's fears in this regard are imaginary for strategic analysis in India make no secret of their view that Pakistan constitutes that one obstacle to what they consider to be India's natural and destined rise to the position of paramount power in the region.

Despite the creditable beginning of SAARC and the Indo-Pak commission, it is evident that the enormous difference in size and power between India and the other constituents of South Asia give rise to misgivings among

its neighbours. Pakistan finds, it difficult to reconcile itself to India's pre-eminence in south Asia; its policy makers emphasize that Pakistan can never accept such a situation. Pakistan's stances to the Indian approach and its over all foreign policy outlook can be seen at two specific levels - that dealing with problems of the region and the other with its relations with the super powers. At the regional level Pakistan considers Simla Agreement to be equivalent to a No War Pact and the problem of Jammu and Kashmir to be a problem of continuing concern which should be solved on the basis of Simla Agreement and the relevant U.N. Resolutions.

India and Pakistan still remain trapped in the nightmare of enmity and tension. The two countries could have settled down to good neighbourly co-existence with commonalities of languages and cultures fostering mutual sympathy, trust and understanding. The important thing is that since 1947, India and Pakistan have not only saddled with bitter and mutually antagonistic postures against each other but have also fought three wars. Among the disputes and major issues that have incessantly aggravated their security concerns are the bitter legacy of the past, Kashmir dispute alongwith linked issues of Siachin, Wullur Lake Barrage, communalism and the ethnic disturbances, intermittent domestic problems the indulgence of extra-regional powers, nuclear question and the terrorist activities. Pakistani leaders every now and then harp on the Kashmir issue; The internal policy of Pakistan demands that this issue be kept alive. No party or government, civil or military can afford to forget Kashmir at this stage in the evolution of Pakistan. Pakistan consider Kashmir 'A cap on the head' while India needs it from the strategic point of view.

USA and the European Economic Community have urged both India and Pakistan to resolve their outstanding problems bilaterally within the framework of the Simla Agreement, China, another important actor in the polycentric world order, wants that both India and Pakistan should find a "just solution" to Kashmir dispute through bilateral peaceful negotiations. As regards India's ties with Pakistan, though the two countries have been able to initiate an agreement on the non-attack of each others nuclear and other key installations, the bilateral relations have generally suffered because of the growing help to terrorist. Some of the pronouncements of Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sherif that his government would continue to support terrorist activities in Kashmir and Punjab have contributed to a deterioration of Indo-Pak relations.

Another major factor aggravating Indo-Pak security concern is the nuclear issue. With China being a nuclear power and Pakistan crossing the nuclear threshold, India has not closed its nuclear option. Public evidence indicates that both states are within easy reach of nuclear device. Indeed the present ambiguous situation seems to suit the interests and pocket books of both countries. A Pakistani bomb would mean the loss of American financial and military support and would be followed by a much larger Indian programme. An Indian bomb might led to greater prestige in the developing world but, it too would be followed by a Pskitani equalizer and might endanger India's access to western high technology.

While advocating international peace and disarmament, India has sustained a throny arms race with Pakistan which has created ever higher degree of insecurity for both. At the diplomatic level, it calls for a shift towards political techniques of conflict resolution and confidence building measures. As a matter of fact, India has brought

almost all south Asian nation states except Pakistan within the reach of her informal regional security framework. In the case of Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, formal treaties, accords and agreements have connected these countries with the regional security framework of India. Most significantly, even though Nepal might have strived to balance China against India in the diplomatic game. Nepal could not, but follow the Indian line on all security issues affecting South Asia in a polycentric world order. India had for more than two decades been persuading Nepal to agree to a common endeavour on water resources development and proceeding with hyde/multipurpose projects on common rivers.

As regards Bhutan, it is worth mentioning that the way in which Bhutan finds accommodation in the security framework of the South Asian sub-system is still marked largely by the strategic perceptions of the past and the China factor. Bhutan agreed, to be guided by the advice of the Government of India with respect to its foreign relations. Like other South Asian nation-states, Bhutan also faces the problems of development and nation - state building. At the same time, the ethenic Nepalese factor in the southern Bhutan constitutes an emerging threat to its internal stability and security.

Turning towards Indo-Sri Lanka scenario, it can be speculated that the strategic and political dimensions of their security framework have been rapidly changing on the basis of emerging patterns of relations between them over the recent years. India's perception of Sri Lanka factor has been compounded by an ensemble of many considerations. There has been, fristly, the influence of Tamils on the domestic politics of both colombo as well as New Delhi. Secondly, there has been serious threats to India's security due to the influx of refugees of Sri Lankan Tamil origin as the fall-out of the escalating Sinhala-Tamil

ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka since July, 1983 and evidently, India's approach and direction to the management and resolution of this crisis. There have also been, thirdly, some irritants in the Indo-Sri Lanka relations that related to the political and diplomatic behaviour of Sri Lanka government towards India. Furthermore, Geo-political and geo-strategic and responses to Sri Lanka turmoil.

As regards Bangladesh, it can be stressed that its major security concerns are the product of its domestic vulnerabilities, the challenges of nation - building, the tribal sub-nationalism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the environmental challenges, the high population growth rate and its divergent perception and position on the issues of mutual interest vis-a-vis India. A section of the public opinion in Bangladesh, including the government circle itself, subscribes to the view that the Indian factor overshadows the rest of external threats to the security of Bangladesh. Negotiations on eastern water settlement and the transfer of Tin Bigha through the Indo-Bangladesh Agreement of 1974 have been striking examples. As the Supreme Court has decided in favour of the transfer of Tin Bigha to Bangladesh and transfer has taken place, this should be followed to remove the last hurdle in enforcing the 1974 Agreement. This would certainly open fresh avenues of mutual trust and cooperation in other fields.

As regards Maldives, it can be visualised that for all practical purposes, its political stability and interests be protected and promoted within the framework of the SAARC, and India should be more inclined to do so as a consequence of the commonalities of interests in the Indian Ocean. Maldives was already indebted to India for its ready support to foil a coup on November 3, 1988. Equally, notably is the fact that the SAARC Heads of State or Government not only condemned the attempt to destabilise

India has the largest area, the highest population, the profounding natural resources and commandable strong army to protect its borders, a navy to safe guard its ports and trade and no other country of South Asia can standby India in industrial developments. It is only India which has the capacity to act as a check to extra-regional powers from interference in the region. India is a guarantee of peace to small neighbour, a treasure of resources to needy neighbours and a ray of hope in the region. It is the best out of the good neighbours, economically more sound than any other SAARC country, militarily more strong than any other country in South Asia and politically more realistic than six nations. The study reveals undoubtedly, "the emergence of India as regional power".

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Dated..... Dec. 24, 1993

This is to certify that the work entitled
"Emergence of India as Regional Power in South
Asia" has been completed under my supervision
by Alka Kulshrestha. The work is original and
has been independently pursued by the candidate.
It reports some interesting observations and
contributes to the existing knowledge in the
field of International Relations.

I permit the candidate to submit the
work for the award of the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in Political Science of the
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'M.A. Kishore', is written over a horizontal line.
M.A. KISHORE

C O N T E N T S

<u>Chapters</u>	<u>Page No.</u>
I (A) New Global Geo-Political Developments : Impact on South Asia	... 2
(a) The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	... 6
(b) Chemical Warheads	... 8
(c) The M.T.C.R.	... 9
(d) US Soviet Cooperation	... 10
(e) The Middle East	... 12
(f) The Arms Sale	... 12
(g) Arms Export to Third World States	... 13
(h) NATO	... 14
(i) Disintegration of Yugoslavia	... 14
(j) German Reunification	... 16
(k) The Korean Unification	... 18
(l) Cambodian Settlement and other Positive Development	... 18
(B) Military Buildup in Indian Ocean	... 21
II Super Powers and South Asia	... 44
(a) American Interests in South Asia	... 44
(b) American Policy towards India	... 54
(c) American Policy towards Pakistan	... 61
(d) China and South Asia	... 70
(e) China-India Today	... 73
(f) Sino-Bhutan	... 75
(g) Chinese Arms Transfer to Pakistan	... 84
(h) Sino-Nepal	... 87
(i) Sino-Bangladesh	... 92
(j) Sino-Sri Lanka	... 95
(k) Disintegration of the Soviet Union and after : effect on India	... 98
III Asia	... 113
(a) South Asia	... 113
(b) Nationalism	... 116

	(c) Security of South Asia	...	118
	(d) Internal Security Dimensions	...	122
	✓(e) SAARC and South Asia	...	123
	✓(f) The Second Cold War	...	132
	(g) Nuclear Proliferation : South Asian Perception	...	139
IV	India and its Neighbour	...	151
(A)	(a) Indo-Bhutan Relations	...	151
	(b) Ethnic Problem	...	160
	(c) Defence	...	164
(B)	Indo-Bangladesh Relations	...	165
(C)	India Maldives Relations	...	182
(D)	Indo-Nepal Relations	...	196
(E)	Indo-Pakistan Relations	...	210
(F)	India-Sri Lanka Relations	...	258
V	Glimpses of India	...	268
	(a) India and South Asia	...	268
	(b) Economic Compulsions	...	272
	(c) India's Economic and Trade Relations	...	273
	(d) The Political System and the Role of Political Leadership and Political Parties : An Indian Perception	...	276
	(e) Relevance of Non-Alignment on India's Foreign Policy	...	286
	(f) Civil Military Relations in India : Deterrent to Coup	...	298
	(g) The Military Balance	...	308
VI	Regional Problems of India	...	321
	(a) Terrorism in India	...	321
	(b) Kashmir Issue	...	331
	(c) The Siachen Glaciar Dispute	...	343
	(d) The Canal Water Dispute	...	348
	(e) The Gangas Water Dispute	...	351
	(f) The Boundary Dispute	...	355

VII	The Economic Resources and Defence Expenditure of South Asian Countries	...	360
	(a) Economic Resources	...	360
	(b) Defence Expenditure	...	380
	Conclusion	..	389
	Bibliography	...	407

P R E F A C E

I recollect the statement of Sir Alfred Zimmern, made in 1935, than holder of the Oxford chair, that International relations should not be a separate subject at all. It was "a point of view" as he put it, "a way of looking at things". Instead of attempting to develop a discipline the effort should be made to try to assimilate in the study of international relations practically every thing that was relevant to international matters. Sociology, political Science and History as well as Philosophy, Mathematics to Engineering, strategic studies began to take the place of the study of international institutions with collapse of the league system, these perspectives and emphases were pushed into the background and an analysis of power politics took the central stage. E.H. Carr (1), Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson suggested that the core of international relations is international politics and..... the subject matter of international politics is struggle for power among nations. The theory was backed by Nicholas J Spykman, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. Morgenthau and Frederick L. Schuman.

The South Asian countries are now faced both by challenges and opportunities and, consequently, their attitude is not surprising. Speaking about Cold War Dr. Majeed said,

"The end of the global cold war has resulted in a fluidity in South Asian relations and regional adversaries are trying for areas of convergence. There was a time when, except India and Vietnam, the Soviets had no friends in Asia. Now, we have no Soviets, as our friends to fall back to. But with the end of deideologisation of international relations, the Russians are not seen as adversaries, or even a threat, by any one in Asia. If the regional security in South Asia is to be based on multi-lateral de-escalation of military confrontation than the collective security has to envisage full participation by extra-regional actors of the multipolar world".¹

1. Majeed Akhtar, "South Asia After the Cold War : An Indian Perspective", Strategic Studies Journal, vol. 5, No.1 and 2, 1992, p. 93.

There have been five powers effecting the events in South Asia : India, Pakistan, China, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. with the total transformation of the U.S.S.R., there would be effect of a different type now. Communism had to far prouded a Secular Ideology to countries of South Asia and decline now resulting in proliferation of ethnic and religious revivalism in many parts of South Asia.

In the recent past we have been witnessing an uncre-
dible rush of events driven by the transformations of the
international political landscape following the end of the
Cold War. Just two years ago we saw the emergence of the
commonwealth of independent states from the rubble of the
former Soviet Union. The disintegration of Yougoslovia,
Unification of Germany and Korea brought significient changes
in the parameters of the South Asia strategy. In various part
of Europe, Africa and elsewhere, political and economic change
appears to be gaining monentum, utmost on a daily basis looking
at the dramatic events that have swept over the European con-
tinent since 1989, one can not but, be struck by the apparent
time - lag between Europe and South Asia in the pace of change.

On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced that
he quite justifiably called "a series of sweeping initiations
effecting every aspect of our nuclear powers". These were
unilateral actions to eliminate or to remove nuclear weapons
from their existing deployment patterns and to lower the
nuclear alert posture. President Bush pointedly called on
the Soviet Union to take comparable measures. He said "if
we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps some on our
own, some on their own, some together, we can dramatically
shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. India
continues its opposition to the NPT and to regional agree-
ments to control or eliminate nuclear weapons and both
countries seem to devote much attention to the development

of their military potentials. Indo-Pak agreement signed in January, 1991 by which both sides pledged not to strike each others nuclear installations, was the first positive development on the sub-continent after their 1972 accord calling for the gradual normalization of relations. In January 1992, India and Pakistan exchanged lists of nuclear facilities under the agreement. These events have a direct bearing upon the strategy of South Asia.

Strategic policy presupposes certain interests and objectives. The importance of South Asia to American strategic concurence is mainly derivative. US viewed its military concerns in South Asia as an important element of its containment strategy directed against the perceived threat to the region from the people's Republic of China. US intervened directly in South Asia on the side of India during the sino-Indian border dispute. China have its own policy and is increasing psychological pressure and assisting Himalayan Kingdoms, Sri Lanka and Pakistan to counterweight India.

Asia is in the process of emerging into modern era and establishing new pattern of relationship with rest of the world. Asia will play a more active role in world politics, a role more commensurate with its size, its population and its might. Robert Payne rightly observed,

"The major task of our generation is the understanding of Asia for Asia represents potentially the mastery of the world in manpower and resources".¹

The nationalism is the pulse of a nation. The past weighs heavily upon the Asian, present nationalism, observed Paul M.A. Linebarger,

"Asian Nationalism involves, the application to a variety of non-European culture of

1. Robert Payne, The Revolt of Asia, New York, The Johnday Company, 1947, p. 290.

political concepts not indigenous to those cultures..... through Asian nationalism functions in the modern world, it is derived from an identification on the part of Asians themselves with 'Asian' projected to Asia by Europeans, whether in person or through mass communications, and by the further mimesis on the part of Asians of the European Concept 'nationalism'. The Asian nationalism..... is an entirely valid response to massive western emotional and spiritual demands".¹

The acronym SAARC was adopted only after the first summit of heads of state and governments held in Dhaka on 7-8 December, 1985. Speaking about the importance of SAARC, Jigme Singye Wangchuk, King of Bhutan reiterated that,

"In the geo-political realities of our region, it would be un-realistic to ignore the primary of the political factor, as, in the final analysis, it would be political environment of the region which will determine the shape and scope of the regional cooperation in South Asia".

Indian ruling elite have planned foreign policy of the country with clear cut objectives, viz. national security, friendship with neighbours, development and world peace. India continues its opposition to the NPT and to regional agreement to control or eliminate nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan seem to devote much attention to the development of their military potentials. It seems that both India and Pakistan recognise the futility of nuclear proliferation in the region and the dangerous implications of a nuclear arms race for their economies. The economic cost of remaining in the nuclear club is rising steeply and thoughtful people in both countries have begun to consider the Soviet Union's obsession with Security and power led it along the path of dangerous neglect of economic, social and political priorities thereby hastening its disintegration.

1. "Asian Nationalism, Some Psychiatric Aspects of Political Mimesis", Psychiatry, XII, August 1954, p. 262.

With the rupture of the bipolar system and the emergence of new centres of power, and like any other region in the world, South Asia has started experiencing the realities of a new polycentric world. In the new polycentric world, South Asian countries would be guided by new paradigms and parameters as compared to what we have been used in the past. All the seven nation states of South Asia - India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldieves are developing countries and are passing through different stages of development and nation state building.

India is motivated by its historical impulses and contemporary perceptions to continue its drive for hegemony to maintain peace in the region. All countries except Pakistan are too weak to stand upto India. Pakistan is one regional power which has persisted in resisting Indian drive for hegemony and had entered into an alliance relationship with west.

India and Pakistan still remain trapped in the nightmare of enmity and tension and refuse of the burdens of the past. India and Pakistan have not only saddled with bitter and mutually antagonistic postures against each other but, have also fought three wars. Among the disputes and major issues that have aggravated their security concerns are the bitter legacy of the past. Kashmir dispute, Siachin and sponsored terrorism are some burning problems between the two nations.

As a whole in the inter-regional perspectives, it can be speculated that South Asia is an Indo Centric region to the extent that India is capable of playing as the Central actor in this region on account of its tangible elements of power and performance.

Despite all the plus points some scholars like Israni Kinnat and Hakim Israni (1) have not accepted India's suzerainty on the basis of calculated drawbacks.

The present study reveals some thing different. Began with the end of cold war, the disintegration of USSR, unification Germany and Korea, rise of unipolar power - USA, Chinese power game, the military buildup in Indian ocean and its effect on South Asia. The SAARC countries their relations with India, economy, defence, political stability balance of power, all arranged in eight systematic suitable chapters goes to the credit side of India's balance sheet. The study is a Library Research based upon historical analytical, speculative and apriori approach and formal descriptive - layonomic and normative prescription method.

All datas, comments available against or in favour have been placed with out any malice. On the basis of the pre-emance of India its highest population, largest area, commandable defence, political stability, devotion, world opinion and policy undoubtedly India is regional power.

I have met with many ups and down during this study, but, have been provided profound motivation by my research guide, Professor M.A. Kishore, Department of Political Science, A.M.U., Aligarh. I wish to acknowledge my heartfelt gratitude and deep appreciation to him. I am also thankful to Professor Hasan Ahmed, Chairman, Department of Political Science for his encouragement, cooperation and useful suggestions.

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I owe special thanks to all those known and unknown authors of hundreds of books, journals, magazines, newspapers and research groups all over the world on whose writings, reports and analysis I was able to draw, relied upon and also quoting some of them with or without their permission.

I wish to acknowledge the continuing and substantial support from the Ford Foundation and the timely assistance friendly attitude of Shilpi Bhatnagar. I am also thankful to my brothers for their help.

December, 1993


ALKA KULSHRESTHA

CHAPTER - I

NEW GLOBAL GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS : IMPACT ON
SOUTH ASIA

NEW GLOBAL GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS : IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIA

There were a series of dramatic events in the world for the last few years which effected the global defence strategy and the security aspects of South Asia. In December 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a super-power and gave birth to new 15 sovereign republics, 11 of which are



in The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 26, 1992

united in a loose confederation known as the Commonwealth of Independent States; 6 of them remained in the Asian territory of the former Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Soviet Union left the world without its geographically largest country and militarily one of the most powerful states. It left the people remaining in the successor states with a massive economic security and social problems, which the

reform attempts of Gorbachev were unable to repair.

'One of the most unexpected results of the demise of the Soviet Union has been the fact that the focus of Moscow's foreign policy concerns has swept to former republics of the Union itself. As Vladislav Zubok has argued that the 'filial ring' of the friendly republics around Russia has become the major source of potential confrontation.

'The enemy ring now lies within Russia itself; the filial and fraternal rings are anything but, filial or fraternal, and the encircling capitalist world is not so much hostile as indifferent to Russia's fate.¹

The Bi-polar power structure with which the world lived for about 45 years, came to an end quite suddenly in 1990. The collapse of the socialistic system in the ex-USSR was an spectacular event. It transformed the whole nature of the global politics and dramatically altered the basic parameters in which the various relationships between nations, states and classes have hitherto operated. This is so far the relations between North-South, East-West, West-West, East-East, and South-South within imperialism, between imperialism and its victims, between exploiting and exploited classes, between fractions of the dominant classes, between states and classes.²

Gorbachev wrote early in 1987

'The 20th century (however) is unique. It has witnessed the range of new factors that compel us to perceive differently the affect that the decisions taken by individual governments would have on the future civilization between the extension of our knowledge and the way we use it and time and space themselves. Power politics that does not go beyond the use of gun

1. Vladislav Zubok, "Tyranny of the World Russia's", New Foreign Policy Journal, Moscow, vol. 9, No. 2, 1992, p. 102.

2. Vanik, Achin, 'Occassional Papers on History and Society', September, 1992, p. 1.


power is one thing and power politics, based on a potential capable of making myth about the world's end comes true in a matter of minutes is quite another to say, it is one thing when a handful of workshop emit smoke into air, and quite another when we have overall air pollution threatening the world with all ecological disaster. Life itself demands that each national economy and the world economy as a whole be re-constructed whether we like it or not.¹

The coup of 19 August and its collapse two days later ended the process of Socialist oriented perestroika begun in March 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded to the General Secretaryship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) following the death of Konstantin Chernenko. Gorbachev suffered the same fate of the other major reformist Soviet leaders like Nikela Khurchev who was disposed as General Secretary of the CPSU by his Politburo colleagues in October, 1965.

The Soviet threat of a concerted ideological and military challenge from militant communism to its non-communist and even weaker communist neighbours has disappeared. The Marxist concept of class struggle for the liquidation of exploitation of the toiling masses by privileged rich. So appealing to the impoverished masses of Asia and Africa - proved to be the greatest hoax of the twentieth century, because class inequalities and class privileges of the upper crust in the former Soviet Union were

1. S. Gorbachev, Michail, Towards a Better World, New York, Richardson and Stieman, 1987, pp. 1-4.

LATEST
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OF THE



The topographical detail within India is based upon the Survey of India map with the permission of the Surveyor General of India, the copyright (1990) of which vests with the Govt. of India.

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greater than in most other societies.¹

(a) The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was agreed in 1990 and was a major development in the terms between the two super power, USSR and USA. The treaty was a significant event in the history on which the past and the future of the global dynamics may depend. It was the first time that the USSR agreed to compromise regarding space based weapons. The START seeked to reduce the strategic offensive weapons to equal intermediate level, in a phase manner, over a period of seven years from the date of the signing of the final draft. The reduction during the first phase of the treaty, equal ceiling shall apply to both the Soviet Union and the United states regarding strategic offensive nuclear weapons. The treaty put a ceiling on the number of the strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. It included the Inter Continental Ballastic Missiles (ICBMs). Long Range Submarine, Launched Cruise Missiles and their Launchers and heavy Bombers. Both the super powers agreed to it. The treaty further prescribed a limit for Sea Launched Cruise Missiles to 880 units for the Missiles with a range in excess of 660 km for armed SLCMs with a range of 300-600 Km.

The verification procedure was also prescribed under the START. The first aspect was to make available to each other, data regarding the systems included in

1. United Nations, Disarmament, Topical Papers 9, United Nations Publications, 1992, p. 41.

START before and after the reduction took place. Site verification and monitoring of the elimination process was also prescribed. A quick look at the meanings of limitation placed upon super powers by START.

	<u>Pre START</u>		<u>START</u>		<u>Actual Warheads</u>	
	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Heavy ICMBs	550	760	154	154	1540	1540
ALCM Bombers	192	97	150	210	3000	1680
<hr/>						
U.S.	: 1 Bomber with 20 ALCM = 10 war heads					
USSR	: 1 Bomber with 12 ALCM = 8 war heads					
ICBMs war heads only	1800	2552	3000	3000	3000	3000
Total current war heads	16000	15000	6000	6000	6000	8000

Source : US DOD, SUSSR MOD USIS.¹

The most significant aspect of the strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was that nuclear warheads in excess of Megaton yield were to be reduced by an average of 76% over the current levels. However, all that the START adds upto is the fact that instead of being able to destroy the planet Earth three times over, the super powers minimized to destroy the planet one and a half times over.

1. Military Year Book, 1990-91, Guide Publications,
New Delhi, p. 78.

After the cold war was declared to be over, following the Bush-Gorbachev Summit in December 1989, former Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe broke loose from Moscow's hegemony and moved towards democracy. A great many disputes and tensions had been resolved in the world or at least deprived of their eminence, as a flash point. The world breaths easier, as a spectre of a global conflict involving nuclear or chemical weapons, recodes into the realm of the impossible. Defence budgets had been reduced as is also the case with armouries of nuclear and conventional weapons. In some areas, even a significant diversion of resources from warline to peaceful construction has been visible.¹

(b) Chemical warheads

Another significant development of the increased cooperation between the united states of America and the Soviet Union, was the agreement on the reduction of chemical weapons. The agreement was based upon President George Bush initiative of Sept. 1989, which proposed that the United States and Soviet Union come forward to destroy their chemical weapons stock piles in order to put ban on nuclear weapons.

The bilateral agreement signed between George Bush and Gorbachev of the Soviet Union at the Washington Summit in May 1990 called for a number of significant steps. The first of which was the reduction of US stocks (over 25,000 agent tonnes) and the Soviet stock (over 40,000 agent tonnes) by 50% upto 1999. The destructions was to began with effect from 1992. It was also agreed that both super powers shall stop production of chemical weapons after the

1. Bhatt, Maqbood Ahmed, strategic Balance In South Asia including the Indian Ocean, Published in Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Vol. XIV, No. 4, Summer, 1992.

agreement. Further, it was decided that the United States and the Soviet Union shall co-develop the environmentally sound means to destroy chemical weapons. The agreement for the destruction of the chemical weapons was designed to give an impetus towards a Global Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty. It was also decided that verification shall be monitored by both sides and will be aided by data made available. The treaty was the result of the confidence building measures adopted by the USA and the Soviet Union starting in late 1989.

Russia also pledged to stop long-range air- and sea based Cruise Missiles. Russian Government halted production of Tu-160 ("Black Jack") and TU-95M5 ("Beer") bombers, and cut short its weapons purchases in 1992 by 70 percent. There had been a general cessation of activities of the former Soviet Pacific Navy out of its home waters.¹

(c) The M T C R

The Indo-Russian agreement on cryogenic engines and technology have been flushed down the drain in Washington. The rationale apparently is the proliferation concerns of the USA for which Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was created in April 1987 by the US and six of its allies, with the ostensible purpose of controlling the proliferation of nuclear capable missiles.

The purpose of the MTCR was to limit the risk of nuclear proliferation by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to nuclear weapon delivery system. The US has maintained that the Cryogenic Sale Violates the MTCR guidelines and hence the ban on ISRO since May 11, 1992 and the continuing pressure to have the contract cancelled.

1. "There are no surface combatants deployed anywhere in the world. Now, 'Zero' said a Pentagon official who follows developments in the former Soviet Navy", Washington Times, 10 January, 1992, p. 1.

The MTCR has become an important factor to India after the cancellation of the Cryogenic deal. The MTCR Guidelines are not intended to impede the objective of peaceful cooperation in space is exactly what the U.S. is doing through its sanctions against ISRO and follows on pressures. There is another fundamental point. The US had sought to justify the sanctions under the authority of its national laws - the key one in this case being Missile Technology Act of 1990 as part of the National Defence Authorisation Act FY 1990-91. The MTCR is neither a treaty nor an international regime.

There are also glaring inconsistencies in US policies on the subject. The MTCR came into force in 1987 but, the U.S. took no action when China supplied 30 launchers and over sixty KM range CSS-2 nuclear-capable missiles from the following year. China has transferred M-11 missiles and technologies to Pakistan as per official US sources. It had also supplied guidance units usable in M-11 missiles to Pakistan and Pakistan is developing 600 Km range Hatf M-9 missiles based on French technology.¹ The US imposed sanctions on China and Pakistan on June 23, 1991 under MTCR for two years. Sanctions against China were lifted in February 1992. Saudi Arabia even continues to upgrade its nuclear capable long-range ballistic missiles with Chinese assistance right under American noses without any penalty, but America is still adopting 'Special relations' with China. India is not the member of the MTCR and is not bound to follow guidelines.

(d) US-Soviet Cooperation

The most significant field - Soviet-US has been to 'Aviation'. It was considered that some US Avionics manufacture may, in the near future begin to supply the Soviets-equipment in order to enhance the capabilities of

1. Singh, Jasjit, Rocket Deal, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 19, 1993.

MIG-29. The Soviet economy was opened to US companies and a number of them were looking towards this end. In the geopolitical field both USA and USSR came nearer to each other. Moscow used its leverage to pressurise the Cubans to withdraw from Angola and the Vietnamese from Cambodia. In August 1990 Moscow, joined the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and China in order to approve the UN Peace Plan to end the Cambodian Civil War. The Soviet and USA jointly pressurised the sandinistas Government in Nicaragua to allow free elections which resulted in the fall of Marxist government.

The most significant part of the cooperation between the two superpowers was the use of vetos in critical issues with wide consideration. The Cambodian civil war could be solved only due to this good gesture. This new found cooperation between the two super powers on the Geo-political area, led to the United Nations becoming the International Policeman, its founders wanted it to be. Another important development has been the United States Clark Field Air Base and four smaller American bases in the Philippines to the Manila authorities and the start of partition to terminate a century old United States military presence in the country by closing the Subic Bay Naval Base. For the United States, a Soviet Union without being able to control third world may not be of much use. In the past Soviets spoke in a monolithic command while US often babbled incoherently. This is not the case now. The non supply of Cryogenic Engine and cancelling the agreement by Russia for the supply to India apparently reflects the height of cooperation between the two nations. However, it can not be suppressed that it is a well thought policy of USA to take use of the crisis and helplessness of the Soviet and aloof them from the Third World Contacts and pave the way for regional power play. However, until the Soviet economy recovers, it can hold

much future for Washington. The Soviets are now a long term prospect as a major market for consumer goods and an investment sector with low overheads.

(e) The Middle East

Despite the military victory of the coalition forces over Iraq, the ejection of the Iraq forces from Kuwait and its immediate environment, Saddam Hussain remained in power. However, his country split in three broad regions, with the Kurdish community concentrated in Northern Iraq, the Shites in Southern Iraq and the Sunni Muslims in the Centre. It is the latter who constitute the power base of Saddam Hussain. There are no chances of the removal of Saddam Hussain presently. The Saudi Arabians, Sunnis themselves, have no wish to see a strength ended and Shites presence on the northern border. Apart from it Saudi Arabia, now even views high technology American bases as an embarrassment, they wish to avoid. Kuwait on the other hand, being concerned with a possible resurgent Iraqi threat, prefers the guarantee of an effective western presence, which has given rise hostility from Arab Nations.

(f) The Arms Sale

The Gulf war has provided another grain warning that arms transfers are dangerous to the long term interest both of the buyer and seller states and are linked to the problem of proliferation. It has also provided further proof that transferring arms, to days 'friendly' nations may end in creating enemies that are far more expensive than any arms sales are worth. Iraq, which was once seen as a stabilising force against Iran, suddenly emerged as a major threat to western interests and as a threat which costed nearly \$ 100 Bn dollars to defeat. The arms sales continue to involve

big business. They involve annual volumes of \$ 30 Bn to \$ 60 Bn in new agreements.¹ Arms sales involve cyclical patterns. They rise and fall according to the pattern of conflicts in the Third World. The total Third world arms imports in constant dollars peaked in 1984 when they reached at the total of \$ 50 Bn. Total imports then fluctuated between \$ 44 Bn and \$ 36 Bn a year during 85-88 than dropped sharply in 1989 to \$ 30 Bn only.²

In the Middle East 1989 was the first year after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and Israil concentrated more on the Palestinian uprising than arms technology. Although Iraq imported \$ 1.9 Bn worth of arms in 1989 and Iran 1.2 bn American dollars, their imports were lower than \$ 8 bn imported in 1986. These countries imported exactly 20% of all arms transfers to the Third world. 1990 and 1991 was the end of cold war and scarcely the end of history for the arms trade. The Southern Gulf nations alone ordered in excess of 20 bn arms in 1990.

(g) Arms Export to Third World States

The arms sales is not only driven solely by the developed world. States like Brazil, North Korea and China have played a steadily more important role in exports to developing countries. China emerged as the world's largest fifth arms seller during 1980s and the increase in volume of Chinese sales is indicated by the fact that China sold \$ 4.1 bn worth of arms during 82-85, but \$ 9.9 bn during 1986-89 an increase in the sales by 138 per cent³ China has found arms

1. In Constant 1989 dollars. See Richard F. Grimmett, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, by Major Suppliers Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, CRS 90-298, June 19, 1990, p. CRS-50 and 51.

2. Ibid, P. CRS-40.

3. Richard F. Grimmett, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers, Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, CRS-90-298F, June 19, 1990, PCRS 45.

to be one of its few successful industrial exports, including missile technology, nuclear reactors and other weapons of mass destruction.¹ India also made exports of 5 to 40 million and Pakistan 10 to 350 million dollars annually. After 1960, developing countries have consistently imported more arms than developed countries. Throughout 1980's, developing countries spent about 4 times as much on arms imports as developed states.

(h) NATO

A strategic review has been underway in NATO since its London Summit in 1990. The new NATO strategy was announced at a Summit in Rome in November 1991. However, this had already been pre-empted by the announcement of its conventional force structure and by President Bush's initiative in the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NATO's new strategy will now be measured against a disintegrated Soviet Union following the abortive Coup in Moscow, infant democracies in Eastern Europe, which may be the component of any future European foreign policy.

(i) Disintegration of Yugoslavia

In September 1989 a number of constitutional amendments considered controversial were adopted by Slovenia which asserted republican sovereignty and by early July 1990, Slovenia moved towards full sovereignty. Its parliament decided that the federal constitution would only apply in Slovenia if it did not conflict with the republic

1. These Sales included M-9 Missiles to Pakistan Heavy Water to India Precursor Chemical to Iran and Iraq Nuclear Reactor 10 Algeria and M-11 missiles to Syria. Time 22 April 1991, p. 44, The Washington Times, April 11, 1991, p. 3. April 18, 1991, p. 2.

constitution.¹ Simultaneously, it proposed to develop its own foreign policy. It was difficult for Serbia to accept.

Slovenia and Croatia propounded confederalism. In Oct. 1990, they presented "Model of confederation in Yugoslavia". In 1991 the Yugoslavia's republics tried to negotiate the future of the country.² The talks were destined to be dead locked as there were irreconcilable differences between Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia. The Serbs of Croatia held a referendum on "cultural autonomy" in August 1990³ and endorsed it. By October 1990, they declared regional autonomy. Slovenia and Croatia also declared independence. Once, there were clashes hundreds of soldiers, mostly Slovenes and Croats deserted the federal defence and joined republic arms forces. There was a war in Slovenia which only lasted for 12 days. The Croatian war was different. The fighting continued for months. The minority Serbs in Croatia supported army and army refused to withdraw because of the safety problem of Serbs. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence in Sept. 1991 and Dec. 1991 respectively. By April 1992 both the European Commission and US recognised Bosnia Herzegovina as an independent state and became member of UN in May 1992. The conflict remained far from resolved.

The Yugoslav crisis coincided with the European community's march towards a united Europe and building supra-nations. During the cold war Yugoslavia was of strategic importance to US and USSR. There being no USSR

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1. A Communist Constitution framed in Russia.
 2. Yugoslavia's eight member collective federal presidency and Prime Minister Markovic and the six republican presidents underscored the authority of the republics themselves.
 3. It is said, that these moves were taken because Serbs were remained by the atrocities committed by Croats during world war II. —

any more which caused a decline of the interest of super-powers.

By disintegration of Yugoslavia, South Asia has missed a strong supporter of the non-allignment and India has lost its friend.

(j) German Reunification

The fall of Berlin wall was a remarkable event which resounded throughout the world and put a new era in history. No one ever thought it possible in such a short period on October 3, 1990. The map of Europe, and Germany underwent transformation for the third time around. Unlike the times by gone, the event was of euphoria since there was no fear of hostility and the world rejoined alongwith Germany. German reunification was brought at a high cost. The Soviets had to be compensated as they were dependent on German goods. Trade obligations had to be fulfilled and so the united states had to be placated.

The euphoria of reunification started to fade. The scores of division in 1945 though have not yet been fully healed, which is evident by the fact that German judiciary is already overwhelmed by over a million litigation suits demanding return of property to west Germans in East Germany and the vice-versa. Unemployment has increased. Teachers have been barred from their profession as have diplomats and other workers due to lack of demand for eastern goods. In the West the employment is increasing for the same reasons. The armed forces have to be structured as has the economy. The fixed cost of reunifications has gone 100 billion DM and more per annum.

The United Germany has withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact and as more states are thinking to withdraw from the pact it is likely to cease early. Germany, however, has continued to remain in NATO. It is admitted that Germany will now allow foreign troops to base on their soil. The NATO will be too weak to act without Germany. The combined arms forces of East and West Germany outstrip those of any other single European Nation with the sole exception of the Soviet Union. However, the potential mix East and West Block Military hardware is a logistic night mare. It is therefore, logical that hundreds of MIGs Sukhois, T-72, MBT's, a large number of helicopters and missiles will be placed on the International market with the result that the prices will fall down. Thus a new round of frantic arms purchase will begun in the third world.

Impact on India and Pakistan

India had extensive trade agreements with East Germany, against rupee payments. Germany has explicitly assured India that these agreements will be honoured. Militarily, Pakistan, is unlikely to receive US military assistance any longer and thus may also get benefit of the rock bottom prices and obtain warheads. It will raise arms race in South Asia. The very fact that the West German companies have in the past supplied Uranium, enrichment equipment for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. It is definite that now, Pakistan will receive East German weapons at will.

The unification of Germany has been welcomed in India. India not merely expected to build strong, mutually beneficial relationship with rich, powerful German state but, because Indians have always reached positively to the existence of a strong power on the continent of Europe as

a counter to British and the United States. India believe that the world of today is different from the world of 1939 and will be given more different in the years and decades to come. United Germany will be fully integrated in the European common market and hopefully in tomorrow's one European home. From the Indian point of view, Germany unification will emerge Europe more stronger and it will be a power centre to balance the United States and the Russia. It will make a stable Europe and a stable world.¹

(k) The Korean Unification

Unification of Korea has also been an important event after the fall of Soviet Union which implicates the change of attitude and sense of cooperation between the two super powers. The two divisions of Korea (South Korea and North Korea) not only impaired the two but, had effected the security of the world at large and of the Asian pacific region in particular. The partition of Korea was marked as much by bloody Korean war as by intensification of super power rivalry. The unification was possible only due to end of the cold war between the super powers, collapse of the Soviet Union and the global set-back of the communist ideology which reduced the tensions in this region and strengthened the possibilities of unification of the two Koreas.

(l) Combodian Settlement and other Positive Development

The evolving peaceful settlement in Cambodia also contributes to the reduction of tensions in Asia. The approach deployment of 22000 United Nations peace keeping

1. Gupta, Bhabani Sen, "India and German Unification", National Herald, New Delhi, July 25, 1990.

soldiers in Cambodia will be a strong disincentive to the resumption of an armed struggle and will hopefully contribute to the full implementation of peace.

The chances of peaceful settlement in Afghanistan have increased as both Russia and the United States finally have stopped arms shipments to the warring parties. The only realistic option left for the conflicting parties is peaceful negotiation. The Pakistan government has also taken decision to stop all weapon supplies to the rebels waging war in Afghanistan. It has been reported that the Muhajedeen hard liners not to obstruct the United Nations plan of a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.¹

A very positive development is the decision by the leadership of the Chinese People's Republic to further curtail the size of its armed forces by one million men - from three to two million.² China also decided to accede to the NPT and pledged to observe a 1987 pact - known as the Missile Technology Control Regime designed to limit the proliferation of missiles that can carry chemical or nuclear warheads.³

Japan, too is considering cuts in its defence forces in response to the end of the cold war and the reduction in United States and former Soviet military forces. Allegedly, these cuts in personnel and hardware were started in mid 1990s.⁴

1. See Washington Times, January 31, 1992, p. A2 and Rising Nepal, January 28, 1992, p. 1.

2. Rising Nepal, January 30, 1992, p. 7.

3. Washington Times, November 18, 1991, p. A1, 21 December 1991, p. A6.

4. Financial Times, New Delhi, January 31, 1992, p. 3.

There are some slightly encouraging developments in the India-Pakistan confrontation. On January 1, 1992 India and Pakistan exchanged lists of nuclear facilities under the agreement thus showing some degree of confidence in each others non-belligerence.¹ It has also been reported that the Indian Government had offered to talk with United states on halting the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia.


The break up of the Soviet Union and the demise of the cold war are raising concerns, about volatile South Asia's military balance... reported Steve Coll of the Washington Post from New Delhi, "(T) he subcontinent is becoming active, if some what shabby arms bazaar, where merchants from around the world peddle cold war, left overs, second grade equipment and spare parts to buyers short on cash but, eager to deal".²

1. New York Times, New York, March 11, 1992, p. 43.

2. Washington Post, January 5, 1992, p. A19.

[B] Military Buildup in Indian Ocean

The Indian ocean enjoys a vital security threat perception in Asia pacific region. This linkage between the Indian ocean and the pacific is a post world war II phenomenon, and more particularly, after the decline of the traditional powers, like Britain, France and the rise of new great powers, like the USA and the USSR. Traditional powers, that had dominated the Indian ocean for centuries, were European powers and hence their line of communication



passed through the mediterranean and the Atlantic. The new entrants were pacific powers and their force projection in the Indian ocean was directed from the pacific. That was true, not only of the USSR but also the USA.¹

The world has seen a remarkable transformation of the international scene in the course of the last two years. After the cold war was over, following the Bush-Gorbachev Summit in December 1989, former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, broke loose from Moscow's hegemony and moved towards democracy, including pluralism. Even more dramatic happenings in Soviet Union in August 1991 have seen, communism largely discredited as a political or economic model. A great many disputes and tensions have been resolved in different parts of the world, or at least deprived of their eminence as potential flashpoints whether in Asia, Africa or Latin America.


The Indian ocean provides a link between Europe and the East. It provide a connection between the Western and Eastern spheres of Russia and a route between Europe and East Africa as well as with West Asia. These routes, therefore, connect regions both in the East-West and North-South directions. Including its bays, seas and gulfs, the Indian ocean is 283 million sq. miles larger than either of the Atlantic ocean. It encompasses 20.7% of the World's Sea area and 14% of the earths surface. The area consists of 36 littoral and 11 hinterland states making a total of 47 independent nations including 30% of the world's population.²

After the World War II, and specially during the last two decades, the geo-political importance of the Indian ocean regions has increased immensely, as the littoral and hinterland countries have become liverated from the colonial Yoke of the European rules and became

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1. Singh, K.R., "Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean : The Political Dimension", IDSA Journal, 17(4), April-June 1985, p. 377.
 2. Banerjee, D., Geo-Politics of Indian Ocean, Strategic Studies Journal, vol.1, No.2, AMU, Aligarh, July 1988, p.8.

U. S. S. R.


THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION



independent sovereign states. Decolonization, internal political upheavals, liberation struggles, interference by outside powers, regional unbalances and internal incompatibilities within the region have contributed to the evolution of a more complex and less orderly state system in this area.¹ The recent shift of centre of geo-political gravity and the super power rivalry into the Indian Ocean region has now assumed for confrontation as a Strategic Crossroad and as a future arena for confrontation between the super powers.² Truly speaking, it has only now entered the world stage in its own right, and its future is still very much in the making.³ The Indian ocean has now been turned into an arena of various overt and covert operations by aircraft carriers and spy ships.⁴ Cohen has identified the Indian Ocean area as the potential third Geo-strategic region in the world⁵ and is vitally important to international security.⁶

The Indian Ocean region comprises 36 littoral and 9 hinterland states. It extends from 20° East to as far as 147° East longitude and from 60° South to the Arab and

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1. Reddy, N.B.K., "The Emerging Geo-political Patterns of the Indian Ocean Region", in Alix Kerr (ed.), The Indian Ocean Region : Resources and Development, (Calorodo) 1981, p. 215.
 2. Ibid., p. 215.
 3. Chopra, Maheraj, K., Indian and the Indian Ocean, New Horizons, New Delhi, 1982, p. 63.
 4. Ghosh, H.M., "Creating a Peace Zone", in Saral Patra (ed.), Indian Ocean and Great Powers, New Delhi, 1979, p. 69.
 5. Cohen Saul B., Geography and Politics in Divided world, London, 1975, p. 66.
 6. Gupta, Ranjan, The Indian Ocean - A political Geography, Marwah Publications, New Delhi, 1977, p. 4-8.



Courtesy: Mahara; K. Chopra: India and the Indian Ocean - New Horizons.

Indian land mass to the North. The economy of the Ocean states is primarily oriented towards the supply of raw material to the developed block. Japan purchases 90%, Australia 60%, France 70%, Europe 80% and the United States 26% of their oil requirements from the Indian Ocean States. 80% Gold, 50% tin, 77% of rubber also come from this area.¹ Dr. Ross Babbage of Australia who was the head of Strategic Analysis in the office of National Assessment, stated that the Indian Ocean had considerable geo-political, economic and strategic significance not so much from what the region itself contained but also from the role that it played as the strategic and economic link with other regions in a broader global context. He elucidated that the combined GDPs in 1990 were \$ 333 billion in South Asia, \$ 264 billion in South East Asia; \$ 350 billion in East Asia and \$ 274 billion in Oceania. Nonetheless the intra-regional exports were 50.7 billion in South Asia, \$ 27 billion in South East Asia; \$ 141 billion in East Asia and \$ 5 billion in Oceania. Indian Ocean was the super freeway with \$ 1 billion of trade floating in the warm embayed waters which includes considerable military hardware and hence merited greater attention.²

The west is heavily dependent on Gulf oil for its industrial and cultural prosperity. The fact that the survival of the western economics is dependent on the assured and uninterrupted flow of Gulf Oil, was twice demonstrated during 1970s. The first was in 1973, when Arab members of OPEC imposed an embargo on the countries and many of them revised their stand on the question of Palestine to get embargo removed.³ King Faisal of Saudi Arabia attempted to

1. D.S.S.C. Study Team, Strategic and Economic Significance of the Indian Ocean, Trishul, vol.2, December 1992, Wellington, India, p. 1.

2. Ross Babbage, Indian Ocean : Viewpoint, Seminar, Indian Ocean News & Views, vol.2, No.3, December 1992, p.5.

3. Sridher, "The Producers Block", Journal of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, vol.7, No.4, 1974-75, p.446-541.

assert the sovereignty of oil producers in determining the production level and the price of oil. But, oil is not the only resource for which there is a scramble of big powers in the Indian Ocean region. In fact oil dependence has been highly publicized while the other reasons have been side track. USA imports cobalt, copper, corundum; and columbium from Zambia and Mozambique, sugar from Mauritius, tea and cinnamon from Seychelles, tea, rubber and coconut product from Sri Lanka, palm oil from Malaysia, petroleum, rubber and tin from Indonesia for hundreds of millions of dollars¹ and had to make export to this part of the world. The economic prosperity of the West thus depends on the free flow of trade and control over the Indian Ocean trade routes. The Western policy is to convert the former colonial dependency relationship to that of interdependency between the developed nations and developing nations. As a result of the laws of the Sea Conference, the world community now, have recognized as exclusive economic zone of 200 miles from the coast as that nations ocean space which is exclusively for that country to exploit for mineral wealth. This has given India an area of 2 million sq.km. of ocean space as our EEZ.

The northern part of the Indian Ocean had a thriving maritime traffic since ancient times. The periplus of the Erythrian sea, covering the East African Littoral, the Hadramaut, Persian and West coast of India was compiled by a Greek mariner sometime during the 3rd century after Christ. It gave a wealth of information on the ports and hinterlands, approaches to harbours, the trade and customs to be paid and other nautical informations. Like the Pacific but unlike the Atlantic, the mid-Indian ocean's dotted with volcanic, and coral islands spreading right

1. Hauks, Robert J., "The Indian Ocean Negotiations Rocks and Shoals", Strategic Review, Washington, Winter 1978, p. 2P.

across its width, from the east coast of Africa to the Bay of Bengal, between the tropics of cancer and capricorn. These island are the focal points for their-geo-strategic and geo-political importance for the ongoing power struggle in the Indian Ocean. The belt of islands from comoros in the Mozambique Channel, the seychelles, the Masearenes, the Andman and the Nicobars at the eastern end of the Bay of Bengal, stretches across the main trade routes of Europe, around the cape of Good hope, and to the far East through the straits of Malacca from the Persian Gulf.

In their search for a base in the Indian ocean, the United States was impressed by the central location of Diego Garcia which seemed to be an ideal base free from political impediments. It was therefore decided, by Britain and the United States to permanently move the 1200 odd Diego Garcians from their homes to a place in Mauritius.

To constitute the new territory Britain detached from seychelles group other island of Aldabra, Desroches and Forquhar and the changes. Archipelago then under Mauriti-
tius. The Americans choose Diego Garcia for several reasons. The decision was endorsed under an exchange of notes between the UK and USSA at the end of 1966. Later, when seychelles gained independence on 30th June 1976, Aldabra Desroches, Farquhar were returned to the new Seychelles government. The Americans wanted to avoid future political problems, and by putting up the cost of transportation amounting to \$ 650,000 to the Mauritian government, ultimately effected the transfer through the process, which took several years.

On 16th December 1971, General Assembly adopted, the resolution No. 2332, declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The resolution called for :

"The Great Power to enter into immediate consultation with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean with a view to (a) halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and (b) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases,

military installations, logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of Great power military presence in the Indian Ocean context of great power rivalry".¹

It also called upon the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian ocean, permanent members of the security council and other maritime users of the Indian ocean to consult on the establishment of a system of Universal collective security in the region and to facilitate the implementation of the declaration. The security arrangements indicated in the declaration covered a broad range of subjects especially the proposal that warships and military aircrafts would not use the Indian ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland state of the Indian ocean.² The pattern of inter-relationship among the regional powers and the great powers determine the fate of peace zone issue.³ The arms race between the great powers is pursued globally with the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act, the main focus of confrontation and the cold war has shifted from Central Europe of the developing world particularly the Indian Ocean.

Two great streams have characterised the Indian Ocean politics since 1950s. The competitive influence building by the external powers on the one hand, and nation building efforts by the littoral and hinterland countries of this region on the other hand. This came to the fore in the form of the policy of containment by the United States and the influence building into newly emerging nation

1. United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty Sixth Session, Annexe, Resolution 2832 (XXVI), December 16, 1971, Operative Paragraph 2.

2. Ibid.

3. Singh, K.P., Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean : The Political Dimension", IDSA Journal, 17(4), April-June 1985, p. 377.

states pursued the policy of nonalignment, marked by a natural antipathy towards outsiders.¹ The United States did not want to loose control over the ex-colonies of Britain as these contributed political, economic and strategic importance to it.² Besides this, the Indian Ocean emerged as a part of the 'Global Strategy' after second world war to contain the expansion of communism in the Afro-Asian region.³ The United States conceived that Indian Ocean has potentialities to bring major shifts in the global power balance.

Seriously, American strategic interest in the Indian Ocean began only in the 1960s. The main impetus was the technological development in nuclear weapon delivery - the emergence of the nuclear powered submarine capable of launching nuclear ballistic missiles. The development of SLBM's, not easily detectable by the adversary, gave a secure second strike capability to the US. The nuclear submarines also had a deterrent role against the Soviet Union by being deployed in the Indian Ocean region. While there is a controversy whether the US actually deployed these during the sixties in the Indian Ocean, a number of observers feel that the deployment did take place.⁴ Indian Ocean, thus, plays a significant role in strategic and space war scenarios. It is interesting to note the broad

1. Mohammed Ayooob, "The Quest for Autonomy : Ideologies of the Indian Ocean region", in Dowdy and Trood, Ibid, pp. 29-45.

2. Singh, K.R., "Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean : The Political Dimension", op.cit. p. 378.

3. Siddhu, K.S., The Indian Ocean, A Zone of Peace, Harnam Publications, New Delhi, 1983, p. 92.

4. Singh, K.K., Indian Ocean, New Delhi : Manohar 1977, p. 23, argues that the deployment did take place. K. Subrahmanyam, "Indian Ocean", IDSA Journal, vol. 14, No. 5, Jan-March 1982, suggests the same. Rodney W. Jones, "Ballistic Missile submarines and Arms control in the Indian Ocean", Asian Survey, vol. 20, No. 3, March 1980, p. 269-79, questions these conclusions.

parallelism in the chronology of the development of direct ascent HIT system against the background of US strategies and military development in the Indian Ocean.¹ In 1978, the US Defence Secretary Brown said, "In the next five years we will be strengthening our forces in the region by the introduction of several advanced weapons systems : Trident nuclear missiles for our submarine fleet; cruise missiles for B52s, F-14 fighters for our carriers, F-15 for our air force squadrons; the aerial warning and control system and other improvement".

The US seems to have vital stakes in uninterpreted access to oil and passage on seas and waterways through out the region primarily to limit Soviet power and influence in the region. The JCS describes the military postures of the United States in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean as follows :

"The United States has a number of major interests in the region comprising the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the North-West Indian Ocean. These interests involve access by the US and its allies to the resources of the area, most notably to oil from the Persian Gulf states - to include protection of transportation routes for the flow of that oil to North America, Western Europe, and Japan, support for friendly regional governments against potentially hostile states and groups; limitation of Soviet power and influence throughout the region; and deterrence of direct Soviet military intervention".²

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1. Singh, Jasjit, "Indian Ocean in Global Strategies : Some perspective", in Akhtar Majeed, 'Indian Ocean : Conflict and Regional Cooperation, op.cit. p. 44.
 2. Annual US Military Posture, prepared by the Joint Chief of Staff, February 7, 1981, USI CA : New Delhi, p.1.

For the containment of major strategic (nuclear) weapons in the Indian Ocean region, the interaction between the great powers and regional powers therefore developed on two levels - first dealt with the cold war and global nuclear strategy and second with regional interests of the great powers.¹ Regarding the establishment of peace zone in the Indian Ocean, they did not respond positively. Soviet Union held that all continents, islands, oceans and sea (should) become total zone of peace, and suggested that it was difficult to achieve everything at the same time.² The USSR favoured nuclear weapons - free zone for naval forces but the US disagreed on the question of total exclusion of all nuclear weapons.³ The US supported the General Assembly resolution for nuclear weapons free zones in South Asia, middle East and Africa.

Like the nuclear weapons free zones in the regions of the Indian Ocean, mutual arms reduction among the regional powers and a built-in mechanism for ensuring peace and for conflict resolution were gradually added to the Indian ocean peace zone proposal.⁴ The acceptance of these proposals by the regional powers were made complementary for the Indian ocean peace zone proposal by the great powers. Since, India was the major motive force behind the proposal, these tools were used to present India as the main hurdle in the establishment of peace zone.

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1. Singh, K.R., Emerging issue in the Indian Ocean : The political dimensions, op.cit., p. 378.
 2. Byelorussia's statement in GAOR, session 26, First Committee, 1840 meeting, No. 30, 1971.
 3. George W. Shepherd Jr., "Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean : Retrospect and Prospect", IDSA Journal, 17(4), April-June 85, p. 435.
 4. Singh, K.R., Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean : The Political dimension, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, p. 392.

Pakistan took advantage of projecting her rivalry with India and thus called for acceptance of nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia, as well question of parity in conventional arms between India and Pakistan, conditional for Pakistan's support for the elimination of great power presence from the Indian ocean.¹ In the specific context of the Indian Ocean, there is a possibility of Pakistan's integration in to the US.RDF strategy. The former Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, has made a strong plea for US. access to Pakistan facilities, particularly the Gwadar port and the Peshwar air base.² Pakistan could serve as an "important entrepot for an RDF moving in to the Persian Gulf from the East."³ With the increasing security nexus between Pakistan and Gulf regimes, there is possibility of Pak armed forces serving as a US proxy force in the Gulf.⁴ Whether Pakistan would actually accept the US "kiss of death" by agreeing to serve as such a proxy is perhaps a debatable issue.⁵

In this regard, Pakistan proposed in the United Nations to evolve a code of conduct regulating regional relations and balanced military strength among the states

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1. Rasul B. Rais, The Indian Ocean and the Super Powers, p. 237.
 2. J. Alvin, Conttrell, Admiral Thomas on Moorer, "The Search for US Bases in the Indian Ocean : A Last Chance", Strategic Review, Spring 1980.
 3. Francis Fukuyama, The Security of Pakistan : A Trip Report, Rand Corporation N-1548-RC.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Tahir, Shirin, "Proxies and Allies : The Case of Iran and Pakistan", Orbis, Summer 1980.

of the region.¹ India considered it an obstacle in the establishment of Indian ocean peace zone as it is bound to create new controversies.² Pakistan alongwith China raised the question at the meetings of Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations in 1974 arguing that India's nuclear explosion has affected the peace and security of the whole region in the Indian Ocean.

South Asia's position in the Indian ocean, and its interaction with the outside interests, could be explained on the basis of intra-regional development.³ The nature of the relationship between India and Pakistan has determined by the relationship of the two supers because they have their own interests in the main local conflict of the region. The establishment linkages between the super powers and the regional consistants have been covered by the changing clouds of peace after the development of detente and relaxation of the tension between the two super powers at the global level and the emergence of another great power in the vicinity of South Asia.

Sri Lanka took initiative for the United Nations General Assembly resolution declaring the Indian ocean zone of Peace, got diverted from its basic concept.⁴ It called, after the nuclear explosion of India

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1. Siddhu, K.S. The Indian Ocean : A Zone of Peace, op.cit. p. 85.
 2. Ibid., p. 85.
 3. D. Brawn, "Changes in South Asia Intra-regional and external Relations", in The World Today, vol.34, No. 10, pp. 399-400.
 4. U.N. Document, A/C, I/W, 590.

for interlinking of nuclear weapons - free zone in the Indian Ocean region, which could be the first stage in the process of creating peace zone.¹ Amersinghe expressed the view, "If a new nuclear weapon power were to emerge in the Indian Ocean region, the denuclearization and also the demilitarization of the area would be seriously Jeopardized".² The responsibility from inviting and sustaining the military, especially Naval rivalry in the region and the subsequent failure of peace efforts lies basically with the regional nations, as they provide opportunities to the great powers to interfere and magnify the regional conflicts into bigger wars.³

India's ambition to rise to the position of the dominant power in its region arose from the perceptions of its leaders and scholars of the historical pre-eminence of the ancient times from South-East Asia to countries of Central Asia beyond the Himalayas. Having gained independence after nearly a thousand years of colonial bondage, India's sights are set on playing the role of a world class power commensurate with its size, population and past glory. Shortly after independence, the first Indian Ambassador to China, Sardar K.M. Pannikar emphasized the strategic position of the Indian Ocean and stressed the India's concern over it.⁴

1. U.N. Document, A/C, I/PV, 2089, November 17, 1975, p.36.

2. U.N. Document, A/C, I/PV, 2015, p. 244.

3. U.N. General Assembly Meeting, May 3, 1974.

4. Bhatt, Maqbool Ahmad, "Strategic Balance in South Asia including the Indian Ocean", published in Strategic Studies, A Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, vol. XIV, No.4, Summer 1992, p. 23.

India's security can not be detached from the developments in the Indian Ocean. When the peace of Indian Ocean is disturbed India's security is disturbed. It will certainly have an impact on India's security. Security has various dimensions such as, security - from military threats, from politico-strategic threats, from threat to its economic interests and against psychological pressures.¹ The direct struggle and competition between the super powers relates to political, economic and military activities in the race for the right to impose one's will on the other.² The Indian ocean has predominant influence on the Indian destiny³ because, India has an open coastline of about 2,000 miles and over 90% of her foreign trade is sea-borne. Thus, who controls the Indian ocean will dominate her sea borne trade and independence.

That's why India continued to advocate for the Indian ocean as a zone of peace, according to the 1971 resolution. Y.B. Chavan stressed in the General Assembly that, "priority attention should be given to mobilising the support of the international community for concrete and constructive action for implementing the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace by eliminating all military bases, conceived in the context of great power rivalry and reversing the present trend of escalating great power rivalry in the era".⁴

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1. Chopra, Surendra, "Indian Ocean Politics - A challenge to India's diplomacy" in Akhtar Majeed (Ed) Indian Ocean : Conflict and Regional Cooperation, op.cit.p.83.
 2. Singh, Jasjit, "Indian Ocean in Global Strategies", IDSA Journal, 17 (4), April-June 1985, p. 453.
 3. Seth, S.P., "The Indian Ocean and Indo-American Relations", Asian Survey, 15(8), August 1975, p. 645.
 4. Statement in the U.N. General Assembly by Sri Y.B. Chavan A/PV 2364, September 16, 1975, p. 81.

India has been vehemently opposed to the newly added proposals. India feels that these proposals are the pretexts to kill the objectives of peace and security in the Indian ocean.¹ The adhering to the nuclear safeguards, will cause setback to her economic development. She wanted also to keep nuclear options open in view of the hostile nuclear power, China. The dispatch of the US naval task forces into the Indian ocean, at the time of Indo-Pak war over Bangladesh, in December 1971, and later during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war can be seen in the way that its presence is intended to provide support facilities for a more effective US role in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, she has been soft regarding the USSR. She considered USSR more in the Indian ocean as reactive and defensive.² Further, Soviet Union has certain responsibilities under the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, peace and cooperation 1971. Soviet presence may be helpful to India in case of a threat to her, as happened in 1971.³ However, India can not ignore the effects of naval competition among super power as they, "fuel the regional conflicts and it might result in local wars by proxy".⁴ India, one of the states directly interested in the Indian ocean, has been aware that without persuading the big powers, the idea can not be realised.

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1. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book, vol. 6 : 1981, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, U.N. Centres for Disarmament, United Nations Publications, New York, 1982, p. 312.
 2. S.P. Seth, "The Indian Ocean and Indo-American Relations", Asian Survey, 15 (8), Aug. 1975, p. 645.
 3. Chopra Surendra, "Indian Ocean and Politics - A challenge to India's Diplomacy" in Akhtar Majeed (Ed.) Indian Ocean : Conflict and Cooperation, op.cit., p. 80.
 4. Seth, S.P., "The Indian Ocean and the Indo-American Relations", Asian Survey, 15(8), August, 1975, p. 649.

It desired, as other Indian Ocean states, the participation of those powers in the deliberations of the international conferences held for this purpose. The 1971 declaration was initially criticised by both western and eastern bloc nations. Only in the second half of the seventies the Soviet Union started to support the proposal. It was criticized on the basis that a group of states in a certain region could not establish a legal regime for the high seas in the region. It was argued that the extra regional naval presence in the Indian Ocean area was required, "in the interests of not only the security of the nations concerned but also of the states that rely on the stability created by a political and military balance".¹ Oil embargo of 1973 provided the justification that the oil lanes had to be protected and access to oil fields should be secured. On October 4, 1977, President Carter of United States told the United Nations General Assembly² that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had a large military presence there, nor was there a rapidly mounting competition between these two nations. The United States stated³ that while it appreciated and shared many of the goals of the supporters of the declaration of the Indian ocean as a peace zone, it believed that such zones of peace could only come into effect through an agreement of all states concerned, wherever situated. It could not accept the proposition that a regional group of states could declare a legal regime for the seas to which other states without

1. United Nations Document A/C I/PV 1849, Dec. 10, 1971, pp. 16-17.

2. Ibid.

3. United Nations Disarmament Year Book, vol. 4 : 1979, op.cit., 1975, p. 304.

their consent, nor could the General Assembly by itself take meaningful action to establish such a legal regime, beyond endorsing what might have been negotiated and agreed upon, among member states by consensus.

In 1979, the General Assembly by resolution 34/80 A and B, decided to convene the conference in 1981 at Colombo, Sri Lanka and to enlarge the Ad Hoc committee further, invited the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to serve on it and participate in its work, particularly in the preparation for the conference. The USSR abstained from voting on draft resolution [] while the United States abstained from both. The General Assembly adopted resolution 35/150 on December 12, 1980 included, "To make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, particularly recent developments as well as the progress made in the harmonization of views referred to in sub-paragraph (a), to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the conference including the dates it convening". The United States¹ questioned the validity of the existing concept of zone of peace and called for a change in mandate of the Ad Hoc committee. It pointed out that it had never accepted the 1971 declaration, as it regarded the Declaration as "faulty and outmoded", as inconsistent charter to individual and collective self-defence, and difficult to reconcile with internationally recognized rights to freedom of navigation. It called that there was no harmonization of views on the basic issues in the Ad Hoc committee, and because of Soviet Union's refusal to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the climate of confidence needed for holding a

1. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book, vol. 6, 1981, op.cit. 1982, p. 313.

successful conference, was lacking. The Soviet Union¹ argued that United States was using the events in Afganistan as a pretext to justify the introduction of its military, naval and airforces into the region. Facts made it clear that long before these events, the United States had broken off talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of their military presence in the Indian Ocean, and had begun to create the base in Diego Garcia, bringing aircraft carriers and other ships into the Persian Gulf preparing plans for forming a rapid deployment interventionist force, and laying down a broadly based infrastructure for military bases.

In the veil of political concluciveness, as an essential factor towards the implementation of the proposal the Indian Ocean states were asked to accept them at regional level. Some of the Indian Ocean states also appeared to make these factors conditional upon the acceptance of such zone as they feel danger from regional powers also. Viewing, this attitude of regional powers and the big powers especially the United States and the Soviet Union which wanted to enjoy the commanding position by using the pretexts one or the another, the prospects for the implementation of such zone in the Indian Ocean appear bleak.

The importance of Indian Ocean drew dramatically after August 2nd, 1992 invasion of Kuwait. The Rapid Deployment forces stationed at Diego Gracia formed the very first contingent of Troops to land in Saudi Arabia at their behest. The subsiquent Embargo on Iraq ratified by the United Nations hit Indian Oil Supplies hard. The loss of Kuwait oil further intensified the crisis which was compounded by the fact that oil prices hit US dollars 35 a barrel.

1. Ibid, p. 314.

The increased military presence in Gulf was a major cause for worry. The Multinational Task Force remained is likely to remain in the region for a long time. The more important aspect is the fact that Pan-Islamism is likely to rear its ugly head. The US policy of supplying hi-Tech armaments to what it deems as United Nations in the region are likely to cause many a sleepless nights to Indian strategists. It is likely that a significant proportion of these armaments are likely to find their way to India's Western Borders.¹

China Factor in Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean and Asian-Pacific region are expected to be the centre of gravity of economic and political activity of the twenty-first century world. In spite of the relaxation in the frozen India-China relations, it is important to assess the nature and direction of their emerging naval rivalry, particularly in the Indian Ocean. India's power equation has to be seen in relation to China's because China is in a geo-strategic position which provides challenge to India as a regional power.²

Chinese naval modernization programme has been geared towards attaining a survivable retaliatory force. China had started the development of a full fledged blue-water navy to enable rapid deployment to the western littoral of the Indian Ocean. China has 97 submarine as against 17 Indian, 137 of USA, T-372 of USSR, 32 of UK and 14 of Japan. It has 300000 personnel against India's 52000 and 53 principal

1. Military Year Book, 1990-91, p. 86.

2. Majeed Akhtar, "Sino-Indian Waves in the Indian Ocean", The Indian Ocean News and News, Vol.2, No.1, March 1992, Society for Indian Ocean Studies, New Delhi, p. 15.

combatants against Indias 31.¹ The naval exercises that China has conducted during the past and around Sparty and Parcel islands and establishment of a permanent marine observation station in spartleys have a long term effect on India's future naval planning. Chinese naval visits to Pakistani and Sri Lankan or Iranian ports in the Indian Ocean would be a vital concern for Indian security. Russia has also improved its relations with China and had sold 24 SU-27 Flanker Aircraft alongwith 40 MIG aircraft putting a grave concern to India's naval capacity.

China has already emerged as a dominant regional power in South-East Asia, especially in the South China Sea, despite the US and the Soviet military bases in the Philippines and Vietnam respectively. There are pressures for the removal of these foreign bases which, in fact, favour China. The division of South-East Asia into two camps, the ASEAN and the Indo-Chinese states, also enable China to play a great power role in South-East Asia. Thus the South China Sea has become a base for the possible naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. India needs to monitor these developments carefully, lest it finds itself isolated and encircled in the coming decade.

China had started the development of a full fledged blue-water navy. Such a navy has to have rapid access even to the Western littoral of the Indian Ocean and free movement in these waters. Chinese navy possesses a large naval infantry force, and bases her strategic defence on a nuclear triad. This navy is security considerations related to India. This is designed to give China a decisive

1. Military Balance, 1988-89.

role in strategically observing such Indian moves as assistance to the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The naval exercises that China has conducted, during the past few years, in the South-China Sea region, and around Spartley (Naushe) and Parcel (Xisha) islands, establishment of a permanent marine observation station in the Spartleys and frequent movements of Chinese East and North fleets in the waters of the South China Sea all have long term effect on India's future naval planning.¹

1. Majeed, Akhtar, 'Sino-Indian Waves in the Indian Ocean', The Indian Ocean News and Views, vol.2, No. 2, March, 1992, p. 15.

CHAPTER - II

S U P E R P O W E R S

A N D

S O U T H A S I A

SUPER POWERS AND SOUTH ASIA


(a) American Interests in South Asia

The geo-strategic location of South Asian sub-continent between the two distinct but of serious significance regions of West Asia and South-East Asia, has figured as decisive factors in America's foreign policy calculations. The South Asian region has, consequently been a collateral factor in this regard.¹ However, the primary objective motivating American involvement in South Asia has been the power politics among the big powers, especially their rivalry with the Soviet's. Twenty four year earlier Olaf Caroe, the British scholar, said,

"It will not be denied that of the region of the globe where there is confrontation between totalitarian and free worlds, the largest in area and the most populous is in Asia not in Europe. The absorption of South Asia in totalitarian system would lay Africa open to further pressure and confine evolutionary political systems to the peninsula of Europe and of North America. This would be true whether the tide Swept it, from China, or from Russia, or from both. The main forces of these pressures may fall not so much on the wings not, that is on South East Asia or the Middle East but on the central position, the sub-continent of India and Pakistan. The sub-continent is in a very real sense the centre of the free world".²

The US media and leaders continued to court India as a potential counter poise to China till the Korean war and its aftermath disabused them on account of Nehru's neutral stance. This became evident in the affairs of the Japanese Peace

1. Muni, S.D., "Regan's South Asia Policy, The Strategic Dimensions", IDSA Journal, New Delhi, vol. XVI, No. 2, October-December, 1983, p. 132.
2. Olaf Caroe "Problems of Power Confrontation in Inner Asia, Royal Central Asian Journal, October 1969, p. 221.



Department of State

United States Collective Defense Arrangements

Treaty in 1951 in which India joined Soviet Union while Pakistan, not only signed the Treaty but, gave it an absolute support. Traditional US interest in the affairs of South Asia limited, with active American involvement in Asia largely restricted to the pacific region countries notably China, Japan and Philippine. There was very little awareness of the Pakistan movement. Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence reveals how ignorant US leaders were about the demands and strength of Muslim League. Since, in the word of Churchill his mind was back in the American war of independence and he thought of the Indian in the American war of independence and Indian problems in terms of the thirteen colonies fighting George III¹ Emmanuel Celler, a US Congress representative called Nehru "almost a saint to uncounted millions, while Celler introduced a resolution to erect a monument to his memory and compared him a Moser, Budha, St. Francis of Asia and Abrulium Huicopn².

After the emergence of Cold War, United States tried to design India to contain the communism, but, India not only spurned all US advances, it also acted contrary to United States interest³. Paniker remarked that "the US was deliverately opposing India at every stage and was taking an anti-Asian policy.⁴

Following communist success in Vietnam the Western powers decided to establish a collective defence system in South East Asia. A conference at Manila created the South

1. Churchill Winston S., The Second World War, London, vol. IV, p. 190.

2. Burke, S.M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1990, p. 117.

3. Quoted by Burke, S.M., op.cit. pp. 150-151.

4. Ibid.

East Asia collective Defence Treaty (known as SEATO) in which Pakistan was a member. In 1955 Pakistan acceded to Baghdad Pact which was reinforced as central treaty organisation in August 1959. By joining CENTO and SEATO Pakistan had to pay a political price in terms of protests and hostility from communist powers. Though America aimed at encircling the communist world led by the Soviets, as also the Chinese, irrespective of the fact that it served no useful purpose for either Pakistan or America, G.W. Choudhury observed that,

"The military alliances between the America and Pakistan was based on different expectations and aims from the two sides, the America give military aid to Pakistan in the context of its global policy of containing communism, Pakistan considered the whole deal from the angle of its problems of security and defence vis-a-vis India...Pakistan's entry into the American sponsored pacts, both bilateral and multilateral, was mainly due to the desperate urge to improve the balance of power in the sub-continent".¹

For much of the post world war II era, American policy towards South Asia was characterised by three major tendencies, the global policy of containment of communism was extended to and applied in South Asia as it was elsewhere, with the key exception that no American military forces were stationed in the region. American aid has been provided in the past 40 years, nearly 22 billion dollars in economic loans and grants in an effort to limit the reach of China and even more the Soviet Union. Pakistan was incorporated into the world wide system of alliance, while India was seen by many Americans as a potential show case of

1. Choudhary, G.W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and The Major Powers, London 1975, p. 87.

non-communist development¹. Secondly, America sought to carryout a policy that promised close American relations both with India and Pakistan. They often ended up with a policy that left them little choice but to choose between friendship with India and Pakistan. And even this less than ideal policy often fell short of the mark, more than once they did enough on Pakistan's behalf to alienate India but, not so much that they could manage to please Pakistan.² Thirdly, and the most significant aspect of American interest in these countries at best uneven as it was decided more on the basis of need and expediency. The tendency was to ignore South Asia except when local conflict or tension boiled up and forced themselves on to their agenda, America would then engage in some crisis-diplomacy, only to pull back once the crisis has passed. The result was that America was not in a position to do as much as they might have to help prevent crisis or manage them effectively once they did occur.³

The US attitude towards a regional framework of peace and security in South Asia has thus been ambivalent. Conceptually, there can be two possible approaches or models for peace and security in South Asia. One is the traditional balance of power approach, which regarded peace and security to be a function of equilibrium of power in a system that posits the weakness, tempts aggression. The other is the "Organski Model"⁴ where the dynamics of peace and security are provided by the preponderance of power in one state

1. Richard N. Haass, "US and South Asia", Strategic Digest, vol. XX, No. 4, April, 1990, pp. 2171-72.

2. Ibid., pp. 2172-83.

3. Ibid., pp. 2177-78.

4. Organski, A.F.K., 'World Politics' New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.

of the system. The weaker state have either to accept the protection and the diktat of the preponderant power or face the possibility of war, which they cannot hope to win. Thus, an environment conducive to peace and security is automatically created.¹

American interests in the sub-continent can be summed up less in terms of the "Defence of the sub-continent" than as the maintenance of some influence or the prevention of a dominant or exclusive position for the Soviets. India's place in American policy concerns has ranged from relative importance in a benign environment to irrelevance or marginality (if not opposition) in a security dominated one.² In 1970's the American policy with regard to the South Asian region especially India was reflected in statement of the American president Jimmy Carter :

"In global politics, history has casted our country in different roles, the America is one of the so-called "super powers, India is the largest of the non-aligned countries", each of them respecting the other's conception of its international responsibilities and the values which "provide a basis for cooperation in attaching the great global problems of economic justice, human rights and the prevention of war".³

It is for these and related reasons that South Asia have remained an important foreign policy concern for

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1. Rai A. Khan, Pakistan-US Relations Divergences and Convergences of Perceptions, Karachi, p. 42.
 2. G. Timothy, L. Robert, L. and C. Shahrans, Security of Asia, Hampshire, England 1984, IISSE, p. 156.
 3. Stephen P. Cohen and L. Park Richard, Indian Emergent New York, 1972, p. XVIII.

the Americans.¹ Having alliance relationship with America, Pakistan demonstrated its zeal by defending western attitude and interests at international levels such as Colombo Conference of April 1964 and Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955. However, America did not abandon its interest in retaining a friendly equation with India. Two countries signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty in 1951 which was renewed in 1958 and 1962 which provided that Government of India is prepared to agree to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self defence. The treaty which was not publicised amounted to India's membership of defence alliance.² The US gave sufficient economic aid to India which enabled it to divert its own economic resources towards building up its military strength.³ In October 1962, a turning point came in US policies towards South Asia when an open clash occurred between China and India. The Chinese forces inflicted defeat on Indian troops. On India's demand, US decided to renew military aid to India which continued till 1963-64. In return for this India agreed to the installation of sensitive electronic devices in the Himalayas to monitor China's nuclear and missile programmes. United States, kept Pakistan away from any consultation. This led to change in its foreign policy and took steps to improve relations with Soviet Union and China. As Pakistan improved its relations with China, in the wake of large scale western aid to India, the US interest in Kashmir, visibly cooled

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1. Richard N. Haass, "US and South Asia", Strategic Digest, vol. XX, No. 4, April 1990, IDSA, New Delhi, p. 2177.
 2. Chaudheri, M. Ahsen, Pakistan and Great Powers, Council for Pakistan Studies, Karachi, 1970, p. 29.
 3. Ibid., p. 31.

when Kashmir was debated in the Security Council in 1964, the US representative suggested bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. By July 1965 there was talk of doubling aid to India from \$ 435 million to 900 million a year.

1971 - A Crucial Year

The US cordiality towards Pakistan increased as Islamabad emerged in an intermediary for historic approachment between Washington and Beijing from 1969 onward. Premier Zhou-Enlai selected Pakistan from among various friends to be the channel for secret contracts between the US and China and it was due to Islamabad that Dr. Henry Kissinger flew to Beijing in July 1971 to plan for Nixon's visit to China in 1972. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 paved the way to take advantage of the political crisis in East Pakistan and midwife the birth of Bangladesh in December 1971. The break up of the country resulted in the end of martial law regime and under Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO which was considered meaningless without East Pakistan. However, Pakistan continued membership of CENTO and strengthen her relations with Iran and Turkey. Nixon administration warned India not to act towards its neighbours in a manner that would jeopardise the stability of the region. It did not get much enthusiasm in India and Kissinger, the Secretary of state received a cool reception when he visited India in 1974. The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 and Emergency declared in 1975 by Mrs. Gandhi made the relations chill. The change of administration in 1981 brought qualitative change in US attitude and policies towards South Asia. The Regan administration saw the need for a stronger and more active US-Pakistan relationship. The dialogue between US-Pakistan became unusually cordial and productive.

Until 1980 when Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan Pakistan played a critical role and thereby received a leading ^{position,} After 1983 there was an improvement in Indo-US relations India toned down its anti-American rhetoric and liberalized its economic policies to attract western investment which continued upto Rajiv Gandhi. Michael Armacost, under secretary of State has rightly claimed, that the Regan administration had forged close relations with both Pakistan and India. During period when Afghanistan crisis was at its height the Regan administration welcomed India's efforts in Sri Lanka and action in Maldives, US counselled other South Asian regimes to accept India's paramount role. President Bush also introduced changes and ^{refinement} requirements and the differences between his rhetoric before the 1991 Gulf-war and his pronouncements thereafter, were based on different footings. The core alliances of the US being with western Europes and Japan, the other regions involving American interests are its immediate neighbours, Canada and Mexico, with which Washington is forging a free trade area, the Middle East for its oil and Israel's security, and then the countries of the pacific rim, now emerging as a major trading zone in the world. These include Korea, China, Australia and the ASEAN countries. Russia and other Republics of the former Union notably those adjoining Eastern Europe form an extension of Europe and Russia alone retains importance as the successor state of the Soviet Union which still possesses enough stockpile of nuclear and conventional weapons ^{and} which still constitute a threat to American security. The three main components of the Third World namely Latin America which is historic domain of American influence under Monroe Doctrine, Africa, geographically closer than Asia and the South Asia which is the remotest in terms of the distance and is at present of less importance. The trade has declined from 26% to 1%

in recent years.¹

The recent US elections have thrown away the Democratic President after twelve years of Republican incumbancy. The US foreign policy has bi-partisan since the second world war. Mr. Clinton with his commitment to change have come with new changes and order. In view of the last democratic administration of Jimmy Carter, it is expected that non-proliferation issues will receive highest value. The pressure will be adopted on India and Pakistan to endorse the N.P.T. Since Pakistan has, already intimated its readiness to join Regional nuclear free arrangements the U.S. administration may centralize in India. The Kashmir issue may again be raised with new approaches. In the words of Narasimha Rao, U.S.-India relationship may rise to the level of cordiality that existed during the Kennedy Presidency in 1950.

The policy of Clinton administration towards South Asia is still not clear. The efforts so far have been akin to those of the six blind men attempting to become familiar with the elephant. Each one received a different impression depending on the issue.² The fact is that there is just no Clinton policy on South Asia and the Clinton administration is taking more time to accomplish the task of resetting agenda. The democrates have been out of power for 12 years and are short of intellectual date base. During his election campaign President Clinton set few principles including non proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, promotion of democracy and human rights, encouragement of unfettered trade and investment

1. Regional Studies, vol. XI, No. 1, under 1992-93, p.25.

2. Menon, N.C., "Focus on South Asia", The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, August 7, 1993.

opportunities on a global scale.

The U.S. has great interest in much talked about Indian middle class market of 200 million plus. Clinton administration takes it seriously that South Asia covers an area of 1.3 billion people, one fourth of the mankind and after the end of cold war, a unique opportunity has clicked to Washington to solve all global problems independently.

America's new administration is serious to the South Asian developments and want that internal problems do not jeopardise the South Asian region.¹

American Policy Towards India

The Crux of the problem that besets the relationship between the two largest democracies of the world, the United States and India, springs from the reality that it is a relationship of unequal stature. In the international hierarchy of power, the United States is an undisputed global power while India is a regional power, but, still uncertain of status because the guardian of the international system has not recognized.² There was a phase when US wanted to befriend India for reasons of what one could call idealism on the basis of shared democracy, value, commitment to rule of law etc. India, also sincerely believed that this was indeed the motivation of American policy, but, soon the American commitments to the cold war and the consequential globalization of the American interpretation of its national interest introduced a radical change in the American perspective on the sub-continent, particularly India.

1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 16, 1993.

2. Parthe S. Ghosh, Neither Abel nor Cain A Frame Work of India-US Relations, New Delhi, p. 77.

In stark contrast by the 1940's the US and India had friendly relationship. On the eve of India's independence the US President, Harry Truman sent a telegram to Lord Mountbatten :

"On this memorable occasion, I extend to you, to Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, and to the people of the dominion of India, the sincere best wishes of the government and the people of USA. We welcome India's new and enhanced status in the world community.... In the years to come the people of this great new nation will find the US a constant friend. I earnestly hope that our friendship in the future as in the past, continues to be expressed in close and fruitful cooperation in international undertakings and in cordiality in our relations one with the other".

US search for a military alliance system to contain China with the sub-continent as the pivot of that system rendered the common democratic values permeating the two internal systems of the US and India less relevant in shaping their mutual relations. India believed that America in befriending Pakistan has projected the primacy of its strategic interests over promoting democratic values. America on the other hand considered that the obligation to contain communism lies on its shoulders and should work for it. US interest in 1950 was thus based upon the criterion of an active strategic presence conched in terms of the defence of democracy. The American decision to build a cold war Maginot Line along the Hindukush and the Western Himalayan Range, meant the cultivation of Pakistan to the detriment of India. During 1950 to mid 1960's Indo-American relations reached a significant level of conflict of interest, though varyingly interpreted by either side.¹

1. Quoted in A Common Faith : 40 Years of Indo-US Cooperation, 1947-87, New Delhi, 1988, p. 17.

John F. Kennedy's strong sentiments about India were well known, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. puts it "Kennedy was most interested in India, which he had long regarded as "the key area¹ in Asia. Schlesinger recalls Kenney's remark in 1959" we want India to win the race with China... If China succeeds and India fails, the economic development, balance of power will shift against ^{US} US. At the time when US was channelling its efforts towards military strengthening the Afro-Asian nations to meet the assumed threat of international communism, Nehru spoke in terms of establishing a "peace area". Nehru's conceptualization of a "Zone of Peace" strove to keep the cold war out of Asian boundaries. The United States tried to achieve peace through military security, while India tried to secure security through binding, mutual measures of peace.

In December 1956 Vice President Richard Nixon condemned the brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between "the communist world and the free world". Nehru opposed it and said "the world can be divided into good and evil" and that "it is not democracy to want all people to think the same way as you do".² John F. Kennedy's era of Presidency raised hopes of closer US-Indo relations, but, Washington's criticism of New Delhi action in Goa in 1961 and America's continued Arms supplies to Pakistan undermined Indo-US relations. Sino-India war in 1962 deeply appreciated the action of the US and British government in immediately providing shipments and military

1. Bal Shrnik, No. 23-20, December 25, 1945, Also See Trusteeship Question, pp. 3-6.

2. Chakravarti, P.C., "Indian Non-Alignment and United States Policy, Current History, Philadelphia, vol.44, No. 259, March 1963, p. 131.

equipment during the immediately after the Chinese attack in October 1962. Though Nehru was happy over their actions his hopes turned into disquite when US started using India's crisis with China as a lever to force for concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir. Chester Bowles said,

"Pakistan was high, we had attempted to force him to make compromise which the Indian people and the Indian parliament would not possibly accept".¹

By 1966 partly due to Johnson's unsympathetic stance towards India's arms shopping list and partly due to India's rather insensitively harsh attacks against American policy in Vietnam, the Indo-US policy cordiality vanished. By the early 1970's, the situation had changed. Broadly, in 1970s once again became considerably significant for super power impact over the sub-continent. In the spring of 1971, led to the inflow of almost ten million refugees to India and the slaughter of thousands of East Pakistanis at the hands of repressive West Pakistani military rulers. The Nixon administration refused to condemn these developments.² Kissinger too repeatedly warned India that China might not remain aloof from a war in sub-continent and that the US might not give it's support as it had in 1962.³ President Nixon's well known theme "From confrontation to negotiations" resulted in the US standing forth for the role of safeguarding her security interest for long term purposes. The development of SIB technology made it possible for the US to adopt a sea-based deterrence policy. The US has a substantial economic stake in India. K.R. Narayan, former Indian

1. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep my years in Public life, 1941-69, New York 1971, p. 473.

2. The New York Times, June 29, 1971.

3. Max Frank "To India the US In A Bitter Dis-appointment", The New York Times, November 30, 1971, p. 2.

States

Ambassador to United/expressed the view that the economic and commercial ties that bind our two countries are strong and growing.¹ Douglas S. Rose also observed "the US has a substantial economic stake in India. We are the countries largest trading partner, its leading foreign investor and an important partner in its development programmes."²

Even before the end of cold war, the US had taken steps to improve its own perception of India. This was done under the Regan administration. Since India was tilting towards the Soviet Union, the Regan administration desired to wean India away from the Soviet Union and help it to move towards greater autonomy in military arms.³ Since 1976, the US Congress has taken an increasingly active role in the making and implementing of foreign policy. Its efforts at "co-determination" indicate the silliness of foreign policy issue to domestic politics in the United States today, but, also reflect legislative discontent with part executive manipulations abroad.⁴ The dominant image of India in the United States is of poor, over populated, in-efficient, hot, hungry and harmless land, needing help, but refusing to express gratitude.⁵ While acknowledging India as the

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1. Narayanan, K.R., India and America, Essay in understanding, New Delhi 1984, p. 2.
 2. Rose, S. Douglas, "A letter from the Publishers", Span (New Delhi), vol. 24, No. 8, August 1988, p. 2.
 3. Cohen P. Stephen, Right for Right Reasons? : The Regan Administration and South Asia, A paper prevailed at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Asian Studies, March 25 to 27, 1988.
 4. Thomas M. Frank and Edward Wenbond, Foreign Policy by Congress, New York 1979 for a well documented analysis of this movement.
 5. Charles II, Helmsath, "Images of India and United States Policy", Asian thought and society, New York, January 1978, p. 214.

"dominant" power in South Asia destined to play a significant role in the region. US policy makers spokesmen disclaim any intention to advocate or support the notion of Indian hegemony. India being considered as ally of the US in the efforts contain and frustrate Islamic fundamentalism. An awareness has developed in Washington of the likely adverse reaction among friendly Islamic countries to any impression that US views Islam as the next "issue" confronting the most or threatening world peace. As Edward P. Djerejian stated in a public address on June 2, 1992. that "Americans recognize Islam "one of the world's great faiths which is practised on every continent including the US. Acknowledging the role of Islam as a historic civilized force, he mentioned that while countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa were seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islam ideals, the US did not see any monolithic or coordinated international effort behind these movement". Further, he declared that American principles encouraging greater openness and responsiveness of political system everywhere, and declared that the US would oppose any extremist philosophy that "practiced terrorism, preached intolerance or violated internationally accepted standards of conduct regarding human rights."¹

When an American scholar wrote a couple of year back could still be the last words of Indo-US relations. He wrote ".... in both the traditional and intermestic areas, the new structure of interest involving US foreign policy will probably have positive effects on US-Indian relations. That relationship is not likely to be too close because there are few central common interests to pull it together but it should be possible to avoid some of the hostilities

1. Burke, S.M., op.cit. p. 150.

of the past. Neither country will be very high on the foreign policy priority list of the other but that should also help keep them off the enemies list". Indo-US relations have now entered a crucial phase of negotiation which will test South Blok's diplomatic skills severely as it seeks to establish an honourable equation with the sole military power determined to police a post cold war world. There were clear discussions between Indian foreign secretary and the US officials on several vital issues during visit to Washington. Washington did not appreciate India's space and missile programme. India's replies were equally blunt, as it reiterated the peaceful nature of these programmes, but the tone and terror of the US administration left no one in doubt here that "the fancing had begun in earnest".¹

India's military capabilities and the policy of non-alignment are baffing the think tank of the American administration and the United State. The only super power in the world is anxious to know the purpose of building its military strength after demise of the bipolar world² and the reason for sticking to its non-alignment policy.

However, United States considered India under US Pacific Command (PACCOM) area of responsibility as one of the emerging power centres in the new multipolar world³ of Europe, US, Japan, Russia and China.⁴ America

1. The Indian Express, May 2, 1993.

2. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 11, 1991.

3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 7, 1993.

4. The Lt. Gen. Clande M. Kicklighter, Closer Indo-US Defence Ties Likely, The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 7, 1993.

considered India as a fast emerging strong U.S. partner. Clinton's administration is adopting two-track policy towards India. It is supportive of Indian economic reforms policies and helpful with loans from International institutions. On the other track, it will continue to pursue relentlessly its agenda to force New Delhi to follow its non-proliferation goals and use human rights as a lever to try to get India to conform to American strategic and political objectives.

American Policy Towards Pakistan

Pakistan-US security relations during last thirty seven years have been based as much on the geostrategic realities and compulsions of both the South and South-West Asian region as on super power globalism after world war II.¹ In a message to Quaid-i-Azam on Independence Day, US President Truman assured Pakistan that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America.² Waltier Lippmann high ranked the ^{US} relations and said, "Though Pakistan and America are far a part in space, though they are very different in their ways of life, each has great responsibilities for the peace and welfare of mankind which it can not hope to meet fully without the advice and help of the other."³ In 1981 a new era in U.S.-Pakistan security relations began as the Reagan administration realised that "some where, somehow, US foreign policy will have to find a way of

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1. Husain, A. Noor, "Pakistan US Security Relations Arms Sales Bases, And Nuclear Issues in United States - Pakistan Forum, edited by Leo-E. Rose and Noor A. Husain p. 1.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Khan, Liyakat Ali, Pakistan : The Heart of Asia Cambridge, Mass, 1950.

rewarding friends and penalizing @pponents.⁴ Pakistan to perceived, "we do believe in the determination of the New US administration to strongly support the independence of Pakistan".²

Pakistan-US relations have been both cooperative and confident. The surprising thing is that the relationship has survived the stress and the strains it has been through; even during the worst of times, the two governments, no matter who the incumbents were, have managed to retain atleast a working relationship.³ The present Pakistan-US relations are revival or reinvigoration of their past ties. The new relationship is an add - cum sales relationship. Though the 1959 bilateral agreement between Pakistan and the United States is still in force. It is not an alliance relationship, This agreement is not binding on Congress and is hostage to public mood in America. The new relationship is also not an "exclusive" relationship. The Washington membership is not the anchor of Pakistan's security as it was in the 1950's. Pakistan's membership and status in the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and its very close relations with China as well as with Muslim neighbours to the West are important components of its security architecture.

The new US-Pak relationship is more durable and credible than the old one, not only because it is more informal and flexible but because it is based on greater commonality of perceptions and interests. The Us never

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1. Henry Kissinger, address to the American Society of News Paper Editors Washington, D.C., April 10, 1980, printed in The New York Times, April 11, 1980.
 2. Agha Shahi, Foreign Minister, New Yorks Times, April 22, 1981.
 3. Khan, A., Rais, Pakistan-US Relations : Divergencies and Convergences of Perceptions, published in United States Pakistan Forum edited by Leo-E. Rose, p.34.

backed up the Pakistan's arms race and comparison with India. As early as 1951 office of the Intelligence Research, in the report 'Pakistan's current Economic Situation and Prospects' opinioned as follows :

"Pakistan's main reason for devoting more than a quarter of its budget to defence, and seeking additional US arms is not to protect the country against a Soviet or Chinese attack for which Pakistan's resources will never be sufficient, nor to maintain internal security for which the present military establishment is excessive. Its chief purpose is to bolster Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India. Although every Pakistani increase in military expenditure has been justified in Pakistani eyes by the need to counter Indian military development, it may also be true that the Pakistani Army has developed as a pressure group to the point that regardless to Indian movement. It might continue to have priority over economic development for appropriations.. what is required to mobilize Pakistani resources and utilize foreign aid effectively is a government that is strong and stable enough to carry out a consistent development program.... and politically skilled enough to reduce its large defence budget by improving relations with India".¹

After 1960 Pakistan came to rely almost exclusively on America for its military hardware. Nearly total Pakistan's combat tanks, much of its artillery, all fighters, bombers, and transport aircraft including supportive equipments, were of American origin.² By 1962 America shifted from strategic to political emphasis, implying a

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1. Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State Intelligence Report No. 7706, May 15, 1958 in Jain ed., US South Asian Relations, p. 150.
 2. Quoted from SIPRI worksheet, the total value of US Military shipment to Pakistan during 62 to 64 at \$ 1-5 billion, Stockholm, 1975, p. 122.

departure from a containment of Soviet policy in West Asia, though the American administration retained the containment of China as an essential aspect in their foreign policy.¹ The India-Pakistan war of 1971, revealed the new alignment of international forces in the sub-continent. The Soviet gave diplomatic support to the liberation movement in Bangladesh and were behind India in the war, whereas America and China gave diplomatic support to Pakistan along with providing necessary military equipment.² The American position after the declaration of cease fire was stated in the official communique of the Sino-American Conference held in Peking in February 1972 as follows :

"The US favour the continuation of the cease fire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces within their own territories and to their own sides of the cease fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, the America supports the right of the people of South Asia to shape their own".

The America-Pakistan strategy of having the substance of a security alliance without it seems to be based upon a programme of preparing the infrastructure of military facilities in Pakistan with American support with a political understanding that such facilities could be made available to America on short notice if and when the situation so demands. Alternatively, Pakistan could perform assigned military tasks, with the help of these facilities and equipment under American guidance to meet necessary contingencies.³ The Americans in pursuance of

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1. Rose, E. Leo, "The Super Powers in Asia, A Geostrategic Analysis", Orbis, Summer, p. 396-97.
 2. Shelton Kodiker, op.cit. p. 43-44.
 3. Cohen P. Stephen and Richard L. Park, India Emergent, New York, 1972, p. 136.

this strategy in the region, have been taking initiatives of providing equipment/stores prepositioning and forwarding deployment in the other pro-American regional countries such as Oman, Egypt and Saudi Arabia etc.¹ The American assurances about "not seeking bases" in Pakistan are often tagged with an exception "unless Pakistan asks for them".² The main plan of American policy in South Asia is of building and consolidating an anti-Soviet strategic consensus has met with very receptive and responsive ground in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.³

The American support to Pakistan existed widely. Surveying the region early in 1982 Richard Cronin of the Congressional Research Service observed that the US - Pakistan relationship is largely devoid of any sentiment of affection from the Pakistani side. In fact he noted later on, that President Zia attempting to move in a direction (Islamicization) that implicitly rejects many western values. Doubts on the reliability of the US are widespread among supporters and opponents of the regime. As a matter of fact there is considerable doubt as to whether the US has gained anything at^{all} in this shift of policy.⁵ Pakistani reactions to American concerns over the threat to their country were quite sophisticated. The Fukuyama report was clearly overstating the case for

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1. W. Scott Thompson, "The Persian Gulf and the correlation of forces", International Security, vol. VII, No. 1, Summer 1982, p. 19.
 2. Posen R. Barry and V. Everd Stephen, "Defence Policy and the Regan administration", International Security, vol. VIII, No. 1, Summer 1983, p. 3-45.
 3. Rana, Swadesh, "South Asia in US Strategic calculation", Strategic Analysis, vol. II, No. 8, Nov. 1982, p. 182.
 4. Richard P. Cronin, "Current Situation in South Asia and out-look for US Interests : Report on a trip to India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, February 20-March 20, 1982, Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service mimeo, June 21, 1982, p.36.

parallel US -Pakistani relations. Writing in the Muslim, Mushahid Hussain, an independent journalist, criticized those in Pakistan were going overboard on the renewal of the Pakistan-US relations. He called for Pakistan retaining faith in its non-aligned and Islamic block ties. In his view, American policy had come to accept Indian pre-eminence in the South Asian region which would negate all security ties in the event of a future Indo-Pak conflict.¹

Most of the Pakistani opposition leaders do not see the opportunities provided by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the manner of the Zia regime. Retired Air Marshal Asgher Khan probably speaks for many Pakistani when he advocates closer Soviet-Pakistani relations as the only method of redressing the security threat to Pakistan. He does not advocate breaking of the Pak-American relations but, argues that a neutralist stance offers more benefits in the present international context than an open identification with the super powers.²

There were some differences between America and Pakistan. America showed its anxiety over the question of Terrorism and Narcotics. Washington was keen to check out a more even-handed policy towards South Asia. Having shifted openly towards Pakistan in the past, it tried to right the balance.³ Though Pakistan was also out of the six countries Cuba, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea, Syria

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1. Cited in R.J. Jain, ed., U.S. South Asian Relations 1947-82, New Delhi, Radiant, 1983, vol. II, pp. 470-482 and Robert M. Crunden, New Perspectives on American South Asia, Chanakya Publications, Delhi, p. 49.
 2. See Robert M. Crunden, New Perspectives in American and South Asia, Chanakya Publications, 1986, p. 49 and Mohammad Asgher Khan, Generals in Politics, Pakistan 1958-1982, New Delhi, pp. 204-7.
 3. The Indian Express, March 29, 1993.

and Pakistan but, America considered Pakistan differently and weighted all the lapses in the light of its friendship and military partner.¹ The Gary Ackerman house foreign affairs committee expressly warned Pakistan against terrorism but, did not like to designate it as a terrorist state as it would affect a whole range of US interest.² and only asked Pakistan to desist from the questionable activities. America did not feel happy over the supply of missiles and missiles technology by Beijing to Pakistan, but, did not like to look it seriously.

US Arms Sales to Pakistan

During the period 1954-1965, the U.S. provided military assistance valued at \$ 619 million, (defence support assistance valued at \$ 619 million and cash or commercial based purchases of \$ 55 million) Arms sales were at a peak from 1954 to 1961. As a result during the period 1955-1965 Pakistan was able to forge a credible deterrence against India and Afghanistan.³

The terms of US-Pakistan bilateral agreement of March 1957 covered communist aggression only. On the eve of the council meeting in January 1958, Prime Minister Firoze Khan Noon said, that Baghdad Pact should have the same rule as NATO. The main aim of US to provide arms to Pakistan was to keep the Pakistani Army commanders friendly to US rather than to Russians. USA pleaded

1. Ibid.
2. The Times of India, June 11, 1993.
3. The Hindustan Times, July 26, 1993.

that, "we are arming Pakistan in order that she may defend herself against Soviet attack".¹ Substantial amount of modern planes and equipment supplied to Pakistan by US consisted of B-57 Jet-Bombers, F-86 Sabre Jets, F-104 Supersonic Star Fighters, Sidewinder Missiles, Transport planes, helicopters and supporting equipment. USA also supplied Rader for the F-104, M-47 tanks, Anti-tank missiles and C-130 turbo Jets, Cargo planes, F-104

to Pakistan after General Ayub Khan's return from his tour of Washington in 1961.²

After the 1965 Indo-Pak hostilities, Washington formally suspended the supply of arms to both the countries (India-Pakistan). But in case of Pakistan, this policy was suddenly reversed in 1967. America started arms supply to Pakistan on a grant basis.³ In 1967 Pakistan turned to China, which agreed to equip three newly raised Pakistani divisions and to provide tanks and MIG-19 Aircraft (renamed F-6) and some fast patrol boats for its Air Force. Pakistan also approached France for Mirages and sub-marines. In 1968 the Soviet Union agreed to offer Pak \$ 30 million worth of guns, M-18 helicopters and vehicles and even offered to develop Gwader as a naval base.⁴

Between 1965 and 1971, Pakistan was not able to obtain significant quantities of modern equipment, largely due to US embargo and lack of funds. The American reluctance until 1972 to supply arms to Pakistan in a big way

1. Raw N. 11 p. 100 : Quoted from U.S. Arms to Pakistan : A Study in Alliance Relationship, Devidas B. Lohakker, p.48.

2. Raw N. 11, p. 101.

3. Chopra, V.D., Asian Peace and Neo-Imperialist Asia (ed.), Pakistan and Asian Peace, New Delhi, 1985, p. 51.

3. Hussain No. 23, p. 4.

had been the result of various factors. USA understood that there was no real danger of any massive supply of American arms to Pak as a quid pro quo for Islamabad's series in West Asian region. The Pak-US relations remained strong, despite Pakistani withdrawal from SEATO as Pakistan enlarged its participation in CENTO.

In March 1973 US again removed arms supplies to Pak with a simultaneous sugar coated announcement, declaring that India too could buy communication equipment worth \$ 91 million. Later on, US changed its policy and started to give arms on the basis of 'Selling Arms' and Pakistan started to purchase \$ 301035 million of arms every year.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the last week of December 1979 provided a lease of life to Zia's martial law regime. In view of Zia's exploitation of religious feelings of entire Muslim world, Zia consolidated power at both the internal and external fronts in the name of Islam. The Carter administration decided to make Pakistan stronger and propose \$ 4000 million aid. Pakistan even considered it short and called 'peanuts'.¹ The Reagan administration in 1981 gave a clear signal that the US need to supply arms to Afghan insurgents through Pakistan. The US supplied arms and equipments² including TOW missiles, Cobra helicopters, Missile Launchers, 2000 anti-Tank Missiles etc. Washington's resumption of security relationship with Pakistan in June 1981 raised Pakistan to a position of prominence in hierarchy of Americas arms clients and the major arms supplies were made by USA.

1. Singh, Rajiv, U.S.-Pakistan and India, Strategic Relations, Allahabad, 1985, p. 151.

2. Singh, NG, pp. 168-169.

(d)

CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA

China has emerged as a major player on the Asian stage with the potential to effect the global balance of power. The freedom from the geo-political embrace of the former super powers has resulted in the emergence of six actual centres of power in the post cold war world. These are USA , the E.C. (with Germany, France and UK - playing a more active role) Russia, China, Japan and India.¹

Speaking about China's policy towards South Asia, Gerald Segal said, "In short China is a major player on the international stage and potentially major trouble maker for the other four Great Powers who are interested in developing a concert of power".² Beginning with North Korea, through Indo-China to Thailand, Bangladesh and westwards, to Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has managed to "Ring" Asia as it were and the strategic implications of this for nations like Japan, India, Indonesia and Vietnam needs little amplification. In assessing China's role in regional security, two things are certain. China will only grow stronger and its central geographic position in Asia will dictate that it has an interest and a role to play in almost every regional issue.³

China, though primarily an East Asian Power unlike Japan or Korea, has maintained a rather close relationship with South Asia. It appears that the first contact of the

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1. Bhasker, C. Udai, Role of China In The Emerging World Order, Strategic Analysis, April 1993.
 2. Gerald Segal James, "Intelligence Review", January, 1993.
 3. David Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy In The Post Cold War Era", Survival, Summer, 1992, note 7, pp. 98-99.

Chinese with South Asia took place at the beginning of the Christian era.¹ The border region between China and India was mostly inhabited by 'barbarian' tribes of Mongoloid. The first effort to delimit a clear boundry between China and India was made in 1914 Simla Conference where the British put pressure on China to accept a British proposal for a new border.² In the western sector too, the Indo-Tibetan boundary was first set by the British Government of India between 1873-78. "China seeks to set limits on India's role in South Asia by hobnobbing with some of its difficult neighbours. Apart from the obvious case of Pakistan (where it has even helped in the development of a nuclear bomb) other countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal had also provided significant military aid or political support as an exercise in Indian baiting".³ China refused to recognize Sikkim as India's part and disregarded in Lin Uang Guang, a Chinese scholar called Indian 'expansionism' and 'hegemonism' toward its smaller neighbours and said, "Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim denied even breathing spell were placed under Indian Umbrella overnight" after the British left India.⁴ The Chinese 'Weltanchnung' enables them to "maintain an objective over an unusually long period of time without seeing frustration or impatience resulting from long delays. Time to the nth degree multiplied by the nth root of effort equal results, described Mao. A touching point in Chinese foreign policy was entente cordialy with USA which resulted from Sino-Pak

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1. Baghala, P.C., India and China, Bombay, Hind Kitab Ltd. 1950.
 2. Neirlle, Maxwell, India's China War, New York, Anchor Books Doubled Day, 1972, p. 44-49.
 3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 30, 1992.
 4. Lin Liang Guang, a Chinese Scholar reitrated in a Seminar in Colombo, 1987.

relations. It created a Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis which led to stronger India-USSR relations. China's first issue is towards war. Mao had consistently urged that China should be prepared "for an early nuclear war". Den Xiaoping made a departure from this view in 1978 when he stated that, a major war between the super powers was not likely in the near future. Time was opportune to build the national economy. China sees new development in the arena of international relations in the coming decade. Primarily, on the basis of US-Soviet detente, it sees the triangular China-USSR-USA relations as maturing. China do not now prefers to be a "Card" to be 'used' by one super power against the other. A mature balanced and equal relationship will emerge in which China will be the 'third polar' in the Asia-Pacific region.¹

China considers that South Asia will continue as an area of peripheral concern to China even though minorities Xinjiang and Tibet may be cause of increasing anxiety which may then enhance this regions future importance. It will be in China's interest to see that these outlying provinces adjacent to the 'Islamic' belt re-mains stable and secure. China's first most effort will lie to see that relations with Pakistan remain close to provide easy asses to West Asia. The people's war doctrine is, "only by loss can loss be avoided". China consider disadvantageous position easy and follow , "We should have the courage to retreat so as to preserve our forces and hit the enemy when new opportunities arise". The policy of, "turning the enemy in deep" is the, "most effective military policy for a weak army

1. Pan Zhengliang "China's Security Options in the 1990s", NATOS Sixteen Nations, April 1989, p. 14.

strategically on the defensive to employ against a strong enemy".¹ China aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre² convinced that the PLA performance in May-June 1989 had exposed political and ideological deficiencies and China should modernize his defence. P.R.C. Minister of Defence Gin Jiwei stressed that the PLA "is determined to make new contributions". CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin stated - "To ensure a stable environment for socialist modernisation, we must maintain a strong force and build up strong national defence, if we have a military force whose strength corresponds to our country's status, we will easily deal with whatever contingency that may occur and will remain invincible."³

China-India Today

There had always been a sense of rivalry between India and China. In a dialogue between Chinese Monk Hsuan-Tsang and monks of Nalanda when the former announced to return to China. The monks of Nalanda, when they heard of it, begged him to remain saying, "India is the land of Buddhist birth, and though he has left the world, there are still many traces of him. What greater happiness could there be than to visit them in turn, to adore him and chant his praises ? Why then do you wish to leave having come so far ? Moreover, China is a country of the mleccchas who

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1. Selected Military Writings of Mao Tsetung, Published by Beijing's Foreign Language Press, p. 81.
 2. Harlan W. Jencks "Civil Military Relations in China : Tiananmen and After", Problems of communism (Washington, DC) May-June 1991 pp. 14-29. Richard H. Young Ed. The PLA and the Tiananmen Crisis SCPS Papers, No. 1, Sim Yatsen Center for Policy Studies, National Sinyat Sen University Kaohsiung Taiwan Oct. 1989.
 3. Quoted in Chen Xiaogong, World Military situation in the 1990s", Jietangjun Bao, FJB, Sept. 7, 1990.

despise the religions and faith. That is why Buddha was not born there. The mind of the people is narrow, and the coarseness profound, hence neither saints nor sages go there. The climate is cold and the country rugged you must think again".¹ It reflects past reflection of China's positions, attitude and coarseness.

The history also established the fact when China betrayed India once more and shrunked all the ties of friendship, struck off the principle of 'Panchsheel' and occupied a sufficient part of its border. The policy between the two countries remained of doubts and miseries. The steps taken by either to fill the vaccums can not be described an act of friendship. Rajiv Gandhi, soon after taking over as Prime Minister in 1988 had frequent discussions to normalize relations with China. To accomplish this he called for a process of modernization on all fronts. There was a change of opinion in the eighties and China praised Indian achievements in the field of education, science and technology. India-China entered into a Trade Agreement in August 1984 after a gap of thirty years. Both the countries accorded each other the most favoured nation treatment in trade and commerce. A degree of professionalism now has created rather than friendship and both countries have exchanged trade and transit. But, the main problem for which Indian Prime Minister lost his life, the Defence Minister, Menon lost his seat and, on account of which India lost his world wide influence and credibility stands the same. It is a misfortune that todays politics is based on interests, India has become victim of the Chinese psyche, had he taken strong hold of the situation, the boundary problem would have altered so far.

1. Joseph Needham, Science And Civilization In China, vol.1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1954, p. 214.

With regard to territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, Izvestia said, "the territorial dispute between India and China is not decided. It is solely 'frozen' and whether they want it or not, the dispute is literally a "hot geyser" which periodically comes into open".¹ After the disintegration of Soviet Union, China is much safe on his borders today while India has further weakened politically, economically and psychologically. India and China has taken major steps towards normalising their relations by signing four agreements including the long awaited peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border areas and pledged to work for expanding their relations in the economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields.²

Sino-Bhutan


China's connection with Bhutan are equally relevant for the study of Bhutanese political developments as that of India. Shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, China started its claim on Tibet. In October next year China entered Tibet through eastern frontiers. After few months China entered the western side from Sinkiang through Indian areas. Indian Prime Minister announced in Parliament in December 1950, "that an attack on Nepal or Bhutan would be tantamount to an attack on Indian territory".³

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1. Upadhyay, Dadan, "Indo-Chinese Ties Bordering on Caution", The Indian Express, September 16, 1992.
 2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 8, 1993.
 3. Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha on August 28, 1959 and in Rajya Sabha on December 8, 1959. See A. Appadorai ed. Selected Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947-1972, Delhi, OUP, 1982, vol. 1, pp. 547-49.

China adopted a policy of blow hot and blow cold towards Bhutan. The accent of this diplomacy was not to treat Bhutan as an appendage of India, China insisted to deal with Bhutan directly without India in the Sino-Bhutan boundry matters. Chou En-Lai reiterated the Chinese position that Sino-Bhutanese border question was not within the scope of Sino-Indian boarder discussions. Nehru refuted this idea and replied to the Chinese Premier's letter dated September 8, 1959, "It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet. Under Treaty relationships with Bhutan, the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Government matters concerning Bhutan's external relations and in fact we have taken up with your Government a number of matters on behalf of the Bhutan Government".¹ In 1959 there were even incursions into Bhutanese territory by armed Chinese.² The Chinese war 1962 and the defeat of India raised suspecion in the minds of Bhutanese but, despite these dialectics Bhutan decided in favour of aligning closely with India and did not like to share the same fate like that of Tibet at the hands of Chinese.

India took timely steps against the perceived Chinese threat, strengthened its defence forces at Bhutan and also provided adequate economic aid in the five years plan of

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1. For the Text of the Chou's letter and Nehru's letter See Ibid, pp. 550-76.
 2. Valentine, J. Belfighio, "Indies Economic and Political Relations with Bhutan", Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol.12, No. 8, August, 1972, pp. 683-684.



the Dragon country. Broadly, Indian defence strategy since the mid 1970's was to meet at par what ever forces China was likely to deploy in Tibet along the northern border of India and Bhutan to maintain enough superiority of striking power over Pakistan, so as to deter attack to police the border with Bangladesh and to defend India's economic zone and island territories in the Indian ocean.¹

The fact China does not recognize India's special relations with Bhutan and Nepal from the very beginning due to his vested interests. Fearing Indian resistance the Chinese questioned primarily India's special relations with Bhutan and accused India of harboring expansionist intentions with backing of the imperialist power.² In the early 50's China criticised the Indian Treaty with Bhutan and said, "The Nehru government can not deny that it has sent man to Lhase. The New York Times reported from New Delhi on August 8th that the spokesman of the Indian Foreign Ministry announced that night that Bhutan has become a proctectorate of India. Since, the Indian Government has announced its sovereignty over Bhutan and declared that Tibet had never recognized Chinese suzerainty, will it not declare suzerainty over Tibet.... The Nehru Government has no right to declare sovereignty over Bhutan. The United Nations should examine the matter."³ The Chinese impact on Bhutan and Sikkim would seem to be greater in comparison, in recent years. Peking has repudiated India's special relationship with both kingdoms and has been

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1. Interview in New Delhi and unpublished thesis at Natural Defence College, New Delhi, 1980-81.
 2. Gupta, Sen, Bhabhani, The Fulcrum of Asia - Kohark Publishers Vikas Marg, New Delhi.
 3. The People's Daily, China, September 13, 1950.

urging them to edge out of Indian fold.¹ In fact Chinese policy in the northern part of South Asia has been of continuous tensions. Mao and his followers took practical steps to establish Chinas supermacy in South East Asia. To this end, they employed, "No war no peace" tactics which were designed to weaken the countries and bring them under Chinese rule". The border conflict with India is going on, for ten years now with tension alternatively heightening and relaxing. Peaking periodically presents India with ultimatums and tries to interfere in her affairs. Mao's agents are weaving a net work of intrigues and plots in Bhutan and Sikkim.² In the early stage Bhutan did not like any change in the provisions of 1949 treaty under which Bhutans external relations were bound by India's guidance. The young king declared at various occasions that part with India needs no change.³ The king said, that we feel what is in practice is more important than what is on paper⁴ and declined for any new treaty with India⁵. But, it began to flex its diplomatic policy soon and declared the treaty can certainly be brought upto date.⁶ The king further asserted that there are no problems between our countries, and our friendship is deeper today than in 1949, but, why loose any thing for loose interpretation it will be the advantage of both India and Bhutan to upto date

1. Gupta Sen, Bhabani, op.cit. p. 29.

2. Prof. M. Kepitsu, "National Liberation and Mao's Group Splitting Activity", International Affairs, No. 7, 1968, pp. 15-16.

3. The Patriot, New Delhi, November 9, 1979.

4. The Statesman, New Delhi, November 9, 1979.

5. The Indian Express, New Delhi, November 9, 1979.

6. The Indonesia Times, Indonesia, October 13, 1979.

the treaty.¹ In fact, the tiny kingdom began to seek international recognition and came out of the isolation. In 1979 at the Havana, Cuba, Bhutan supported the Pol Pot regimes claim to be recognized as the representative of Kampuchia (Cambodia) while India was neutral. The King draw its own interpretation to Article 11 of the 1949 Treaty and contended that the clause, "agrees to be guided by "Indian advice implies that the advice will not be mandatory".² When Bhutan joined the UN and acquired a Charter relationship with India as a fellow sovereign member of that international. Bhutan Prime Minister ascertained that "from time immemorial the Himalayas have provided us into magnificent frontiers... we can not allow the barrier to be penetrated because it is also principle barrier to India".³ Later on Nehru ascertained the logic of not allowing the barrier to be crossed or weakened would apply equally to Bhutan.

Sino-Tibetan relations in 1950s strengthened. A cause of distrust made home in the minds of the Bhutanese and consequently their trust for India was cemented. Chinese policy destroyed the Tibetan way of life and the religious Institutions. It had a direct effect upon the psyche of the Bhutanese people, most of whom were Mongoloid and from Tibetan origin. The stories of Chinese cruelty, harrasment and atrocities narrated, by the Tibetan refugees, who came to Bhutan created hatred and fear against China. Simultaneously India came much nearer due to asylum to Dalai Lama, and the fear psyche removed to some extent.

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1. The Times of India, New Delhi, September 10, 1979.
 2. Hong Kong Standard, dated October 12, 1979.
 3. Rose E. Leo, 'Bhutans' External Relations, pp. 193-194. Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), vol. 47, No. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 192-193.

Sino-Pakistan

Friendship makes room for indulgence, but enmities also mellow in the course of time. The fact of international politics are subject to constant change. "World affairs" said Hans J. Morgenthau have surprises in store for whoever tries to read the future from his knowledge of the past and from the signs of the present.¹ Pakistan choose to be the first Muslim country to accord recognition to the Beijing government and vociferous support to China on its right to the seat in the United Nations. In the Korean war Pakistan adopted an ambivalent attitude and its stand on Japan Peace-Treaty was pro-West although Pakistani leadership was aware that Chinese stakes were involved in these two issues.² Pakistani leaders interaction with the Chinese leaders at the Bandung Conference led to some understanding between the two countries. The reciprocal visits of the leaders of the two nations improved the relations further and established that there was no clear clash of interest.³ China had succeeded in keeping its relations with Pakistan fairly free of strains. Pakistan membership in SEATO and CENTO was not condemned in Chinese Press.⁴

Chou-En-Lai made the declaration "Although Pakistan was a member of SEATO since its government and people had

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1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations - The Struggle for Power and Peace, Knof, New York, 1967, Ch.2.
 2. Bhole, P.L., Pakistan-China Relations Search for Politico-Strategic Relations, Jaipur, 1986, p. 65-66.
 3. Survey of China, Mainland Press, Hong Kong, No. 1440, December 31, 1956.
 4. Gupta, Sen, Bhabani, The Fulcrum of Asia, Relations among China, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, p. 113.

expressed friendliness for China, there was no reason why China could not be friendly with Pakistan. In the first instance the relations between China and Pakistan were not friendly. In New Delhi, Chou found India and Burma responsive to new image and gave a clear formulation of the policy of peaceful coexistence and said, "All the nations in the world, can peacefully co-exist, no matter whether they are big or small, strong or weak, and no matter what kind of social system each one of them has. The rights of the people of each nation to national independence and self determination must be respected.... Revolutions can not be exported, at the same time, outside interference with the common, will expressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted."¹ After the border dispute Pakistan approached China to redemarcate the boundary between Pak-occupied Kashmir and Sinkiang, but, China did not agree because Sino-Indian talks were going on : In 1960 Chou-Nehru talks resulted in a failure. With the signing of the Indus water Treaty in 1960, in September 1960, the process of peaceful settlement of Indo-Pak disputes came to an end. Pakistan changed his policy in favour of China after the American aid to India.

After development of ICBMs and Polaris submarines the importance of military bases at the periphery of the Soviet Union was reduced and a favourable atmosphere of cooperation was installed, Kashmir question was basically not important in relations with China. Bhutto said, if Indo-Pak talks resulted in a settlement of Kashmir dispute they would strengthen Pakistans relations with China.² Bhutto considered that Pakistan should attempt,

1. Quoted in an Editorial in People's Daily, China, July 2, 1954.

2. Year Book of United Nations, 1961, p. 128.

"to set up bilateral equations with each one of them with the clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should promote..... mutual interest (of the great power and Pakistan) without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of the third parties (each equation was to be) determined by the limits of tolerance..... and acceptance of third parties with whom might be able to establish bilateral relations of mutual benefit.¹ Soon Pakistan-China received a complete agreement on the location and alignment of boundary between Sinkiang and the areas of Kashmir under Pakistans control and signed the Sino-Pak boundary agreement on March 2, 1963. On October 23, President Ayub Khan disclosed his intention to approach China for peaceful settlement of the border. In case China showed encouraging responses to Pakistan's desire for settling the boundary between Sinkiang and northern regions of Gilgit, ranking statesmen of the two countries may eventually meet to lay down principles for specific demarcation of the boundary.² The sole purpose of the agreement was to eliminate a possibility of conflict in future.³ However Pakistan did not enter with any defence treaty with Pakistan, as it would have meant a complete break away from the West.⁴ China provided Pakistan, economic and \$ 142 million and also supplied 4 MIG-15, 4-11-28, 40 MIG-195 (F-6) and 80 T-59 Tanks between 1965 and 1966.⁵ When Yahya

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1. Khan Mohd. Ayub, Friends Not Masters', London 1967, p. 117.
 2. Dawn, Karachi, November 24, 1959.
 3. Khan Mohd. Ayub, Friends Not Masters', London 1967, p. 162.
 4. Sayed H. Anwar, Pakistan and China : Diplomacy of an Entente Cordial, London 1974, p. 244.
 5. Barke, Wolfgaug, Chinas Economic Aid, New Delhi, 1975, pp. 10-11.

Khan succeeded, he changed the foreign policy and declared, "We, therefore, try to hold a balance in our relations with the major powers around us and with the USA. We do not solicit the friendship of one at the expense of the interests of the other".¹

In 1977 Pakistan was again beset by political upheavals. In July, General Zia seized power from Bhutto. By that time there was a change in Chinese policy towards India and when Zia raised the question of Kashmir on his visit to China, Deng Xiaoping said, "South Asian countries could solve their mutual relations through consultations".² Pakistan played its cards with considerable skill during Zia ul Haq's regime, while the old CENTO links with Turkey were kept up, very close economic and military links were developed with Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. China's friendship was kept at an intimate level.³ The other neighbours did not go as far as Pakistan, but, they too saw the western and Chinese relationship as a useful lever against India. China has acquired an important position, as one of the most important suppliers of arms to Pakistan. Chinese weapon systems form the back bone of the Pakistani military arsenal. Not only this, China also helped Pakistan in the Nuclear Set up. According to CIA intelligence report China also helped Pakistan to achieve nuclear weapon capability.⁴

1. Yahya Khan's speech at the Joint Session of Iranian Parliament on October 30, 1969, cited in S.M. Burke Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis, London 1973, p. 360.

2. Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, December 1977, p. 6-8.

3. ^{The} Times of India, New Delhi, January 15, 1991.

4. Kumar, B.K., Nuclear Nexus Between Peking and Islamabad, an over view of some significant development Issues Studies. A Journal of China Studies and International, Taipei, vol. 21, No. 8, August 1985, pp. 140-50.

Chinese Arms Transfer to Pakistan

As regards China's arms transfer policies, proceeding since the imposition of the first embargo, China being Pakistan main supplier in the period from 1966-71 and had provided Pakistan \$ 133 million worth of arms.¹ China had sent apart from the arms, rod instructors to Pakistan to train their troops in counter-guerrilla warfare.² China also offered to equip, two divisions being raised in West Pakistan to replace those sent to East Pakistan.³ In 1971 when Pakistan defeat became imminent, Chinese rescue ships were based in Ganges delta for evacuation of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan.⁴ However China supplied all weapons and ammunition that Pakistan needed and that some were supplied free.⁵

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1. Ali Mehrunnisa, China's Diplomacy During The Indo-Pakistan War 1971, Pakistan Horizon, 25(1), 1972, p. 58, quoting USIS News Text, Karachi, February 9, 1972.
 2. Ibid., quoted Dawn, Karachi Nove,ber 25, 1971, p. 13.
 3. Ibid., quoting Economist London, November 13, 1974.
 4. Ibid, Daily Telegraph, December 13-14, 1971.
 5. Dr. Nisha Sahari Achulhan, Soviet Arms Transfer Policy In South Asia - 1955-1981, p. 81.

China has emerged as a major conventional weapons supplier in Asia and specially to Pakistan. The Arms Sales from 1950 to 1990 are as below.

Countries receiving Major Conventional Weapons from China
1950-1990

Missiles	Land Weapons	Ships	Aircraft
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Albania	Albania
Albania	Albania	Algeria	Bangladesh
Bangladesh	Angola	Angola	Burma
Burma	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Cambodia
Cambodia	Burma	Cambodia	Egypt
Chile	Cambodia	Cameroon	Iran
Egypt	Congo	Cape Verde	Iraq
Iran	Egypt	Congo	Laos
Iraq	Guinea	Egypt	North Korea
North Korea	Guinea-Bissau	Equatorial Guinea	North Vietnam
Pakistan	Iran	Ghana	North Yemen
Saudi Arabia	Iraq	Guinea	Pakistan
Syria	Mali	Indonesia	Somalia
Thailand	Nepal	North Korea	Sri Lanka
	North Korea	North Vietnam	Sudan
	North Vietnam	Pakistan	Tanzania
	Oman	Romania	Thailand
	Pakistan	Sierra Leone	United States
	Somalia	Sri Lanka	Zambia
	Sudan	Tanzania	Zimbabwe
	Tanzania	Thailand	
	Thailand	Tunisia	
	Zaire	Zaire	
	Zimbabwe		

Reproduced from Strategic Digest, November 1992.

Source : R. Bakes Jill - ORBIS 36/3, Summer 1992.

China had succeeded in keeping its relations with Pakistan fairly free of strains. Pakistan Membership in SEATO and CENTO was not condemned in Chinese press.¹ Chou-En-Lai made the declaration "Although Pakistan was a member of SEATO, since its government and people had expressed friendliness for China, there was no reason why China could not be friendly with Pakistan".

1. Gupta, Sen Bhabani, The Fulcrum of Asia, Relations among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR, p. 133.

Sino-Nepal

China has emerged as a important factor in South Asia. Nepal's relationship with China goes back to a hoary past and is a story of indifferences and friendship. Nepal and China have no close contacts at any time. Contacts between the two countries were limited and may be traced back to fifth century A.D. Tibet was more important and close to the hill state than China.

After the end of the second world war, there were many changes of far reaching importance all round the world. Success of Indian national movement influenced Nepal and touched off several abortive revolts against the Ranas.¹ It was only around the mid 1946, when Interim Government was formed in India, that the Ranas realized the might soon have to deal with elected, representatives of the Indian people while they were not prepared to introduce any change in the domestic affairs, they decided to expand international relations with the US, France and Brazil.² They also made overtures to China³ but, the civil-war and the communist victory stalled any further development in Nepal-China relations. The Ranas were also of the view that they may persuade the Nehru Government not to interfere in the Nepalese domestic affairs. They even decided to conclude the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. As the pressure of democratic mounted and the Nehru Government supported the King, the revolution of 1950 in a way swept the Ranas. In fact India initiated Nepal to proceed to develop relations with China. Sure of its hold on Nepal, India in order

1. Kant, Rama, Ibid., p. 16.

2. Chatterjee, Bhole, A Study of recent Nepalese Policies, Calcutta, 1967.

3. Bhasin, A.S. (ed) Documents on Nepal's Relations with India and China 1946-66, New Delhi, 1970, p. 8.

to defuse the anti-foreign statement of the Nepalese towards China and at the same time to assure China that it had no designs against it, put pressure on Nepal to establish diplomatic relations with China. What India did not foresee was that Nepal after establishing relations with China would try to balance the two for achieving more freedom in its affairs.¹ Diplomatic relations with China were established in August 1955 to counterweight the influence of India. After the Chinese military takeover of Tibet, India and China came nearer. China also enlarged a picture of reasonableness and accommodation both towards India and Nepal. India and China concluded the convention of Tibet, in April 1954 signed the Panchshila. China reoriented its policy towards Nepal on three point bases.

- (a) Termination of unequal rights and privileges that Nepal enjoyed in Tibet.
- (b) Remuneration of its own imperial claims on Nepal.
- (c) Prior understanding with India on the Himalaya Region.

King Mahendra's accession heralded a new era of foreign policy in Nepal. In his design China occupied a vital place. India having readjusted its relations with China, Nepal had to breakway from the an chronistic relationship and bring it to live with modern ideas based on the principle of equality and reciprocity. In 1955 Nepal and China entered into an agreement and established normal diplomatic relations. As a first step an Agreement to maintain Friendly Relations and on Trade and Inter course was signed between Nepal and China, which regulated the travel across border, normalized trade relations and did away with the privileges of the Nepalese traders in Tibet.²

1. Staff Study, "Pakistan and Nepal", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XV, No. 2, 1962, p. 131.

2. Asian Recorder, June 13-19, 1959, p. 2714.

China's policy towards Nepal moved with caution. Despite their interests, Chinese Government continued to pay regard to the Indian position and sensitivities in Nepal. During 1955 to 1958 Nepal made significant changes in his policy towards China. After the appointment of B.P. Koirala as Prime Minister, there was a change in the policy. Dalai Lama, taking shelter in India and the Khampa rebels in Tibet taking refuge in Nepal territory, the newly elected government was put to a difficult position. There was yet a national consensus in Nepal that a meaningful relationship with China should be enlarged. B.P. Koirala was pro-India and his party on Tibet was highly critical of the Chinese. China appeared more appealing and more honourable than India's "middle way" of non-alignment and mixed economy. On the sub-continent the Indian Government was unsympathetic to revolutionaries, had difficulties with the tribal people in the North-East and vacillated in its dealings with the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. On each court, China projected itself as friend and sympathiser against a reactionary bourgeois imperialist India.¹

Soon after, Nepal was faced with a grave situation, Sino-Indian relations had deteriorated much. China challenged the entire Sino-Indian border and even questioned its relations with Sikkim and Bhutan. The interpretation of the 1954 convention as well as the Nepalis border with Tibet were challenged. The Chinese attack on India in 1962 marks a watershed in the Nepalese foreign policy towards China. The revolution of 1950, the Delhi Agreement of 1951 and the Constitution of 1959 could not resolve the basic issues whether the sovereign power lay with people or the king.

1. Singh, Surjit Man, India's Search for Power, Sage Publication, New Delhi, p. 196.

India wanted that monarchy may develop as a symbol of national unity and make the government broad based with the help of peoples representative. King Mahendra preferred to abrogate the Parliamentary system. It was criticized by public and the Indian press. Nehru declared that kings action was a set-back to the democratic process. In view of the king Nehru's diplomacy was an obstacle in his way, so king used China to gain popularity and scare India. It was in the wake of this delimma that the Chinese Foreign Minister declared on behalf of the Government and people of China to assure His Mejesty king Mahendra, His Mejesty's Government and the Nepalese people that if any foreign forces attack Nepal, we Chinese people will stand on your side.¹

In this way Nepal was successful to pressurize India and gain substantial concessions both in economic and political field. Chinese conflict with India and its increased involvement in Nepal, occurred at a time when Nepal had started asserting its international personality. China wanted Nepal to protect Chinese interests by observing centrality in Sino-Indian struggle and not allow its soil to be used against Tibet. The period of 1961-62 was set back to India. Chinese attack on India led to some hard thinking. The rise of powerful China altered the balance of power in the Himalayan kingdom. Nepal assured China, of its goodwill and friendship. It supported China on Tibet, did not allow its soil to be used by Tibetan refugees and even disarmed the Khampas. In 1972 when Mahendra passed away, his son Birendra succeeded on Throne. The Chinese leadership after 1971 particularly after the death of Mao, adopted the way of flexibility in its foreign policy.

1. Survey of China Main Land Press, No. 1835, October 9, 1962, p. 34.

Towards India, it agreed to discuss all border issues while no headway could be made. It did not extend full support to the king as before.

King Birendra has been trying to keep China in good humour. While China has extended fair amount of economic and technical aid to Nepal in some important sectors, road constructions and industries. China has acquired an important place in Nepals foreign policy.

China's new policy shift opposes super power's domination and encourages the unity amongst third world countries. In this broad frame work in South Asia also she tries to establish friendly relations with India and encourages a bilateral settlement of disputes between the core and peripheral powers of the region. From this point of view she has welcomed the emergence of SAARC and finally for the present. She seem not to have any desire to involve herself in the internal crisis of the South Asian countries.¹ Sino-Nepalese relations in post 1980s may be viewed in this perspective, China has taken pain to assure Nepal that there was no weakening of its friendly relations with her² but, she can not efforts to strengthen friendly ties with India.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 4, 1981.

2. Mahanty, M.R., "China's recent Policy in South Asia", Dharmdasani (Ed.). Contemporary South Asia, Shalimar Publishing House, Varanasi, 1985, pp. 174-175.

SINO-Bangladesh

Bangladesh-China relations may be traced in their countries old ties. Sultan of Bengal, Ghiyas-ud-din Azam Shah, sent emissaries to China's emperor Yung-log of the Ming dynasty in 1405-1409. The emperor of China also reciprocated this friendly gesture of the Sultan of Bengal and sent enjoys and gifts in return.¹

China did not support the Bangladesh war of Independence, because of China's perception that the new state Bangladesh, in the creation of which both India and ex-Soviet Union played important role, would remain under influence of New Delhi and Moscow and consequently, China declared it "Manchuko" Government, thereby dubbing it as "the quisling government" set up by New Delhi.² China's post-1971 diplomacy was tailored to contain the Soviet and Indian influence in South Asia. The Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and cooperation of March, 1972 was considered by Beijing as inimical to the Chinese interests. The Mujib government which explicitly tilted towards Indo-Soviet axis following its independence was viewed by Beijing to be antagonistic to the latter's Strategic interests. Obviously, China's attitude towards Bangladesh did not change until the fall of Mujib government specifically, because the Mujib government remained determined to try the Prisoners of war (POWS) and also blocked the admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations.³

1. Mujumder, R.C., An Advanced History of India, Macmillan Melbourne, Toronto, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1967, p. 337.

2. Peking Review, December 17, 1971, p. 15.

3. Abu Taher Salahuddin Ahmed, "Bangladesh-China Relations : An Assessment", BIISS Journal, vol. 13, No. 2, 1992.

The changed political scenario in Bangladesh following the overthrow of Mujib in 1975 suited China's perception of its role in South Asia. The beginning of Ziaur Rahman's period witnessed a marked slide back in Bangladesh-India relations. By contrast, China has been cultivated as a counterbalance against perceived hegemonistic designs of New Delhi. During the Zia regime foundation of close ties between Bangladesh and China was laid and cooperation took off in all aspects, political, economical and strategical. During Zia's visit Chinese vice Premier Li Hsienien stated that, "China firmly supports the Government and people of Bangladesh in their just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and resist foreign interference".¹ On the other hand Zia while speaking of a banquet said :

"We believe that only in an environment of stability free from outside interference can we consolidate our independence and state sovereignty. The people of Bangladesh are determined to continue their struggle and in concert with the people of the third world will oppose expansionism and hegemonism."² The Chinese charged Affairs in Dhaka, Man Ping declared in March 1977, "We firmly support the reasonable stand taken by Bangladesh on the question of sharing the waters of the Ganges river".³

The foundation of Bangladesh's close ties on the military front was also laid during Zia period. Several factors motivated the two countries to cooperate in this field. Following the dramatic change in Bangladesh in 1975, Kremlin refused to supply spare parts for military equipment to Bangladesh in 1976. China stepped into fill in the vacuum. Besides the supply of arms, China built

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1. Bangladesh, vol. 2, No. 4. Dhaka Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, January 15, 1977, p. 5.
 2. Iftikher, A. Choudhery, Op.cit. p. 6.
 3. Bangladesh, Op.cit. vol. 2, No. 9, p. 2.

the country's arms and ammunition factory in Joydevpur. Bangladesh and China signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the shipping sector on May 29, 1988.¹ China also supplied to Bangladesh a multipurpose cargo-Banglar Doot, on December 13, 1989 and promised for another ship of 300000 metric tons capacity.² Every year since 1977 China also offered Bangladesh 12 undergraduate and 2 post graduate scholarships and developed cultural relations. After assuming power through bloodless coup in 1982, Ershad in an interview to the New York Times termed Russians as "Crude and imtrusty"³ and applauded Beinging having very good military terms".⁴

At the political level both countries continued to share identical views on matters related to international, regional and disarmament issues. The two maintained identical approach to the question of the New International Economic order on regional issues like Indo-China, Arab. Israel conflict Indian Ocean as zone of peace, de-nuclearization of South Asia, both China and Bangladesh hold similar views which brought them on a common political plateform.

1. Bangladesh Times, May 31, 1988.

2. News Review on South Asia, February 1989 from Bangladesh Observer.

3. SIPRI Year Book : World Armaments and Disarmament, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1980, p. 97.

4. The New York Times, April 17, 1982 and also International Herald Tribune, April 12, 1982.

SINO-Sri Lanka Relations

In the beginning Sri Lanka adopted the policy of "Mid-way" - the way of not getting involved in the conflict of rival ideologies and power blocks, they maintained an attitude of anti pathy towards the communist block countries. The UNP Prime Minister had an intense dislike for communism and commonist countries. Prime Minister, John Kotelawale expressed his views and said, that "I have all my life been opposed to this lamentable. And if there is anything that I can do, whether in my capacity or any where else to stop the further advance of communism, I shall certainly do it".¹ However, they had different attitude towards China and Soviet Union. Lalithe Raj Pakasa, a UNP member said, "I have no sympathy for Russia but, I am quite sure that Ceylon has a great deal of sympathy and good will for China..... ... I earnestly hope she will be able to shake off the Russia impedements and get rid of the Dolshevik hindrances that stand in the way of her progress".² UNP leadership never branded China as an aggressive communist power John Kotelawale once expressed his opinion -

"We have no reason to consider Red China a growing menace to peace in South Asia. We have to observe its actions before we come to such a conclusion. China has its own troubles and so long as it keeps its redness to itself and does not seek to impose it on others, there would be tittle justification to consider it menace".³

China was the first country with whom Ceylon established trade relations. In 1951 Sri Lanka sold rubber to

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1. Between Two Words, "The Collected Speeches of the Right Honourable Sir John Kotelawale, Ceylon, 1954, p. 30.
 2. Ceylon, Senate Debates, vol. 5, June 26, 1951,
 3. The Observer, London, September 12, 1951.

China "Not so much from economic motives as from economic compulsions".¹ Ceylon's administration was cautious about Chinese closeness and Sri Lanka even refused to permit the visit of the Chinese good will mission to Sri Lanka in 1953 because Sri Lanka considered "visiting communists were apt to disseminate more harm than goodwill".²

When Bandaranaike came to power there emerged "New Sri Lanka" with new look and neutralist policy. British evacuate Trincomalee naval base on 15th October 1957 and Katunayake air base on November 1, 1957, Sri Lanka also granted diplomatic ^{sanction} ~~recognition~~ to China and USSR.

China offered economic assistance and cultured cooperation. An agreement on Economic Aid was signed between the two countries providing for Sri Lanka Rs. 75 million in commodities spread over a period of five years.³

In 1965 when Dudley Senanayake took over, he declared his adherence to non alignment and friendship with all nations. His attitude towards the communist countries was cautious and at times strained particularly with China during the cultural revolutions.

After the 1971 war, the balance of power in South Asia to the extent it had existed earlier between India and Pakistan disappeared. China constituted the principal 'counter weight and the ceylon's government considered its relations with China in this context. China also increased its interest in Lanka's affairs and offered" fullest

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1. Carden John, "Ceylon's Trade with China The Economic Background", New Commonwealth, London, vol.25, p.377.
 2. Kotelawall, Sir John, An Asia Prime Minister's Story, London, 1956, p. 115.
 3. Ceylon Daily News, July 3, 1956.

cooperation to speed up the socialist march of Ceylon by helping it economically and in every otherway appreciated later on and said, "a relationship based on mutual respect and good will has sufficient substance to stand by itself with out the need for formalization. we, therefore, sincerely appreciate the understanding which China has shown in its relation. With us these relations are a model of interstate relations".¹

J.R. Jayewardene, advocated for "independent foreign policy" Rubber, Rice, Agreement was changed for the Sixth Time. Both China and Sri Lanka condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka said, "the principle of intervention or to give it legitimacy in any form would be to make small state vulnerable and powerful states belligerent".²

1. Gamira Navaratne, The Chinese Connection, Colombo, 1976, p. 81.

2. Kodikara, note 1, p. 154.

The Disintegration of the Soviet Union and after - Effect on India

The Soviet interest in South Asia were determined by its conception of global strategic interests. The beginning of its regional states in the developments in South Asia can be traced more particularly since 1950's, because of two major factors, viz. Pakistan's adherence to American military pacts; and the Soviet rift with China.¹

The process of image building was initiated by Khrushchev during 1950's through the projection of ideas based on the spectacular growth of the Soviet military and economic power under the Soviet dominated socialist bloc to help the newly liberated "peace-loving, anti-imperialist nations, such as India, in their political and economic development".²

In August 1971, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko came to New Delhi and signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and cooperation, the first of its kind that India had signed.³ The Indo-Soviet Treaty within provisions indicating the determination of the two powers to repel aggression and stipulating immediate mutual consultations in case either country has subjected to attack from outside unevitably aroused suspicion and dismay in the West and angered Peking.⁴ The Treaty lent a new dimension to the

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1. Shelton, Kodikara; Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia, New Delhi, 1984, p. 45.
 2. Gupta Sen, Bhabani, Soviet-Asian Relation in 1970's and Beyond, An Interperceptional Study, New York 1976, p. 107.
 3. For text of the Treaty, See Foreign Affairs Record, August 1971, p. 161.
 4. Dutt, V.P., India's Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1984, p. 154.



Indo-Soviet relationship wherein Soviet backing came to be crucial forwarding off the most serious threat to India's integrity and socio-economic policy.

Individual humans dies when they do finally and irretrivably, whether death comes suddenly or in a lingering manner. It is not the same with nations, states or countries. Through the history of centuries one has seen how they evolve, growing strong or weak^a culturally, economically, geo-politically or militarily. They either flower or bloom, or wilt and drop. Occasionally, they lose territory, or gain, or regain it. Sometimes there is an effort to erase them through war but, mostly such a phenomenon ultimately proves a temporary one. The mix of history and geography and literary, cultural and ethnic traditions, that fashion nations and people and countries is such that they hardly if ever, can be said to die in a fuial or irretrievable manner.¹

Lenin must have thought that he had destroyed the Czar's family but not his domain. Many think today that the Soviet confederation is dead^{ad}, never again to be seen on the world stage. One can not state with any finality what kind of picture will emerge in those territories, a quarter of a century, or half a century, down the road. After all we have just witnessed chancellor Kohl regain the territories lost by chancellor Hitler^{Hitler}.

On December 8, 1991 the death Knell toiled for Soviet Union. Leaders of the three slavic republics - Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - called for the creation of a commonwealth of independent states (CIS) to replace

1. TRISHUL, Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India, vol. V, No. 1, July 1993, p. 1.

the impolding Soviet State left moribund in the wake of the failed August Coup. Within two weeks this contederation had replaced the decaying Union, with eleven former Union Republics joining the CIS. The newly independent Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decided not to join as did Georgia. The once powerful central apparatus in Moscow, weakened by failing economic output and a lack of popular legitimacy, was unable to fight off the final blows against it. The Soviet Union officially passed into history on December 25, 1991, taking with it the legacy of the world's first socialist state committed to the task of restructuring society.¹

The death of Soviet Union did not alleviate the immense problems that faced the new commonwealth. Rather, the problems of the former all union governments were placed squarely in the hands of the eleven member states. It was left to the new commonwealth foreign policy structure to sort out the problems of the Soviet Union international debt, the remnants of the Soviet Army, and most alarmingly for the West, the fate of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The Soviet successor states have managed the drive each other apart, with petty turf battles over the removal of Soviet troops from their territory, the imposition of trade restrictions, and discrimination against non majority ethnic communities. Vice President Alek Sandra Russkoi, called for a re-establishment of Russian hegemony over

1. Brian V. Souders and Roger E. Kanet, "An Emerging Interstate System, Russia and Other Former Republics of USSR", Occasional Paper, John D. and Catherine T. Mac Arthur Foundation, University of Illioniss, September 1992, p. 1.

the erstwhile republics of the Soviet Union.¹

After the demise of the USSR, the Western and Soviet concerns focussed immediately on the issue of control of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapon arsenal. Among the first provision of the new CIS security structures was the agreement on the control of the nuclear stockpile. On December 23, 1991, the four nuclear states of the CIS (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) signed an agreement on joint measures of Nuclear Weapons. It followed the Soviet non-first use pledge of nuclear weapons and granted control over eventual usage to the Central CIS authorities. The article of the agreement noted that until nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated on the territory of (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), decisions on the need to use them will be taken, by agreement with the heads of the member states of the agreement by the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic (RSFSR) president, on the basis of the procedure drawn up jointly by the member states.² This agreement was strengthened further by the agreement between the Member States of the commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic Forces of December 30, 1991. Article 3 of the agreement laid that the member states agree to the joint control of the nuclear weapons of the former USSR. Article 4 has Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan relinquishing control of their nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation for destruction

1. Eduerd Kondratov, Vizit A. Rutslogo V. Pridnestrov's Izvestia, April 6, 1992. Cited in Suzanne Crow, Russians Relations with Members of the Commonwealth, RFE/RL, Research Report, vol. 1, No. 19, 1992, p. 11.

2. Agreement on Joint Measures on Nuclear Weapons, Pravda, December 23, 1991, p.2; in FBIS-SU, December 23, 1991, p. 30.

by the end of 1994.¹ Belarus was to be free of strategic nuclear weapons' by 1996 or 1997, reported by Chairman of the commission for Matters of National Security of the Belarusian Parliament.² The Kazakhstan's missiles were to be returned to Russian territory by 1994.³

Ukraine President suggested that an international commission needed to be set up, consisting of the four nuclear states of the CIS, but also international observers, to assure that the missiles were actually dismantled. Kravchuck proposed the establishment of a nuclear processing region in Ukraine to take care of nuclear waste within republic. Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin emphasized the problems of dissolving the unified command of the army.

The real conflict in the CIS arose when Ukraine claimed control over the Black Sea fleet as the new independent navy, but Ruslam Khasbulatov of Russian Supreme Soviet, claimed that all the fleets naturally belong in their entirety to Russia.⁴

In addition to the above problems between the CIS members, there were economic problems. The highly integrated structure of the centralized Soviet economic system meant that economic developments in one republics or

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1. An agreement between the Member States of the commonwealth of independent states on Strategic Forces, TASS International Service, December 31, 1991, in FBIS-SU, December 31, 1991, p. 17.
 2. TASS, January 26, 1992, in FBIS-CE, January 27, 1992, p. 59.
 3. POSTFACTUM, January 25, 1992; in FBIS-CE January 27, 1992, p. 53.
 4. For the Moment the Guns Are Silent. It is the Politicians Who Are Exchanging Shots, Izvestiia, December 28, 1991, p. 2; in FBIS-CE, January 14, 1992, p. 15.

region would have almost immediate influence elsewhere. TASS referred to the commonwealth as a way to promote economic development in the former Soviet Republics.¹ The member states of the CIS proposed the formulation of an International Economic Commonwealth. Its role was to institute a common economic area for market relations with the free movement of goods, labour, services and capital. It called for improving the currency and tax regulations. Finally it called for coordination of the development of inter-republic trade relations.²

While the economic collapse hastened the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the commonwealth states have been facing severe economic challenges. Production of industrial and agricultural goods has been going down steadily during last few years. In 1991, the decline was officially reported to be 20-30 per cent over the level of 1990. Budgetary deficit reached to a very high level. Soviet external debts swelling to 80-100 billion.³

Despite agreements concerning continued economic collaboration, problems arose almost immediate in the arena of ethnic nature. The ethnic situation of groups unleashed from central rule has proven to be the bloodiest part of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soviet rule had promoted the ideal of a nation where the 130 ethnic groups lived together in peace and harmony. Ethnic problems

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1. TASS, December 18, 1991; FBIS-SU; December 19, 1991, p. 20.
 2. Draft Treaty on 'Instituting International Economic Commonwealth, Izvestiia, January 13, 1992, p. 3; in FBIS-CE, January 14, 1992, p. 6.
 3. Kothari, Raj Kumar, Demise of Soviet Union, Third World Impact, Bombay, August 1992, p. 7.

became a major headache for Mikhail Gorbachev in the waning days of the Soviet Union. Apart from it human rights involving minorities were one of the highlights of the initial meetings of the CIS but, were not sustained.¹

One of the most unexpected results of the demise of the Soviet State has been the fact that the focus of Moscow's foreign policy concerns is now the former republics of the former Soviet Union.

The External Relations with Asian States

These new emerged countries are conscious of their 'Asianness', as also their Islamic identity. With the disappearance or removal of the old heroes of the Soviet era, they are busy discovering new ethnic cultural heroes like Ali Sher Nawai in Uzbekistan and the poet Abai in Kazakhstan. These countries recognize their traditional historical, cultural, geo-graphical and religious links with Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan and China. Kirghizistan and Kazakhstan, also seeing the logic of geography and of economic requirements, they are working to build closer relations with South Korea, China and Japan. The Arabs are showing great interest in the emergence of these republics. Basically it is their attraction as Muslims mingle with curiosity about how communism has affected their perceptions. The Saudis have made a beginning by inviting the state recognized Muftis and Mullahs of these countries to join the Rabita-al-Islami and by sending hundred of thousands of copies of the

1. Moscow, Central Television, December 21, 1991; in FBIS-SU, p. 34.

Holy Quran for distribution. The new Republics can not afford to appear unsympathetic to these moves as they expect Arab and oil countries to a future gain. Since Pandit Nehru's two visits to this area, in 1956 and 1961 India forged special cultural and economic links with Central Asia even while these republics were part of Soviet realm.¹

This region of Central Asia is full of historical memories. Places with evocative names intimately tied up with India's political architectural, artistic and dynastic history. Samarkand, Tashkent, Bokhera, Alam Ata, Askhabad and Ahokbad are all part of the medieval lore. Babar's beloved Ferghane Valley Andijan City and Ulugh Begs observatory in Samarkand are known places.

Soviet Union marked a certain stage in Indo-Soviet relations. Both countries so adjusted their relationship that it has survived the radical changes in the international order in Asia and in Europe not to forget the growing understanding between the super powers.² On Indian territorial integrity and security on Kashmir and in all the established sphere of Indo-Soviet cooperation, the Soviet stand has remained substantially the same. Soviet Union, consistently taken a strong stand against nuclear non-proliferation, it has cooperated with India in the nuclear field, despite India's opposition to the NPT. For some past India's special relations' came into hot exchange. Ms. E. Arefeva criticised the Izvestia and

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1. Singh, S.K., "The Demise of the Soviet Union and After", TRISHUL, Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India, vol. 5, No. 1, July 1992, p. 4.
 2. Noorani, A.G., "Indo-Soviet Relations Today", Indian Express, New Delhi, August 21, 1990.

said, that the ideologized policy of sustaining special relations between India and the Soviet Union also lacks geo-political clarity.¹ Alexander Mozgovoi on the point of supply of another submarine to India criticised Russia and said why did nuclear fuel to the fire of Indo-Pakistan disputes² further he added that the supplying nuclear submarine to India runs counter to the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into the zone of peace. Not all this a new. On October 26, 1989, a Soviet journal specialising in American affairs, U.S.A. Economics, Politics, Ideology, urged Moscow and Washington to take joint steps to restrict Arms sales to the countries in the Indian sub-continent on the basis of principles of responsible sufficiency, it added that the two could discuss a number of concrete joint steps regarding promotion of the policy of nuclear weapons.³ Russian Foreign Ministry was of the view that while maintaining close relations with India, Russia should not let it be interpreted that its policy is deliberately pro-India. A draft concept paper prepared by Russia Foreign Ministry said, that 'On the whole the policy towards India should be pragmatically renewed based on realistic possibilities and the legitimate interests of both sides with an emphasis on economic stimuli.'⁴

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1. E. Arefeva is an expert of economics in Moscow.
 2. Moscow News, Moscow, July 8, 1990.
 3. Noorani, A.G., "Indo-Soviet Relations today", Indian Express, New Delhi, August 21, 1990.
 4. Indian Express, New Delhi, November 23, 1992.

India thought otherwise and considered the Russian changes on the basis of time-tested relationship¹ between them. India and the erstwhile Soviet Union were able to develop a unique phenomenon in the world by developing what came to be known as the Rupee-Rouble rate of exchange. It kept dollars and hard currencies out of all transactions between the two countries, and increased upto Rs. 9000 crores in 1990. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union Rupee-Rouble exchange system has now broken down. There is practically no movement now either in the sphere of trade or in joint ventures, between India and the CIS Republics. The Russian Federation is still willing to maintain this old Rupee-Rouble rate.²

India and Russia finalized a new political treaty and signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) on trade and supplies of defence and power generation equipments in 1992. The political treaty contained elements of the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, while the memorandum on trade, defence and power equipments have been structured to all flexibility to meet changes. Indian delegate described the steps as the 'finalization of the political treaty as a positive response from India to Russian President Boris Yeltsin's suggestions for such a arrangement'.³ The two countries agreed on a two year transitional arrangement that would ensure continuity of all existing contracts between the two, specially with regard to the defence supplies, spares and setting up of power projects.

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1. Vats, B.R., "India and Russia; New Perspectives", Hindustan Times, New Delhi, October 13, 1992.
 2. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, October 13, 1992.
 3. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 16, 1992.

In January 1993, India and Russian Federation reached on understanding on utilization and liquidation of Indian technical credit by the latter, repayment of Russian loans and improvements of counter trade arrangements.¹ India agreed that Russia could utilize till May 31, 1993 the technical credit granted by the former in 1992. For liquidating the 285 million credit, Russian Federation agreed to pay India Rs. 850 crore by transferring this amount from the Central Account of the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs with Reserve Bank to the Central Account of the Bank for Foreign Trade with RBI. As regards Russian debt, it was decided that the funds received from India as repayments of credits granted by the erstwhile Soviet Union shall be utilized by Russia for purchase of goods and services. In pursuance of the five years bilateral agreement on trade and economic cooperation signed on May, 1992, the two sides agreed that persons of either country shall be free to import and export goods and services from each country.² Mr. Kremenjuk Deputy Director of the Institute of USA and Canada in Moscow said, "in the post-cold war world, the only super power was using all the means at its disposal to win contracts and guarantee for itself a major place under the sun". A space expert further added that ('The American have become the world's policeman and we have no option but, to follow when they blow the whistle').³ India regretted on Saturday (July 18, 1993) the Russian decision to cancel the cryogenic rocket engine deal.⁴

1. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 29, 1993.

2. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 29, 1993.

3. The Sunday Times, Delhi, July 18, 1993.

4. Indian Express, New Delhi, July 18, 1993.

The visit of President Boris Yeltsin proved very successful. For the first time Moscow considered Delhi as an equal partner rather than a client state. This explains the offer of defence joint ventures rather than the existing Licence - production implies equal sharing of finances, joint research, development and exports. Whereas Licence production means assembling of ~~important~~ components,, called semi knock Down (SKD) and complete knock-down (CKD).¹ A more practical suggestion was the offer of spares technology transfer and joint ventures, both of which, however, were limited to the use depending upon the cost-effectiveness on case to case basis.

A solution was sought for very urgent equipments for the defence purpose by transfer of technology to India. Speaking to the members of Parliament and other eminent persons, President Yeltsin talked of an overall Asian policy as the Russian objective and the improvement in Russian - Chinese and Sino-Indian relations were perceived as part of this policy.

The relations of India with the CIS countries remained more sympathetic than expected. It was expected that the new Republics will move towards Pakistan as a muslim majority country and Pakistan was also hopeful to make a confederation of these countries including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia to fulfill its growing ambitions. Kazakhstan signed two pacts with India on May 25, 1993 for bilateral cooperation in political, trade, economic, scientific, ecological cultural and information areas.² India Uzbekistan signed five agreements to promote

1. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 30, 1993.

2. Times of India, New Delhi, May 26, 1993.

cooperation in the economic and commercial fields, science and technology,^{and}/tourism.¹ The agreement on cooperation between the foreign ministries provided for regular consultations every year and to train Kazakh diplomats. Another agreement on Science and technology stated that the governments would promote development of cooperation in area of mutual interest, and for close interaction between scientific institutions. The agreement was valid for five years. President Nazarbaev said, that the future was in favour of Asia which had immense human resources, but, unfortunately the continent was riven with conflict which could be only resolved by the Asian nations themselves.²

There were some differences over the supply of cryogenic engine by Russia under pressure from the USA, which India considered discriminatory in its attitude. The U.S. has not been able to subscribe to stop China from providing M-11 and other missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia. India, considered it a voluntary agreement and not binding. The future of Indo-Russian cooperation in the defence field does not seem very bright either despite agreements and promises. The supply of spares for the equipment supplied by the former Soviet Union to the Indian armed forces which had stopped completely has yet to pick up. It is not possible to tie up supplies from individual manufactures numbering above 3000 spread over the CIS. The search for spare for AN-32 transport aircraft has been intensified in the Ukraine.

In the political field, admittedly India is a vital factor in Russia's Asian policy but due to the woes of the

1. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 30, 1993.

2. Times of India, New Delhi, May 26, 1993.

crisis - ridden national economy during its transition to market relations and pressure from United States, the Russia's policy towards South Asia and specifically India may be changed.¹ Jyoti, Malhotra, rightly observed that the days of 'Hindu-Russi Bhai Bhai' are over. Those old Soviet hands who so pains takingly developed a special relationship between the two nations may now be told that they belong to a super fluuous generation, while the pragmatist knights of a new shinning order hold up candles to terminologies such as 'Self interest' and 'Commerce'.

1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 22, 1993.

CHAPTER - III

A S I A

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Asia

Asia is in the process of emerging into the modern era and establishing new pattern of relationship with rest of the world. The continent's shifting from neo-colonialism to nationalism is symptomatic of a new order of affairs. Although the revolution for national independence in Asia is over, the more deep rooted "revolution of rising expectations" is proceeding. The masses of the people are beginning to be articulate - a development that has revolutionary implications for the world. Asia will play a more active role in world politics, a role more commensurate with its size, its population, and its might. Robert Payne rightly observed, "the major task of our generation is the understanding of Asia, for Asia represents potentially the mastery of the world in manpower and resources".¹ Asia is geographically divided into six major land regions, separated from one another by mountains - Northern Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Asia, South-East Asia, South-West Asia and South Asia.

(A) South Asia

South Asia consists of India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives.² This region lies South of Himalayan mountains. It is rich in natural resources. It is bounded on the North by Asiatic Russia and China, on the South by the Arabian sea, the bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean. On the West by Iran and on the East by Thailand and Laos. The most important of the states is India, with which Pakistan forms an enormous

1. Robert Payne, The Revolt of Asia, New York : The John Day Company, 1947, p. 290.

2. See Annexure 1 to 7 for details about the countries.

peninsula commonly referred to as a sub-continent. This peninsula is joined to the great land mass of Asia ring of smaller states and is separated from the South China Sea by Burma and the Malaya Peninsula.¹ The region contains vast human and material resources several regioned countries possess impressive political skills and military establishments to back them up.² The demarcation of South Asia as a region has been achieved through South Asian Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Forum. India covers the largest area with a population of 847.1 million and Maldives islands having the highest per capita GNP of 470 US dollars. The comparative figures are given below :

Country	Capital	Area Sq.kms.	Population million 1990 est.	GNP per- centage (US dollars)
Bangladesh	Dhaka	1,43,999	118.0	208
Bhutan	Thimphu	46,500	1.6	160
India	New Delhi	3,287,263	847.1	310
Maldives	Male	298	0.2	470
Nepal	Kathmandu	147,181	19.1	160
Pakistan	Islamabad	976,096	113.1	365
Sri Lanka	Colombo	66,610	17.1	420

In whole of the world there is no other region forming such natural boundaries as this sub-continent. In the North four thousand kilometers stands Himalays and

1. Das, S.T., The South Asian Countries, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad, p. 41.
2. Thornton, P. Thomas, The Security of South Asia, Analysis and speculations in Stephen P. Cohen, (ed.), The Security of South Asia, American and Asian Perspective, Vistar Publications, New Delhi, 1987.

Hindu Kush ranges. The mountains separating the sub-continent from Iran, Afghanistan and the Islamic world to the West are less impressive, but are buttressed by extensive semi-arid winter lands on both sides of the frontier. South Asia is comprised of a rich mosaic of religions, languages, races and cultures and is heterogeneous in nature. Hindus are the majority community in India and Nepal, Muslims are in majority in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Maldives and in minority in India and Nepal. The distribution of linguistic ethenic communities across the state system in South Asia makes harder the problems caused by religious heterogeneity. Bengalis, both Hindus and Muslims constitute about 98% of the populations of Bangladesh, large number of people in West Bengal and Tripura in India, and a good number in Assam, Punjabi speakers form about two-thirds of this population in Pakistan and Punjab and Haryana states of India. Urdu the national language of Pakistan is the home language of more families in India than in Pakistan. There are Hindi speakers in Nepal, Nepali speakers in India and Bhutan, Tamil speakers in Sri Lanka, and English is used as a common language even after forty six years of independence.

It was India's status the principal entrepot in a complicated but, highly profitable oceanic trade structure that made the Western and Southern coastal areas of South Asia, so vital to a succession of maritime empires, from the West Asian Muslims Commercial entities in the eleventh to fourteenth centuries to the Portuguese, Dutch, French and British colonial powers in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. India became the jewel in the crown of the British Empire in Asia due to its role as the fulcrum, upon which the British Imperial and commercial system in Asia was balanced, with the result that external world dares to intrude upon South Asia.

At least 23 major languages and several hundred minor languages and dialects are spoken throughout the region and the foreign policies of each region in South Asia are separate.

(f) Nationalism in South Asia

The power equilibrium which prevailed throughout most of the Asia at the turn of century was shattered due to the national consciousness of the Asian people and weakness of the colonial powers. Invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931 inaugurated a campaign of expansion in Asia and created the opportunities which culminated world war II. Japanese slogan "Asia for the Asians" had explosive effects which lasted long after the sun of Nippon had set in the waters of the pacific. The defeat of Japan created a vacuum in the international balance of power in the Far East and United States and Soviet Union rushed to fill the vacuum. Howsoever, US could not raise its suitability in Asian continent and reservoir of goodwill has reached a new low. Besides, the United States has never before been so deeply involved in Asian affairs; her influence is considerable, even if her objective and intentions are often misunderstood and her policies and action widely criticized. The Asian nationalism which confronts the world today is, ideologically and emotionally considered, not an internal dynamic springing from the older pre-modern Asian cultures. It is, instead, an entirely valid response to massive Western emotional and spritual demands.¹ Japan for instance, was the first of the Asian countries to be influenced by modern nationalism,

1. Asian Nationalism : "Some Psychiatric Aspects of Political Minesis", Psychiatry XVII, August 1954, p. 262.

strongly flavoured by traditional practices and beliefs.¹ What happened under Mac Arthur in Japan has paved the way for the insurgence of Japanese, Ultra nationalism.² In addition, the growth of modern nationalism in China has been very great. The concept of one nation among many was foreign to Chinese tradition. Positive Chinese nationalism however, goes back to the late years of Manchu Rule and from the Revolution of 1911-12. Its greatest leader was Dr. Sun Yat Sen the father of the Chinese Republic. Chiang-Kai-Shek also promoted the ideology of Nationalism. He said, "In order to enable to pass from instability to safety it is necessary that education throughout the country focus on the concept of state hood, and place the ideology of nationalism before anything else".³

In India Revolt of 1857 was the first organised expression of anti-foreign sentiments. The birth of nationalism may be dated back to the formation of Indian National Congress in 1885. The congress soon became the dynamic, consolidated expression of Indian nationalism. In 1920 Gandhi launched a campaign of non-violence and force were resorted to by some of his non-followers. Both Gandhi and Tagore subordinated the idea of Nationalisms', as representing the political power and economic mastery of the state, to the less materialistic and more spiritual conception

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1. Yoshida Shoin and a few of his disciples who became leaders of Meiji Japan exposed views which might be described as nationalistic or even ultranationalistic in the mid nineteenth century. Japanese Nationalism and Expansionism. The American Historical Review, LX (July 1955), pp. 820-821.
 2. Hessell Tilkman "Japan : The Strictly Democratic Banjai", The Reporter, March 20, 1951, p. 19.
 3. Shek, Chiau-Kai, 'China's Destiny', English translation by Philip Suffe, New York, Roy Publishers, 1974, p. 462.

that nationalism means the well-being development and unity of its people.¹ While addressing the joint session of congress in May 17, 1956, Sukarno, President of Indonesia declared that, "Nationalism may be an out of date doctrine for many in this world, for us of Asia and Africa, it is the main-spring of our efforts understand that, and you have the key to much of post-War history".

Thus, nationalism has proved a dynamic force in Asia. It played an important part in the independence of the Asian countries. It was the importation from abroad. The origin of nationalisms in Asia was in the nature of a rebound from the European imperialism of the last century.²

India achieved the freedom in 1947 but, at the cost of partition³ the Chinese attack on India in 1962 was a threat to India's security which, however glorious, India acquired through the war, results of 1971 with Pakistan, Nehru said that "Nationalism has a place in each country and should be fostered, but, it need not be allowed to become aggressive and come in the way of International developments".

-(C) The Security of South Asia

The strategic importance of South Asia lies in its geographical location as also its political, cultural and ethnic structure. South Asia lies in the center of two volatile regions of West Asia and South-East Asia and dominates the vital Sea Communication between the West and

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1. Mery E. Towmerd with the collaboration of CH Peake, European Colonial Expansion since 1871, Philadelphia, JP Lippinestt Co. 1941, p. 412.
 2. Sen, B.R., "Nationalism and the Asian Awakening", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science CCL. July 1952, p. 110.
 3. Asian Relations. A report of the proceedings and documentations of the first Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March 1987, p. 26.

East. A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.¹ Stanley Hoffman has defined national security as the "protection of a nation from physical attack and safeguarding its economic activities from devastating outside blows".² Arnold Wolters pleaded the security as a value of which a nation can aspire to have in greater or lesser measures. It has much in common in this respect with power or wealth, two other values of great importance in international affairs. But, while wealth measures amount of a nation's material possession and power its ability to control the actions of others, security in an objective sense measures the absence of threats that such values will be attacked.

The meaning and nature of security differs from nation to nation as each of them face a distinct type of threat. The nations which are strong though, their security surrounds towards protecting the external threat. The nations which are weak, they had to face a generated threat in their domestic sphere. The third world nations fall under the latter conditions which don't have or have failed to generate a domestically strong political and social consensus to eliminate large scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political and social life

1. Lippman, Walter, US Foreign Policy, Sila of Republic Boston, 1943, p. 51.

2. Hoffman, Stanley, "Security in the age of Turbulence : Means of Response in Third World, Conflict and International Security", Adelphi Papers, no. 167, Summer 1981, p. 4-5.

of the nation.¹ Speculation about the future of South Asian security, says Thomas P. Thornton, can be discouraging because the range of this future seems to be between the desirable and unacceptable. Despite its lack of formal institutions or even the objectives South Asia definitely constitutes a system.² With the cold war having shifted to the Asian sub-continent, South Asia and South East Asia fall as a region of interest to the super powers. Most of the maritime sea routes pass through the hemisphere and admittedly this industrially under-developed region is rich in manpower, natural resources and therefore a good market to the foreign powers and have increased the importance of the sub-continent from strategic point of view.

The Soviet intervention and presenceⁱⁿ the Asian region has proved to be more effective and durable than those of its two rivals, the United States and China.³ After the demise of USSR, the Chinese policy of "no peace no war" has affected the balance of power in the region. The Chinese view of the external world has designed the complex historical geographical and other factors that have constituted to a military doctrine emphasizing a strategy for defence against invasion by superior enemy forces. China is following it through large conventional forces capable of fighting a protected war and a credible nuclear retaliatory capability. China's nuclear forces and the doctrine of peoples

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1. Barry Buzan, People, States and Feers : The National Security Problem in International Relations, Transasian Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, p. 18.
 2. Thornton, P. Thomas, "The Security of South Asia, Analysis and Speculations" in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.) 'The Security of South Asia, American and Asian Perspectives, p. 214.
 3. Rose, E. Leo, "The Super Powers in South Asia", Orbis, A Journal of World Affairs, 22(1), 1978-79, p. 365.

war are pillars of Chinese deterrence. China's primary strategic area lies in its neighbouring region, with which it shares common boundaries.

The cold war between the East and the West, principally between United States and Soviet Union was fought on many fronts, such as monolithic communist block one side and the containment of communism on the other. It went through a period of rivalry and confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact. In 1985 Gorbachev declaring the policy said that our Asia-Pacific platform is originally linked with our programme of stopping the arms race and liquidating the nuclear threat to man kind.¹ In terms of India's security concerns, the Soviet Union played a dual role as a direct supplier of arms and a licensor of certain classes of military hardware produced in India.

Both the United States and the USSR regarded India as the preponderant power in South Asia, but, Chinese stake in some South Asian countries precluded it from considering India in the same light. Japan too began to take interest in South Asia. The Japanese Prime Minister in May 1979 expressed that the development of friendly relations between Japan and China as between the United States and China have broadened the foundation for our Asian policies. Japan will act in close concert with United States and Western Europe to extend appropriate cooperation to China's economic development efforts.²

1. Muni, S.D., India and Gorbachev's Asia Pacific Security Proposal, Stockholm, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1988, p. 7.

2. Saburo Okita, Japan, China and the United States' Economic Relations and Prospects, Foreign Affairs, September 1979, Council of Foreign Relations Inc., New York.

Robert H. Donaldson observed, "The 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty was perceived by Moscow not simply as a guarantor of India's preponderance over Pakistan but as a symbol of 'a special relationship' between itself and the New Delhi aimed at jointly balancing the regional influences of Peking and Moscow.¹ In the changing world order, the Indo-Soviet Treaty and Pakistan alliance with US have lost their importance. Pakistan's value as a strategic ally of the US has too been reduced due to end of Afghanistan war and has come within the ambit of the Pressler Amendment.

(d) Internal Security Dimensions :

There are winds of change, blowing across South Asia, but some of these are having effect of reviving old traditions and of giving new importance to old institutions like caste, community and religion. The extent of separation of powers, the freedom of mass media, individual rights of expression and conscience, the standards of living of the masses, geographical and social mobility are some of the participatory characters of political system. The countries of South Asia have mixed boundaries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Nepal and Pakistan having common border with India separately and individually in terms of their cultural identities, economic patterns, philosophical trends and historical experience. Conversely there is a bit of India in every other country of South Asia.² Pakistani leaders tend to forget that - India - a much larger country has common border not only with Pakistan, but also with a number of

1. Robert H. Donaldson, "The USSR, the sub-continent and the Indian Ocean", in Lawrence Zining, (ed). The sub-continent in World Politics, New York, 1978. For details of Treaty See Appendix 8.

2. Muni, S.D., 'South Asia' in Mohammad Ayub (ed.) Conflict and Intervention in Third world, Vikas, New Delhi, 1980, p. 131.

(e) SAARC and South Asia

The genesis of regional cooperation in South Asia can be traced to 1945 when Jawahar Lal Nehru had advocated the need to establish South Asian federation for unity, peace and progress in the region. The initial conference was convened in New Delhi in March 1947. Nehru emphasized the need of cooperation to find solution for the common problems, and said :

"The countries of Asia, we must remember, are very backward and the standards of living are appallingly low. These economic problems demand urgent solution or else crisis and disaster may overwhelm us. We have therefore, to think in terms of the common man and fashion our political, social and economic structure so that the burdens that have crushed him may be removed and may have full opportunities for growth".¹

Substantial progress was made in this regard because the Asian continent was denied against itself. The growth of militarization in various parts of the world also contributed to undermining the process of regional cooperation. The political and social structure of newly emerging nations also began to disintegrate due to their internal weaknesses and external intervention.²

One of the most significant facets of contemporary international politics has been the proliferation of regional groups whereby most of the regions of the globe have been covered. In fact the whole of Europe (East and West), America (both North and South) Africa and the Arab world and South East Asia have been covered by distinct regional groups. The NATO, the EEC, the OAU, the ASEAN

1. Nehru, Jawahar Lal, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September, 1946 - April 1961, New Delhi, p.29.

2. Professor Rajni Kothari perceptively observes that due to "a growing permeation of the super powers tempo of militarization has accentuated a sense of insecurity and mutual suspicion compelled them to choose to encircle the global, Rajni Kothari, State and Nation Building in the Third World, Bombay, 1976, p. 8.

and LAFTA are some of the important regional organisations which emerged after the second world war. The progress of SAARC is based upon the proximity of ASEAN and the general influence of the cautious approach of the ECAFE/ESCAP philosophy of regionalism that has influenced the general thinking of the Asian bureaucrafts. Regional cooperation has emerged as an important factor during the post second world war period. Post colonial countries tended together in many groups. There are forty five such groupings among the developing and less developed nations, five in Asia, eleven in Latin America and Caribbean, nineteen in Africa and ten of inter-regional nature.

In the regional and inter regional cooperation the main force lies in the urge to ensure the participants and to create confidence about their interest and safety. Although in the intra-regional and inter-regional cooperation the states are the dominant participants, but the interaction process, to a great extent, is influenced by the "intrusive forces". The external powers play a great part in shaping the nature of the cooperation.

South Asian countries have many problems of mass poverty, hunger, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy and dogmatism. On the other hand, the high level of inflation and the increasing rate of unemployment have accentuated domestic problems.¹ The reluctance on the part of the developed world to increase Official Development Assistance (ODA) on liberal terms have led Third World leaders to believe that greater South-South cooperation is essential despite their inherent handicaps and limitations.²

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1. Jackson, A. Robert, South Asian Crisis : India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, New Delhi, 1978, p. 103.
 2. Haza Hasemlung and Karlsauvans, The New International Economic Order, Confrontation and Co-operation Between North and South, Boulder, 1977.

The acronym SAARC was adopted only after the first summit of heads of state and government held in Dhaka on 7-8 December 1985. The proposal for establishing a regional forum of seven South Asian States-Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka - was originally made by President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh in May 1980 and was followed by working paper circulated by his country entitled "The proposal for Regional Cooperation in South Asia" in November 1980. The modus operandi for South Asian regionalism was eventually worked out through the meetings held up at foreign Secretariat level, beginning on April 1981. In August 1983, President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan observed "It would be beneficial for us all to make a collective pledge, renouncing the threat or use of force against one another."¹

At the same occasion Jigme Singye Wangchuk king of Bhutan reiterated that,

"In the geo-political realities of our region, it would be unrealistic to ignore the primary of the political factor, as, in the final analysis, it would be political environment of the region, which will determine the shape and scope of the regional cooperation in South Asia. The main obstacle is not only to overcome the psychological and emotional barriers of the past but the fears, anxieties and apprehensions of the present".²

The foreign ministers of the seven countries issued a Declaration on South Asian regional cooperation (SARC) which defined objectives and principles and the institutional and financial arrangements for the new organization.

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1. Address by General Mohammed Zia ul Haq, President Islamic Republic of Pakistan at SAARC Summit Meeting December 7, 1985, p. 7.
 2. Address of His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuk, King of Bhutan to the First SAARC Summit Meeting, Dhaka, 7-8 December 1985.

In the Second Summit Meeting Rajiv Gandhi putting emphasis on regional cooperation summarised -

"The important statements made by each one of you yesterday, and the discussions that followed at Nandi Hills, showed that you at the mechanisms of regional cooperation ^{are} and meshing into gear, matters of grave national import, have impinged upon and permeated our deliberations - peace stability and security, confidence building and nuclear threat, non-violent and co-existence, the un-mitigated evil of terrorism. The lesson to be drawn is that the pertinent building of regional cooperation in identified areas of cooperation must take place in an atmosphere of good neighbourliness and responsible international behaviour".

South Asia represents one of the largest contiguous geographical unity of strategic importance with a vast population. Each country of the region has its own fears and apprehensions. The region has a tourmented and Iranmatic history of conflicts and clavages. Between India and Pakistan three wars have been faught. Besides several border clashes, the region is prone to ethnic tensions and troubles. Any step by the small countries for any regional cooperation may be a cause of countervailing mechanism and the same on the part of India "runs the risk of being instantly perceived by others particularly Pakistan, as yet another manifestation of India's hegemonism".¹

In fact, India, which commands more than 70 per cent of the land area population and national income of the region, does not need any regional cooperation when it has the capacity to act alone independently and any move by India for regional cooperation is understandable. In

1. Pande, Raja Ram, "Recent Development in South Asia", Asia Pacific Community, A Quarterly Review, Spring 1984, No. 24, Tokyo, p. 54.

fact, it was a widespread opinion that India should be generous towards his neighbour countries. Selig Harrison suggested,

"India should begin to show a sprit of large heartedness and magniamity that it has rarely displayed in dealing with its smaller neighbours. Indeed, in the absence of such a sprit, New Delhi is unlikely to win enduring acceptance of its regional preponderance regardless of the degree of military superiority it achieves.¹

The process of South Asian Regional Cooperation was initiated by the late President Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangladesh in 1980. The South Asian countries were of the view that they are being exploited of the "Unholy alliance" of power, privilege and technology.² The initiative of a regional cooperation may be traced to the developments of late seventees when the international economic situation had become difficult for South Asian and there was much enthusiasm to explore South Asian cooperation. The position of Bangladesh at that time was complex due to Gangawater dispute between India and Bangladesh. King Birendra endorsed the idea of regional cooperation in his inaugurol address to the Colombo Plan. In a consultative meeting he asked for cooperation among Asian countries such as India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and China.³ The western elite also supported the idea of regional cooperation when they visited South Asia in 1978. South Asian academicia also undertook studies of various dimensions of cooperation for development in South Asia with the financial backing of

1. "The Flames in South Asia Foreign Policy", New York, No. 45, Winter 1981-82, p. 99.

2. Ward House "Separate Unequal But More Autonomous Technology, Equity and World Order in, The Milennial, September 1980-357-407.

3. Text of the Speech in H.M. King Birendra's Proclamations, Speeches and Ranges, It is Majesty's Government Press, Kathmandu, 1982, p. 179.

international agencies including Western foundations¹. Defeat of Mrs. Gandhi in the elections and overthrow of ZA Bhutto in Pakistan also encouraged formation of an institution for regional cooperation. The Carter Doctrine in January 1980 for cooperative regional security framework gave birth to the SAARC in South Asia and GCC (Gulf Cooperative Council) in Persian Gulf.

Indias Support for the SAARC

The Indian ruling elite have planned foreign policy of the country with clear-cut objectives viz. national security, friendship with neighbours, development and world peace, SAARC can be considered as an offspring of NAM because it gave a major thrust to South-South cooperation and Economic Cooperation ^{on among} and Developing Countries (ECDC).

India's rulers have reiterated on many occasions that they respect the independence, autonomy and sovereignty of other South Asian countries. India has tried to assuage fears of the smaller nations that it does not want to harbour ulterior motives. India agreed to exchange scientific and technical knowledge with its neighbours in fields of health and population control. It also assured to cooperate curb chronic diseases and agreed to formulate research prospects to conduct in-depth studies so that impending natural disasters could be avoided. On a non governmental basis India has agreed to expend cooperation in Trade and Industry. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reiterated "Indians commitment to "search for peaceful and cooperative relations" with the neighbours, India also gave assurance to other nations of the sub-continent that India will settle bilateral problems through friendly and peaceful negotiations. However, South Asia bears a unique psycho-politics.

1. Committee in studies for cooperation in Development in South Asia (CSCD) has set up at Colombo.

Pram Chopra has rightly observed "Far from facilitating regional cooperation the overhang of history has cast a shadow upon South Asia, creating a fog of mistrust in which the problems of the centrality of India and the disparity between India and its neighbours form even larger than life".¹ Chopra further states that "although nature has created the Indian sub-continent as a single strategic whole, and although relevant parts of the subcontinent have been single strategic area for long periods in the past, during the past four decades inter-country relations through out South Asia have been poisoned by conflicting perceptions of threat".²

There are four types of conflicting perceptions of perceived threat in South Asia. In the first type, ^{one} South Asian country feels threatened by another directly and believes itself to be the victim of actual or potential aggression by the latter. In the second type a South Asian country under threat from a country outside South Asia suspects the latter has an accomplice or a proxy within South Asia. The third type is the intrusive of super powers rivalries into South Asia which made or are seen to more on South Asia country an enemy of another. The fourth the most pernicious types interest with each other and reinforce all of them.³

India is the lynchpin of South Asian cooperation. India has not made clear its role in regional affairs and this is because the other member nations of the SAARC consider India as "prudent for a functional approach to regional cooperation". In order to face their past boldly and

1. Quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review Year Book, 1986.

2. Ibid.

3. Gupta, Bhabani Sen, SAARC-ASEAN, op.cit. p. 74.

tackle the present with sincere mutual understanding and trust under-writing one another's sovereignty and independence, regional cooperation is essential. The external powers are powerful only due to our past ~~failings~~ ^{failings} ~~tailmas~~ and bickerings.

SAARC cannot remain a closed system to impervious to external influence. Therefore, it should effectively use the positive elements for the common interest while trying to shield it from the negative ones. External actors which can have an influence on the functioning of the organization include foreign governments, regional and international organizations and transnational corporations. On the negative side these forces have been blamed for either attempting to undermine the process of cooperation, itself or using it for their own purpose.¹ On the positive side these actors offer incentives which regional organizations in the third world need the most for an effective operation funds, talented manpower and ideas. In a nutshell it will be necessary to search for a broad based system which will be less dependent on the political structure of relations among the member countries for continued viability.

The SAARC countries have entered into a South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement at Dhaka on April 11, 1993. The trade blocs in the world like EEC, ASEAN, NAFTA are functioning according to their plan despite all sort of conflicts but SAARC has not moved even a few paces forward despite its 7 years old existence.

1. Vaitzos, V. Constantine, "Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration Among Developing Countries," A Survey, World Development, 1978, pp. 726-736.

All the seven countries - Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka continue to remain in the same positions they enjoyed seven years back. The clear anti-India stance of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) at Karachi on April 27-29, 1993 Pakistan continued to promote cross-border terrorism and violence in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and other parts of India.

The South Asian region has a total population of 130 crores people. SAARC enjoys 22¹/_c of the world's fossil and fuel deposits. 460 cubic kilometers of renewable water resource, 86 million hectares of the forest cover, 250 million hectares of the farm land, largest Animal population and abundance of milk. The total import by SAARC countries was around US \$ 38 billion in 1990.¹

The members of the South Asian countries have many commonalities - cultural heritage social habits and religions equity. There are vast possibility of cooperation on many fronts. India produces 15 per cent of the Iron ore and exports major part of it while Pakistan imports Iron from Australia, Canada, Brazil and Liberia at a higher price. Similarly, Sri Lanka exports 120000 tonnes of natural rubber every year and India imports nearly 40000 tonnes of rubber from Malaysia and a deal may have good foreign currency. Pakistan imports tea from Kenya, China and Indonesia while Indian tea will prove less costly and of better quality. India exports coffee and Sri Lanka imports coffee from Ivory coast but, the both countries could not come to terms.

THE SAARC has failed a economic front to achieve any fruitful results as well as have failed totally on political front.

1. Hindustan Times, June 20, 1993.

(f) The Second Cold War ; Impact on South Asia

There was a time when, except India and Vietnam, the Soviet Union had no friends in Asia. Now, there is no Soviet Union, as friends to fall back to. With the end of dideologiation of international relations, the Russians are not seen as adversaries or even a threat, by anyone in Asia. Regional security in South Asia to be based on multilateral de-escalation of military confrontation than collective security has to envisage full participation by extra-regional actors of the multipolar world.¹ Jawahar Lal Nehru's dream for independent India was to keep it out of maelstrom of power play, tension and conflict that had affected the history of nations.²

Neither of the socalled superpowers were able to use their overwhelming military and economic resources for purposes of effectively projecting power or controlling developments in regional conflict situations in the third world. Neither superpower was able to dictate terms to its allies or clients. Although both could provide assistance in ways which exacerbated local or regional tensions, neither was really able to resolve those tensions in ways favourable to its own objectives. At the same time bilateral relations of the US and the Soviet Union were restricted because of the dangers of nuclear confrontation which was recognised by President Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisors and lay, in part at least, at the base of the shift in Soviet Policy.

1. Strategic Studies Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 and 2, 1992, p. 93.

2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 15, 1991.

While new thinking in Soviet policy was resulting in rather dramatic shifts in Soviet foreign policy behaviour, the US began to reassess its own position. Prior to the end of the superpower confrontation and of the cold war, US policy throughout the third world, for example, had been influenced to a substantial degree by a concern for Soviet expansion and of its influence in regions viewed as important or essential for overall US interests. This "zero sum" approach to relationship in the Third world had characterized both US and Soviet policy until the late 1980s.

By the summer of 1991, even prior to the aborted coup in Moscow, the US-Soviet relationship had changed dramatically. Soviet policy was committed to expanding economic and political relationships with the US and its western allies as an essential component of economic and political rehabilitation at home. Rather than competing with the US for influence across the Third world something which had characterized Soviet policy for more than three decades - the Soviet leadership increasingly sought to cooperate with the US in resolving regional conflicts. This was most evident in Soviet political support for the US and UN, in the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91.¹

The year 1989 proved to be a watershed, in terms of the transformation of the global scene, with major changes taking place in many parts of the world. The Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan in February 1989. By the middle of the year, Eastern Europe

1. On shifts in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States see "International Security and the Collapse of the Soviet Union", The Washington Quarterly, vol. 15, No. 2, 1992, pp. 15-32, Stephen R. Covington and John Lough, "Russia Post Revolution Challenge, Reforms of the Soviet Superpower Paradigm, The Washington Quarterly, No. 1, 1992, pp. 5-26.

was in ferment, with communist regimes tottering and collapsing in the Warsaw Pact countries as the democratic movement gained a hold on countries no longer afraid of Soviet-backed repression. The collapse of the Berlin-Wall became a milestone in European history and the reunification of Germany which had looked a distant dream, materialised in 1990 with the acquiescence of Moscow. The effects of the democratic movement were felt also in China, where demonstrations by students and young workers were tolerated in major cities till they became violent and destructive, and were suppressed in June in the Tiananmen Square of Beijing in a manner that attracted Western sanctions.

The Bush-Gorbachev summit towards the end of the year proclaimed the end of the cold war, and public opinion in the United States, deeply agitated over massive budgetary deficits and neglect of domestic economic issues, vociferously demanded a scaling down of U.S. commitments and expenditures abroad. As the decade of the 1990s began, a significant reordering of policies and priorities by the US came into evidence. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the relevance and purpose of the NATO alliance came into question. However, it was felt by all the members that the plans and structures achieved over four decades should not be abandoned, particularly as the world order was in a state of flux, and possible future threats to peace and stability could not be ignored.

With the communist bloc in disarray, and the Soviet model of political and economic management discredited. Western analysts and policy-makers saw the need to reassess future threats to the interests of the capitalist world. With a substantial input by powerful Jewish and Indian lobbies which are specially influential in the media and in centres of learning (there being an estimated 800,000

Indian scholars and scientists in the US alone), Islamic fundamentalism was identified as the main ideological challenge, taking the clue from the rhetoric used in Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979.

A second potential threat centred on the spread of military technology to developing countries, notably those in the West and South Asia. When this strand of thinking is linked to the first one, concerning the Islamic fundamentalist threat, the Muslim countries are perceived as being the greater potential menace. This explains why pressure was built up against Pakistan to conform to nuclear safeguards while India had demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1974, began to be seen as a potential partner. A suspicion persisted among influential segments of US and European intelligentsia that the Islamic countries might pass high-technology secrets to each other, whereas such a risk hardly existed in the case of India, so that it had to be viewed as an aspiring regional-hegemony whose perceptions could be harmonised with those of the United States.

Some Asian countries are now faced both by challenges and opportunities and, consequently, their incertitude is not surprising. There are potential source of instability in the changing international relations and unpredictability may generate destabilization and various ethnic identities which are now going to be a major international security problem for the countries of South Asia.¹

1. Strategic Studies Journal, op.cit., vol. 5, No. 1, and 2, 1992, p. 93.

Most of the South Asian elites have frequently ascribed their regional problems to the cold war. The South Asian states inherited problem peculiar to decolonized societies. These included disputed borders and backward economies. The brutal nature of the birth of some of these countries made conflict an inherent part of regional relationships. The initial years of the cold war confused the priorities of these states. The exaggerated claims of capitalism and communism made them dependent on the mechanism of nonalignment. Conflict in South Asia was never generic to the cold war but became subject to alignment.

There were a series of conflicts at regional level. The conflicts arising out of disputed areas, "lines of control" instead of international borders, nationalities with multiple loyalties, and religions, cutting across international boundaries of hostile and not so friendly states, were irrespective of the cold war. Though the cold war has ended as a model of relationship between the US - and the former USSR, it remains valid elsewhere both as an academic concept and an international strategy.

The bipolar division of the world had been harmful to the interests of the new states. A mutual rivalry of big powers was anticipated by Nehru, Long before the advent of the cold war when he was at the ^hhelm of affairs. Nehru perceived this before the advent of the cold war and the birth of Pakistan which is indicative of a theoretical awareness that conflict elsewhere would imply peace in the region.¹ After independence the ruling elite of South Asia did lament about bipolar divisions and the cold war more as a rhetoric. This included the concept of nonalignment which frequently became an instrument and a technique for

1. Jawaher Lal Nehru, Young India, September, 1936.

gaining moral stature and material benefits. In times of peace it sheltered them from partisan politics and fetched economic and military aid from both Washington and Moscow, a more realistic ideom in regional relations needed to be evolved independent of cliches of neo-imperialism ideological hegemonies and political exploitation.

In Brief, all the South Asian states, face problems of ethnic, religious and linguistic character that posed challenges of their national political order and integration and further hinder the process of cooperation among them. In the case of China despite her conventional superiority India can tackle a conventional threat, if the conflict reaches the plains in the northeast as happened by the possession of nuclear weapon. Second, it would condition Chinese conventional options. As for Pakistan, conventional superiority as well as the possession of a nuclear weapon is deterrent enough. The unintended fallout of this, could be that Pakistan would desist from aiding the terrorists across the border. Even if their stance is demonstrated as a peace move, India's nuclear weapons would have done more good than the critics would have imagined. But, if we are not a nuclear power, Pakistan can attack India with the confidence that it has a nuclear weapon. Since all the wars between India and Pakistan have been started by Pakistan, an Indian nuclear weapon will deter Pakistan, what a massive conventional superiority could not be attained in the past, a small nuclear weapon could do in the future.

There have been five powers affecting the events in South Asia. Various ethnic identities are now going to be a major international security problem for the countries of South Asia.¹ A security doctrine for India will need to

1. Strategic Studies, Op.cit., vol. 5, No.1 and 2, 1992, p.93.

spell out the threats to her security and the appropriate Indian responses. The two main adversaries China and Pakistan and their respective strength would determine its broad parameters.

Implications for India-Pakistan Relations

South Asia assumed importance as an international sub-system with the withdrawal of the British and a number of new states emerged which were either parts of the British empire or were its protectorates. India's problem with Pakistan is different from its problem with other states. The present state of tension in South Asia may be viewed against the background of India-Pakistan relations. These are the two major countries which account for most of South Asian policy. The Kashmir problem became more and more complicated due to the cold war between USA and USSR. However, of late, with its end, no major player in international politics at the moment follows original political and military strategic interest in the region. The end of the cold war, thus, not only changed relations between the West and East, but virtually the whole nature of international relations with implication for US and South Asia. Recently a Clinton administration official said, "The issue of Kashmir is complex and multifaceted and "we urge both India and Pakistan to get to business" in resolving it in line with the Simla Accord. "We cannot, however, solve the Kashmir problem for them, just as we cannot solve the Arab-Israeli problem".

(9) Nuclear Proliferation : South Asian Perception

In the past few years the world has changed and a cloud of uncertainty and antiquity has arisen. The easing of the super powers and the crumbling of the communist order has widely changed the world strategy but the main demographic trends are unchanged and in terms of the geography of the world panes of communications, continents and ocean look the same as at the height of the cold war. The cold war throw has generated regional power centres in the third world that have increased the risk of conflict and also generated arms race based on the dynamics of action-reaction. This trend is disturbing enough for the peace of the region in case of sophisticated conventional weapons. It is extremely worrisome for the world and South Asia is one such threatre where the chronic problems still persists.¹

As a result of the pressure of domestic public opinion in the West, and Russia to reduce nuclear stock piles, and, partly as a result of the momentuu of arms control efforts, Washington and Moscow signed a series of agreements reducing their nuclear stock piles. The first Bush, Yeltsin Summit in Washington in June 1992 advanced the process of army control. The Charter was signed on June 17, 1992 and was the landmark in controlling strategic weapons and prescribed a deeper cut to reduce warheads 3500 US and Russia 3000 i.e. a reduction of 70 percent was considered to be implemented by 2003. The Bush-Gorbachev and Bush-Yeltsin initiatives concerning nuclear weapons in the autumn of 1991/winter of 1992 potentially are a great boost to the world disarmament process. Not only do they represent a move towards a substantial denuclearization of the former soviet Union and the United States ground forces and surface navies, curtailment of armed forces and dicreasing military

1. Micheal T. Kalre, An Arms Control Aquede for the Third World, Arms Control Today, April 1990, p. 8.

efforts, Washington and Moscow signed a series of agreements reducing their nuclear stock piles. The first Bush, Yeltsin Summit in Washington in June 1992 advanced the process of army control. The Charter was signed on June 17, 1992 and was the landmark in controlling strategic weapons and prescribed a deeper cut to reduce warheads 3500 US and Russia 3000 i.e. a reduction of 70 percent was considered to be implemented by 2003. The Bush-Gorbachev and Bush-Yeltsin initiatives concerning nuclear weapons in the autumn of 1991/winter of 1992 potentially are a great boost to the world disarmament process. Not only do they represent a move towards a substantial denuclearization of the former Soviet Union and the United States ground forces and surface navies, curtailment of armed forces and decreasing military budgets, they signify a radical turn from the arms competition between the two sides to effective cooperation and even partnership in disarmament.¹

President Bush also announced that all tactical nuclear weapons outside the United States have been finally withdrawn. The withdrawal of 2400 war-heads and missiles weapons was part of the START Agreement signed in 1990, but, its implementation was delayed due to disintegration of Soviet Union. These arms control and disarmament measures aimed at reducing nuclear stockpiles, eroded a objection of the non-NPT states, against the treaty. Joseph S. Nye Jr. a former White House official, observed that Nuclear proliferation, if not contained would have a dissolvent effect on international relations and increase the prospects of terrorist nuclear attack".

1. Hanry Trofimenko, "New Geopolitical Developments, Disarmament", Topical Paper 9, United Nations, New York 1992, p. 42.

The older proliferation problem between the two edge of Asia lies in South Asia and the continuing competition between India and Pakistan. In testimony before the Congress, reported by the New York Times of 21 January 1991, CIA Director Robert Gates made the following assessment.

"We see South Asia at the precipice of a nuclear weapons race. Within the next five years, both sides will have medium-range missiles. Each side will have to resume the worst of each other. And this is destabilizing because of the hair-trigger nature of these missiles in times of tension... not only do both countries have nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programme; they have recently pursued chemical weapons as well. These programmes are particularly worrisome because of constant tension and conflict in Kashmir".

The implications of Director Gates assessment are clear. Imagine the following scenario by General K. Sunderji in the 30 November, 1990 edition of India Today.

"Pakistan has escalated its efforts at subversion and guerrilla warfare in Jammu and Kashmir to a high pitch. Though technically still covert, its involvement is almost open. Pakistan has also threatened that if India goes through with its declared conventional strategy of carrying the war into Pakistan territory in the plains, all means would be used to defeat implying the use of nuclear weapons. Will through with its conventional counter offensive in the plains? Will Pakistan's nuclear bluff be called?".

Since 1985, the provisions of United States assistance to Pakistan has depended on a Presidential certification to congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear

explosive device. The certificate for fiscal year 1991 was not given. As a result since October 1990, the United States has provided no new economic or military assistance to Pakistan which amounted to some \$ 600 million annually.

The then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri while refusing to change from the Nehru path of using atomic energy for peaceful purpose in a subtle departure from the earlier position stated at his party's conference in Durgapur, in January 1965, that "I can not say any thing about the future but, our present policy is not to manufacture the atom bomb, but to develop nuclear energy for constructive purposes".¹ Evolution for India's first nuclear power station took place in 1961 and the legal instrument for the most tangible demonstration of Indo-US nuclear cooperation was the "Agreement of the Tarapur Atomic Station (TAPS), signed on 8th August 1963."²

The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and the subsequent Chinese explosion in 1974 generated a strong desire in India to obtain nuclear weapon capability. During this period relations of India and Pakistan were harsh because of the Chinese Border Agreement 1963. This also forced India to undertake changes in its defence policy. Indian nuclear aspirations and modernization programme brought India and Pakistan to a cross road. Simultaneously, Pakistan also made up its mind to consider possibility of nuclear weapon

1. Bhatia, Shyam, Indias Nuclear Bomb, New Delhi, p.12.

2. Singh, Surjit Man, India's Search For Power, Indra Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982, Sage Publications, New Delhi, p. 96.

programme. The dis-integration of Pakistan and India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 characterized the emergence of India as a dominant force in Asia. After three weeks of the Indian explosion, Z.A. Bhutto said that "Pakistan would eat grass" if necessary, to acquire its nuclear deterrence. Bhutto was the first to think about an Islamic bomb and emphasized that the christian, jewish and Hindu civilization have their nuclear capabilities, the Islamic civilization alone was without it".

Pakistan along with some western powers charged India for violation of the solemn agreement made with Canada for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. She maintained that India had misused its atomic power plants under the very nose of their foreign benefactors.¹ Pakistans Foreign Secretary told a 25 nation disarmament conference held at Geneva on 23rd May 1974 that the Indian explosion has given a death blow to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the road has been thrown open for emergence of more nuclear powers.² Speaking in favour of Pakistan, New York Times propagated that Pakistan is under great pressure from the Soviet Union a sharply increased in recent months and needs outside support to continue to resist this pressure.

In view of the sentiments, present nuclear policy has benefited Pakistan. Pakistan has deliberately maintained ambiguity regarding its nuclear weapons programme although it can build a bomb whenever it wishes.³ It is also clear

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1. Khanna, D.D., Pakistans Nuclear Development and Policy, p. 66.
 2. The Australian, May 15, 1976.
 3. Cohen, S.P., "The Possibility of Arms Control in South Asia", Strategic Studies Journal, 1990, p. 1 also See Time, March 30, 1987.

that if Pakistan declares its nuclear option, India will also use its option and a Pakistani Bomb will not only legitimate Indian bomb but, will accelerate an arms race which will destabilize, the strategic balance of the sub-continent.

In February 1993, Pakistan officially admitted that it possessed requisite components to assemble at least one nuclear device. Russian Foreign intelligence service placed before the US Senate Committee that "Pakistan is at present estimated to possess four to seven nuclear bombs".¹ The report further added that, "India may be classified as being among the countries which unofficially possessed nuclear weapons."²

Pakistan's military nuclear programme was started in the middle of the seventies and was initially oriented towards uranium as a means. The uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta can produce high quality uranium to manufacture 122 nuclear bombs every year.³ But, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary claimed that Pakistan's nuclear programme had been frozen on the level of 1989 and not 1990.⁴ Pakistan entered the nuclear field much later and its programme is much smaller compared to India. India was the first among the developing countries to launch a long range atomic development programme, soon after independence in 1947. [Table No 1] Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1958 and got low priority until 1972. India acquired its first

1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, February 26, 1993.

2. Ibid.

3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, February 26, 1993.

4. The Muslim, Islamabad, February 10, 1992.

research reactor Apsara in Trombay in 1956, while Pakistan got it in 1965. On 30 March, 1987 General Zia told Times Magazine "You can virtually write today that Pakistan can build a nuclear bomb whenever it wishes to what is difficult about the bomb? Once you have, the technology which Pakistan has, you can do what ever you like".¹ In December 1990 the former Vice Chief of Army Staff K.M. Arif told BBC, "Nuclear proliferation has already occurred in South Asia. The atomic weapon are there, you can't deny their existence because you refuse to look at them".²

It may be in view of the "limits of nuclear power" that India has not exploded the another nuclear device since 1974, and Pakistan during the last 20 years had made a number of proposals to win over the nuclear game, including establishing a Nuclear weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia which India has bluntly refused on the ground that proliferation is a global problem.

Russia also wanted India to cooperate in accepting the Missile. Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines to allay fears in the West about New Delhi's missile programme. The Prime Minister, Mr. Rao reiterated, "India's known stand on this subject - that the MTCR, like NPT was discriminatory in character and compromised with national sovereignty. India had made it known many times that it was interested in discussing nuclear as well as missile proliferation on a global basis and stood for complex abolition of nuclear weapons".³

1. The Times, Magazine, 30 March 1987.

2. Radio Minotoring Report, BBC, 20 December 1990.

3. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 10, 1993.

There is no possibility of any future limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan. In context of South Asia, both India and Pakistan have embarked upon nuclear programmes. South Asia in any case is not committed to existing non proliferation regime. India gives up its weapon option as a potential political and diplomatic if not military, deterrent against NWS and against China in particular. It is therefore unlikely that India would relinquish that option entirely, unless it is a deal including at least China.

TABLE - 1

NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTORS (INDIA)

Name of Plant	Location	Reactor Type	Power (MWt)	Date of Commissioning	Safe-guards
Aspara	Trombay	LWR	1	1956	No
Cirus	Trombay	HWR	40	1960	No
Zerlina	Trombay	HWR	400 Wt	1961	No
Purnima I	Trombay	FBR	100 Wt	1972	No
Purnima II	Trombay	Homo-geneous	5 Wt	1984	No
Dhruva (R-5)	Trombay	HWR	100	1985	No
FBTR	Kalpakkam	FBR	40	1985	No
Kamini	Kalpakkam		100 KWt	1986	No
Purnima III	Trombay			1988	No

Source : Paper presented at the International Conference on Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and Preventing Nuclear Weapons Proliferation held by the Italian Union of Scientists for Disarmament, Castiglione della Pescaia 5-8 October 1991.

TABLE - 2

Name	Location	Power Output	Year	Safe- guards	(Dismantled in 1990)
PARR-1,	Nilore	5 Mwt	1965	Yes	
PARR-2	Nilore	27 Kwt	1990	Yes	
PARR-3	Nilore	10 Mwt	End 1991	Yes	

Source : PACE Annual Reports.

TABLE - 3
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS (INDIA)

Sr.	Name of Plant	Location	Reactor Type	Design Gross	Date of Commissioning	Safe-guards
1.	Tarapur-1	Bombay	BWR	210	11/1969	Yes
2.	Tarapur-2	Bombay	BWR	210	11/1969	Yes
3.	Raps-1	Kota	PHWR	220	12/1973	Yes
4.	Raps-2	Kota	PHWR	220	4/1981	Yes
5.	Maps-1	Kalpakkam	PHWR	235	7/1983	No
6.	Maps-2	Kalpakkam	PHWR	235	3/1986	No
7.	Napp-1	Narora	PHWR	235	10/1989	No
8.	Napp-2	Narora	PHWR	235	1990	No
9.	Kaps-1	Kakrapar	PHWR	235	1990	No
10.	Kaps-2	Kakrapar	PHWR	235	1991	No
11-22	Raps-3,4	Kota	PHWR	235	1995	No
13-14	Kaiga-1,2	Kaiga	PHWR	2x235	1995	No
15-18	Kaiga-3 to 6	Kaiga	PHWR	4x235	-	No
19-20	Taps-3,4	Bombay	PHWR	2x500	-	No
21-24	Raps 5-8	Kota	PHWR	4x500	-	No
25-26	Kundankulam 1,2	Kundankulam	(VVER)	2x1000	-	Yes
27-32	Six Units		PHWR	6x500	-	No

Source : Indian Department of Atomic Energy, Annual Reports.

TABLE - 4

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

Name	Location	Power Output	Year	Safeguards
KANUPP	Karachi	150 MWe	1972	Yes
CHASHNUPP-1	Chashma	300 MWe	1997	Yes
CHASHNUPP-2	Chashma	900 MWe	1998 (France has since backed out)	Yes


Source : PAEC Publications.

CHAPTER - IV

INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS[A] Indo Bhutan Relations

Bhutan occupies the pivotal position from where both Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh could be outflanked. It faces a part of Tibet that is ^W well served with road net work and with eastern Nepal, Sikkim and Western Arunachal, it covers the fertile and populated West Bengal, Bangladesh and Assam. In 1962 conflict, it was isolated and out-flanked on its eastern and western borders by Chinese forces, which emphasized its vulnerability.¹ The basic structure of Indo-Bhutanese relationship is the extension of British Imperial policy in the region. As asserted by China now, Bhutan was a kind of



protectorate of the Middle Kingdom till the British altered the situation in Nineteenth Century.² Relations between British India and Bhutan were formalised on November 11, 1865 when the treaty of Sinchula was signed. The treaty put an end to the continued conflict in which the two were engaged

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1. Cohen, Philips Stephen - The Security of South Asia, Vistar Publication, New Delhi.
 2. Mao used the phrase stripped away to describe the loss of the Chinese rights to imperial British. Mao Ise-tung 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese communist Party' selected works, vol. 2 (Peking 1965), p. 307. Cited by Srikant Dutt 'India and the Himalayan States, Asian Affairs (London) vol. 6 (old series vol. 67, part 1, February 1980, p. 73.

since 1837. Britain agreed to pay Rs. 50,000/- per annum to Bhutan and under write the independence. Bhutan ceded the pass areas at the foot of the hills to British, released its prisoners and established free trade between the two countries.

China's influence was cut short on account of the Sinchula Treaty. Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet gradually slipped away from Chinese influence. Britain sent young husband expedition to Tibet in 1903-5 to evaluate the strategic importance of the Himalayan states. On 16th December, 1907 hereditary monarchy was first established in Bhutan and Ygyen Dorji, the king was expected to meet the interest of the British rule. Another Treaty of Punakhe was signed in 1910, which made significant changes in the former Treaty of Sinchula. The annual allowance of king of Bhutan was increased from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000.00 and it was also agreed upon that the Bhutan will enjoy internal autonomy but, its external affairs will be guided by the advice of the British Government.¹ In the context of the existing situation this was nothing more than de jure recognition of the defacto reality, for even without this clause Bhutan would in any case have had to clear any foreign policy innovations or initiatives with the British authorities in New Delhi.²

There was no change of relations during the 37 years. Upto 1947 Britain did not interfere in the internal autonomy of the kingdom and also did not establish the Residency. After independence of India no stand still Agreement was signed between Bhutan and India but, practically Bhutan adhered to all the previous agreements and Indian political officer in Gangtok continued to be accredited to Bhutan as well.³

1. Ibid.

2. Rose, E. Leo, "Bhutan's External Relations", Pacific Affairs, (Vancouver), vol. 47, No.2, Summer 1974, pp. 192-93.

3. Ibid.

(a) The Treaty of 1949

India and Bhutan signed a treaty on August 8, 1949 according to which, India recognised the independence of Bhutan and restored the Dewangiri hill strip on the Indian border. India raised the annual subsidy from Rs. 100000/- to Rs. 500000/- under this Treaty, India agreed to provide all trade facilities and carriage by land and water throughout the Indian territory. It was also agreed upon that Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and approval of the Government of India, whatever arms, ammunitions, machinery. Bhutan though expressed that it has no problem from India,¹ but, despite the facilities extended to Bhutan all was not well. There were potential problems regarding the Indian Advisor and the interpretation of Article 11 of the 1949 Treaty dealing with the guidance clause relating to the external relations. The assassination of the Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji raised doubts and created an atmosphere against India. It was expected that the assassination was plotted by pro China lobby.² The pro-China lobby was also strong enough and there was the likelihood of a civil war in the country. The king appointed Lhendup Dorji as acting Prime Minister to maintain law and order. In the first instance, Lhendup Dorji tried to settle the Conflict, but, later on moved to Pro-China lobby. In July 1965, the king too, was assassinated and Lhendup Dorji along with his supporters fled to Nepal. This time too, blame for the assassination was casted upon India. The relations between the two countries declined after the assassination of Dorji.

Any how, both governments tried to maintain their friendly terms. King made a visit to India, in May 1966

1. Muni, S.D., Bhutan Steps Out, The World Today (London), December 1984, p. 517.

2. The Telegraph, (Calcutta) 29.9.1985.

and personally expressed "I am deeply touched by the sympathy and understanding with which the Government of India viewed our problem. The help and advice furnished by the government of India are of great value to us and are appreciated by my Government and my people". India accommodated Bhutan in getting membership of United Nations in 1971. India adopted a policy of gradual accommodation of Bhutanese aspirations and sensitivities. But, Bhutanis king Patoron, made it clear that it is not mandatory for his country to accept India's guidance in Thimpus Foreign Policy and that it is to the advantage of New Delhi to upto date the Treaty.¹

The relations between the two countries however, remained friendly. India and Bhutan renewed the agreement on trade and commerce for another five years from March 21, 1990 to March 30, 1995. Under the agreement, India and Bhutan were allowed to continue to have force trading arrangements as before. A major modification in the renewed treaty was that the free trade was opened for private Bhutanese traders. Till then it was controlled by the Royal Government.² Bhutanese Trade Minister, Om Pradhan envisaged the continuance of free trading said "a new mile stone has been achieved in the age old ties between the two neighbours."³ The Trade Minister further asserted that "we have received all round cooperation. The Government of India has been very accomodating and, it extended all help we required".⁴ Bhutan

1. The Economic Times, New Delhi, dated November 3, 1979.

2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 3, 1990.

3. The Business Standard, New Delhi, March 3, 1990.

4. The patrika, New Delhi, March 5, 1990.

king lauded India's peace efforts.¹ The legend of Sindu Raja of Bumthang and his battles with Na-u-che (Big nose) a neighbouring Indian Ruler, warns that if Non (Bhutan) succeeds all of India will be conquered, if India succeeds all of non will be conquered." The warning was really an exhortation to peace. It persuaded the two princes to meet under Guru Padmo Sambhava's benign and aegis and swear everlasting amity at the oath stone Pillar which was thereafter known as Powerless since the kings relinquished their own power for the sake of eternal friendship, between the two countries.

It is a pretty tale recalled by the fervour with which every one in Thimpu pays tribute to the Indian connection. Following the clash between India and China in 1969, Bhutan found itself increasingly drawn closer to its Southern neighbour, India.² From the time of the present kings connection in 1974, the Bhutanese have been saying even if Sotto Voce, that according to their understanding of the treaty it is not obligatory on them to seek India's advice on every foreign policy matter and even when such advice is in fact sought, it is not binding on Bhutan.³ The Indian government described it as tendentious and unfortunate.⁴ The king of Bhutan Jigme Singwa Nagehuk said, that the India-Bhutanese treaty leaves room for all negotiations and changes in the event of difficulties. But, there are no difficulties whatsoever (in the implimentation of the treaty) in practice.⁵ At another occasion king of

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1. Tribune, Chandigarh, September 30, 1985.
 2. The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu, December 21, 1971.
 3. The Times of India, New Delhi, September 27, 1979.
 4. The Patriot, New Delhi, October 19, 1979
 5. The Statesman, New Delhi, November 25, 1979.

Bhutan lauded the Indian relations and said, "As far as Indo-Bhutan relations are concerned they are carried on within the traditional framework in spirit of friendship trust and co-operation. Indo-Bhutan relations are bound to expand."¹ After the annexation of Tibet by China in 1959, the Bhutanese relised the immense disadvantage of a close door policy. In order to cast aside the fears hovering over the horizon and to ensure national security and unhindered economic progress, Bhutan came closer to India and found a genuine friend.² The king said at a banquet in honour of the Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi, "I believe we have succeeded in demonstrating that enlightened and farsighted leadership can make it possible for a large country like India and small neighbour like Bhutan to co-exist in perfect hermony, trust and co-operation."³ Bhutan's problems with India are basically the same as Nepals or rather India finds itself under similar pulls and pressures from both its Himalayan neighbours. Nepal as is known wants a political and economic identity of its own and does not want to be a satellite of India. This is broadly Bhutans attitude to India as well. Bhutan is looking for wider contracts especially trade with its southeast Asian neighbours under blessings of India. It has opened doors of New foreign aids. In the Fifth Plan (1981-87) Indias support was less than one-third out of the total outlay of Rs. 433.8 crores while it was 100 percent in the first Five year Plan. In the Sixth year plan India committed for only 57%. Bhutan, did not like diplomatic over extension just for the sake of it.⁴

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1. The Tribune, Chandigarh, February 26, 1980.
 2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 27, 1985.
 3. Financial Express, New Delhi, September 30, 1985.
 4. Financial Express, New Delhi, February 13, 1980.

With the raising of India's posture direct talks were held between China and Bhutan. Bhutan became the member of UN in 1973, through Indian initiatives. It expanded its contracts with outside world, with Bangladesh as well as with Singapur and Hongkong. Bhutan became the member of the SAARC. It was given a common platform to discuss problems of vital importance with other members. King Jigme Singye Wangchuk in the First SAARC Summit made policy statement and said, "In the geo-political realities of our region, it would be unrealistic to ignore the primacy of the political factor, as in the find analysis, it would be political environment of the region which will determine the shape and scope of regional cooperation in South Asia. The main obstacle is not only to over come the psychological and emotional barries of the past, but, the fears, anxieties and apprehensions of the present".¹ It has broad based its external aid dependence, established diplomatic relations with several countries, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait the EEC, Switxerland, Sudan, Norway and Finland including all South Asia region including Bangladesh (1979) and Nepal (1983). India's policy towards the Himalayan States revolved around the idea of special interest. In the case of Bhutan, New Delhi was to guide the former in its external relations in keeping with the treaty of 1949.² Indian policy was essentially a continuation of the British approach. Thus the major objective of Indian policy in this region is ultimately to retain control of the area. The merger of Sikkim with India in 1975 should be seen as a logical extension of the policy towards this region and is a guiding factor.

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1. Address of His Mejesty Jigme Singye Waqchuk, King of Bhutan to the 1st SAARC Summit meeting Dhaka, December 7,8, 1985.
 2. Foreign Policy of India. Texts of documents 1947, 59 (New Delhi, 1959) pp. 35-40 and Ceylon Dally (Colombo), November 13, 1979.

Geopolitical and strategic compulsions make it explicit that whatever status they may try to seek, it is not possible for border states to take anti-India stand because such an attitude would make them susceptible to threats from China or they will be struck down by internal upheavals. In the border areas in the Asian Landmass, there exist a cluster of traditional societies embracing a vast host of sub-culture inherited from centuries of unrecorded history. These are Sinkiang, Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan and the tribal areas that lace India's (and Pakistan's) northern front. These irraditional communities which inhabit either side of the national frontiers are also being pressed into varying degrees of modernization. The result has been rebellions, uprisings political and social tensions and demands or struggles for independence acting on and reacting to, relationship between the four major powers.

Bhutan is slowly marching the way Nepal has once crossed.¹ Indian working in Bhutan are being humiliated and forced to leave that country. Though both governments are silent on this aspect but the fact is there. It is on record that Bhutan for the last two years has been complaining about Indian labourers who constitute nearly 80 percent of the 100000 strong labourers and do not return to India even after the expiry of their contracts instead they start agitations. In this regard King of Bhutan expressed that,

"For years people have been coming to Bhutan, once they come in, it is difficult to distinguish them from our own people, by bribing local officials they become Bhutanese nationals. The unchecked immigration is creating unemployment and straining our agrarian economy. It is a potential of social tension".

1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, April 27, 1989.

Government of Bhutan in order to win over the difficulty decided to issue identity cards to out side officials and labourers.¹ In the wake of this, 200 workers were expelled by Bhutan chemicals and Carbide Ltd. at pasakho in Phunisholing. Moreover, Bhutan Govt. cancelled the trade licence of M/S Shyam Sunder Stores owned by an Indian at Phuntsholing. Another remification of Bhutans peculiar anti-Indian stance has been its restrictions imposed on the owners of televisions to watch programmes telecast by the doordarshan.² Bhutan has no major border problem with India, but, it has also a minor border problem at different type with India. It relates to the boundry between Geylemhung in Bhutan and Assam. According to Bhutan the road connecting Geylephung and Sarbhang (Bhutanese territories) had been initially constructed within the boundaries of Bhutan. But, now this 4 km. stretch has fallen under Assam due to some early demarcations based on maps prepared in 1911 and 1914. Bhutan raised the issue in 1980. The National Assembly also passed the resolution in 1987 to raise the matter with Government of India. Contrary to the Indias treaty 1949, Bhutan became a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which India has opposed vehemently. Bhutan, also joined hands with Pakistan in declaring South Asia a nuclear free zone in United Nations. The most alarming is the fact that it has started direct border talks with China in order to settle the problem of incursions by Tibetan herdsmen in its chumby valley on the disputed Northern border. It implies that the Bhutan-China border issue will, henceforth not be

1. The Indonesia Times, Jakarta, February 9, 1983.

2. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Allahabad, May 5, 1989.

considered an integral part of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. In an interview to a West German journal Indo-Asian in October 1986, the king is reported to have said that in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict, Bhutan will adopt the principle of Non-alliance.

(6) Ethnic Problem

Ethnic problems have always been a source of tension and conflict in interstate relations among the countries of South Asia. Since independence these countries have been vulnerable to ethnic tensions arising out of the colonial policy of 'divide and rule', accentuated by the controversial demarcations of boundry by the British. Recently, a long standing and 'low intensity' ethnic problem between Bhutan and Nepal has caused considerable relations to strain between Nepal and Bhutan. In the past months several thousands of these people have crossed into Nepal and Indian territory. Their primary reason for fleeing Bhutan according to these people is that they are being persecuted by the Bhutanese authorities for their different ethnic identity.¹

Bhutan, the last bastion of Mahayana Buddhism in the Himalayas with its mystical charm has been enveloped by the smog of gloom. The problem of the 80,000 refugees living in camps in Nepal has engulfed the kingdom in a crisis and soured relations between the two countries.² A long standing ethnic problem prevailing between Bhutan and Nepal has caused considerable concern in South Asia and the relations between Nepal and Bhutan have become

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1. Hossein, Farzana, "Bhutan's Ethnic Problem A Case of a Fragile Ethnic Mosaic in South Asia", Bliss Journal, vol. 14, No. 1, 1993, p. 17.
 2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 5, 1993.

strain. Thousands of Nepalese living in Bhutan have crossed the borders and camped in Indian territory or Nepal for fear of persecution by the Bhutanese authorities for their different ethnic identity. The root of the problem is that Nepali population in Bhutan has increased greatly over the past few years. Bhutan which has the per capita, GNP of 415 US dollars is one of the richest in South Asia¹ and thousands Nepalis have come to Bhutan in the past illegally in search of livelihood. Bhutan fears that if the migration continues, Bhutan may become a Nepali majority state. Therefore, Bhutan has taken stringent immigration measures to check the inflow. This position has been taken advantage of the migrants living in India and the B.P.P. (Bhutans People Party) to establish democracy in Bhutan, Bhutan, new worry now corners to stop the psychology of "greater Nepal".

According to Nepal, Ethnic Nepalese, the Tamong family are victims of a programme of systematic persecution being conducted by the Bhutanese Government on the Southern part of the country.² By mid-summer, there were 6200 Bhutanese refugees living in fire camps, three of which were in Tarai.

The kingdom of Bhutan is divided into three regions - Southern, Central Himalayan and Northern Bhutan.³ Each of these regions have a different cultures and ethnicity. The southern region is inhabited mainly by peasants of Nepalese origin, high cost people and Tribal population who continued to immigrate since 1950. They are full Bhutanese. The Central Himalayas is divided into three

1. The Asian Week, January 7, 1993.

2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 4, 1993.

3. Pormaret, Francoise, An Illustrated Guide to Bhutan, The Guide Book Company Ltd. Hong Kong pp. 44-50.

parts. Each part has its distinct language mutually incomprehensible to others. The Western Bhutan is occupied by Drukpa people of Mongoloid race and speak language of Tibeto-Burman family called Dzongkho, "language of the Dzong" which is the official language. Eastern Bhutan is inhabited by "Sharchopas". The region also contains semi-nomadic people who are called Dakpas. The Northern region is inhabited by semi-nomadic Yak traders.

According to 1988 census, Bhutan has population of 6,00,000 of whom Bhutanese Buddhist comprised 48%, Nepalese Hindus 45% and other 7.5%.¹ The most easily identified group is that of Nepalese origin in Southern Bhutan. Most of them are living in Bhutan for three to four generations, representing alien element in the population structure. During the last hundred years, the Nepalese have developed the South Western belt of Bhutan. In 1904 there were only 14000 Nepalese in Bhutan. By 1905 the winter grazing grounds began to diminish with the increase in Nepalese settlers which effected the Bhotia's chief source of dairy produce and worsened the relations between the two.² The Nepalese in Bhutan are comprised of three groups, Takuris, Newaris and Kiralis and relate to two groups.³ The establishment of multiparty democracy in Nepal in 1990 have profound impact on Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. The pro-democracy movement in Bhutan in August 1990, was spearheaded mostly by non-Drukpa people.

There are three aspects of the Bhutanese identity.⁴ The Drukpa church of Lamaism is distinct from other forms

1. Feer, July 23, 1992.

2. Sinha, A.C., Bhutan : Ethnic Identity and National Dilemma, Reliance Publishing House, New Delhi, 1991,p.38.

3. Ibid, p. 38.

4. Ibid., p. 212.

of Buddhism. The Druk-Gyalpo bear separate identity and the last is Tshongdu, which acts as the dual sovereign along with King of Bhutan and is the symbol of Bhutanese natural identity. The genesis of the present problem is the result of accumulated hatred which Nepalese immigrant have harbored for many years. Nepalese claim parity with the Drukpas who form the core of the people. Since no political activity is permitted in Bhutan, there is no outlet for these grievances. The present situation has reached to critical stage and demands of Human Rights, abuse have taken home. Nepalese complain that they have been treated as alien and Bhutan's policy is to confine them to Southern Bhutan. The 1985 citizenship Act declared that those non-Bhutanese who have entered Bhutan after 1958, would not have any citizenship rights and consequently 30,000 Nepalese were put to statelessness.¹ Since the problem is becoming complicated. The king's action to assert Bhutanese culture led to the outflow of 60,000 refugees in 1992 and may reach to 100,000.² The another political grievance is that the Southern Bhutanese elect their representative through indirect method while the highlanders follow the direct election procedure. The procedure is manipulated by orthodox landed gentry and clergy. The Nepalese also complain about restrictions on their movement to other parts of Bhutan and harassment on checkpoints.³

The talks between king Jigme Singye Wangchuk and the Nepali Prime Minister Koirala failed on April 9, 1993. The two leaders could not agree on any vital point. The king suggested that all the refugees in the camps in Nepal are not bonafide Bhutanese citizen and could not be taken

1. Feer, October 3, 1991.

2. The Holiday, Dhaka, August 7, 1992.

3. Asian Year Book, New Delhi, 1979, pp. 147-148.


back, further, many of them had committed criminal and terrorist offences in Bhutan. The king also issued an edict on 16.1.89 proclaiming the importance and need to promote national dress, language and driglam Namzha to strength Bhutans unique national identity, the dissident group has criticised proclamation. Presently there is no hope of any settlement of the problem.

(C) Defence

Bhutan's 4000 strong army looks like a Liliput before the military strength of its two large neighbours China and India. So it can hardly be expected to stand even a minor threat from either. Armed defence, however, is not the central issue for the security of this small Himalayan nation, rather it is its political relations with its neighbours. It has special relations with India and China and both sides take care of the little Himalayan kingdom.

3) Indo-Bangladesh Relations

Bangladesh emerged in December 1971 with moral and material support of India. The emergence of new country changed the geo-political and geo-strategic condition of South Asia, with the defeat of Pakistan in 1971 war and its dismemberment, India emerged as a major power in South Asia. The Indian factor has significance for Bangladesh politics, but there is no Bangladesh factor in Indian politics. The only



exception in the Indo-Bangla relations is the Chakma insurgency, while the agitation against Bangladesh infiltration into Assam has caused immense difficulties for India and has strained the relations to some extent. The Indo-Bangladesh relations started on a happy note. India's role in the liberation of Bangladesh and particularly the military assistance earned for India the friendship of Bangladesh resulting in

the signing of Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace between the two countries in March 1972. The period from August 1972 to 1975 (Mujib era), represented a period of good relations between the two countries, Mujib enunciated a secular democratic and socialistic policy of nation-building and steered clear of alliance with super powers. However, the inherent contradictions of Bangladesh Society and polity, which the Pakistan colonisation and Mujib's steam-roller popularity, had only temporarily eclipsed, soon became visible.¹ But, after Mujib, anti-Indianism in Bangladesh policies became sharp. The growth of Muslim 'Sufism' and Hindu 'Sahajive' or folksy 'vaisnavism' had resulted in an efflorescence of the Bengali language and a dilution of religious distinctiveness between the Bangali-Muslims and Bangali-Hindus. As Bengali Hindus sought and discovered continuity in the Hindu Indian past, within Indian and overseas, the Bengali Muslims discovered continuity in the Muslim Indian past, within India and West Asia. The process of Hinduisation was paralleled by the process of Islamisation not only of the language and culture but, of the overall identity and social groups which had hitherto been nominally unself-consciously, Muslim or Hindu. The process of Islamisation beginning in mid-19th century, was to continue through the early part of the 20th century.

Bengali Muslims started feeling alienated from their Hindu neighbours and began to look for some sort of political organisation to ventilate their grievances and was assisted by eminent Muslim leaders and intellectuals like Sir Syed Ahmed Mohammad, Iqbal, Sir Aga Khan and others. The past performance; the partition of Bengal in 1905, the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 which provided for separate electorate for the Muslims, and some other acts, of omissions

1. Ali, S.M., After the Dark Night, Delhi Thomson Press 1973, Josph T.O. Council Dilemmas of Secularism in Bangladesh Journal of Asian and African Connel Studies (Leiden), vol. II, No. 1-2, pp. 64-81 and Times of India, New Delhi, November 2, December 21, 1974.

and commissions were all responsible for this shift. In 1906 Muslim league was founded in Dhaka. Its avowed policy was to establish a political association for the protection and advancement of the political rights and interests of Muslims of India "and to respectfully present their needs and aspirations to the Government".² The League supported the partition of Bengal. It was resolved in Dhaka Conference that in view of the interests of the Musalmans of Eastern Bengal, the partition is sure to prove beneficial to the Mohammadan community which constitutes the vast majority of that province.³

Besides, Hindu-Muslim dichotomy in pre-partition Bengal, Bengali Muslims were opposed to Bengali Hindus but, their interests did not converge with the Muslims from other parts of India. The movement of Pakistan in this region was spear-headed by the Muslims of Calcutta. Though most of the Muslims supported creation of Pakistan, but, failed to recognize that once East Pakistan was created it would be the Biharis, or the Urdu-speaking Muslims migrants from Calcutta, Bihar and West Pakistan who would dominate the economy and politics of the province.⁴

(A) India's Role in Bangladesh Movement

The military intervention of India, sharpened the contradictions in Bangladeshi politics to the detriment of political stability in Bangladesh, India's interest in Bangladesh was politico-strategic. India and Pakistan had

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1. Bhattacharya, Jnanbrals, Aspects of Cultural Policy in Bangladesh, Economic And Political Weekly, Bombay, March 26, 1983, p. 500, See also Abu Jafar Shamsuddin, Sociology of Bengal Politics and Other Essays, Dhaka, Bangla Academy, 1973, pp. 83-98.
 2. Quoted by Chakrabarti, S.K., The Evolution of Politics in Bangladesh, 1947-1978, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1978, p. 8.
 3. Quoted in Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia Publication, New Delhi, p. 60.
 4. See Kenneth Mc Pherson, The Muslims of Calcutta, 1918 to 1935. Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra April 1972, and Amalendu De, Islam in Modern India, Calcutta, Maya Prakashan, 1982, pp. 214-27.

fought three wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971. The presence of 10 million East Pakistan refugees on its soil and establishment of an exile Bangladesh government in Calcutta provided necessary base for Indian intervention. Indian Parliament on 31 March 1971 declared "throughout the length and breath of our land, our people have condemned in unmistakable terms, the atrocities now being perpetrated on an unprecedented scale upon an unarmed and innocent people. This house records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph. The house wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole-hearted sympathy and support of the people of India.¹ India whole heartedly helped Bangladesh in her struggle for freedom.

The military crackdown of 25th March 1971 worked as a catalyst to bring all shades of political opinion in favour of independence except a few pro-Chinese communist groups. The pro-Soviet communist party of Bangladesh (Mani-faction) and the National Awami Party (Muzaffar faction) the left forces accepted India's role albeit, with reluctance or for sheer tactical reasons.²

Foreign policy of Mujib was according to India's choice. Bangladesh accepted to keep the region free from super power entanglements. It gave India a political relief. The major challenges which India's foreign policy now faces is from the extra-regional linkages of its neighbours. The importance that Pakistan pays to the US or to Islamic world, Nepal to China, or Sri Lanka to the United States or the ASEAN are similar. Bangladesh declared that shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party and thus foreclosed its option to register extra-

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1. Quoted in Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Why Bangladesh, Dhaka, pp. 47-48.
 2. Lifschultz, Lawrence, Bangladesh The Unfinished Revolution, London, Zed Press, 1979, pp. 15-36.

regional support to counter balance India's superiority.

The first military coup of August 1975 led to political instability and resulted in establishment of a military dictatorship in Bangladesh. Army brought Khondaker Mushtaque Ahmed to power, one of the Cabinet Colleagues of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.¹ On November 3, 1975 the eleven week old regime headed by Khondaker Mushtaque Ahmad was overthrown by the army under the leadership of Khaled Musharraf and Zia-ur Rahman who were freed from house arrest by Taher's forces was reinstated as chief of the Army Staff.²

After assassination of Mujib in August 1975, an era in Bangladesh politics ended. The secular tenor of Mujib policy was replaced with Bangladeshi nationalism based on Islamic solidarity. On 23 April 1977 Ziaur Rahman amended the constitution of 1972 and dropped secularism from the Constitution. It was laid down in new constitution that the state shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity.³

Bangladesh relations with India were not cooperative during Ziaur Rahmans period. Anti-Indian campaign had started during Mujibur Rehman's time. The Government and Awami League Party did not refute anti-Indian charge. The silence of Government of Bangladesh was interpreted in Indian circles as an attempt to divert the hostility of the people from the Government of Bangladesh to the Government of India.⁴

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1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, August 16-17, 1975.
 2. Jahan, Rounaq, Bangladesh Politics : Problems and Issues, Dhaka, 1980, p. 198-199.
 3. Nair, M. Bhaskaran, 'India's Image in Bangladesh', Janta vol. XXX, No. 3, February 16, 1975, p. 8.
 4. See Jayadeva Uyangoda, Indo-Bangladesh Relations in the 1970's Bangladeshi Perspectives, South Asian Strategic Issues, p. 78.

Mohd. Taha blamed India and said, 'The Indian expansionists with the active support and martial help from the Soviet Union, launched aggression against our country and have occupied it. Today, East Bengal, renamed as Bangladesh, has become a protectorate of India'. After the assassination of Ziaur-Rahman the government was replaced by a military coup led by Lt. General H.M. Ershad. Soon after Ershad proposed the setting of Zakat fund and declared to base cultural life on Islamic principles.

The communalisation of politics, in Bangladesh all the more affected relations with India. In the aftermath of Mujib's assassination, India feared that since the forces which had toppled, Mujib rode the horse of anti-Indianism the phenomenon would now be even more explicit.¹ It was feared that the deterioration of communal relations in Bangladesh might lead to a repetition of the large scale exodus of Bengali Hindus into India as had occurred earlier with the communal riots in East Pakistan.² According to Intelligence Bureau report the number of Bangladeshis in this country is about one crore.³ India announced to build the barbed wire fencing to check alleged infiltration of Bangladesh nationals.⁴

There were evidences of Bangladeshi involvement in supplying arms training to rebel outfits of north-east India⁵ at Moulavi Bazar Camp in Sylhat district.

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1. Mukherji, Dilip, Uncertainties in Bangladesh : Problems of Identity, The Times of India, September 20, 1975.
 2. Ghosh, Partha, Ethnic and Religions Conflicts in South Asia, Conflict Studies, London No. 178, 1985, pp. 5-6.
 3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, October 1, 1992.
 4. The Rising Nepal, Nepal, April 13, 1985.
 5. The Statesman, New Delhi, July 16, 1990.

(f) New Moore Island South Talpatty Controversy :

The controversy over the new Moore Island¹ generated heat between the relations of the two countries. The continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal extends to a significant extent. It reaches near Sri Lanka and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Bangladesh and India have no agreement on the delimitation of maritime zones such as territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf.² The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOS Convention)³ has raised new questions on the continental shelf.⁴ Within 200 nautical mile (n.m.) sea zone measured from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. The continental shelf in the 200 n.m. sea zone is subsumed in the regime of the EEZ. In the case of continental margin extends beyond 200 n.m. the coastal state is not free to extend the seabed jurisdiction.⁵ The continental shelf in

1. The Island dispute is about 24x12 KM and situated in the mouth of River Harya Bhana. The Harya Bhana River flowing through the Sunderbans forms the border between India and Bangladesh. Since Pur basha is situated at the mouth of river, determining the ownership of the Island has become difficult. See also Khyber Mail (Pakistan) July 24, 1985.
2. The delimitation maritime zones creates Conflict between Bangladesh and India. Disagreement arose mainly with India when the Bangladesh government in 1974 signed contracts to share production with six oil companies. See The Bangladesh Observer, Dacca, May 9, 1977, White Paper on the South Talpatty by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh (Dhaka); 26 May 1981.
3. UN Documents, A/CONF. 62/122 of October 7, 1982.
4. See Article 76 LOS Convention.
5. In this case article 76 para 4-8 of the LOS Convention is attracted. Para 4(a) speaks for the purpose of this Conventions the Coastal state shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 n.m. from the base lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured by either.

the Bay of Bengal is quite extensive and needs delimitation. Its sediments at 16.5 KM are as thick as any in world.¹ The Bay of Bengal has an area of 879,375 sq. miles and a depth of 2586 metres.

The continental slopes terminates at less than 3000 metres depth. To the West of Bay are Indian state of West Bengal and Orissa, on Southern part is Sri Lanka and on east is Burma, Andman and Nicobar Islands. These islands are the submerged parts of the outer fold ranges of the Arakan yoma of Burma.² The Ganges-Brahmputra Delta of the Bengal is located at the combined mouths of Bangladesh and India. Bangladesh has passed the Territorial waters and maritime Zones Act (No. XXVI) of 1974 and covers the geological shelf and the slope and rises. Bangladesh is in problem as to the delimitation of Sea zones with her neighbours. Islands are coming up in the Bay of Bengal. There is on agreed sea boundary between Bangladesh and India. Problems are arising on the ownership of New born islands in the maritime zones.³

India has its own enactment, and has passed the territorial waters continental shelf Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act 1976 (No. 80 of 1976) which speaks.

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1. Francis P. Shepard, Sub-marine Geology, 1973, Third edition, New York, Harper and Row, pp. 334-418.
 2. Monkhouse, F.J., Principles of Physical Geography, 1972, London University Press, p. 342.
 3. Rahman, M. Habibur, Bangladesh and India, their approaches to the Law of the Sea and the issues of conflict involved in the delimitations of Sea zones between the (Part A) XII (1984), The Rajasthan University Studies, p. 107, 108.

"The continental shelf of India comprises the sea bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the limit of its territorial waters throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the base line". In the case of ownership of the 'new born' Islands in the sea zone beyond the territorial sea there is little chance of Bangladesh to exist by way of occupation. Due to the existing position of Andaman and Nicobar islands, India is in a favourable position in respect of New Moore island. The issue was discussed when Narsimha Rao visited Decca in August 1980, Bangladesh rejected India's claim over the newly emerged island.¹ In a written statement in Rajya Sabha the Indian External Affairs Minister maintained that the newly emerged island was situated within Indian territorial waters on the basis of Median Line Principles. Charts produced by U.S. Navy also confirmed that the New Moore Island claimed by Bangladesh lies well within territorial waters of India.² On May 28, 1981, Bangladesh Parliament resolved to ask India to vacate the island. But, Indian External Affairs Ministry reiterated that Island always belonged to India.³ The Island controversy is still unresolved and causing tension between the two countries.

(C) The Chakma Problem

There are many thorny issues between India and Bangladesh. The Chakma issue need immediate attention. In November 1986, Bangladesh President H.M. Ershad himself

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1. The Statesman, New Delhi, December 21, 1980.
 2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 30, 1981.
 3. The Statesman, New Delhi, May 30, 1981.

admitted to the then Minister that the situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is not suitable for the return of refugees.¹ Subsequently, when repatriation was to take place on January 15, 1987, violent out burst and the transfer was stopped surprisingly Bangladesh accused India for preventing repatriation.² Netherland-based Chittagong Hill Tracts committee was organised to look after the repatriation. The committee appealed to both the Governments not to repatriate refugees, till normalcy was restored.³ The influx of refugees on Indian soil has created many problems before India.⁴ Bangladeshi has raised many questions about the nationality of the refugees and has offered to take back only the genuine "Bangladeshis".⁵ India has declared number of refugees approximately 27,000 and 32,000. Bangladesh maintains the figure as 24,000.⁶ Later on, India raises the figures to 49,000, but Bangladesh puts it at 26042.⁷ The number now is estimated to 50,000 and Bangladesh claims them about 30,000.⁸ The Chakma problem is getting more tough day by day. India has accused Bangladesh for helping Tripura National Volunteers and India has been blamed

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1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, November 12, 1986.
 2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 29, 1987.
 3. Public Opinion Trends 20 and 30 January 1987, The Telegraph, January 31, 1987.
 4. The Indian Express, New Delhi, February 1, 1987.
 5. The Telegraph, December 17, 1987.
 6. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, November 21, 1986 and The Bangladesh Times, March 26, 1987.
 7. The Indian Express, New Delhi, April 3, 1987.
 8. The Statesman, New Delhi, September, 1981.

by Bangladesh for sheltering Shanti Bahini (The military organisation of Chakmas). The refugees have denied to return till normalcy is maintained in Chittagong Hill Tracts. Zaker Party of the peer of Atroshi was pseudo-named Maulana Dhiren Bagchi and slogans were casted. "La ilaha ill lallah Dhaner Shishe Bismillah" (Read the Kalimah and vote in favour of paddy leaf in the name of Allah). The people relaye Anno Bastra, Basosthan-Islam Dehe Sama dhan". (Islam will solve problems of food, clothing and shelter) so much so that demonstrators often chanted slogans for declaring Bangladesh on Islamic Republic and forming a confederation with Pakistan. The rise of religion-based politics has proved counter productive. History is replete with instance of rise in religious frenzy leading to communal tensions¹. Moreover the relations between India and Bangladesh have become more tense due to the Islamic fundamentalism.

(d) India and Bangladesh After Indira Gandhi

With the assassination of Indira Gandhi the Indian nation faced a threat, both internally and externally. Rajiv Gandhi took over reign of the country at a crucial time. The functioning of Gandhi was different from his predecessor Indira Gandhi revealed that there was a notable difference between the style of functioning of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi with its neighbouring country particularly with Bangladesh.² After assuming power, in order to improve the relations not only with the nearest neighbours, but also with the

1. Recent press reports have it that in rural areas of Southern districts the Hindu minority community are being harrassed. Statement of CPB leader Saifuddin Manik, August, 30, 1991.

2. The Tribune, Karachi, May 26, 1985.

countries of other continents, Rajiv Gandhi established rapport with the Governments of the neighbouring countries. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi visited Decca and assured full support to flood affected people. The influx of refugees from Bangladesh is a problem which has been causing strain on the relations of the two countries. India and Bangladesh have conflict over the erection of barked wire fence by India along the 3400 kilometers long border between the two countries. Bangladesh opposed the project Fencing around Bangladesh on account of boundary dispute.¹

(c) Religion and Ethnicity in Bangladesh Politics

Bangladesh emerged as a secular polity with a constitutional embargo on religion in politics. The first constitution (1972) abolished all kinds of communalism, political recognition of religion by state, exploitation of religion for political purposes and discrimination on religions grounds.² But, soon after the change of political scenario Islam made a come back in Bangladesh politics.³ Islamic resurgence is a common phenomenon to the Muslim world spreading from Morocco to Malaysia. Bangladesh has basically relied on Islam. The secularism laid in the 1972 constitution but, neither the six point programme⁴ nor the

1. Morning News, March 31, 1985, and also Assam Tribune, (Gohati) April 1, 1985.

2. Article 12 of the Constitution passed on November 4, 1972.

3. Syed, Anwar Hussain, Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh; International Variables and External Inputs in Rafiuddin Ahmad (ed) Religion Nationalism and Politics In Bangladesh, New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 1990.

4. The Six point formula was presented at the subjects committee meeting of the convention of opposition parties held in Lahore in February 1966 by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on belief of the East Pakistan Awami League. This formula essentially sought for complete fiscal and political autonomy of East Pakistan. He left the convention when

eleven point programme, a synthesis of which as considered to be the Magna Carta of Bangladesh, had any owing on Secularism and even the proclamation of the Government dated 10 April 1971 endorsed secularism¹ in following words -

"Secularism does not mean absence of religion. The 75 million people of Bangladesh will have right to religion by law. We have no intention of that kind.... Muslims will observe their religion and nobody in this state has the power to prevent that. Hindus will observe their religion and nobody has the power to prevent that. Buddhists and Christians will observe their respective religions and nobody can prevent that our only objective is that nobody will be allowed to use religion as a political weapon".²

The secularism and a ban on religion-based politics brought universal results and driven into permanent opposition to the Awami League and the Government. The Islamic elite linked it with Indian pressure and Indo-Soviet guardianship.³

Soon after, Mujib's role as a Statesman underwent changes and began to use religious symbols and sentiments with political purposes. Islam became politically important because the legitimation attempts of the nationalist

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the organisers of the convention refused to discuss on the formula. See Purvadesh, Dhaka Weekly 13 February 1966. For the details of formula see Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Amader Banchar Davee-6 Dafa Karmasuchi (Bengali) published by Tajuddin Ahmad for East Pakistan Anami League, Dhaka, 4 Chaitra 1372; also Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Six Point Formula Our right to Live, Dhaka, March 23, 1966.

1. See Bangladesh Documents, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 281-82.
2. See his speech in the constituent Assembly, November 4, 1982, Bangladesh Observer, November 5, 1972.
3. For details See Syd. Anwar Hussain, Foreign Policy of Bangladesh 1972-1975, Dependency Relations C110, Department of History, Jahangir Nagar University, vol.V, 1986.

elites failed. The Mushtag regime used Islam for his political game and started his morning in mercy of Almighty Allah.¹ The process of using Islam for leadership purposes was given coherent speed by Zia and Ershad. The principle of secularism was replaced by the words. Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions.² Between 1982 and 1990 Ershad, made systematic efforts to continue the policy of rehabilitating anti-liberation forces and of parallel Islamisation culminating in the 84 Amendment to the Constitution declaring Islam as a state religion. Ershad used 'Islam' more than Zia ur Rahman. Zia was a freedom fighter, well known for his honesty and integrity. Ershad on the other hand did not have such linkage and image.

In the elections of 1991, religion was used at large. Even a Hindu candidate Dhiren Bagchi from Bangladesh violated the agreement between the two countries and started construction a high and well equipped embarkment along the Mahuri opposite Belonis. The Indian delegation objected to it.³ The editorial in Bangladesh Times commented that

"There is an element of positivism in the way India is viewing its relations with its neighbour including Bangladesh. How far this attitude will be translated into action, is a matter that time will tell. Indias foreign Secretary, Bhanderi said that India's intentions (for building closer ties) were honest", India wants cooperative relations with neighbours".⁴

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1. Cited in Ahmad Shafiqul Haque and Muhammad Yeekia Akhtar, "The Ubiquity of Islam. Religion and Society in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, vol. 60, No. 2, 1987, p. 205.
 2. Article 8(1A) : Article 12 declaring secularism was omitted. The Proclamation (Amendment) Order No.1, 1977.
 3. The Financial Express, April 5, 1985.
 4. The Bangladesh Times, Dacca, April 18, 1985.

Indo-Bangladesh talks on Ganges water ended without reaching any agreement. The delegation failed to resolve the problem of augmenting the Ganges flow during the dry season. The Ganges water dispute was a critical problem. Some experts suggested that a permanent body of cobasin states ought to be set up for sharing and using trans-national waters.¹ There were little misunderstanding between the two countries. Bangladesh was of the view that India has always been consistant in its stand, despite the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Peace which goes on.

The High Contracting parties further agree to make joint studies and take joint action in the fields of flood control, river basin development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation, than agreed to the concept of augmentation (India Mujib Joint Declaration of May 16, 1974) then signed the Farakka Agreement of 1977 which formally introduced the shielda. Indian scheme of Ganges-Brahmanputra link canal and linked the sharing of Ganga water to the augmentation of its flow - than revali-dated the 1977 Farakka Agreement though 1982 Memorandum of understanding than belatedly sharing from augmentation and now thinking of new approach.²

Rajiv and Irshad reached an accord on Ganga waters similar to the earlier one³, and said that the two countries have agreed that irrigation ministers will meet during the next few days to set up terms.⁴ The agreement was applauded and was said but the Rajiv Ershad understanding breaks a new ground.⁵ The new agreement prescribed

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1. The Rising Nepal, Nepal, August 5, 1985.
 2. Holiday, August 16, 1985.
 3. Holiday, August 16, 1983.
 4. National Herald, New Delhi, October 19, 1985.
 5. Bangladesh Times, Dacca, October 20, 1985.

that the Ganga waters will be shared for a period of three years beginning the dry season of 1986 on the same basis as laid down in the November 1982. Bangladesh will get 35,000 cusec of water during the dry season and India somewhat less than 40,000 cusec.¹

(f) Defence

There are five army infantry divisional headquarters, with infantry brigades, two armoured, 6 artillery regiments and 6 engineer battallions with total strength of 90,000, with an additional 55,000 para military volunteers, including an armed police reserve and the Bangladesh refiles. Equipment includes 30 Soviet T-54 and 20 Chinese Type 59 Tanks.

Naval bases are at Chittagong, Keptal Khulna and Dacca. The fleet comprises 3 former British frigates, 8 Chinese built 390 tonnes fast attack craft, 4 Chinese built fast torpedo boats, 2 ex Yugoslav 200 ton. Patrol craft 1 British Built 140 ton. Patrol craft, 5 Indigenously built 70 ton river gun boats, 12 auxillaries and traing ship of 710 tones. The man power of Navy is 600 officers and 6900 ratings.

Air force

Deliveries from the Soviet Union and China successfully have built up strength of 20 MIG 19, IAN-24 and 3 AN-26, 20 Mi-8 bell, 212 Bell, 206 L and Aiouslle 111 H. helicopter 10, Chinese CJ-6 primary trainters, 6 Magister armed jet and some light aircraft. Personal strength in


1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, November 25, 1985.

Air force is 4000. The strength is sufficient to look after internal safety. Bangladesh is secured on all four corners by a powerful neighbour India, which acts as a buffer state. There is neither any external danger to its security nor Bangladesh can create any problem to his neighbour.

[C] India-Maldives Relations

(a) The Political Phenomenon

Nasir was elected the first President in the wake of its independence and ruled for 21 years. In March 1975 president Nasir dismissed the Prime Minister, Ahmed Zagin



and the post of Prime Minister was abolished. To succeed Nasir who did not stand for reelection, the legislature chose Manmoor Abdul Gayoom the then Minister of Transport who was approved by referendum in July 1978. President Gayoom who took office in November announced that the main

priority would be the development of the poor rural regions, while in foreign affairs the existing policy of non-alignment would be continued. In September 1983 and 1988, President Gayoom was re-elected for five year terms. By a referendum with 96.37% of the votes.¹

(6) Maldives Strategy

The republic of Maldives ranks among the worlds 25 least developed countries but, has an importance in the power, game, much greater than might be expected while most of the peoples in the world would havent heard it, but, significantly the state has its deplomatic relations with more than 75 countries in the world.

For the once ignored republic of Maldives, has one key bargaining point in the world powergame - its strategic location in the centre of Indian ocean and the value of the strong point has grown tremendously as the importance of the Indian Ocean has increased especially now, with the need to keep the oil routes free. The value of the Maldives strategic position, has also been enhanced by the existence of the former British Royal Air Force Base and Air Field on Gan. The Gan base was established by the British during world war II and it was, re-activated in 1957 as a staging most between the East and the West. The piece of real estate also happens to be nearest land to the Anglo-American Military installation in Diego-Garcia in the Changos Archipelago South of the Maldives. Today, the British Staging port on Gan is an unoccupied military base like a ghost town. The Maldives however,

1. V.S. Uryan Narayan - South and South East Asia in the 1990's Konark Publishers A 149-Main Vikas Marg, Delhi.

realise it is useful as a back droup for all their dealings with foreign powers. Foreign diplomats concerned with Maldives readily admit the vacant base is the important but, unusually, unmentioned presence behind any relations with Maldives, who desperately, recognize this diplomatic reality and have learned to play skilfully with this chip. Being a small and poor country, that is dependent for its. Survival on a peaceful Indian ocean and increasingly dependent on foreign exchange for its modernisation projects, has cultivated its friendship with as many and as politically varied countries as it can.

Among the nations, with which Male has diplomatic relations are Soviet Union, United States, Britain, Cuba, China, Japan, India, Sri Lanka, Libya, South Korea, Pakistan, France, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, Austria, united Arab Emirate, Vanualu, Morrocco, Labanon, Fizi, Sierro, Leone, and Colombo. It is evident that the diplomatic terms have been extended without any consideration of size, power and financial capacity. Within a year 1988, Maldives entered with 6 countries in various agreements. India and Maldaves too, signed a cultural agreement aimed at developing closer bilateral cooperation between the two countries in the field of art, culture, archeology, education, social welfare, public health, mass media and sports.¹ India maintained her relations with Maldives on the basis of equality and respect for each others territorial integrity.

Despite all its cooperation and assistance, there was mild ripple in New Delhi when Gayoom reported on questioning of the status of Indias small minicoy island in an Independence day speech in July 1982. President said, "when I look at such prerequisites in my personal

1. The Tribune, Chandigarh, September 19, 1983.

capacity, I have to tell you the atoll..... is a part of the Maldives¹, but he asserted that he had not lodged any claim with India. Maldives wanted India to help to set up a defence academy and also increased its quota for training of the military officers in Indian military academies.² Gayoom praised India for its timely help and said : "I don't think India has any hegemonistic ambitions or designs in the region".

Maldives entered into various agreements with other countries. Dhaka signed an agreement on waiver of visas and accord on cooperation in the fields of education, culture, sports. Chief Martial Law Administration made a visit to Maldives on July 26-29, 1983 and hinted at possibility for the further development of the existing friendly and brotherly relations between the two countries.³

As regards Maldives and Sri Lanka relation President Gayoom said we have a specified relationship with Sri Lanka which is our closest neighbour and also on gateway to the world. It is in the interest of Maldives to have very close links with Sri Lanka. Gayoom further declared that we have also found ways further consolidating our traditional relations in this field of culture trade and so on.⁴ Lankan Dy. Minister of Foreign Affairs

1. The SUN, Sri Lanka, dated 13.11.1982.

2. The National Herald, Delhi, September 19, 1989.

3. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, July 31, 1983.

4. The Ceylone, Colombo, August 11, 1980.

Tyronne Fernando signed 2 agreements with the Maldives one was the extradition Agreement which will provide the legal frame work for mutual Maldives and Pakistan signed cultural exchange programme in 1989.¹ This is the first time Sri Lanka entered into such as agreement outside the common-wealth. The other agreement was about cooperation between the two countries in the field of education, science, cultural affairs, sports and youth affairs.²

(C) Non Alignment

The determination of the Maldives to protect its non-aligned status without caring into big power pressure for letting portion of the ocean republic to be used for military purposes should solve to boost the morale of all nations that wish to see the Indian ocean turned into a zone of peace. After the winding up of the British Military outfit in 1976 it has been a period of various proposals coming in for a lease of this or that part of the strategic island which the Maldives government resolutely turned down on each occasion and then prevented proliferation of the Diego Garcia phenomenon. President Gayoom seems to be determined to steer clear of all probable foreign attempts to spread tentacles over his territorial jurisdiction.³ The Foreign Minister dismissed an speculative the reports that the US was making overtures to Maldives to establish a base in Gan. The Minister added "We are determined not to allow any one to settle

1. The Dawn, Karachi, July 20, 1989.

2. Ceylone Daily News, Colombo, September 3, 1981.

3. The Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, November 10, 1982.

any where in our territory with military or strategic intentions.¹ The islands are string out in the series of the coral attols between Sri Lanka and equator, affirming an excellent location for watching traffic on international sea laves between West and East,² which is even more significant manifest in Gayooms foreign policy, and intends to define the countries non-alignment status in terms of pragmatic relations with a number of nations who might be willing and able to render development assistance to Male-without strings. Its decision to join the commonwealth has thus been prompted by desire to breakout of the entrangement which Britain has forced upon Maldives ever since the former quit the Gan island.³

Maldives island has full faith in the disarmament and for securing the status of zone of peace for the Indian ocean and thus to enable upon an invigorating programme of socio-economic development. India has been continiously denouncing the militarisation of the Indian ocean and the attempts to intensify arms. In the first session of Majilis (Parliament in 1983, Gayoom said that 'The Indian ocean should become a zone of peace for neuclear weapons, military tensions and military bases.⁴ He further added that the government of Maldives will strictly abide by the non-alignment course.

Maldives is against arms race in the region by supplying an increased quantum of sophisticated US Arms of mass destruction to Pakistan. Like India, Gayoom inhesitatingly endorced that the Indian ocean should remain a zone of peace, as resolved by UN in 1971. Foreign minister of

1. The Hindu, Madras, May 7, 1982.

2. The Indonesia Times, Indonesia, March, 1979.

3. The Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, April 10, 1982.

4. Working people daily, dated February 22, 1983 and Rising Nepal, dated April 12, 1985.

Maldives expressed that "we will not be interested in giving Gan to superpowers."¹ and further added that "we will not be allowing even ship repairs if they are going to serve any foreign military interest."² The strategic Indian ocean, Republic of Maldives emerging from years of isolation; has fended off overtures from the big powers and stock an independent foreign policy posture. President Gayoom declared his determination to preserve Maldives non-aligned status and told to Reuters in an interview "That he will not allow the island to be used for military purposes by any big power."³ As to his predecessor who wanted to preserve the Maldives non-aligned status, the present President is also of the view "to persue to non-alignment policy."⁴

The Maldives called for a multilateral framework to ensure protection and security of the small states. In United Nations General Assembly Fathulls Jameel the Foreign Minister said that such a farmework is the most feasible mode, "of sound security, mechanisms for the weakest members of the United Nations. The socio-political identity of the weaker states and the principles of Sovereign equality are not strong enough to be impervious to the possible vicissitudes of unequal relationship."⁵

Gan is just 300 miles (480 km) North of the US Military base on the island of Diego Garcia and already 400 a runway capable of handling big aircrafts. In line

1. The Financial Express, New Delhi, May 7, 1984.

2. Ibid.

3. The SUN, Sri Lanka, November 13, 1982, Amrit Bazar Patrika, December 18, 1982.

4. The Indonesia Times, Indonesia, March 5, 1979

5. The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu, September 28, 1989.

with its policy of neutrality Maldives has maintained cordial relations with North and South, East and West. In 1980 Maldives signed a scientific and cultural Agreement with Soviet Union and a Technical Cooperation accord with China. It also made an agreement with Australian Government to renovate in the former British Air Port facilities for commercial use.¹

(d) Maldives and South Asian Regional Cooperation

Understandingly, any cooperative effort in the expanded sphere of such a neighbourhood i.e. South Asia has evoked full support of Maldives for a number of reasons. As one of the smallest countries struggling to arrive on its own, any cooperative venture is bound to be beneficial to it. To began with common action between the members of a regional grouping of developing countries enhances the bargaining capability and manoeuvrability of all vis-a-vis the developed South, but more so of a small state like the Maldives. Besides, under the regional aegis, joint functions may be carried out in several sectors (e.g. provision of technical services, supply of information, creation of regional financial institutions, etc.) which may be beyond the capability of an individual country. Moreover, in view of similar climatic and physical features of these states, their experiences in several sectors have been almost identical. Some of them who have learnt their lessons the hard way but with a modicum of success in dealing with certain economic problems, can impart their rich experience to others. This is pertinent in view of the fact that regional bodies like ESCAP or Agency for Integrated Rural Development in

1. The SUN, Sri Lanka, November 13, 1982

Asia and the Pacific Region have, generally speaking, taken a global macro-perspective and in the process, often side-tracked the micro-problems of common regional situations.

As such, from the beginning, when the initial draft prepared by Bangladesh was discussed at the Foreign Secretary level conference at Colombo in 1981. Maldives evidence a keen interest in the proposal. In the initial draft, it suggested the additional theme of health which was subsequently incorporated. Further, in Kathmandu Conference, the same year, Maldives took the responsibility of acting as the nodal country to prepare a detailed report on transport which was one of the eight themes selected in the deliberations for concerted plan of action at the regional levels. During the deliberations, right from Colombo to Kathmandu to Islamabad and finally, Delhi, in August 1983, at the foreign Minister level when the South Asian regional cooperation SARC assumed a certain degree of institutional trappings, the Maldives representative underlined the fact that such a regional institution can help facilitate the sharing of experiences in harmonizing and coordinating planning at the national levels finally, and mentioned by the Maldivian delegate at the Colombo regional cooperation in South Asia, "can offer a unique contribution to the cause of promoting the understanding between the countries of the region."¹

(c) India Maldives Linkages

When Gayoom was elected as President, a coup was attempted. The third abortive coup which ironically coincided with the beginning of the President third term also raised acute dilemma for the island nation of internal

1. For the text see Sri Lanka, Meeting of South Asian Foreign Secretaries, 21-24 April 1981, Colombo.

stability vs external security underlying at the same time the crucial nature of the security issue of small island nations.

The third coup drama was engineered by Abdullah Lathifi a leading businessman with the help of some Lankan mercenaries hired for US dollars 2-5 millions establishing a permanent base for Tamil Militants.¹ Maldivians considered it an act of terrorism. Gayoom called it foreign aggression. Among the 400 mercenaries 200 had already infiltrated the islands; the remaining 200 equipped with AK 47 rifles and rockets propeller grenader (RPG-7) joined them on November 3 at 4 a.m. Lathifi has left Male for Singapore but, actually was waiting to accompany the mercenaries from Sri Lanka. At 4.15 a.m. they attacked the Presidential palace and the National Security Service (NSS) head quarters. The attempt killed 7 NSS guards and 13 civilians and injured several people. The mercenararies took 2000 hostages including Transport Minister Ahmad Mujilhabe and his wife and captioned the Radio and TV Stations, power supply and foreign exchange units.

Though the Coup-makers managed their assault calculatively they appeared somewhat over confident since they failed to capture the telelink and airport. Gayoom telecasted for International help.² Because of the Indian timely decision Indian military planes landed at 8 PM at Male with 1600 para troopers³ and on November 3 by 4 a.m. 1600 peace-keeping force reached male. On November 5 the mercenaries

1. The Asian Week, November 28, 1988.

2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, November 9, 1988 and Hindustan Times, New Delhi, November 4, 1988.

3. The Hongkong Standard, Hongkong, November 4, 1988.

demanded free passage to Sri Lanka which was denied. A naval ship fired its final shot at 6:16 a.m. and the mercenaries surrendered at 9.25 and the coup came to an end. Indian help received international accolade. Nepal said " We appreciate that India at the request of the Maldives President. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom sent military assistance to Maldives."¹ The secretary of Commonwealth observed " many a small country is today a safer place because of India's selfless action in turning back aggression in Maldives."² After the pullout of mercenaries, a small force of 500 indian Troops was retained in Maldives till the situation in the Indian Ocean archipelago stabilises.³

The Maldivian aborted coup leader Abdulla Lateefi ~~has~~ alleged that the Tamil militant leader, Uma Maheshwaran had masterminded the bid to topple the government of President Gayoom..With his hands and feets tied and eyes blind folded the balding Maldivian businessman told P.T.I., that the People Liberation Organization of Tamil Elam (PLOTE) leader wanted to get hold of the island to shift his group away from Sri Lanka where he feared annihilation.⁴ The plot was hatched in Colombo and no intervention from India was anticipated.⁵

Sridhar Rao of Indian Institute said "it shows beyond doubt Indias willingness to project military power in terms of assisting its neighbours."⁶ Indias policeman role in the South Asian Waters of the Indian ocean dramatised its capacity.

1. The Stateman, New Delhi, November 5, 1988.

2. The Hindu, November, 4, 1988 and Indian Express, New Delhi, November 5, 1988.

3. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, November 9, 1988.

4. Ibid.

5. The Indian Express, New Delhi, November 6, 1988.

6. The Hongkong Standard, Hongkong, December 1, 1988.

The rescue operation was display of India's military power and the sophisticated skills of its defence planners. The distance for the nearest military base in South India to Male was 600 KM and not a mere 57 km. as in the case of Jafna in Northern Sri Lanka. The use of military power to help two neighbouring governments coup with an internal threat (in the case of Sri Lanka) and an external threat (in the case of Maldives) alarmed small nations.

As regards India, the earlier interaction with the Maldives was in the main in socio-cultural spheres. In the 1960s a number of Maldivian students came to study in India under Colombo Plan. In the 1970s, there has been a marked increase in official and unofficial transactions. A State Bank of India branch was opened in Male in 1974 and an airline service commenced in 1975. Earlier the only air route to reach Male was via Colombo, India was the first country to open a resident mission in 1976. In 1977, the Indian Airlines collaborated with Air Maldives in launching the country's first air service between Male and Colombo. The agreement has been renewed in 1982 for another three years. Further, since 1982 Air Male has started operating a bi-weekly service Male-Trivandrum sector too.

In 1978 the International Airport Authority of India won an international tender to expand the runway of Hulule airport and modernize, it. It completed its work in 1981. Through another agreement visas were abolished between the two countries. In 1980 India and Maldives signed a trade agreement. Besides, India has also provided technical assistance in various spheres as desired by the Government of the Maldives. It has grant scholarships to Maldivians to study in India and provide Indian Building schools, and in other

activities relating to community development programmes. It has also agreed to help Maldives in modernizing its fishing industry.

An institutional form to such socio-cultural relations was provided in 1983 when President Gayoom visited Delhi and signed a cultural agreement covering the field of arts, culture archaeology education, social welfare, public health, mass media and sports.¹ Being a free port, Maldives has been attracting a large number of Indian tourists. Thus, in 1982 out of a total of 20,000 tourists from Asia, about 15,000 were Indians. This constructive pattern of relations between India and Maldives has been free of any controversy. However, the issue of Minicoy an Indian island in the north of the atoll state created a mild flutter when during the July 1982 celebrations of Maldives independence, the President's brother Abdullah Hameed declared that an island in the north of Maldives. Tiladummati Atoll was always ruled by Male and was in fact part of Maldives. The reference was obviously to Minicoy islands. Almost immediately, the President clarified that this reference was to affirm the religio-linguistic-cultural identity between Maldives and Minicoy only and that Maldives was not laying any political claims on Minicoy.

(f) Defence

The security problem of Maldives was noticed for first time at the third coup attempt. Its security problem is in fact so acute that development of military capability to adequately defend itself is beyond its capacity. As the incident demonstrated, Maldives did not even have enough strength to resist the coup attempt which compelled President Gayoom to seek assistance from the friendly countries. This is basically the most important event the capital now face. This is also one of the main aspects Gayoom is advocating

for Indian ocean zone of peace proposal (1020 p). One impact of the incident is, President Gayoom desires to enlarge the structure of the National Security Service (NSS). The President has called upon the youths of Maldives to join NSS to reduce its vulnerability.¹ But, even an enlarge NSS can not absolutely reduce its vulnerability in view of the thousands of small scattered islands in the High Seas. Control of the vast sea territory with a population of 200000 constitutes a real dilemma for small country like the Maldives. F.M. Jameel, admits that management of a sophisticated defence system is beyond the states capacity, but he is willing to discuss in different forums, the arrangement of a regional force which looks appealing at the moment.²


1. The Times of India, New Delhi, November 20, 1988.

2. The Front Line, November 26, 1988.

D] Indo-Nepal Relations

The social, economic, political and historical binding between Nepal, and India are deeply familiar. The cultural pattern in India and Nepal are hardly indistinguishable. Hindus in the pain of the majority of the people in India, is the dominant religion in Nepal, Gorkheli, the official language of Nepal is a consonant of Sanskrit.¹

similarly, the economies of the two countries are in



extricably interwoven. Gorkhas are serving in the Indian Army. They come to India in search of their livelihood and a large number of them settled in India.

Indian relations with Nepal are the outcome of British Rule. British India relations with Nepal were based upon the treaty of Sugauli, which Nepal had to sign after the war of 1814-16. It was however, a contact between two sovereign states. The terms and condition of the treaty do not reflect that Nepal had surrendered her sovereignty to the Britishers.²

1. Other languages and dialects spoken and understood in Nepal have close resemblance to Indian language. Gorkheli is written in Devanagiri Script, Hindi, obviously is understood in Nepal.
2. Kant Rama, Indo-Nepalese Relations, 1816 to 1877 Delhi, 1968, p. 2.

After independence, the Indian Government constantly received gestures of friendship from Nepal. Nepal was conscious that practically no government in Nepal could survive without India's support.

Another treaty was signed on December 21, 1923 at Sugauli between Nepal and British India and the former timely obtained as "unequivocal" recognition of its independence. In the first clause both governments agreed 'mutually to acknowledge and respect each others independence, both internal and external. "The scope of Nepal's independence however was limited by the third clause which obligated each other "to exert its good offices" to remove cause of any serious friction or misunderstanding with neighbouring states whose frontiers adjoin theirs".

Although defined in terms of mutual obligation, infact this ment that Nepal would continue to 'consult' the Government of India on relations with Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan and China. Clause V provided, that Nepal gain the right to import arms and ammunition without previous Government of India approval so long as the intentions of the Nepal Government are friendly and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importations. Here again however, this right was limited in practice if not in theory.¹ This was evident from the treaty of Sauqauli. The Nepal Government therefore, signed a "stand still Agreement" with India in 1947 and agreed to continue the spirit of British India-Nepal relations. This was followed by a tripartite agreement on August 9, 1947. By this agreement², Nepal agreed to continue to allow recruitment of Gorkhas for the armed forces of India and

1. Rose Leo E., Nepal Strategy for Survival, London, 1971, pp. 171-72.

2. The practice of recruitment of Gorkhas had been started by the British long back. For details, see Ashad Hussains, British India's relations with the Kingdom of Nepal, 1857-1947. Allen and Unwin, London, 1970, pp. 234-254.

Great Britain.¹ In return for the recruiting facilities, the Government of India managed to fulfil Nepals military needs regarding dependence production, army transport planes, civil supplies and training facilities.²

The two very important treaties were conducted on 31 July, 1950 between Nepal and India. These two treaties (a) a treaty of peace and (b) a treaty of trade and commerce, are still considered the corner stone of Nepalese-Indo relations. The first treaty was almost a defence part between the two countries. The second treaty provided for India's directions and guidance in matter of trade and commerce between the two countries.

India, infact had very high states in the security and defence of Nepal. Such strategic considerations were repeatedly emphasised by Prime Minister Nehru. The treaty of peace and friendship of 1950 provided the basic and legal framework for the unified measures for mutual security and defence between India and Nepal. Following the treaty for instance check posts were established along Nepal's northern borders.³ The Government of India also sent Military mission to Nepal to assist the host government in the 'Training and re-organization of the Nepalese Army'.⁴

India's policy towards Nepal has always been receptive to Nepal's security needs. It was believed at New Delhi

1. Nepalese forces activity assigned India, in the Kashmir and Hyderabad military campaign in 1947-48. See The Hindu, Madras, February 16, 1950.

2. Muni, S.D. Foreign Policy of Nepal, Delhi, 1973, p.20.

3. Malik, B.N., The Chinese Betrayal, New Delhi, 1971, 122-124; also See Pradyuman P. Keran and William H. Jenking Jr. The Himalayan Kingdom : Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal Princeton, 1963, p. 117.

4. See Bhasin, A.S., Documents on Nepals Relations with Indian and China, New Delhi 1970, p. 37, Leo E. Rose, Nepal Strategy of Survival, California, 1971, p. 197.

that it could be accomplished only if Nepal became strong, progressive and stable political unit. The Indian Government therefore, advocated a compromise between the Rana's and the "revolutionaries". India adopted, thus, the "middleway" policy.

Indira Gandhi was not able to resolve the fundamental dilemma of power facing India how to be strong enough to prevent encroachment on natural interests by outside powers and yet avoid intimidating small neighbouring states by an increase of power indeed. She exacerbated fear by her forceful actions in the protectorate of Sikkim and showing anger over what she called "Anti Indian Nonsense" in Nepal and Bangladesh".¹

(a) Indo-Nepal bid to mend fences

The ice was broken on August 25, 1989 when P.V. Narasimha Rao, the then External Affairs, Minister paid a two day visit to Kathmandu and met the King. It was felt that the two countries were now moving towards a phase of serious and purposeful dialogue covering almost the entire gamut of bilateral issues.² Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India and Nepal's king Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev also met on September 4, 1989, in Belgrade on the occasion of NAM meeting.

(b) A new phase in Indo-Nepal Relations

V.P. Singh, The Prime Minister of India announced the policy decision of his government after coming in power in 1990 that it would be his endeavour to normalise relations with all its neighbours, including Nepal. It was

1. Singh, Surjit Man, India Search for Power, Sage Publication, New Delhi, p. 39.

2. The Hindu, Madras, August 27, 1989; also see "Welcome move", Editorial, The Times of India, August 29, 1989.

believed at New Delhi that the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship had been under operation for the last 40 years but time and again Nepal had flouted it. India itself must do some introspection for its diplomatic land failures. It was felt that this time an affirmation would be sought from Nepal that it would honour in letter and in spirit the 1950 treaty and the security and commercial pacts through a well devised and mutually accepted machinery and monitoring system.¹

It was a landmark in the relations between India and Nepal when the Prime Ministers of India and Nepal, V.P. Singh and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai signed a joint communique on June 10, 1990. The acrimony and bitterness of the past 14 months were over. It took care of their major concerns. The trade and transit arrangements, snapped on March 23, 1989 were restored. India was relieved by the proper understanding and appreciation of its security concerns by Nepal and also the promised end of discrimination against its nationals.² The two sides were prompt with followup administrative measures to implement the decisions incorporated in the communique. The reactions in the two countries were euphoric.

(C) Restoration of Status quo

India and Nepal decided on June 15, 1990 to put aside the aberrations of the recent past, normalise relations fully and resolve status quo-anti to April 1, 1987 in trade and transit arrangements pending the finalisation of a comprehensive arrangement. The interim government of Nepal

1. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, March 28, 1990.

2. The Frontline, June 23 - July 6, 1990.

fully exempted additional customs duty levied on all goods imported from India as well as the customs duty levied on primary products.

It was also decided that the two governments will take all necessary steps such as issue of administrative orders, notifications, legislation/ordinance etc. in order to ensure the status quo anti to April 1, 1987, is restored by July 1, 1990 it was agreed.¹

The advent of the democratic era in Nepal also contributed to the happy conclusion of the talks. It was for the first time that the Prime Minister, and not the King, committed that country's government to major decisions with India. The change exerted a beneficial influence on the negotiations and the preceding exchanges through diplomatic channels. This was also the first time in diplomatic channels that agreed decisions were made known through a joint communique signed at a press conference.

On trade and transit, Nepal was fully accommodated. The 15 points earlier designated as transit points for Nepal's transit trade through India with third countries were reinstated. The 22 border points and the routes specified as land customs stations for the movement of goods between India and Nepal were restored. The new dispensation was aimed to boost Nepal's exports to India. For instance, it was decided that there will be customs-free and quota-free access for manufacturing items containing upto 65% of Nepalese or Nepalese and Indian materials, as against 80% in the past. The tariff concession on import duty was also provided where the value of Nepalese and Indian materials

1. The Hindustan Times, June 15, 1990.

and labour added in Nepal was 40% of the ex-factory price. In the past, it was 50 percent. The standby credit to Nepal was enhanced from Rs. 25 crores to Rs. 35 crores.¹

In response, exemption of additional customs duty to Indian goods was restored by Nepal. Indian nationals were exempted from the ambit of the work permit scheme. The Indian government, to recall, had taken strong exception to the work permit for Indian nationals. In India, Nepalese nationals are treated at par with the locals in employment in the private sector or the government, barring the three all India-services, and ownership of property, trade and business. Likewise India expected the same status and privileges for Indian nationals as the local citizens in Nepal. India and Nepal also agreed to usher in a new era of cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the spheres of industrial and human resource development for the harnessing of the waters of the common rivers for the benefit of the two peoples and for the protection and management of the environment.²

Chandra Shekhar became the Prime Minister of India after the premature fall of the V.P. Singh government. He provided unstinted support to the leaders and the people of Nepal in their quest for restoration of democracy. He played an inspirational role when the democracy movement was being launched in Nepal. He reached [] to Nepal to attend a Nepali Congress convention in December 1989 and later in February 1990 when a multiparty movement was launched for restoration of democratic institutions.

Chandra Shekhar's visit to Kathmandu on February 13, 1991 when the parliamentary elections of Nepal were very

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

near gained considerable significance. He said, speaking at a banquet hosted in his honour by the Nepalese Prime Minister : "The time has come to put our economic and commercial relations on a comprehensive basis."¹

In a significant development, the two countries agreed on February 13, 1991 to more gainfully harness their water resources potential for the benefit of the people of the two countries and to obviate the annual recurring flood-related losses. India also offered Nepal a trade regime which would allow Nepalese goods uninhibited duty free entry into India. India also agreed to purchase all the surplus electricity generated by Nepal.

It was also agreed that the Indian railway ministry would examine Nepalese proposals for the upgradation, expansion, extension and repair of some delapidated and broken railway lines in Nepal. India also showed readiness to assist Nepal in building the physical and institutional infrastructure for industrialisation and human resources development. Chandra Shekhar expressed his view : "we, on our part, must also fully appreciate that in helping Nepal, we are helping ourselves, there is nothing that would give more satisfaction to the people of India than the happiness,, prosperity and progress of the people of Nepal."²

The Nepali congress secured a mandate in the Pratinidhi Sabha elections held in May 1991.³ Girija Prasad Koirala, the new prime Minister of nepal, became the complete master of his government's affairs. He will have to take full responsibility for his policy decisions, both

1. The Times of India, Delhi, February 14, 1991.

2. Ibid.

3. Pratinidhi Sabha is the Parliament of Nepal.

in the domestic and international spheres. The Nepali Congress believes that common rivers between Nepal and India should be jointly harnessed for mutual benefit. He has tremendous fund of goodwill in India. Indian policy makers assumed that she will cooperate with India without flaunting a China card which had often in the past created misunderstanding in New Delhi. There is every hope of the two countries prompting the bonds of friendship further on the basis of equity and fairplay.

2) Indo-Nepalese Cooperation

South Asia is endowed with vast and yet unexplored and untapped resources hidden in seabeds, high Himalayas and huge population which can offset to a considerable extent. The three major river systems - the Indus, the Ganga and the Brahmaputra effect the life of millions in India. Similarly, the three rivers flowing from Nepal into India - Kamali, Gandak and Kosi also possess huge water resources and can bring prosperity in whole region.

Although, Nepal is a small country it has tremendous potential in terms of water resources. The three major river systems namely Kamali (Ghagra) in the far west, the Gandak in the Central Region and Kosi in the east bring the annual run close to 200000 million cubic meters and can generate 83 thousand MW of hydropower. The present capacity of Nepal is simply 127 MW and is only 0.5% of the potentiality.¹ Addressing the fourth SAARC Summit King Birendra said, "Nepal is willing to cooperate in any venture for the multipurpose development of her water resources bilaterally, triaterally and multilaterally for the mutual benefit of the people in

1. The Nepal News, January, 1988.

the region.¹

Power cooperate is the main sphere in which India can cooperate to a much extent and which is also beneficial to the economy of the Indian people. Next to Brazil, Nepal has the largest power potential in the world. The estimated capacity of 83 thousand MW is equivalent to the combined installed hydroelectric capacity of Canada, the United States and Mexico.²

Out of the different projects the Kosi Multipurpose project, the Gandak irrigation project and the Trisuli Pokhara, Devi Ghat Projects are most important. Kosi project was the first major project under taken jointly by Nepal and India in April 23, 1954. The project was intended to provide irrigation for an area of 500 sq.miles of Morang Delta and generate 900 MW power available to both countries. Gandak Project was the second scheme which was aimed at harnessing the large irrigation and water potential of the Gandak for benefit of India and Nepal. It was started in 1959. The project provide irrigation facilities for 1.43 lakhs acres in Nepal. The Kernali is the third most important project in which India shared. It will generate 32 MW of power.

An agreement was signed on Nov. 20, 1958 for the construction of Trisuli Hydel Project. The work on the project was ^{Completed} completed on Nov. 17, 1981 and is generating 2100 MW.³ Another project of Devighat Hydel Project

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1. Sharma, S.N., Energy Resources in Nepal : Cooperation for Development in Asif A. Waq (ed) South Asian Cooperation Industry Energy and Technology, Sage, New Delhi, p. 17.
 2. India, Nepal Studies, Vol. II, 1989-91, p. 74.
 3. The Rising Nepal, Nepal, November 18, 1971.

was also taken by India and Nepal in 1978 and was completed at the cost of Rs. 50 crores. Its installed capacity was 14.1 MW. Thus for Nepal harnessing of water resources remain one of the most concerned areas of cooperation.

(c) The Indian Community in Nepal and the Nepalese in India

The word 'Indian Community' includes "People of the Indian origin" and denotes in broader sense, peoples from India who has migrated to those regions in lesser or greater number at one point of time or another. These expressions may be used for a set of people from the Indian origin living in any country like Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, Surinam, Trinidad, Tobago, Nepal, Pakistan etc. There seems a very connotation of these terms in the context of South Asia. Under normal circumstances these terms are used in a disparaging sense to identify a group of people distinguished from others generally, the power holders, or regions, linguistic and ethnic grounds or the underprivileged in the state concerned.

The Tamils are treated to be associated with the terms "of Indian origin" in view of the status they hold in the state population structure". It is insignificant that Sinhalese too consider themselves from the Indian origin and connect them to the pedigree of Prince Vijaya who established Sinhalese race in Sri Lanka in the 6th century B.C. and irrigated from the part of India which presently is called Orissa. Similarly, the people of Nepal who have so far been ruling elite in the state also call themselves, People of Indian origin. But, they use it only at time of grievances and aggregating their demands. There are certain segment of people in Nepal who under normal conditions suffer on various counts and whose life in Nepal is not pleasant. They are called 'Indians' even after their stay

in Nepal for generations back. Similarly Madhshis are the people of Indian origin in Nepal. There are about 75 lakhs and more Medheshis in Tarai. They face a number of problems relating to citizenship, agriculture business, education and religion etc.

The most serious problem faced by large section of the Indian community in Nepal is that of citizenship. Many of the Madheshis are of the opinion that the Nepali ruling elite wants to drive them away from Nepal by not recognising them as citizen of Nepal, and a different approach is being exercised in respect of the people of Indian origin living in Hill areas. There are 3 type of Nepali citizen. The first consists of the paternal, the second is that of inherent citizens by virtue of both rights' and the third category is that of the naturalized citizens, neither, born in Nepal nor having Nepali ancestors and are living for a long time. They have created problems. Even after the proof that they are living in Nepal for long time some of the Medheshis are not being given citizenship rights. Initially, they are being provided temporary citizenship certificates and than try to get the permanent one. The task is cumbersome and some fails to get it. The possession of the Nepali citizenship certificate is a must to apply for any government job.

Agriculture

The tarai is known as the granary of Nepal and is the backbone of the economy. It produces jute, tobacco, oil seeds, sugarcane, herbs, spices, timber, hidec. The area which is responsible for producing a substantial part of Nepals gross domestic product and revenue is paradoxically faced with numerous problems. Land Reform programme was oriented in Nepal in 1963-64 to achieve equal distribution of land ownership. But the more important goal for

some influential elements was the replacement of land-owners, tenants of the Indian origin in the Tarai region with Nepalese from the Hills. As a result of the ceiling provisions 3% land was found excess and only 27000 hectares of land was given to the people of the Indian community.

Under Panchayati Raj system a large number of agriculturists have been dispossessed of their holding. Moreover, forests have also been cleared but, despite all of it Madheshis could not get any share worth mention. Apart from it excessive Malguzari is also being imposed on agricultural sector and they had to pay Rs. 70 to Rs. 80 per Bigha. The major effect of it goes on to Mehshis, "the people of Indian origins". A number of restrictions have been imposed on the business of 'people of Indian origin'. A nepali paper commented as early as 1969.

"If the Government of India wants to see Indian in Nepal looked upon in the same way as Indians in Ceylon, Burma and Africa, it has only to continue the present policy of attempting to protect in economic monopoly of Nepal".

The Madheshis are discriminated against in respect of the education also. Indian Government provide huge amount as assistance for Education to Nepal Government. A number of Nepalese get education in Indian Universities without any discrimination. A large number of Indian students went to Nepal under the Colombo plan but, it is strange that 10% marks were deducted out of gross number for purpose of competition from the outsiders most of whom were Indians.

The position of Nepalese in India is quite different from those people of Indian origin in Nepal. India

Government has issued guidelines for Tribunals to detect foreigners in Assam under the illegal migrants (Determination of Tribunals) Act of Feb. 2, 1984. The Government of India also clarified its official position regarding Nepali nationals in possession of restricted area permits. They will not be treated as illegal migrants. The person protected under Government of India, Notification of August 14, 1970 are also protected.

In India the intensive development of the plantation and construction work gave job opportunities to Nepalese migrants. Free plot of land were being given to plan taken workers in Darjeeling and Assam while in Sikkim South of Bhutan. There was considerable land for reclamation which was a great asset to the land-hungry hillmen of Nepal.¹

(f) Defence

Nepali Army consists of 1 Royal Guard, 7 infantry brigades and single artillery, engineer, signals, parachute and transport battalions, and 1 air squadron. Equipment includes 25 Ferrets. Strength of all services is about 40000 and there is also a 28000 strong para military police force.


Air force; independent of the army since 1979, the air force has 3 Suyau Transport aircraft, 1 Purna helicopter and 3 Chetak helicopters. An HS 748 turboprop transport and 1 super Purna and 1 Purna helicopters are operated by Royal Flight.²

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1. Quoted from the unpublished dissertation submitted in parties fulfilment of requirement of the Master of Philosophy degree in J.N. University by Nimala Das.
 2. Manorma Year Book, 1993, Malayala Manorma, Thiruvananthapuram, p. 189.

[E] Indo-Pakistan Relations

Pakistan came into existence as a separate homeland of Muslim minority. The word 'Pakistan' was first brought by Muslim students in Cambridge in 1933. Islam, whether as separatist force not in line with the national main stream of anti-colonial struggle or as a religion per se; a rallying point for national unity of people conscious of their different identity, has been identified by both India and Pakistan as the root of the genesis of Pakistan.¹ Pakistan's perception of its role emerged from the realisation of two vital forces - the area pull of South Asia and the ideological pull of Pakistan's Islamic identity. The defence policy revolved around the central theme of Indian domination and safeguards to counter it.

This made the found and affiliations this way of to value Liyakat Ali



of being part of core dower Asia and the ideological Islamic identity. The defence policy revolved central theme of Indian and safeguards to counter

was the main cause which religious tilt more pro-the talk of religions more pronounced. Due to strategy Pakistan turned religion based politics. Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan talked of the strategic importance of the Middle East, of West Pakistan bordering on Iran and Afghanistan and East Pakistan bordering on Burma keeping in mind the Muslim concentration of Indonesia.² Their attempts did not prove successful. This phase of Pakistan's foreign policy, when attempts were made to be friend the Arab World, was full of

1. For details see Pakistan : The Struggle of a Nation 1949, The Paradox of India-Pakistan Relations, New Delhi, 1965.

2. Khan, Liyakat Ali, Pakistan : The Heart of Asia, 1950, pp. 11-13.



misunderstanding between the Arab World and Pakistan. Having exhausted the natural image to bring about a solidarity in the Muslim World, Islamabad sought to break isolation by aligning itself to the west.¹ Pakistan's foreign policy changed when Pakistan joined the Western alliance system. This step ended its isolation and provided it an opportunity to counteract India's desire to dominate in what she called, her sphere of influence.² India opted for non-alignment and kept itself aloof from the East-West and North-South conflict. India's stand to keep extra-regional powers from interference in South Asia and the cold war, rejected the Balance of power doctrine enriched by Western powers. India's moto for peace was based on a dual policy of settlement of conflicts through peaceful negotiations. Peace was to be achieved to tackling the root of conflict (social, economic, political) and not by taking poise of strength and negotiation.³

Pakistan's policy resulted thus in the replacement of the Regional power hegemony with that of the Great power hegemony. The motive for alliance was thus not to escape geography but, achieve security in the context of India.⁴ India viewed with suspicion the extra-regional linkages which Pakistan entered with great powers, Nehru's classic reaction to Pakistan's decision to enter into US alliances was that "conditions have qualitatively changed and it affects Indo-Pak relations. In view of Pakistan, the major aspect of going, the US alliance was fear of Indian hegemony as well as the position of the traditional mountain route under Pakistan's control, through which the

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1. Bhutto, Zulfiker Ali, Foreign Policy of Pakistan : A compendiom of speeches made in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 1962-1964, Karanchi, 1964, pp. 18-19.
 2. Mohd. Khan, Ayub, Pakistan Perspective, Washington, DC. 1966, p. 18.
 3. Appadorai, A., On Understanding Indian Foreign Policy, in K.P. Misra, Foreign Policy of India, A Book of Reading, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 115-116.
 4. Bhutto, Z.A., Bitateralism : New Directions, Islamabad, 1976, p. 12.

sub-continent was invaded throughout history. The burden of guarding these routes is now borne by Pakistan.¹ The argument was that a strong and stable Pakistan would be the strongest bulwork of security for India and in performing this role, it would gain an identity for itself.

After independence and partition of the sub-continent Pakistan was assiduously cultivated as an ally by the next for the cogent reason. Sir Olaf Caroe, a well known expert on this region, who had advised the UK and USA "governments", Summed up the matter that "Pakistan has succeeded to much of India's responsibility, for the Gulf opens directly on Karachi..... India is no longer an obvious base for Middle East defence. It stands on the firing of defence periphery."² The American interest in Pakistan is more or less on account of her interest in the Gulf.

The 1971 war had two main repercussions for South Asia. It legalised India's claim as a regional power as well as it changed Pakistan's perceptions of security interests and problems. Pakistan lost a valuable part in the form of East Pakistan; it was disenchanted with the United States for its half hearted support during the war and turned more towards West Asia and developed its linkages with China. Speaking about the changed circumstances, Bhutto, described that at the global level both the United States and China two friends of Pakistan - slightly modified their stance. The United States gave slight

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1. Reply by Foreign Minister Hamidul Haq Choudhari to the debate in National Assembly on 25 March 1956, Foreign Relations, Karachi, 1956, pp. 54-55.
 2. Sir Olaf Caroe, The Wells of Power, Macmillan and Company 1951, page IV.

accepted to Indian position when both Nixon and Kissinger recognised India's new responsibilities¹ China, in an oblique reminded Pakistan that it would have to accept the new balance of power in South Asia.

Pakistan considers itself a cut above Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and did not accept India's predominance. Pakistan's hope is to cut India down to a size to match India's strength. This has been the dream of all those who fragmented India in 1947 by Collaborating with the West. They have reconciled themselves to the partition as it came about since their dream was to Balkanise India.² The precipice of a nuclear weapons race in South Asia is between India and Pakistan. Within the next five years both sides will have medium-range missiles. Each side will have to assume the worst of each other. And this is destabilizing because of the hair trigger nature of these missiles in times of tension. Not only do both countries have nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, they have recently pursued chemical weapons as well. These programmes are particularly worrisome because of constant tension and conflict in Kashmir.³

Pakistan's main threat perception of India is based on the suspicion of Indian motives. In view of Pakistan, India have not reconciled to the establishment of Pakistan. 'They will like to undo it, if they can, because their motives from the beginning have been inimical'. For example,

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1. Nixon's statement of the world Annual Message, 3 May 1973, in Asian Recorder, 9-15 July, Col. 11487-88. Henry Kissinger's address to the Indian Council of World Affairs, 28 Oct. 1974 in Foreign Affairs Reports, November 1974, p. 213; Indian Ministry of External Affairs Report, 1974-75, New Delhi, p. 5.
 2. K. Subrahmanyam, Security Policy: World Focus, New Delhi, No 23-24 November, December 1981, pp. 5-7.
 3. Robert CIA Director, Report before Congress, New York Times, 21 January, 1991.

when the Muslim ruler of Hyderabad delayed acceding to India, the state was captured by Indian using force. Finally, when Pakistan had some internal difficulties in East Pakistan in 1971, India-played an active role to break up Pakistan and have not stopped there. India has been finding disruptionist elements like Sindhis for further fragmentation or annexation of Pakistan.¹

In 1977, Congress lost its 30 years domination from the Indian political scene. The Congress was replaced by the Janta Party. Janta Party introduced aggressive policy of non-appeasement towards Pakistan and thus it effected India's relations with Pakistan. Further more Pakistan first tried to achieve parity with India in military strength by joining US sponsored Military alliances, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and later by obliging China and take use of it. After emergence of Bangladesh, Pakistan's strategy of maintaining parity with India was finally buried. China's support to Pakistan can not always be described on India's cost. Pakistan in fact lost much by providing China Karakoram High way and had opened doors for a powerful expansionist country, moreover, introduced China with USA with the obvious intention by using two giants as counter weight to India, without deeply thinking that in politics no one is friend or enemy. History repeats that China had never been a reliable friend.

Zia failed to bring about a consensus on any issues facing the country and always remained under the psyche that dead Bhutto may turn to be more dangerous than the

1. Chibbar, M.L. Indo-Pak Reconciliation, Lectures, page 75.

living one. The re-emergence of the military bureaucrats establishment in the decision making process in Pakistan proved dangerous portent for Indo-Pak relations, when the possibilities of a genuine 'detente' become visible for the first time since 1947.¹ The common idea was that if Zia decides to remain in the saddle for long and if his legitimacy is questioned, he may find it increasingly difficult to maintain the present process of normalization of relations between India or Pakistan.

The relations of India with Pakistan have never been cordial. Pakistan has never taken to their heart, India's policy of cooperation and has always tried to show superiority and with these objectives it shook hands with extra-regional powers. John E. Owen has rightly observed that many Pakistani would like to see India weakened or even destroyed by communist China. S.S. Harrison wrote early in 1965. That "Frustrated and at loose ends, Pakistan searches restlessly and needlessly for a degree of recognition and respect out of all proportion to its size. It huffs and puffs and still finds to its understandable despair that India is bigger".

Pakistan's attitude towards India is in fact of rivalry to the point of bitter jealousy. Pakistan's Foreign Minister while speaking about the relations with India expressed "Even if India were to treat us with yielding the tomorrow, we should only regard it as a trap. Pakistan's rivalry with India is so deep that Pakistan has a desire to keep conflicts alive till India realises the need to settle all disputes with Pakistan on the basis of recognised international merit and in a spirit of equality". Ayub Khan

1. "Pakistan comes full circle", India Quarterly, New Delhi Jan. March 1978.

characterised India "as the most treacherous country whose plighted words were worthless". Prime Minister Liyakat Ali Khan followed a 'clinckea flat' policy towards India while another Prime Minister Firoze Khan Noon called India 'the enemy of Pakistan'.

It has been the policy of Pakistan to keep alive its dispute with India. Pakistan failed to carry any agreement entered with India. It violated the agreement of 1958 regarding her borders with India in Kutch, under which India's frontiers in Kutch were disposed off. Evidently, Pakistan treated the Nehru-Noon agreement of 1958, Indo-Pak agreement of 1960 and the Simla Agreement as a waste paper and scrummbled many problems before India to divert the attention of his population from its own problems. Pakistan has a root cause that 'India's enemy is Pakistan's friend' Pakistan shaked his hands with China, even though it was aware that China was agressor and can not be believed.

Yahya Khan, gave a twist to Pakistan's foreign policy and played active part in the world politics to isolate India. But, the efforts of Pakistan to play the role of a powerful nation proved a nightmare. Economically, geographically and politically Pakistan remained too week to compare with India. The separation of East Pakistan had far reaching consequences. It cut short the importance of Pakistan as a Muslim country and strategically also weakened its position.

Pakistan is India's most difficult and the most important neighbour. But, seldom has any thing, any issue or any argument (been) resolved between India and Pakistan. Dialogue is the most vital thing between them. Their drift towards war begins when they cease to talk.¹ India-Pakistan

1. Bahadur, Kalim, "India-Pakistan Relations" Year Book on India's Foreign Policy, 1987/88. Edited by Kumar, Satish, p. 83, extract from M.K.Rasgotra's "Dialogue with Pakistan Indian Express, 16 January, 1987.

relations go back to the pre-independence conflict between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League, the two nation theory propounded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and the manner in which the partition of the sub-continent was brought about by the departing British Colonial rulers.

The conflicts and Controversies between the two major parties over partition were later transferred to the foreign policies of the two countries and coloured their world view. This was strongly reflected in Pakistan's Foreign Policy.¹ One plank of the Muslim League's movement for Pakistan was that the Muslim League be treated on par with the Indian National Congress. Pakistan claimed equality and parity with India. Implicit in the framework was the Pakistani awareness of the disparity between India and Pakistan in terms of size, population natural resources, and industrial, Scientific and Technical levels. To make up for this disparity Pakistani leaders began to seek outside support.²

Pakistan could only look to the United States for this support. The USA was also seeking allies in Asia to counter the growing influence of the Chinese People Republic. Pakistan joined the SEATO in September 1954 and CENTO in 1955. Pakistan could only get an apparent sense of Security with the USA support. Nehru stated "That such

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1. See Burke, S.M., Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, Minnea polis University of Minnesota Press, 1974 for detailed study.
 2. Chohen, P. Stephen, The Pakistan Army, New Delhi, Himalayan Books, 1984, p. 137.

a step imperilled the freedom of the Asian Countries, that it would upset the existing equilibrium and constituted a form of intervention in Indo-Pak problems and that it was a step towards war....". Large Scale Supplies of sophisticated weapons by the United States to Pakistan over the decades has had a profound influence on Pakistan's domestic and external affairs and particularly on Indo-Pak relations. The impact of this on Pakistan's relations with India has been that the ruling elite considered military solutions to problems, which could have been solved through bilateral negotiations. Here in lays the cause of three Indo-Pak wars (1947, 1965 and 1971).

Pakistani Leaders failed to understand the genesis of Indian Foreign policy of the Indian National Movements long struggle against imperialisms, colonialism and racism. Nehru said "peace and freedom have to be considered in their political and economic aspects. The economic problems demand urgent solution or else crisis and disaster might overwhelm the newly independent countries"¹. The Indian experience has been that whenever Pakistan has accumulated large stocks of arms, mainly supplied by the United States, it has gone to war with India. Neither India nor Pakistan has solved any of the problems which led ^{to} war.²

1. Quoted in Haksar, P.K. (ed.) Nehru's vision of Peace and Security in Nuclear Age, New Delhi, Patriot publishers, 1987, p. 28.

2. Bahadur Kalim, "India-Pakistan Relations", Year Book on India's Foreign Policy, 1987, 1988, Saga Publications, New Delhi, P. 84.

(A) Pakistan and Islamic Ideology :

In 1977 Zia-ul Haq took over as President of Pakistan on the basis of the military coup and overthrew the democratically elected government of late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on the plea that there was a confrontation between the PPP Government and the opposition united front. On the one hand Zia ul Haq made repeated attempts to legitimate the military rule by associating opposition political parties; on the other hand he Islamized the Pakistan society. The constitution was also amended repeatedly by the General to meet the wishes of the Generals.

The Muslim League was dominated by feudal aristocracy and a group of professionals, merchants and leaders. The rich urban professionals were led by Mohd. Ali Jinnah. The Muslim trading communities were active in supporting the Pakistan movement. The reason for this was that they either felt inhibited by restricted opportunities in India or saw much greater scope for themselves in an independent Muslim State.¹

After Pakistan emerged as a new country Muslim League was represented by the rich urban professionals who had migrated from India. The indigenous feudal aristocracy had not supported the Pakistan movement and it took them several years to reassert their power in the ruling party of Pakistan.² The landlords continued to exercise strong influence in politics and the society in general. Individual landlords could make or break parties by utilising the power

1. Stanley, A. Kochanek, Internal Groups and Development Business and Politics In Pakistan, New Delhi, 1983, p. 21.

2. For details Burki, Javed Shahid, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977, London, 1980, p. 10.

they enjoyed over the land and their tenants.¹ The five year plan under Ayub Khan led to leaders who were educated in western countries and did not know Islam.² Islam served only as a slogan to rally Muslims belonging to all classes. Both the Islami ideology and the concept of Pakistan had meant different things to different people.³ The traditional Ulama and fundamentalist groups backed by feudal forces and rival factions of the capitalist attacked the constitutional and political programme of the ruling faction as un-Islamic.⁴ The fundamentalist could always take up provocative theological issues and sectarian conflicts to distabilise any government. Pakistan had five constitutions in forty six years. In each constitution a new defination of sovereignty had been given. In Pakistan lopsided industrialisation and the poor and the impoverished became poorer and the in famous twenty two families emerged.⁵ The policy of promoting capitalism needed. Capitalist ideological framework. However, Pakistan's ruling classes have failed to evolve a capitalistic Islam. The ruling classes of Pakistan half heartedly attempted to impose a prefeudal and feudal Islamic ideology on a society which was rapidly developing capitalist relations of production

1. Ali, Tariq, Can Pakistan Survive : The Death of a State Harmonds Worth, 1983, p. 41.

2. For details see Cnowdhari Habib Ahmed, Tehrik. 1. Pakistan Aur Naynashnalist Ulma, Lahore, 1966.

3. Bahadur, Kalim, South Asia in Transition: Conflict and Tension, p. 137.

4. Leonard, Binder's Jummat-i-Islam of Pakistan, New Delhi, 1977, for the Jammati arguments against Pakistan.

5. Business Recorder, Karachi, 25 April 1968.

6. Haq-Zia-Ul Pakistan and Islamic ideology in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rasheed (eds.) Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, The Political Economy of a Propetarian State, Delhi, 1983.

Most of the leaders of Muslim League in power after 1947 belonged to urban professionals and they paid lip sympathy to the promise of Islamisation of Society. The capitalism favoured individual rights and freedom, democracy and constitutional governments and also separation of religion from politics. It was a major tie between the ulama's and the capitalists. Ulmas believed that Muslim League leaders claims that Pakistan would be an Islamic State.

In Pakistan Islamic fundamentalism is an ideology of the dominant feudal and capitalist classes, which means defence of private property, free trade, suppression of democratic rights, authoritarian regime and national oppression. General Zia used Islam as a tool to legitimise his military rule and to attract the general mass and divert attention of public from the ethnical conflicts. He commanded as the true Islamic concept the institution of Amir or one man rule for the country.¹ Zia's Islamic concept was related to interest free banking, enforcement of Zakat and Shariat courts. The minority Muslim sects like shias and Ahmedis were placed under repressive measures by the State. The followers of Shia community found to their dismay that they were being pressed to follow laws and regulations of Sunni Schools. Their voice was suppressed by violent policy action. Similarly new laws were enforced which almost outlawed the Ahmadi religion. Rights of women were also reduce in the name of Islam. Restructions were imposed on social activities of woman.

1. Munir, Mohammad, Jinnah to Zia, Lahore, 1980, p. 146.

The Pakistans rulers laid stressed on the unshakeable bond between the State and religion and the ruling class embraced religious fundamentalism. As an ardent advocate of the Islamic Unity, Pakistan has been making untiring efforts to promote world Muslim Unity on the pretext that zionist expansionist menace was a threat not only to the Arabs but to the entire Muslims world. Pakistan maintain the closest possible contacts with the fraternal Islamic states at the highest level.¹

(b) Ethnic Conflicts in Pakistan

Ethnicity can be defined as the emergent expression of primordial feelings long suppressed but, now awakened, or as a mode of seeking political redress in the society.² It is a term which is most often applied to any group which differs in one or several aspects of its patterned, society transmitted way of life from other groups, in the totality or that way of life or culture.³ Ethnic conflicts have posed a serious challenge to a large number of states.

Waller Conner has described the nation as a self differentiating ethnic group" and the pre-requisite of a nationhood is an awareness that one's own group is unique in a 'most vital sense'.⁴ No where is such a crisis, so clearly manifested as in a multi-ethnic state like Pakistan.

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1. Kathpalis, P.N, National Security Perspactive, Lanccer International, New Delhi, p. 44.
 2. Danial, Bell, Ethnicity and Social Change, in Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moyouhan, eds. Ethnicity : Theory and Experience, Massachusetts, 1975, p. 169.
 3. See Dictionary of the Social Science, edited by Jullius Gould, William L. Kolh compiled under the auspices of U.N.E.S.C.O.
 4. Waller, Corner, National Building or Nation Destroying, World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1971-72, p. 92.

Pakistan bears the major ethnic threat from internal violence along regional ethnic identities. The Bengali's Sindhis, Baluchi's and Pakhtun's constitute important elements in Pakistan's ethnic mosaic. The primary cause of conflict is the Muhajir representation of their community among Pakistan most significant national elites. This has served to politicize the Muhajirs community.

Sindh is the most ethnically diverse of Pakistan's frountier province, due to the international transfer of peoples into the promise during the subsequent to partition. The 1981 census disclosed that Sindh had a population of 19.3 million of whom 10.6 million (55.7%) were indigenous Sindhis.¹ The ethnic consciousness of the Pathans, Baluchis- and Sindhis indicated that the feeling of relative deprivation has exhisted among all the three groups and the present upsurge in ethnic conflict in Sindh, can be attributed to this factor. It is pertinent to mention here that political violence results from an intolerable gap between what people want and what they get.² Relative deprivation as conceptualized by Ted Gurr arises when an individual does not get what he thinks is justifiable due to him. Relative deprivation is the mechanism that produces frustration of sufficient intensity to motivate people to engage in political protest and violence.³

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1. Source adopted from GOP Population and census organization, Statistics Division 1981, Census Reports of Sindh Province, Islamabad, Population Census organization, 1984.
 2. Gurr Ted, Hand Book of Political Conflict : Theory and Research, Princeton, 1980, p. 167.
 3. Gurr Ted, Why Man Rebel, The Free Press, 1970, p. 5.

(c) sindi question of nationality

The crystallisation of the Sindi Nationality had taken place as far back as 1200 years ago. The tribal identification had been subordinated to the Sindhi national identification. A feudal nationality, so to speak came into existence while vestiges of tribalism remained and a number of secondary languages continued to consist. When the Arabs conquered Sind in eight century. They did so by defeating a sovereign ruler of the long establishment state of Sind. The Arabs had difficulty in recognising the separate national identity of Sind and even considered of about from Hind and India people.

After lapse of Sind rule, two Sindhi dynasties 'Soomro' and 'Momo' ruled Sind independently. The Arghums and Tarkhans who came from Central Asia also ruled as more or less sovereign rulers of an independent state. In 1652 Mughal ruler of India, Akbar imposed direct rule over Sind. But, it did not cease to be a distinct entity. The Mughals never thought to integrate Sind with Hindustan. The subedars and faujdars of the Sarkars were no more than farmer generals of revenue.¹ The Mughal rule was never accepted by the Sind public and remained in continuous revolt against the Mughals. Sumeja Umar, Chandio and Nomri were particularly noted for their resistance to alien rule. Lastly Mughals had to recognize the sovereignty of Sind under Kalhor native rule. Despite all efforts by Iran and Afghan to win over Sind, no fruitful efforts could be achieved and Sind maintained its sovereignty.

Before the British conquered Sind in 1843, the latter had established itself as a sovereign state under

1. Chopra, V.D., Studies in Indo Pak Relations, Patriot Publishers, p. 11.

Talpur Yirs. Commander Hoshoo, who became a hero, raised the slogan of "Murvesoon, Sindh na leseon (we will die but will not give Sindh). Even British had to recognise the advanced nationality development of Sind. They declared Sindhi to be the official language, Muslim nationalistic consciousness in Sind was not only based on narrow material considerations but on long nourished Sindhi nationalism. Its social extent was extremely limited. The HUR movement in 1940 paid resistance to the British Rule in Sind, The British imposed martial law in 1942. Sent police from Punjab but remained unsuccessful. The Hur movement was for independence of Sind. Pir Sibghatullah Pagoro claimed that his ancestors were Guddi Nasheen of sind and will rule Sind. For Pakistan the task of nation building was more difficult than any other newly independent country. Beside the geographical separation of East Bengal, which had the minority of the countries population from west Pakistan, each of the five province represented a distinct nationality which had a fully or equal sovereign state of its own before the British conquest. Besides, the provinces had different population resources and proximity of power.

The transfer of population from India in 1947 also created much difficulty to the existing mass. The removal of colonial rule led to an enormous concentration of power in the hands of civilian bureaucracy which largely belonged to Punjabis and Urdu speaking refuge and Kathiawari immigrants. The landlord class which was quite powerful in Punjab and Sind could not exercise political hegemony. The Military which immerged as the paramount political force in the country dominated in all fields.

Pakistan was aware about the position and creation of Bengladesh as a result of the insusitivity of its rulers.

The Balooch's people were subjected to armed suppression from 1973 to 1977 resulting alienation of Baloochies from Pakistan. The army also took hard steps against Sindhis, who were claiming disparity. The main problem in Sind is demographic. In 1947 about 1 million Hindu Sindhis left for India and in their place more than one million urdu speaking persons from India settled in Sind. Recently several hundred thousand Behari from Benglâdesh have been settled in Sind with the result that they have been reduced to minority and creating disparities. The other aspect of discontent among Sindhis is that practically, more than half of the Pakistan industries are located in Sind, but, they have no participation in it. The lucrative, commercial transportation construction and service sector, which comprises 55% of the Pakistan's domestic gross products are largely located in Sind but, Sindhis have no share in this sector. As regards to service class their margin comparatively to the population is nil.

Similarly, agriculture lands were the bastion of the Sindhis economic power. But, after creation of Pakistan situation has dramatically changed. More than two million acres of land left behind by the Hindu Sindhis in 1947 was distributed among the refugees and was not allotted to landless Sindhis. Also, over one million acres of land which was brought under cultivation due to construction of Kotri and Guddu barrages were also distributed to non-Sindhis. It has exacerbated the condition of the common Sindhis.

The Sindhis met their first political shock when their primate city Karachi was separated from Sind and declared "Federal capital Area". It put Sind in ridiculous position of locating its government as no other city in the province had the infrastructure to host the provincial government. Sindhis surplus revenues was appropriated by the West

Pakistan (New Pakistan) and Sindhis people hardly benefitted with it. In Pakistans ethno-political calculus, there is no room for a Sindhi Prime Minister. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto accomplished the unthinkable, but, had to pay for its cosmopolitan outlook. The constitution of 1973 did not provide sufficient quantum of provincial autonomy. The Sindhis were turned as strangers in their own Karachi city Sindhi schools were shut down. In 1975 all the periodicals were banned by the government. At present only the government and Jammat-i-Islami are allowed to publish news papers in Sindhi.

Sindh comprises 23% of the Pakistans population but contains 60% of its industries, consume 42 percent of energy and has a per capita income of 40% higher than in Punjab. The crux of the matter however, is the question of nationality which Sindhis are not ready to alienate. They want and fair participation in the democratic policy. A free hand to develop their culture and national personality and their future without coercion. It is estimated that Mohajirs now make up about 35 percent of Sindhis population. They are concentrated to the major cities in Karachi and Hyderabad where industry and commerce has thrived. The seeds of ethnic conflict in Sindh were sown in 1947 when during the blood letting which accompanied decolonisation on both sides of the sub-continental divide more than half a million Urdu speaking refugees Muslims (Mohajirs) came to Sindh as displaced people.¹

1. The Times of India, July 31, 1990.

(d) Baluchistan Problem

Baluchistan is a vast country in West Asia divided into three geographic units, the Palistan or Eastern Baluchistan the Iranian or Western Baluchistan and the Afgani Northern Baluchistan. The total area Baluchistan is around 7 lacks kms, having a population of 7½ million people. Apart from it they are about three million ethnic Baluchi in sind who have merged with Sindhi population and have become the part of its socio-political matrix. When the British arrived in this part of Asia in 19th century, the Baluchi area consisted of several independent Principalities. In Sind, klat and Western Baluchistan. The British conquered Sind and finished Baluchi power. Soon Punjab was subinghted and the Baluchi area of Dero Jah (Dere Gnezi Khan, Mushirgash Jhang and Dere Ismail Khan) came under British sway. British attached Khan Mehraf Khan in 1939 and after killing him, put his son in Khante. The British agreed with Iran on the occupation of Western Baluch area. However, due to strong resistance, Iran could not take possession. The Khan of Balat was made the head of the Baluch confederation. Before the partition of India a conference was held on August 4, 1947 in Delhi which was attended by Lord Ismay, for Liaquat Ali Khan and Sir Sultan Ahmed as legal advisor of Khan of Keret and Kelet was declared as an independent State on August 12, 1947.

However, Khan of Kerat treacherously and unexpectedly announced on March 22, 1948 surrendered and ⁿanexed its area with Pakistan. Pakistan took over the entire administration and put behind bars all the prominent leaders. In 1954 a party Demarook Ulus (Progressive People Party, was organized to struggle for the democratic rights of the people. In 1955 Baluch leaders organized another party VSI a man Gal

(Peoples Party) with Agha Abul Karim as its President to form autonomous Baluchistan. On GX/1958 Khan of Kelat was arrested and put into jail with all other leaders. For three months the whole Zakakzai tribal area was indiscriminately bombed and several peoples were killed. A special concentration camp was opened in Quetta. After 1962 martial law was uplifted. Elections were held and Baluch leaders came in majority. Again there were disturbances and finally compromise was reached in 1967. In 1973 NAP came into power but, again NAP ministry was dissolved and troops were sent to takeover to look after law sorter similar with from hands. After the emergence of Bangladesh again an elected provencial government was established but that could not last long and was dismissed in 1973. The main reason of the discomfort was that Pakistan since 1958 upto ZIA had been under Army rule except short periods and has blotted the national feelings of the Baluchi people. The other important fact was the national awareness against the tyranny of the Punjabi people. Baluchi people feel that they can not get solution of their demands in the present set up.

Baluchistan in fact is situated at an important strategic cross-road as it is wedged between Afghanistan to the north and gulf of Oman to the South and is of great importance to the US because of its proximity to the oil-rich gulf. It has remained the centre of attention of Pentugow. Till the fall of Shah of Iran, American policy makers mainly operated in this area of Pakistan through him. In the early seventies Iran was in the forefront of suppressing the movement of the Baluch people Guwdian reported. "What has now become clear is the recent involvement of the Iranian Army Aviation in the province working together with the Pakistan Army Aviation, Nine Iranian Helicopters and 18 crew were deployed between Dec. 73 - May 74.

Daily Aayendagan reported but military block had shifted its focus of attention from the north to the South, particularly. The southern border of Iran and Pakistan" - which means the areas inhabited by Baluch people. After the fall of Bhutto, Washington intensified its efforts to gain a foothold in this strategic area with a view to building military bases.

It is now clear but Baluchistan has become a springboard for imperialist subversion and intervention in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. The area has been brought under the newly established Pakistani Rapid Deployment Force which has direct bonds with US Central Command. It is evident that new type of military arrangements have been initiated after the CENTO has been dissolved and Baluchistan has been a key link.

(e) Military Rule in Pakistan

Pakistan has been under military rule for a pretty long time. The first serious blow to the democratic set up was effected in 1953 in the wake of anti Qadiani riots and martial law was imposed in Lahore, which became the key stone in the arch of military coup in Pakistan.¹

After the incident of Lahore riots, Governor General Ghulam Mohd. dismissed Khwaja Nizamuddin in April 1953 despite of the fact that he was enjoying the majority in the constituent Assembly.² It provided ample powers to bureaucracy and resulted in the alliance of Military and bureaucracy. In 1954 Prime Minister Mohd. Ali was forced to

1. Defence Journal, Karachi, November, 1978.

2. Khan, Asghar Mohd, General in Politics : Pakistan 1958-1982, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988, p. 5.

include General Ayub Khan and General Iskander Mirza as Ministers of Defence and Home and thus formed a semi-dictatorial executive. Ayub Khan imposed a new political system in the name of basic democracy. After ten years of rule he was toppled and Yahya Khan stepped into power.

In 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power after ousting Gen. Yahya Khan on account of the defeat and disaster in East Pakistan. He was the first civilian Administrator in Pakistan. Gen. Zia Ul Haq, the C-in-C of the army took over in 1977 after throwing Bhutto and thus Pakistan again entered into Military rule.

Pakistan is one of the many third countries, where military rule has been permanent feature. Some scholars view that military does not have any unique effect on social change regardless of the level of economic development.¹ Other sect of scholars are of the opinion that third world countries where backward and outdated customs prevail and where primitive practice and culture dominate and in such countries technically trained civilian cadre is too small, the military perceives that it alone can modernise the country and this perception is an incentive to military take over.²

There is a strong argument that in Pakistan effective power within the state apparatus since the coup d' etat of 1958 and thus the first martial law in Pakistan was in fact not a seizure of power as the power was already in the

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1. Arthur J. Smith, in Military Role and Rub Belmont 1974, Robert W. Kackman, Politicians in Uniforms, Military Government and social change in the Third World, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, no.4. December, 1976.
 2. Edward Shiles, The Military in Political Development of the New States in J. Johnson, The Role of the Military in the underdeveloped Countries, New Jersey, 1982.

hands of those who were supposed to have it. There is a strong view that Islami character is the cause of the military rule. An overall view of the Muslim states shows that soldiers have governed a majority of Middle Eastern (Muslim) countries almost continuously. In 1980 half of the Muslim states were directly ruled by the military and in rest the military was the ultimate power.¹

Ayub's contacts with Pentagon were well known U.S.A. was of the view that Military officer corps was a major rallying point of the defence against communist expansion and penetration. The main cause of the emergence of Pakistan in its territory was not Muslim league, but because majority of their population was Muslim who provided support and followed the Muslim Leagues proposal.

In Pakistan bureaucracy prevailed for the first ten years. The relationship between the political parties and the bureaucracy was in Pakistan, Political parties were waxed, waned and suffered eclipse. Political leaders argued and reduced each other to importance. In the meanwhile the state has been run by the civil service, backed by the army, which has carried on much as it did before independence.² In Pakistan, after the failure of Muslim League, the country could not build the democratic institutions as was done in India. After dismissal of Khwaja Nizamuddin, Governor General held overall control on power. He dismissed the constituent Assembly and brought Ayub into power. The Martial law imposed by Ayub remained till 1962. After the fall of Ayub in March 1969 power passed to Yahya Khan. The defeat of Pakistan Army in East Pakistan and emergence of

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1. Qureshi, Saleem, Military in the Polity of Islam: Religion as a Basis For civil Military, Interaction. International Political Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1981.
 2. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political study, London, 1957, p.5.

Bangladesh, discredited the army and its legitimacy. Bhutto reduced the powers of military bureaucratic oligarchy and removed sword of military intervention.

Bhutto was overthrown by Gen. Zia. General Zia's regime was the most isolated in the history of Pakistan. After Zia's aircrash, Mrs. Bhutto, a political leader took over as Prime Minister of Pakistan and after a short interval Nawaz Sharif succeeded. The Military again put pressure in one way or the other and both of the Prime Ministers had to try their fate. Mrs. Bhutto again became the Prime Minister of Pakistan and thus power again transformed to a political leader and the military failed to interfere this time due to extra regional pressure.

(f) An Analysis of the Threat :

Pakistani Armed Forces have undergone a number of major changes in the four decades since independence, and partition from India. Not only have there been a number of political upheavals, but the entire outlook of the country has changed. Importantly, the Pakistani Armed Forces have learnt that they don't have the slightest hope of an outright victory in a war with India, as has been illustrated in the outcome of the 1947, 1965 and 1971 conflicts. Also, Pakistan has learnt that it can weather the disapproval of one super power with the endorsement of the other. Although there have been major upheavals since independence in 1947, the basic outlook of Pakistan's foreign policy has largely remained unchanged. The primary purpose of its armed forces; officially; is to render its sovereignty absolute. Pakistan's primary perceived threat is her parent country - India.

(g) Social Conditions :

Pakistan's current population stands at approximately 110 million, which includes some 3 million refugees from neighbouring Afghanistan. These Afghan refugees entered the country between 1979 and 1989, the period of Soviet occupation. The Gross Domestic product has tripled to almost US \$ 40 billion in 1989 compared to a little over US \$ 10 billion in 1959. And the Pakistani Defence Budget by overly austered estimations is a little over 8% of their GNP. Though one factor remains common with the rest of the third world, the average man's per capita income is less than US \$ 400 per annum.

(h) Foreign Aid and Defence Expenditure :

The Pakistani military expenditure regularly absorbs between 40 to 50% of the Federal Budget of the country annually. The Defence Budget for the year 1989 was US \$ 2.9 billion. Of which 2.4 million was from the Federal Budget and US \$ 500 million was from foreign aid. Out of this foreign aid US \$ 230 million was aid from the United States alone. The 1990 defence budget for Pakistan has been set at US \$ 3.2 million of which the United States has contributed US \$ 290 million. About 3/4th of the foreign aid to Pakistan comes from a consortium of nations including, the UK, USA, and ten other countries. Between 1962 and 1974 the United States and the United Kingdom were the principal sources of foreign aid. In recent times, however, China and Saudi Arabia, have contributed increasingly towards Pakistan's Defence Budget. This has been by either hard cash transfers or major concessions on the purchase of military hardware, and often both simultaneously. Under the military dictatorship by General Zia the armed forces as a whole underwent a major

modernisation, though little was done to strengthen the arms industry base particularly in the private sector. The reluctance to invest has its roots in the large amounts military aid from the US. This aid is the result of agreements signed by the late Gen. Zia, under whose tenets the US will supply Pakistan US \$ 3.3 billion worth of military hardware, including the General Dynamics, F-16 Falcon and the Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft amongst other items.


(i) Armed Forces :

The overall manpower of the Pakistani Armed Forces continues to grow. Particularly alarming is the fact that the manpower of the Pakistani Army will exceed 500,000. The combined strengths of the armed forces at present stands at 523,000 with the Army accounting for over 90% which numbers 480,000 and has close to 500,000 reservists. The Air Force has a total strength of 25,000 which does not include the 800 reservists, while the strength of the Navy including the aviation wing is 13,000 and besides which are the 8,000 reservists. The 271,000 strong para-military forces of Pakistan include the coast guard, Rangers, and the National Guard which will augment the armed forces in event of a contingency.

Like India, and Pakistani Army retains the British organisational legacy. This is highly evident in the army, where the regiment forms the basis of organisation for the higher brigade, division, and corps level formations. The Army comprises of nine corps level formations, each commanding two or more divisions.

There are two Armoured Divisions, each of which commands two brigade headquarters; each of which commands

Sketch 1: General Locations Pak Land Forces



five armoured regiments and two mechanised infantry regiments and various support units. The infantry strength comprises of 19 infantry divisions each of which has, three brigade leve headquarters, one armoured regiment, one artillery regiment (towed) one engineer regiment, one signals battalion, and one supply unit. Besides these there exist four independent armoured brigades and eight independent infantry brigades, supplementing reconnaissance battalions, and one special force group. The comparative figures are given below :

Table 1
Percentage of Population in the Military
and
Military Expenditure as percentage of GNP/GDP

Country	Population (in million)	Total Armed Force (in millions)	Percentage of Population in military	Military Expenditure as percentag of GNP/DP
China	1,008.175	4.100 + 4.300(Reservists) +10.3000(Militial)	1.86	Not available unlikely to be less than 6 percent.
India	723.500	1.120 + 0.200(Reservists)	0.18	3.39
Pakistan	89.500	0.478 + 0.513(Reservists) + 0.030(Troops Abroad)	1.14	7.00
USA	234.516	2.136 + 0.005(Reservists including National guards)	1.32	7.20
USSR	271.800	+ 5.050 + 5.000(Reservists)	3.70	Not available but unlikely to be less than 8 per cent

Table 2

Military Capability Equation

Pakistan	19 Armoured/infantry Divisions	India	21 Armed/Infantry Divisions
Bangladesh	5 Infantry Divisions		
China(in and around(Tibet)	28 Divisions out of her approximately 280 Divisions of various types.		10 Mountain Divisions
	<hr/> 52 Divisions <hr/>		<hr/> 31 Divisions <hr/>

Note : Above figures are as in 'The Military Balance 1988-89'.

As far as the equipmental aspects of the Pakistani Army go, it is the perfect haunting logistics nightmare, requiring sheer genius to make things worse. The major weapons systems have been acquired from a variety of sources which include the US, the UK, China, Germany, Sweden and France. Presently, the Army is desperately seeking to modernise its armour capability. A combat development Board was established in early 1989 to make recommendations on future tank procurements. The main contender is the MIAI Abrams, manufactured by the US based General Dynamics, Land systems Division. Even though the US has reduced the per unit cost of the MIAI, a final decision is as yet awaited. Meanwhile, Pakistan is also seeking the Chinese T-80 MBT, and setting up a production unit for the T-69 II MBT with Chinese help. The T-69 II is believed to be the "indigenous" tank that is expected to roll out shortly, (around 1995-96).

Pakistan operates mainly US supplied M-47/485 and Chinese T-62/69 MBTs. The retrofitting of these tanks with modern equipment has developed into very major programme for the Army. Moreover, Pakistan has also entered into contract with the US firm EMC corporation to manufacture the M-113 armoured personnel carriers, the first of which is expected to roll out around 1993-94. In the area of anti-aircraft systems, the Pakistani Army is in the process of selecting guns, alongwith gun control and fire control systems. Alongwith the new guns from the Swedish firm AB before manufactured RBS-70 Laser surface-to-air missile, which have already produced are being integrated with the force. A quantum jump in the capability of the Army was achieved with the successful tests of the ANZA (Lance) man portable surface-to-air missile, that has been modelled on the basis of Chinese HN-5 and the HAFT-11 (Deadly) surface missile. The Chinese assistance in both the missile programmes is evident, the ANZA is believed to have an indigenisation content of 70% with complete indigenisation before 1993, while the indigenous content of the HAFT remains unknown, though it is believed to have a range of about 300 km.

(j) Navy :

In the two and a half decades India and Pakistan fought three wars with each other. All three Indo-Pak wars were probably the result of Pakistan's basic need to justify the two nation theory and thereby its very existence, since a secular, stable India constitutes a standing negation of the philosophy which gave birth to Pakistan. In an attempt to combat India's growing stature and to draw attention away from its own deficiencies. Pakistan's leadership has resorted interference in India's internal affairs. It has also raised the Indian hegemonic bogey to wean sympathy and military

aid from other nations.¹

The army and the air-force have remained the principal actors in all the Indo-Pak wars fought so far. The last war in 1971 witnessed the two navies playing a small but significant role. Consequently, Pakistan appears to have re-appreciated the scope of the navy in the pursuit of its national objectives, and assiduously followed a maritime policy of modernization and expansion. As a result of its post-1971 maritime strategy, the Pakistan Navy has emerged today as a leading maritime power in the Indian Ocean region, with the major part of its naval assets being developed to provide it with a formidable offensive capability.

The Early Years (1947-72) :

At the time of its creation, the Royal Pakistan Navy received 10 ships and 3,200 men from the Royal Indian Navy. The ships included four frigates, four minesweepers and four motor launches, while the manpower comprised 200 officers and 3,000 sailors. In the early years, the Royal Pakistan Navy made slow but steady progress. By 1954, it had added four destroyers to its fleet and had more than doubled its manpower to 7,100 personnel (including 600 officers). At the same time, the Government of Pakistan resorted to vigorous lobbying for US military aid which resulted in their joining the SEATO and CENTO, and the signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between the US and Pakistan governments on 19 May 1954.

In the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the US-leased submarine PNS Ghazi was deployed extensively, but failed to see any

1. Kathpalis, P.N., National Security Perspectives, Lancer International, New Delhi, p. 44.

action. In the next war with India in 1971, the Pakistan Navy managed to notch its first kill when tow torpedoes, fired from the submarine PNS Hangor, struck the Indian frigate INS Khukri. The Pakistan Navy, however, lost several ships in Indian naval action in the same war, including the submarine PNS Ghazi, the destroyer PNS Khyber and a mine-sweeper ONS Muhafiz. The creation of Bangladesh further depleted the Pakistan Navy which thereby lost and depleted the Pakistan Navy. Nearly 40 per cent of its manpower and the shore establishments based in east while East Pakistan were transferred accordingly. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 seems to be the turning point in the growth of the Pakistan Navy, which prepared itself thereafter for a greater role in the region.

The Preparatory years (1972-87)

The exit of General Yahya Khan and his coterie from the political scene after the 1971, probably encouraged the Pakistan Navy to press the succeeding order for a greater role. The value of a strong maritime capability in the pursuit of Pakistan's national objectives seems to have been better appreciated by the new political order and, significantly, the Naval Headquarters was finally shifted to the national capital, Islamabad, on March 15, 1975. The Pakistan Navy also prepared itself for modernisation and expansion, and appears to have adopted a maritime strategy which would permit it to develop its base steadily and progressively for this purpose.

The Expanding Years (1988 and onward)

In the period after 1987, the Pakistan Navy undergone a major expansion. A glance at figures 1 and 2 shows a sharp rise in all fields, viz, tonnage and combat potential. Correspondingly, the manpower strength is once again on the

rise. The present expansion has thrust the Pakistan Navy into a leading maritime power in the Indian Ocean region, as is evident from a comparison of the Indian Ocean navies (shown in table 1).

The past few years have witnessed the Pakistan Navy coming of age, and its transition to state of the art missile technology. It has developed its submarine force to fire the Harpoon submarine launched anti-ship sea skimming missiles, of range 130 km. This greatly enhances the Pakistan Navy's sea denial capability, and maritime offensive power. It has also acquired 10 more frigates from the US and UK, which doubles the potency of its surface fleet and accords it with a strong sea control capability.

With the end of the cold war between the two super-powers, there was a possibility of the US discontinuing its strategy of maintaining Pakistan as a frontline state. However, it is likely that the recent events in the Gulf may well have baled out Pakistan.

Pakistan's Maritime Strategy :

It is evident that Pakistan has formulated a clear and cohesive maritime strategy for attaining its national objectives, and that the ongoing expansion of the Pakistan Navy comes at the end of a careful planned and laborious period of preparation.

In the case of Pakistan, this stands out more poignantly on account of the limited maritime security concerns of the nation. Pakistan has only a 700 km coastline, with about 250,000 sq.km. of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It does not possess any island territories, nor any known off-shore assets. The favourite cry of Pakistan for obtaining attention and military aid, for a long time now, has been

the bogey of Indian hegemonic designs. In order to appreciate the baseless nature of this cry, it is necessary to briefly examine India's maritime security concerns.

Pakistan has in the last four decades pushed its military and political envelope to the point where its weakness have become apparent. The 'Zarb-e-Momin' exercise in '89 and the Sind problems in early '90 indicate that the Army is as yet arrogant, a carry over of the martial law days. More disturbing is the tendency of the Army to claim a capability they do not possess; and get adventurous on the basis of their claims. Which is a decidedly dangerous thing.

Bilateral relations with India touched a new low in early 1990, with Pakistan aiding anti-India subversives, and disputes on the Kashmir issue. Moreover, Pakistan continues to expand its military capabilities beyond legitimate requirements. Even though it is evident that Pakistan cannot win a 'conventional' war against India they continue to prepare for this eventuality. The result being that the entire South Asian region is poised for an economically devastating arms race. Pakistan must seek to sort out bilateral matters amicably without sabre rattling. In the meantime Pakistan continues to arm itself and configure its armed forces for a possible conflict in the region.

MAJOR COMBATANT : PAKISTAN NAVY

Class	Quantity	Gross tonnage (tons)	Operational Range (n.m)	Weapons	Weapons range (km)
A. Submarines					
Agosta	2	1,740	8,500	4-20 SSM Sub-Harpoon/ 4-20 Torpedoes ECANF17P	130 20
Daphne	4	1,043	4,500	12 SSM Sub-Harpoon/ 12 Torpedoes ECAN L-5	130 17
B. Destroyers					
Country	1	6,200	4,500	2x4 Seacat SAM 4 Guns 4".5 4 Guns 37 mm	5 19 8.5
Gearing	6	3,500	4,500	6 SSM Harpoon 2 Guns 5" G Topedoes MK 32	130 17 11
C. Frigates					
Leander	2	2,962	4,000	2x4 Seacat SAM 2 Guns 4".5 1x3 Mortar MK 10	5 19 1
Garcia	4	3,403	4,000	2 Guns 5" 1x8 ASROC MK 116 6 Torpedoes MK 32	17 10 11
Erooka	4	3,246	4,000	16 Standard SAM 1 Gun 5" 1x8 ASROC MK 116 6 Topedoes MK32	46 17 10 11
D. Missile Craft					
Huangfen	4	205	800	4 SSM Fei Lung 4 Guns 25 mm	95 3
Negu	4	79	400	2 SSM Fei Lung 2 Guns 25 mm	95 3

SOURCE : Jane's Fighting Ships 1990-91

PAKISTAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT : POST 1971

Year	Commissioned	De-Commissioned
1972	-	-
1973	6 Midget submarines	-
1974	-	-
1975	-	-
1976	1 Daphne submarine,	-
	2 Hainan FAC(G)	-
1977	2 Gearing destroyers	1 Type 16 frigate
1978	-	-
1979	1 Agosta submarine	1 minesweeper
1980	1 Agosta submarine	
	2 Gearing destroyers,	1 Type 16 frigate
	2 Hainan FAC(G)	-
	4 Hegu missile craft	-
1982	1 country destroyer	2 CR destroyers,
	1 Gearing destroyer	1 CH destroyer
1983	1 Gearing destroyer	3 minesweepers
1984	4 Huangfeng missile craft	-
1985	(Agostas developed for SSM Harpoon)	1 Dido cruiser
1986	-	-
1987	-	-
1988	2 Leander frigates, 3 midget submarines (Daphnes developed for SSM Harpoon)	1 Battle destroyer
1989	4 Garcia frigates, 4 Brooke frigates	-
1990	2 patrol craft	-

SOURCE : Jane's Fighting 1972-73 to 1990-91

(k) Air Power Structure :


When Pakistan was created in 1947, the assets of the erstwhile Royal Indian Air Force was divided between the two countries in the following manner :

	India	Pakistan
Fighter Squadrons	60	20
Transport Squadrons	05	10

Equipment and spares were divided on the basis of one third of everything to Pakistan. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was also established as an independent force. From that date onwards, the PAF has continued to grow, both in quality and quantity. It underwent a massive re-equipment and expansion with American military assistance programme after Pakistan joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955 besides the joint security agreement with USA in May 1954. The PAF, which had inherited its structure from the Indian Air Force (IAF) modelled on the British pattern, also moved closer to the American force structure patterns. Under this American influence, an Army Aviation Corps was created as integral to the Pakistan army in 1958 after its personnel and aircrew were trained in USA. The Naval Aviation element was created in 1975 with MR and ASW capabilities. However, this element continues to be commanded by PAF officers : and PAF provides maintenance support and initial training facilities.

Pakistan's aggression and war with India in 1965 led to an American embargo on supplies of arms to Pakistan. This

Sketch 3: Air Power and Defence Bases



embargo was lifted for a short period in October 1970 which permitted restocking of spares and equipment to a supply level of 30 days at the Air-base and six months reserves at 'depot' level, besides resupply of F-104A Starfighters and B-57B Canberra aircraft to make up for peacetime attrition etc, Pakistan also moved close to China, especially in the field of arms and equipment, and received generous military arms supply, assistance and aid in 1966. At the same time, Pakistan settled on a third, and comparatively independent source of other weapons systems for its arms supplies, viz. Europe, especially France. This established a pattern of equipment for Pakistan's air power which is in evidence today, and which, barring some major developments in international relations and alignments, is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.

Another element in Pakistan's air power has been the significant support from other Muslim countries of Asia, both in kind and in cash to support arms acquisition which expanded in a large way in 1967 with the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia agreement. Concurrently, large scale cooperation in the military field with these countries has led to a significant number of PAF air and ground crew being involved in training and maintenance activities to assist these countries. This has led to the twin advantage of build up of valuable experience at the cost of the recipient country, and also in an opportunity and valuable operational experience to operate some of the equipment common to IAF (e.g. Mig 21, SU-7, Jaguar aircraft etc): an opportunity PAF may not have been able to obtain otherwise.

(c) Military Expenditure

Pakistan has also been receiving military equipment as aid from USA (under the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) in the 1950-60s and more recently, the US \$ 3.2 billion

security related economic and military aid granted in 1981, and \$ 4.02 aid in 1987) as well as arms acquisitions funded by Muslim states, especially Saudi Arabia. It also receive a significant quantum of military equipment on 'lease', as indeed the recent acquisition of a 8 Brooke/Garcia class frigates on lease from USA shows. An analysis of military expenditure in Pakistan (~~See Figure 1~~) indicates that :

(a) Except for one year (1974) the military expenditure has been progressively increasing in spite of reduced national security commitments after East Pakistan separated and became a sovereign state in 1971.

(b) After a period of comparatively stabilized growth, during 1967-1978, there has been a significant upwards surge in the level of spending starting from 1978 going up substantially in 1979, when it registered record 43 per cent increase over the previous year. The high rate of growth coincided with the establishment of the new military dictatorship and growth of Islamic fundamentalism. A more significant jump has taken place after 1986. During 1988-90 military expenditure experienced a 40 percent growth rate mostly under a democratic government and during a period when Indo-Pak relations were showing positive signs of improvement and the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.

(c) For over 20 years, Pakistan's annual military expenditure has constituted on an average, over 6 per cent of its GNP. In recent years, it has hovered close to 8 percent of the GNP.

(d) Pakistan's military expenditure may be expected to grow at an annual rate of 10-15 percent (current values) by a most conservative estimate. This could be significantly

higher if the national government remains under military control/domination/influence and thereby sustain the military elite and its concomitant effects.

The above analysis is further borne out by other indicators of increasing militarisation of Pakistan. Pakistan's armed forces have increased by over 49 per cent since 1968, although its national security commitments significantly reduced after the separation of East Pakistan in 1971. If the raising of the large reserves after 1972-1973 is also taken into account, the armed forces during the 20 years period (1968-1988) have grown by over 204 percent - that is, an annual average of 10.2 percent. Although the population of present Pakistan is estimated to have registered a 22 percent increase between 1972 and 1980, its per capita military expenditure had gone up progressively to a figure of \$ 18.85 per person (see figure 2) i.e., a 200 percent increase by 1980, and had reached \$ 24.8 by 1988 and onward.

Arms transfer to Pakistan has also shown a spurt during the 1990s. In the ten year period between 1967-76, total arms transfer to Pakistan were valued at US \$ 831 million (current dollars) : in the five years between 1975-1979, Pakistan imported arms valued at US \$ 875 million. The first package of US aid of \$ 3.2 billion security related economic and military aid in 1981 visualised 50 percent for direct military aid alone. This implied an arms transfer to Pakistan with American aid alone amounting to US \$ 160 million in the five year period between 1983-86. It started receiving the second package worth \$ 4.02 billion from 1987. This has meant nearly \$ 2,100 million for arms acquisitions from USA under Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) during the six year period.

Maritime Role

Pakistan operates - a fleet of 4 Atlantique long-range maritime petrol aircraft which are also equipped for the strike role with AM-39 Exocet sea-skimming anti-ship missiles (ASHM). It is scheduled to get six P3C Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft from US Navy surplus stocks. These will be fitted with the more capable Harpoon ASHMs. Pakistan also maintains 12 Mirage 5P for maritime strike role with AM-39 Exocet ASHMs. In addition, 6 Westland Sea King Mk-45 helicopters are also fitted with AM-36 Exocets. The maritime reconnaissance strike force available to Pakistan during the 1990s would be the second largest (next to Australia) in the Indian Ocean littoral during the 1990s. At the turn of the century, the Atlantiques may provide the 'second-string'.

Early Warning and Air Defence

PAF has maintained an efficient early warning coverage with mobile observer units which is now progressively linked to automated air defence command and control system. Six Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 3-D radar EW/GCI systems were acquired. PAF has also acquired a large number of low-level early warning radar systems to provide a near complete coverage of all of Punjab and other essential areas of the country with adequate overlaps to cater for redundancy etc. Automatic data processing system would significantly enhance the capability of the air defence command and control system.

In October 1989, Pakistan established its Army Air Defence Command in addition to the existing PAF air Defence Command. It made vigorous efforts to upgrade the air defence system after 1974. By the early 1990s, as many as 80 high and low-looking radars, connected by data links and automated computerised transmission to the sector operations.

Helicopters :

Pakistan has a total fleet of helicopters as under :

	Air Force	Navy	Army	Total
Alouette III	04	04	23	23
Super-Freion	04	-	-	04
Super Puma(SA-330 J)	-	-	35	35
Sea King MK 45	-	06	-	06
Mi-8	-	-	16	16
SA/IAR/UH-1H/Bell 205/206	-	-	46	46
Kaman HH 438	04	-	-	04
AH-1S	-	-	20	20+20
Total	12	10	140	162+20

Force Levels :

Forecast of force levels is more difficult to predict especially over a twenty year period since they involve factors like the very nature of national leadership, their perceptions and prejudices, interaction of international relationships and other imponderable and unquantifiable parameters. However, force levels may also be treated as part of an evolutionary process brought about by the interaction of a complexity of factors which normally undergo only marginal changes in the rate of evolutionary process. An attempt at forecast can, therefore, be made, based on the historical context.

Throughout the years of independence, Pakistan's perceptions, regardless of the nature and personality of its leadership, have been observed with a security concern viewing India as its primary adversary. This is essence has evolved from a crisis of identity in Pakistan which,

while it may reduce in its intensity, can hardly be expected to disappear in the foreseeable future. As a matter of fact, the very process of militarisation of Pakistan further heightens this crisis. The independence of Bangladesh in 1971, in effect, improved Pakistan's security situation: it was reduced in size and population but not in military strength and was left with a geopolitically cohesive unit and militarily a more compact and lesser area to defend. However, inspite of a better security situation, Pakistan's militarization, in fact, increased after 1971. The significant growth of Pakistan's military forces (as indicated below in respect of its Army) can thus only be explained by factors of deep-rooted military elite jealously guarding its privileged position in society and a heightening of the crisis of identity in Pakistan and a value threat posed by Indian socio-political structure : factors which, short of a revolution altering the course of events, are likely to influence military force levels like along the evolutionary path charted so far :

Pakistan Army	1970-71	1980-81	1989-90
Total strength	300,000	408,000	480,000 (+500,000)
Infantry Divisions	11	16	17
Armoured Divisions	2	2	2
Independent Armoured Bde	1	4	4
Independent Infantry Bde	-	4	8
Air Defence Bde	1	2	3
Artillery Bdes	2	6	8
Armoured Recce Regts	-	6	6
Special Services Group	-	-	6
Army Aviation Squadrons	-	6	6 + Indep. flights

Contd....

Aircraft	20	176	255
Tanks	500	1065	1750 +
APCS	100	550	800 + 775

In effect, a 40 per cent increase in the Army's active strength took place in the 10 years after the 1971 war, after which Pakistan was actually not responsible for the security of its erstwhile Eastern wing with 93 million people, which now maintains an 103,000 strong armed force. The increase is maintained in the trend in the past two increase is of much greater order if reserves and military personnel serving abroad are also taken into account. During 1990-92 Pakistan will add 775 APCS (Armoured Personnel Carriers) of M113-A2 type increasing the strength of APCS to 1975. The armour (tanks) and APC represent the strike elements and also the focus of air power operations - both hostile and friendly.

(m) Nuclear Capability :

Assessment of the air threat will not be valid without taking into account the prospect of nuclear capability of Pakistan. As and when Pakistan achieves this capability, its choice of delivery method against strategic targets will remain serial and the vehicle will remain primarily based on manned aircraft, at least during this century. Given the present trend of PAF reequipment, both Mirage and F-16 aircraft could be the logical candidates. (Mirage IIIs of the French Air Force are capable of delivery of 25 KT tactical nuclear weapons). PAF may be expected to retain its options for high altitude delivery or a low-altitude manoeuvring, one using the toss-bombing technique for which the F-16A's nav-attack system has been optimised. This would make the task of air defences time-critical and extremely

difficult without a complete day/night coverage by airborne early warning system and integrated automated air defence command and control systems, especially since the target for nuclear attack may not be a purely military one.

At the same time, Pakistan has been developing missile capabilities. In 1987 it initiated its ballistic missile development programme. On April 25, 1988, it launched a ballistic missile produced by the SUPARCO (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) which was claimed to be capable of reaching Delhi and Bombay - that is, a range in excess of 800 kms. This was noted by the then Senator and now US Vice President, Dan Quayle, in, his May 1988 report that, Pakistan took a quantum lead forward last month in its efforts to develop its own ballistic missile arsenal....' The missile was developed apparently with assistance from China and the Federal Republic of Germany, Pakistan also launched a 'multi-stage' rocket into deep space on 10 January 1989. The missile carried a 150 kg payload to 640 kms altitude and the payload was claimed to have been recovered over national territory. The height-payload combination would suggest a range of 2,200 km or more in surface-to-surface ballistic mode. Pakistan also tested its 'Hatf-I' (80 kms) and 'Hatf-II', which is apparently based on the Chinese version of Scud-B design and can be developed further to ranges of 600-1000 kms (as Iraq with a lesser technological access and capability did with its 300 kms 'Al Hussain' to develop the 650 km range 'Al Abbas' version by grafting the propellant fuel tank from the earlier version). Chinese assistance in further missile development cannot be ruled

out. It is also instructive to note that Pakistan's missile programme, initiated in 1987, was placed under Dr. A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme and still heading it.

(f) India-Sri Lanka Relations

At the tip of the Indian peninsula, Sri Lanka occupies a position of considerable strategic importance overlooking as it does the Sea route from the straits of Malacca to the Gulf and the Suez Canal. For India the Island assumes significance from the fact that all Indian Naval and Shipping traffic, which is not inconsiderable, must move around the island. All traffic from the eastern seaboard ports to the Suez or from the Western ports to Japan and South East Asia must also pass by the island. The proximity of the island and the internecine conflict involving the minority Tamils and the Sinhalese has repercussions in India, especially in the Southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu.¹

Surveying the external milieu of Lanka's foreign policy decision - making Kodikars identified India as one inevitable factor in Sri Lanka's World out look.² He highlighted two important facets of Colombo's perception of India and ties with China and Pakistan to counter-balance Sri Lanka's unequal relationship with India³. Sri Lanka adopted common approaches with India on issues as Indonesia, (1949), the Suez Crisis (1956), Hungry (1956), disarmament problems, the statue of military pacts, but in matters of India's relations with Pakistan and China, Sri Lanka sterred itself clear of Kashmir issue observed an overall neutrality in Indo-Pakistan wars⁴. As regards to China, she adopted a dual stand and entered into an agreement with Beijing in 1952⁵

1. Joshi, Majoj, "Windo to Sri Lanka", Indian Defence Review, Vol. 11-12, July, 1989, p. 104.

2. Shalton Kodi Kere, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka, A Third World Perspective, Delhi, 1982, pp. 17-19.

3. Ibid., p. 18.

4. Except perhaps provision of refusing facilities to Pakistan Airlines on way between West and East Pakistan.

5. Kodikere, n. 1, pp. 60-65.

and instead of declaring China as an aggressor in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, summoned the Colombo powers to take the role of mediator.¹

India and Sri Lanka solved the citizenship question raised by the problem of emigrant Indian labours, settled in Sri Lanka through an agreement in 1964² and the maritime boundary agreement also came into effect in 1974.³ The geostrategic environment in which Indo-Sri Lanka relations have been taking place has undergone changes in some respects in recent years due to a number of factors, the most important of which being changes in the terrain of global politics, changes in the strategic scenario in South Asia itself. The new security relationship between India and Sri Lanka which was brought about by the escalation of Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis after July, 1983.⁴ K.M. Paniker, and even politicians like Pattabhai Sitaramayya, had advocated the strategic unity of India and Sri Lanka and the closer union between the two countries for strategic reasons.⁵ A retired commander of the Indian Navy commented

"Sri Lanka is as important to India as Eire is to the United Kingdom or Taiwan to China....As long as Sri Lanka is friendly or neutral India has nothing to worry about but, if there be any danger of the island falling under the domination of a power hostile to India, India can not tolerate such situation endangering her territorial integrity".⁶

1. Ibid., p. 27.

2. Foreign Affairs Record, October 1964, pp. 263-265.

3. Ceylon Daily News, Colombo, March 27, 1981.

4. Shelton, U. Kodikere, South Asian Strategic Issues : Sri Lankan Perspectives, Sage Publications, New Delhi, p. 13.

5. Shelton U. Kodikare, Indo-Ceylon Relations since Independence, Ceylon Institute of World Affairs, 1965, pp. 32-35.

6. Kaul Ravi, The Indian Ocean, A Strategic Posture for India in T.T. Poulese, ed. Indian Ocean Power Rivalry, New Delhi International Publication Services, 1974, p. 66.

It was a well known fact that India's Security interests are coterminous with Sri Lanka, and not vice versa¹ India is Sri Lanka's near neighbour hence threat perceptions of India are always present in Sri Lanka.

Both India and Sri Lanka have common geographical, cultural, social and historical links. Sri Lanka came into contact with the west in the sixteenth century and was annexed by the Dutch from the Portuguese in the middle of the 17th century. Sri Lanka became a Crown Colony under the Treaty of Amery in 1802 and achieved dominion status in February, 1948. The migration of Indian indentured labourers to Ceylon started in the middle of the 19th century and in 1954 their number together with the number of persons who had migrated to Ceylon from India for business and other purposes constituted nearly ten percent.²

India's relations with Sri Lanka has always been cordial, but, the question of the status of persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka has caused friction between the two nations. The Tamils want to enjoy the fundamental rights including the right to freedom of speech, expression, assembly religious worship and right to form trade union and associations. The United National Party had promised to placate 1.2 million Tamils of Indian origin who were defranchised in 1948, which the LITTE do not agree³ Sri Lanka became the member of SAARC but also desired to be member of ASEAN⁴ while there was disagreement between India and

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1. Dher, Sri, An Anatomy of the Trincomali Deal, Strategic Analysis, June, 1984, p. 242.
 2. Sen, Kumar Asit, International Relations, S. Chand and Company, N. Delhi, 1993 p. 614, Bindra, S.S. India and Her Neighbours, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, p.293.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Cohen, P. Stephen, The Security of South Asia, Vistaar Publications, N. Delhi. p. 14.

Sri Lanka in international affairs, their bilateral relations were dominated throughout by the protected problem presented by the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka.¹

Sri Lanka passed some legislative measure which in effect, denied citizenship or voting rights to the majority of its Indian immigrants. The citizenship Act of 1948 and the Indian and Pakistan Act, 1949 restricted citizenship claims to those who could prove their eligibility through descent or continuous residence since 1939.² In 1964 an agreement was reached between Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Sirimavo Bandaranaike which established for the settlement of 875000 persons - 300000 to be granted Sri Lankan Citizenship and 5,25,000 to be repatriated to India within a period of 15 years. Meanwhile, Sri Lankan Government agreed not to discriminate against those leaving and that the facilities would be accorded to them as other citizens until the time for their departure.³

The demands of the Tamils remained generally unresolved and all the Tamil groups were forced to make a Tamil United Front in 1973. Some Tamil Youths dissatisfied with the non-violent policies of the T.U.L.F. took up arms in the name of the same cause. Neelam Tirunchevelam, a prominent Tamil Lawyer in Colombo said "Our old conception of Sri Lanka as a liberal and Secular state is shared by fewer and fewer people."⁴ Even Indian Tamils could not prove more helpful to Lankan Tamils.⁴ In spite of the hopes earlier raised

1. Appadorai A., India's Foreign Policy and Relations, South

2. Ibid.

3. For complete text, See Ceylon Treaty Series No. 5, 1965 Also Coelho, No. 172, p. 132.

4. Observer, London, June 4, 1986.

5. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, September 23, 1986.

weapons was solved through government to government negotiations with Pakistan and China¹. US, 7th Fleet ships of loaded arms and ammunition and also helped train Sri Lankan Security forces. France Presse in Madras declared that the November 10 to 14 port visit by four US ships led by the aircraft carrier Kittyhawk was not a mere goodwill call, but, part of a move to strengthen the armed forces² not only this Colombo purchased arms from Israel.³ Sri Lanka became South Asia's top arms market due to continued violence owing to Tamil Separatists crusade. Sri Lanka became a Central hub of sale and purchase from a needle to a battleship⁴ Sri Lanka acquired military equipment from Britain also to combat Tamil guerrillas. Britain supplied nine 'Congar' petrol boats to be used in Palk - Straits off the northern Coast⁵ and six fast naval petrol boats were received from Israel⁶ Jagewardene appealed to the west for arms to money and moral support to fight the Tamil militants.⁷

Maritime Boundries

Sri Lanka being an island her natural boundaries are the Sea, but in the north, and in the north-western and north-eastern sectors, she shared a Common maritime boundary with India. The waters in the Palk Bay and Palk straits between the two countries has been delimited by the Boundary Agreement of 1974, i.e. "Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the Boundary in historic waters between the two

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1. Bangkok Post, Bangkok, May 20, 1985.
 2. Indonesia Times, December 2, 1985
 3. Hindu, Madras, January 25, 1986.
 4. Tribune, Chandigarh, August 30, 1985.
 5. Patriot, New Delhi, May 21, 1985.
 6. Assam Tribune, Gohati, May 21, 1985.
 7. Patriot, New Delhi, May 12, 1985.

by the Sri Lankan and Indian Governments coming closer indications do not provide for the optimism Tamil minority groups demanded a separate¹ state for the Tamil dominated districts in the Island nation lying just 40 miles of the Southern Coast of India.² The Lankan Government in order to solve the ethnic problem decided to form Provincial Government similar to those of India and Pakistan.³ As the tortuous, Indian mediated negotiations on devising a political settlement to the Sri Lanka ethnic problem wind on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which humbled the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO).⁴

The Lankan Army planned to major offensive action against the quarrel activities. The warning notices were dropped from the air by helicopters throughout the Jaffna.⁵ The Deputy Minister for Teaching requested for a United action against terrorism and said that the whole country should realise that it has to fight the war together⁶. The minister for security Athulathmudali declared that the army would take action against terrorists.⁷ A Innovative programme was initiated by the Ministry of Planning to motivate youths for development work and leave terrorist activities.⁸

Sri Lanka solved the problem of finding weapons for its security forces to fight separatist Tamil guerrillas by obtaining arms from Pakistan. The problem of finding modern

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1. Assam Tribune (Gohali) December 20, 1986.
 2. Hong Kong Standard, Hongkong; October 30, 1986.
 3. Morning News, Colombo, September 30, 1985.
 4. Times of India, New Delhi, December 19, 1986.
 5. Telegraph, Calcutta, April 6, 1986.
 6. SUN, Sri Lanka, November 16, 1985.
 7. Telegraph, Calcutta, June 5, 1986
 8. Indonesia Times, September 15, 1986.

countries and related matters". This demarcates the boundry in the waters from Adams Bridge to Palk Straits. The Second Agreement in 1976, i.e. "The Agreement between Indian and Sri Lanka on the Maritime Boundry between the two countries in the gulf of Maaunar and the Bay of Bengal i.e. to the west and east respectively. The Agreement of 1974 has become important due to the dispute relating to Kachchatives island. This island lies in the Palk Straits and was apportioned to Sri Lanka as the boundry line was drawing just one mile to the west of island. The Agreement, refered to the 'historical waters' and they were accepted as such by both the governments at the initial stage; subsequently, by a Proclamation under Maritime zones Law, the waters on Sri Lanka side of the boundry line have been declared 'historic water of Sri Lanka', and have been further sub-divided into "internal waters" and territorial Sea", i.e. the waters on the Sri Lanka side of the Palk straits and Palk Bay upto Adams Bridge, are demarcated as internal waters of Sri Lanka, and the waters in the Gulf of Manner upto the tip of Kalpitiya on the water Coast as Territorial sea. Sri Lanka has declared its right on the new island and have based partly on the findings of a case decided by Madras High Court. In Anna Kumaru Pillai V Muthupaya decided by Madras High Court in 1903 it was declared that the Kings of Sri Lanka had exploited the sedentary fishries in the Gulf of Mannar i.e. Pearls and Chank fishries, from time immemorial and a reference was made to a king of Sri Lanka having sent a chank to emperor Ashok of India, as present.

The 1974 Agreement states that each of the country shall have sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction and control over the waters, islands, continental shelf and subsoil falling on its own side of the boundry. Kachchalive is one of the islands on Sri Lanka's side hence falls under the

control of Sri Lanka and in view of Article 5 of the Agreement India has no rights to free passage.

LTTE and India's Security

In a letter to Prime Minister Premadasa in 1979 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) claimed.

'We are neither murderers not criminals or violent fanatics..... on the contrary, we are revolutionaries committed in revolutionary political practice. We represent the most powerful extra-parliamentary liberation movement.'

Sri Lanka had shows proclivity to steer an independent course in South Asian affairs vis-a-vis its northern neighbour, as was evident in the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak conflicts. In the early eighties the influence of the U.S.A. and its European allies had been increasing rather rapidly as Sri Lanka under Jayawardane turned up them for weaponry and other aid in return for the VOA broadcasting facilities in Northern Sri Lanka and its Trincomalee oil tank farm and harbour facilities. That was seen by Indian policy makers as a threat to its national security sabotaging this sell-out became its immediate goal and militarising Sri Lanka Tamil discontent a ready means and method manipulation. Added to this was the distance, distrust and dislike between JRG and India Gandhi.¹

Sri Lankan Chauvinism undoubtedly had brought considerably misery to Sri Lanka's Tamils estimated to be about 4,60,000² and put great strain on the states economy psyche and even politics. Tamil militants both Sri Lankan and local have impinged on politics, and have resulted in large scale smuggling gun-running and manufacture of destructive war like materials with corresponding increase in

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1. Sardesh Pande, LTTE and Indias Security Indian Defence Review, Lancer International, Delhi, p. 46.
 2. Bangkok Post, Bangkok, September 30, 1986.

propagation of violence.

The U.S.A. in violation of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord has succeeded in getting facility for Vol. broadcasting near Puttalam, South of Mannar and in keeping out India from the Trincomalee tank farm. Despite the LTTE's thoughtless slaughter of Muslims in Arnparai, Batticoola and Trincomalee, no Islamic country has raised its voice. The LTTE had mesmerised its people not only in Sri Lanka but also in Tamil nadu. Amidst the LTTE brand of obstinate aberration and violence, whose danger is spreading to the People's War Group in Andhra. The United Liberation Front of Assam in Assam, possibly Khalistan in Bombay and Naxals in Karnataka and it has succeeded in persuading us to see it busying itself in breaking up a slice off our country. India and Tamil Nadu are realising how deep and wide the LTTE poison has spread in society and polity, social, ethnic, linguistic, religions and tamilial ties have been laced with centuries old economic of smuggling and fishing 'smuggling through the coast is not new and can not be controlled by any one'¹ Sri Lankans have enough money to find appropriate shelter and merge with Indian population.²

The Defence

The army was constituted on 10 October, 1949. It consists of 5 infantry brigades, 2 reconnaissance, 2 field artillery and 1 engineer regiments and 1 signals ballalion, Equipment includes 18 Saladin Air mounted cars and 15 Ferrent Scout Cars with 40000 active reservists.

1. The Indian Express, July 30, 1991

2. The Times of India, July 22, 1991.

NAVY

The navy was constituted on December 9, 1950. It comprises 4 surveillance command ship, 2 new Colombo - built off shore patrol vessels 6 patrol gunboats, 50 small patrol boats, 2 landing craft and 2 fast passenger craft. It has 500 officer s and 6000 ratings.

Air Force

The Air force was formed on October 10, 1950 and is equipped with 4 squadrons comprise 9 SF-260 and 4 cessne 150/152 Trainer, 2 Iterons, 3 HS 748, 6 Chinese built Y-123 2 Chinese Y-8s, 1 Super King 3, Cessne Sky Masters, 1 421 and one cessne cardinal for general transport with 3700 officers.

CHAPTER - V


GLIMPSES OF INDIA

(A) India and South Asia

There are three continents on the periphery of the Indian Ocean, Asia to the North, Australia to the East and Africa to the West. By reasons of the sheer number of countries and of the population involved, Asia looms largest in the strategic equation, and India, as the biggest and most populous country emerges as the country most likely to seek a major role in the region. In terms of size, resources, technology and military capability there is an inherent imbalance in this region with India, containing 800 million people and demonstrated pre-eminence in the industrial and technical spheres a committed candidate for regional hegemony.¹

India has been so placed in South Asia that she has common border with all her South Asian neighbours, while none of her neighbours, share border with each other. Such a geographical context lends the nations of this region with a peculiar situation with socio-economic and political consequences for all of them. South Asia has been bestowed by nature a shared wealth - wealth of natural resources. In that sense, it is a composite entity. The Indian sub-continent comprises virtually the whole of South Asia, Sri Lanka and Maldives being at the outer fringe of this geographical reality. Apart from common inheritance in terms of culture, tradition and socio-economic and political legacies, the countries of the sub-continent have more things in common than irritants among them. Despite of the linguistic and religious diversities and differences in milieu in different parts of South Asia region there does exist a unique cultural unity in the sub-continent.² The states in this region - India,

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1. Bhatti, Maqbool Ahmed, "Strategic Balance in South Asia", Strategic Studies, A Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, vol. XIV, No. 4, Summer 1992, p. 21.
 2. Narain Virendra, "India and the South Asian Region : Hegemonism versus Mutually Beneficial Relationship, South Asian Studies, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, vol. 25, No. 1 & 2, 1990, p. 65.



Based upon Survey of India Map with the permission of the Surveyor General of India. The territorial waters of India extend into the sea to a distance of twelve nautical miles measured from the appropriate base line. The boundary of Meghalaya shown on this map is as interpreted from the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971, but has yet to be verified. The Administrative Headquarters of Chandigarh, Punjab & Haryana are at Chandigarh.

The External Boundary and Coastline of India shown on this map agree with the Record Master copy certified by the Survey of India, Dehra Dun, vide their letter No.T.B.-2313/62-A/3/213 dated 5.7.1990. Responsibility for the correctness of internal details shown on the map rests with the publisher.

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Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldieves belong to what Curzon conceived as the Indian Empire and are geographically compact.¹

Historically, the South-Asian sub-continent has experienced a constant stream of invasions and migrations, mostly through the mountain passes of the north-western region, now incorporated into Pakistan. Some four to five thousand years ago, one branch of fair - skinned Aryans moved into the sub-continent, pushing the dark skinned Dravidians towards the Deccan in the South, where they constituted a different ethnic entity. Subsequently the Seythians, Parthians, Greeks, Huns, Turkish, Mughals and Arabs also came into the sub-continent providing the basis for a multiplicity of languages and cultural traditions. The last foreign occupiers were the British, who came by the Sea, establishing their suzerainty over the entire region by the 19th century. The two century's of British Rule resulted in the emergence of substantial Christian minorities. This mixture of ethnic cultural and religions traditions gave birth to many disputes that effect the interaction between them.

The British Raj was conscious of China's South Asian connections and status, and of Tibet and Sia Kiang as (security) zones of South Asia, especially after China's attempt early in this century to form a Himalayan Confederacy with Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet under Chinese patronage as they were all "subjects of China"; hence the presence of British consulates, trading marts, listening posts, and soldiers in three Tibetan towns, and in Kashgar in Sinkiang until 1947. In geographic terms, both cartographic map

1. Chaube, S.K., "Understanding South Asia, A Superstructural Analysis", South Asia Some Reflections, Aalekh Publishers, Jaipur, p. 1.

projections (Mercators showing correct shapes and Arno Peters' showing correct sizes) leave no doubt that Tibet and Sinking were geographically contiguous to south Asia. The same is true of the spring-board area South of Hindikush it belongs ethnically and linguistically to South Asia, with another 3000 kilometers of common border with present day Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province.¹

The other regional misconception pertains to the so-called Indian Ocean. In ancient times, even in the Indian epic Mahabharat, this waterbody was called 'Dakina Samundra'. Until not long ago the Arabs who used this Ocean for trade called it Al Bahar Al Muhit (the enclosed ocean), the Arabian Sea being the Sea of Fars (Persia), and the Bay of Bengal being the Sea of Hind or Sea of Harkund. It was only the British Raj and its global maritime power that conceived it as an Indian Imperial Lake. The sub-continent contains a quarter of the human race, densely packed and characterized by the "triple crises of slow economic development, insufficient political integration and a disorderly arms race (which) with and feed upon each other."²

India has to play a more magnanimous role considering her central position in South Asia. On some occasions India's response to the developments in the neighbourhood have not been upto mark but, quite often her response could not get the desired reaction from her neighbours as in the case of India-Sri Lanka accord, which India entered honestly and lost money and power but, could get brickbats from her ungreatful neighbour. The repeated and much debated allegations

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1. Hussain, Noor A., India's Regional Policy : Strategic and Security Dimensions, The Security of South Asia, Stephen Philip Cohen (ed) Vistar Publications, New Delhi, p. 27.
 2. Stephen Philip Cohen, A Special Report of the Rockefeller Foundation on International Relations Research in South Asia, New York, 1982, p. 1.

of India's hegemonistic designs in South Asia, the big brotherly attitude expansionist ambitions and bullying tactics vis-a-vis her small neighbours have been made on the basis of anti-Indian trade.

It is in India's interests to think in terms of the region as a whole, it is equally in the interests of the small neighbours to be cognizant of regional realities and imperatives of her national and security interests should also be considered by her neighbours. It is true that a lasting and unhindered growth of social intergration in the South Asian region can not be expected unless fences are mended at the political front, ethnic and communal overtones played up by fundamentalists forces and the unabated phenomenon of terrorism have wieldered the political power in South Asia. The policy of divide and rule pursued by the colonialists exploiting ethnically mixed population in all parts of the sub-continent, nay the entire South Asian region created fertile ground for acrimonious relationship between South Asian nations even after they gained independence with serious social implications for all of them. Geographical continuity has made migration of the people from one country to another easier. The worst effected country is India which shares the boundary with each of South Asian neighbours and also shares largest migrants.

(B) Economic Compulsions

Economic compulsions play a significant role in pushing South Asian countries towards each other and into a situation in which India's neighbours stand to be in a closer economic relationship with her. Geographical setting and the natural distribution of resources are such that mutual dependence is an inescapable reality. Mistrust, psychological hang-ups arising out of much advertised small nation psyche and emphasis on competitive rather than on complementary

nature of economy, the growing protectionism shown by the developed nations; the inevitable political strings attached to foreign economic aid, and the tendency of the North to economically dominate the South should compel South Asian countries to come closer to each other. Spectre of Indian hegemony in the sphere of intra-regional collaboration haunts India's neighbours. This misplaced perception should be given up. If India had such expansionist ambitions, she would have occupied Sri Lanka when her armies were stalled legally or when she intervened in Maldives and easily when Pakistan was defeated in 1971 and major Pakistani forces were prisoners under Indian government. It was not beyond her capacity to immerge newly created Bangladesh in her territory, which emerged only due to her help. There would have not been any cry if Nepal had been imerged, when King took shelter in the country.

(C) India's Economic and Trade Relations

India's neighbours in South Asia sub-continent share a number of common characteristics. The one all small in size¹ and have close proximity and/or common land trade ffrontier with India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were subject to a common British rule during pre-independence period. Agriculture provides the main source of output in Bangladesh and Nepal amounting to 50 per cent of the GDP, while manufactured output is relatively small in all the four countries.² Such activity is going momentum in employment in all the four countries. In this group Bangladesh and Nepal with GNP per capita at \$208 & ¹⁶⁰ are also the least

1. Bangladesh 144008 sqr. km. Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bhutan.

2. Bangladesh 33%, Nepal 30%, Pakistan 44% and Sri Lanka 42% per cent.

developed among the developed countries.¹ While Nepal is land locked, Sri Lanka are an islands economy. Exports from the above countries mainly comprise of primary commodities, textile and clothing covering more than 70% of the total export value.² Merchandise imports of all these countries consists mostly of manufactures, the actual share of which in total imports is 55% to 79%. Food items and fuels are the two other items.

Geographical proximity, historic association and cultural affinity make Indo-Nepal relations unique and unparalleled. Unlike other land lock countries Nepal can approach the Sea only through India. The Nearest Sea port Calcutta is 800 km. away from Kathmandu. Though Bangladesh has provided Nepal, transit route via Bangladesh also passes through India. Indo-Nepalies relations go back to ancient times. Even Kautalya's Arthshastra gives reference to trade between India and Nepal.

The island of Sri Lanka has for India the next land mass just across the 23 miles of shallow wasters of Palk straits. Sri Lanka have common geographical, cultural, social and historical links with India, which goes back to 3rd century BC. when Ashok the Great Sent the message of Lord Buddha to his friend King Davanampiyalise of Sri Lanka though his own son.

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1. The share of manufacturing GDP and the rate of interest.
 2. Percentage of exports of primary commodities textile and clothing

Bangladesh	25 + 57	(1986)
Nepal	28 + 37	(1987)
Pakistan	33 + 51	(1986)
Sri Lanka	41 + 25	(1987)
India	33 + 16	(1987)

Source - World Development Report, 1988-89.

India's relations with Bangladesh and Pakistan are unique. These two countries are greater in size than Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldieves. They were parts of Indian economy before independence. The unified economy of pre-partition India implied a considerable interdependence in the regional production pattern for the various parts of the sub-continent. East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind and North West Frontiers comprised the rural hinterland of undivided India.

India's trade with her neighbours has increased since 1970. Trade which was 36.2% with Nepal, 05% with Pakistan, 39.6% with Sri Lanka, in 1970, reached to 132% 26% and 83% respectively upto 1988-89.¹ Commercial relations between India and Bangladesh are governed by Indo-Bangladesh Trade Agreement signed on July 5, 1973. This agreement was renewed for a further period of three years. India is one of the major trading partner of Bangladesh. While imports from Bangladesh have remained a more or less static, the exports from India have been steadily increasing. Indo-Nepal Trade was governed by Treaty of Trade of 1978 which is in status-quo and exports are being made under the per-view of the Treaty. Nepals exports to India primarily consists of rich, butter, animal feed, jute and textile.²

Trade turn over between India and Pakistan has been low. India has accorded MFN treatment to Pakistan but, Pakistan does not reciprocate the gasture to India. Government of Pakistan has adopted 'a list of approach'. The list of 240 items for imports by private traders of Pakistan was approved in 1988 and 322 items were added to the list in 1989-90. Most of these items have no significance to India.³ India's export include tea, betel leafes, ginger

1. Director of Trade Statistics Year Book, IMF Issues.

2. Annual Report, 1989-90, Ministry of Commerce.

3. Annual Report, 1989-90, op.cit.

iron ore, tubes and angles of alloys, steel, tractor tyres and the imports contain rock self, fish, pig iron and petroleum products. With other countries India has limited exports and imports under various treaties and agreements.

(D) The Political Systems and the Role of Political Leadership and Political Parties : An Indian Perception

It is one of the axioms of the contemporary science of politics that party has become an indispensable factor in the working of the representative form of government. It lays down this irrefutable rule that a political party in one form or another "is omnipresent".¹ This phenomenon signifies the maximisation of political participation for the reason that it enjoins upon the members of a ruling community to take the people, as much as possible, in confidence either for the sake of observing the myth that the voice of the people is the voice of God or to justify the very legitimacy of their leadership and authority.

India is the world's largest and most populous democracy and largest developing country with a democratic system, surrounded by military-dominated and non-democratic state. It represents one of the most interesting cases of firm, stable and authoritative civilian control of the military. It is remarkable that the appalling problems of low economic development, sharp differences in income, mass poverty, over population, illiteracy, ethnic antagonism, absence of any linguistic, unity, cultural fragmentation, social diversities, and a complex class system do not seem to hinder civilian control of the Indian military. The two

1. Quoted in John J.C., Indian Government and Politics, Vishal Publications, Jullunder, p. 820, from Joseph la Palombare and Myron Weiner : Politics, Parties and Political Developments, p. 3.

neighbours of India-Pakistan and Bangladesh are comparable or closely matched to her in a number of ways, yet display divergent patterns of civil military relations.¹

Its ability to build a powerful institutional structure which ordered and moderated individual drives and ambition - a unique party system, a rule-bound administrative and judicial structural, planning machinery, a long network of autonomous institutions and voluntary bodies operating at various levels and plural basis of informed criticism and debate. Culturally and historically too, Indians have shown a remarkable capacity to order their plural identities and their considerable ideological ambiguity by resort to a well laid out operating hierarchy based on formalised rules and conventions. The Indian secular tradition has permitted considerable ideological fluidity but, it had always laid emphasis on an ordering mechanism. This was carried over into the modern period by conceiving the national state as such an ordering mechanism, a new all India cultural tradition based on the ideas and ideals of the new intelligentsia on which the Indian National Congress and the new state were based. The orderly growth of the first two owes itself to this institutional factor.²

THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL SYSTEM'S INSTITUTIONALISATION AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARDS INSTITUTION-BUILDING

No other on the marrow of independence was institutionally as well prepared as India was for self-government. In terms of institutionalisation, defined by 'adaptability',

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1. Cohen P. Stephen, 'Civilian Control of the Military in India', Claude E.Jr. Welch (ed.), Civilian Control of the Military : Theory and Cases From Developing Countries, Albany : State University of New York Press, 1976, pp. 43-64.
 2. Kothari, Rajni, Why Has India Been Demoratic - And Why Not, Type - Script, Delhi, Lokayan, New Delhi, pp. 29-30.

'complexity', 'autonomy', and 'coherence' of its organisation and procedures¹, according to Huntington, India has ranked high 'not only in comparison with other modernising countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America but also in comparison with many more modern European countries'.² The survival and sustenance of the stable and effective parliamentary democracy in India rested largely on the Congress party³, the Indian civil service⁴ and the charisma of Nehru⁵. India not only inherited these two organisations, i.e. the Congress party and the administrative system, but these two highly developed institutions were prepared to assume the primary responsibilities for input and output functions. Additionally, the relatively slow pace of modernisation, and social mobilisation in India did not create excessively disrupting demands and strains which

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1. Huntington, P. Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1968, p.12.
 2. Ibid., p. 84.
 3. Michael Brecher views the ability of the Congress to handle three Prime Ministerial successions as a crucial index of Political development. See his 'Succession India 1967 : The Routinization of Political Change', Asian Survey, vol. VII, no. 7, July 1967, pp. 423-43.
 4. Paul H. Appleby considered India as one of the dozen best administered states in the world as its civil and military services were experienced and professional. See his Public Administration in India : A Report of Survey (New Delhi : Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, 1953), pp. 8-9. Ralph Braibanti maintains that the Indian Civil service, dating from the early 19th century was appropriately hailed as 'one of the greatest administrative system of all time'. See his 'Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan', in Joseph Lapalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 373.
 5. Huntington, however, argues that the success of democracy in India rested more on two developed institutions - the Congress party and the Indian Civil Services than on the charisma of Nehru. See his Political Order in....., op.cit., p. 84.

the party and bureaucracy were unable to handle so long as these two organisations maintained their institutional strength.

The extraordinary leadership¹ of Nehru for seventeen years instilled in the system a set of values, norms of behaviour and rules of the game, and gave exceptional push and support for parliamentary political system. Nehru had stifled initiative and leadership by others by the dominating, even domineering, position he had held in Indian public life. As S.K. Patil, a strong man of the Congress party, put in bluntly, while 'Nehru is the greatest asset we have because he is just like a banyan shade millions take shelter, he is also a liability' because in the shade of that banyan tree, biologically nothing grows'.² But on the whole, Nehru made tremendous contribution towards building a national outlook by developing the patterns of identification between the rulers and ruled and evolving a policy consensus.³ Nehru's ability to build national consensus on political, economic and social structuring, firm commitment to parliamentary democracy, an open society, respect for an independent foreign policy (culminating in the non-aligned movement) have made India the most stable policy in the Third World. In sum, it was leadership in the highest sense provided by a man of Nehru's world stature, calibre and orientation at the helm during the formative phase of nationhood. His leadership provided time for the powerful interest group to learn to mediate their conflicts through the centre, by procedures patterned on those of the British Parliament.⁴

1. Appleby, op.cit., p. 3.

2. Quoted in The Times, December 1959, p. 22.

3. Consult Wayne Ayres Wilcox, 'Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development in India', *Annals of the American Academy and Social Sciences*, vol. 358, March 1965, pp. 117-118.

4. Kothari, op.cit., p. 31.

After the death of Jinnah and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in Pakistan and the bloody removal of Mujib in Bangladesh, the cult was that of mediocrity. Because the leadership that Pakistan and Bangladesh inherited was largely centred in the titanic personalities of Quaid - I - Azam Jinnah and Bangabandhu Mujib, respectively. Jinnah and Mujib ran the ML and the AL respectively like a General issuing orders to his troops and local commanders.

The formative phase of the nationhood the high level of institutionalisation in India, has largely been possible because of the strength of the ruling Congress - the oldest party of Asia which has often been called the heart of the Indian 'political miracle'.¹ The most remarkable feature about the Congress has been its highly institutionalised character which is measurable in terms of its effective adaptation with changing times and contexts, its structural and functional complexity, and its autonomous and coherent performance despite factionalism and social pressures.²

As Huntington maintains, 'The decline in party strength the fragmentation of the leadership, the evaporation of mass support, the decay of organisational structure, the shift of political leaders from party to bureaucracy and rise of personalism, all herald the moment when colonels occupy the capital.'³

1. Jones W.H. Morris, *Politics mainly Indian*, New Delhi, Orient Longma, 1979, pp. 131-43.

2. Richard Sisson, 'Party Transformation in India : Development and change in the Indian National Congress', in Nema1 Sadan Bose (ed.), *India in the Eighties*, Calcutta : Ferma KLM 1982, pp. 2-24.

3. Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 409.

Independence, Congress, unlike other 'movement' parties of South Asia, such as Muslim League, Anti-Faxist People's Freedom League - which also originated as 'mono-functional' organisation and 'functional exigencies' of freedom struggle has neither been reduced to mere skeleton nor faced electoral erosion.¹ Additionally, (1967-72, 1977-79 and 1989-91), the congress has enjoyed a monopoly of power which has been characterised as one-party dominant system reflecting 'inter-party competition but no alternation in power.'² It functions simultaneously as a ruling party in terms of 'an authoritative spokesman of nation' and also as an opposition in terms of 'affirmative agent of criticism and change'; it has been thus able to domesticate dissent and pre-empt counter mobilisation. The obvious reasons for the congress dominance were its consensual authority³, 'a unifying agent not merely in the obvious 'horizontal' sense in which it holds together a range of opinions and interests, but also in the important 'vertical' sense that it brings into contact and interpenetration all levels of politics from the most sophisticated to the most simple and traditional.'⁴ Congress provided 'the chief competitive mechanism' of the Indian political system in

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1. For the details of the development and regression in South Asian party system see P.C. Mathur, 'Origins and Development of South Asian Party System' in his (ed.) Government and politics in South Asia : The Domestic Political Scene, vol. 1, Jaipur : Printwell, 1985, pp. 246-72.
 2. For the full model of this party system See Rajni Kothari, 'Party System' Economic Weekly, vol. XIII, June 3, 1961, pp. 847-54; and 'The Congress System in India', Asian Survey, vol. IV, no. 12, December 1964, pp. 1161-73. Also See his 'Congress System Revisited : A Decinnial Review' Asian Survey, vol. XIV, no. 12, December 1974, pp. 1035-54.
 3. There has almost always been a remarkable ideological consensus around the professed goals of socialism, democracy, nationalism and secularism although the very operation of the system produced centrifugal drives. However, the recent Indian party system points to the disintegration of the consensus on which Congress retained its electoral success and legitimacy. See Kothari, 'The Congress System in India, op.cit., pp. 1161-73.
 4. Morris Jones, The Government and Politics in India, London Hutchinson University Press, 1964, p. 153.

which competition has been 'internalised' and carried on within the ruling party.¹

The Congress, like the League, was not simply a political machine for the attainment of independence but a movement with nation-wide ramifications. The ML was not as committed as the Indian National Congress or the Ceylonese nationalist leaders to parliamentary institutions. Although the Congress and the ML both displayed strong central direction, the leadership of the Congress was 'collective' not 'dictatorial' like that of the League.² The ML had been to keep control of the party in a small group instead of popular support sought by the Congress. The socialists who broke away from the Congress, or the communists, Hindu communalists, and other group who organised their own national and local political parties, were not regarded by the ruling party as political traitors. While in Pakistan, loyalty to the state was often equated with political support to the League.³

After the brutal assassination of Mujib there was political chaos in the country. The deaths shortly after the independence of their countries of Senanajake in Ceylon, of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan in Pakistan, and of Aung San in Burma directly hastened the disintegration of their political parties. That the deaths of Gandhi and Patil in India had no such effect on the Congress was not due just to Nehru.⁴ The League could not develop enduring organisational loyalties which facilitated for the rapid degeneration of

1. Kothari, 'The Congress System in India', op.cit. pp. 1161-73.

2. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama : An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, 3 vols. London : Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. 1968, p. 259.

3. Ibid., p. 262.

4. Huntington, op.cit., pp. 409-10.

the League after the departure of Jinnah¹, this was not immediately apparent because of the charismatic authority wielded by Jinnah in all sectors of political life.² The ML was never able to establish the same level of political dominance in Pakistan that the Congress did in India. The ML failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a broad-based national party seeking to lead the nation on the road to democracy and planned economic development due to its weak and narrow political support base. Although it took credit for the creation of Pakistan, it rather failed and fattered in coping with the different set of post-colonial challenges of political articulation and political aggregation.³

The Congress has always been a party with a soft cell organisational frame⁴ which is sometimes exaggerated to the extent of the image of a 'mass rally'.⁵ The ML, the Congress committed itself to a programme of social and economic change in line with the modernisation theory. The Congress, thus, provided the new government of India with a programme of action, but the policies pursued by the Muslim League in Pakistan during its first decade were throughly

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1. Morris Jones, 'Pakistan Post-Mortem and the Roots of Bangladesh', The Political Quarterly, vol. XLIII, no. 2, April-June 1972, p. 195.
 2. See Mathur, P.L. (ed), Government and Politics in South Asia, op.cit., pp. 262-64.
 3. The Congress was more successful in aggregating diverse interests than was the League. The former aggregated diverse interests and permitted them to continue while the latter tended to absorb them at the cost of their identity. For elaboration see Weiner, 'Politics in South Asia', in Almond and Coleman (eds.), op.cit., pp. 187-95 and 219-20.
 4. Morris Jones, Politics Mainly Indian, op.cit., pp. 234-63; and S.R. Mehrotra, 'The Early Indian National Congress 1885-1918 : Ideas, objectives and Organisation', in B.R. Nanda (ed.), Essays in Modern Indian History, Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 42-62.
 5. B.D. Graham, 'Congress as a Rally : An Image of Leadership', South Asian Review, vol. VI, no. 2, January 1973, pp. 111-24; S.R. Mehrotra, 'The Early Indian...', op.cit.,

to social change and national consolidation. The Congress drew its strength from the urban classes of northern India, the League largely from the wealthy Muslim landlords, who abhorred the reform programme of the Congress.¹

The Congress played a double role as a parliamentary party and as a movement of social reconstruction which operates directly among the people outside the parliamentary institution.²

FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

The success of democracy in India was partly a product of a long experiment with political ideas and practices and partly the integration of these with traditional Indian values. The basic political tradition in ancient India was normally monarchical, there were some elements such as the institution of Samiti, Panchayat, Sabha and the institution of Brahmin as the adviser to king, which put constraints on monarchical power, and, therefore, seemed supportive of tendencies towards democracy.³ Pakistan did not enjoy the same experience of representative institutions as India did.

Pakistan, unlike India, Iftikhar Ahmad observes :
'.... inherited a military bureaucratic state structure, a strong landed class, an almost non-existent industrial

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pp. 42-62; Morris Jones, 'Politics Mainly Indian', opcit., pp. 233-63 and M.P. Singh, 'Whether Indian Party System' A Crises in Indian Pluralism', in Urmila Phadnis, S.D. Muni and Kalim Bahadur (eds.), Domestic Conflicts in South Asia, vol. 1, New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 1989, p. 108.

1. Myrdal, op.cit., pp. 320-25.
2. Horst Hartmann, Political Parties in India (Meerut : Meenakshi, 1982, p. 54.
3. For details see A.S. Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India, Delhi : Motilal Banarasidas, 1962, pp.

bourgeoisie and a weak commercial one. These classes lacked a social base, and were dependent on the state for their economic and political power....¹

LEGITIMACY

During the first two decades the strength of civilian institutions representing effective centres of power under the leadership of Nehru, coupled with policy consensus of Congress, stable bureaucracy, flexible and sensible legislative response to sanial change and growing commitment of masses to use the ballot box-all these lent legitimacy to the government, and, consequently, paved the way for the consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, Pakistani ruling classes could not acquire legitimacy as they had a kind of viceregal government by civil servants in the guise of politicians, who were spending all their time in playing musical chairs for office and lacked agreement over the fundamental organisation and purposes of the Pakistani state.

A change has occurred now in political sphere of the South Asian countries and a democratic thinking has developed rather than military rule.

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225-38 and R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhury and Kalinkar Datta, An Advanced History of India, London : Macmillan and Co., 1958.

1. Ahmad, Iftikar, 'Pakistan : Class and State Formation', Race and Class, vol. XXII, no. 3, Winter 1981, p. 240.

Relevance of Non-Alignment on India's Foreign Policy

(a) Non-Alignment

Past and Present :

Nehru's perception that the big power rivalry in a way protected India's security and that India should therefore play its part skillfully in the global balance of power game and thus ensure her security and power position in World Politics.¹

Nehru proposed that, as far as possible, India should keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one other, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again led to disaster on an even vastal scale² speaking at another occassion, Nehru articulated. It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. Once foreign relations go out of your hand into the charge of somebody else

1. Elaborating on this theme, Nehru wrote in his "Defence of India" article published in Gandhi's Young India :... It may be that some will cover her, but the master desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No country will tolerate the idea of another gaining domination over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous to make the attempt, all others would combine to prevent this and to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry in itself would be the surest guarantee against an attack of India.

.Source : Young India (Ahmedabad) 24th September 1935, p. 276 and 1st October 1931, p. 234.

This perception of Nehru continued even after independence and there are ample evidence to show that during the cold war years, Nehru wanted India to act as a balancer in the big power game and thus ensure her security and power position in world politics... For details see : Girija Shankar Baj Pai, "India and the Balance of Power", Indian Year Book of International Affairs (Madras), vol. 1, 1952, "Middle Ground between America and Russia", Foreign Affairs, New York vol. 32, no. 2, January 1954. Supposed to have been written by K.M. Panikkar, article argue that India had sought and achieve to some extent a middle ground between the United States and the Soviet Union, See also, P.S. Jayaramu, "Foreign Policy Behaviour of India, Afghanistan and the Himalayan Kingdoms : A balance of power interpretation",

to the extent and in that measure you are not independent¹. He was keenly aware of the historic role that the Indian National Movement was playing in the resurgence of Asia and in the dismantling of colonialism and racism in Asia and Africa. As he told his fellow Asian nationalists in April, 1947,

We stand at the end of an era and on the Threshold of a new period of history..... Asia, after a long period of quiescence has suddenly become important again in world affairs.

...It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development..... We have no designs against anybody/ours is the great design of promoting peace and progress all over world. Far too long, have we in Asia been petitioners in western courts and chancelleries. That today must now belong to the past.....We do not intend to be the play things of others².

India's policy of non-alignment does not imply pacifism or passive indifference. Nehru more vehemently explained the policy of non-alignment and said :

"Our policy is not to commit ourselves previously to follow a certain line. Our policy is independent of action. If we say we are permanently neutral, it has no meaning except permanent retirement from public affairs in the national sense, Sanyas.³

In Lok Sabha on December 9, 1958 Nehru made his policy of Non-Alignment crystal clear and said,

"When we say our policy of non-alignment, obviously we mean non-alignment with military blocks. It is not a negative policy. It is a positive one, a definite one and I hope, a dynamic one. But, in so far as the military blocks today and the cold war are concerned, we do not align ourselves with either block.

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The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol.L.no.4.
Oct. Dec., 1989, pp. 519-32.

2. Jawahar Lal Nehru, to the constituent Assembly 8 March, 1949, In Independence and After Speeches, New Delhi GOI, 1949, p. 340.
1. Ibid. p. 257.
2. Singh, Surjit Man quoted in India's Search for Power, Sage Publications, New Delhi, p. 14.
3. Quoted in Mahajan, V.D., International Relations, S. Chand and Company Ltd., New Delhi, p. 786.

This in itself is not a policy; it is only part of a policy. Countries talk and act so much in terms of military blocks and the cold war in the world today, that one had to lay stress on the fact that we are not parties to the cold war and we are not members of or attached to, any military block. Nehru had realized in other words, that non-alignment was a logical necessity from the points of view of India's economic development."

To quote Singham and Hune "Nehru had the ability to view issues within an international perspective Tito insisted on maintaining contact and holding regular meetings. Naseer's political skills brought different groups together and he was especially able in committees where he methodologically achieved consensus, Nikrumah had the vision of a free Africa, Soekarno provided an indomitable spirit to their activism. Each was an advocate for an issue that became part of the integrated set of principles known as Non-alignment.¹

Nehru could see the emergence of the Cold war with all its implications and dangers and realize how the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union representative of the two different kinds of Social and economic systems, has likely to bring the colonial world under greatest control.² India achieved its independence in August 1947 but Nehru could see that the other colonial powers were not willing to withdraw from their colonies. In 1949 the Dutch started an intensive and violent aggression in Indonesia, Nehru, now the Prime Minister of a fully independent India called the second Asian Conference in

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1. Singham, A.W. and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignment : In An Age of Alignment, Lawrence Hill and Co. Zed Books Ltd., 1986 p. 62.
 2. The only major writer who has taken exception to Nehru's role as a founder of the movement is Alvin Rubinstein who argues that Tito was the critical architect of non-alignment, Rubinstein Yugoslans and the Non-Aligned world Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 112-118. Lex Mates, General Secretary of the Belgrade Conference in 1961 fully acknowledges the pioneering role of India and Nehru in his classic work, Non-Alignment Theory and Current Policy, Belgrade 1972.

New Delhi consisting of Asian and Arab Countries this time on a governmental level in support of the liberation movements. This led to the withdrawal of the Dutch and the independence of Indonesia¹. In the later days non-alignment became the symbol of freedom. Carter stated the view that the non-aligned countries can and should make an active contribution to the resolution of international problems and to the more favourable evolution of international relations.²

Prime Minister Nehru, and after him also many other political leaders of young sovereign states, came to understand that full elimination of colonialism and peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems are indispensable conditions for the achievement of India's national aims and world progress.³

Since, the 1959 summit at Belgrade 'The world scene changed dramatically. The Soviet Union has bowed out and the presiding deity of NAM, Yugoslavia, is a shambles. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union has far reaching implications for the countries of NAM. As time passes we see, that the consortium of big powers of the North; that known by the name of G. 7, are preoccupied with furthering and consolidating their own economic interests. The NAM in a spirit of Trust and cooperation should initiate a process to evolve a system to end regional wars and tensions amongst

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1. Michael Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biography, Boston Beacon Press, 1962 pp. 226-238 G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, New York Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, pp. 51-98.
 2. Joint statement following meetings between President Jimmy Carter and President Tito, Office of the White House Press Secretary 9 March, 1978 p.2.
 3. Yuri Nosenko, Kawahar Lal Nehru and India's Foreign Policy Sterling Publishers, New Delhi p. 206.

the neighbours¹ and should work as a check to powers detrimental to their interest. Bush emphasised the need for continuing American Leadership to prevent global instability and pave the way for a worldwide movement of democracy.² In the joint session of U.S. Congress on September 14, 1990, Bush asserted.

"Out of these troubled times our objective - a new world order can emerge a new era free from threat of terror stronger in the pursuit of justified and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world. East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.³

It is not an exaggeration to say that the western, specially North American understanding of the origins and objectives of the non-aligned movement have seen the movements origin and even its raison-de-tre in terms of the cold war, and are arguing that now the Cold war⁴ has ended. Non-alignment also has lost its relevance⁵.

The decade of the 1990s has begun thanks to the series of summit meetings in the closing years of the 80s between the soviet and American leaders resulting in the

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1. Gujral, L.K. NAM's Role in the changed World, Third World Impact, Vol. 11, No. 33, September, 1992 p.9.
 2. Kessings Record of World Events, Vol. 36 No. 9, September, 1990, p. 37 696.
 3. Jayaram, P.S. New World order, Non Alignment Movement And India, India Quarterly - A Journal of International Affairs Vol. XL VIII, No. 1. and 2, January - June, 1992.
 4. Some of the significant writings from this perspectives are Peter Lyon, Neutralism, Bombay Oxford University Press, 1964, Lawrance Martin ed. Neutralism and Non Aligned Movement, Bombay Popular Prakashan, 1978.
 5. Janson, J.J. the noted Journist has gone to the extent of daying that the nonaligned movement is deed and reedy for burial. See his recent writings in The Times of India and Deccan Herald.

signing of the INF Treaty by the two countries and a further decision to cut down their nuclear arsenals - with the winding down of the cold war. Not only has Soviet American relations improved considerably, but the map of Europe has undergone tremendous changes as a result of the unification of Germany, the virtual disintegration of the warsaw Pact and the survival of NATO as an in effective political alliance. As a consequence of the new detente many of the regional conflicts too have either disappeared or lost their importance. Nearer home, China and Soviet Union have normalised their relations. All these changes in the global and regional politico-strategic environment resulting in the dawn of the post-cold war era, argue some analysts.¹

The dismemberment of the Soviet Union has fast reaching implications for the countries of NAM. As time passes we see that the consortium of big powers of the North, that go by the name of G-7, are preoccupied with furthering and consolidating their own economic interests. They view the south as their fie. The IMF, the World Bank and GATT are used to change our economic and social projections to suit their purpose. Helplessly, we are forced to follow them dictates. Sometimes the prescriptions are sugarcoated but consequential result remain the same.²

For the first time it was realised that the presidency of the NAM was so crucial at critical moments in the world History. Unfortunately, neither our scribes nor

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1. For a representative view, See, Chopra, S.N. "NAM on the wayout World Focus, Vol. 11, No 5, May 1990, G.H. Jansen has written vigorously questioning the validity of Non-alignment his newspaper writings. Also see M.S. Rajan's article in the same issue of world focus.
 2. Gujral, I.K., "Third World Impact" Vol. III, No. 33 September, 1992.

parliament comprehended this new situation whenever the Gulf crisis was discussed in parliament it urged to activate the NAM. The scribes wrote about its glorious past. It was neither easy nor diplomatically expedient to elucidate that the nerve centre of the NAM system had paralysed particularly when the conflict involve two NAM countries - Irak and Kuwait. At its summit the NAM must realise that its political tasks have not ended with the end of the coldwar. Political sovereigntic are still threatened on one plea or the other. The NAM in a spirit of trust and cooperation, should initiate a process to evolve a system to end regional wars and tensions amongst the neighbours. India also need to use its influence among the developing countries to initiate effective measures for greater south-south cooperation. India should also be able to persuade and preswive the developed world to restart the global negotiations for the building up of a new international economic order based on equity and Justice. India has the inner strength and the sophisticacy to rise up to this tall order.

(b) Relevance of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy :

The promotion of national interest is the principal objective of every countries foreign policy; in fact it is the objective of all government policy. It provides the 'eternal' or the permanent element in a country's reactions with foreign countries. Lord Palmerston said we have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interest are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow¹. Very often national interests are projected through doctrinaire ideological or system expositions, but,

1. Quoted in Padeiford and Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics, 1962 Macmillan and Company, p. 234.

even then the primary factor influencing the utterly realistic nature of foreign affairs in the countries national interest¹ Nehru observed -

"Whether a country is imperialistic or Socialist or communist its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country."²

The Brookings Institution defined -

"Interests'(as) what a nation feels to be necessary to its security and well-being objectives are interests sharpened to meet particular international situations, policies are thought out ways of attaining objectives and commitments are specific undertakings in support of policy, national interests reflect the general and continuing ends for which nationa acts."³

India adopted the policy of non-alignment as the surest way of assuming peace in a world devided by 'Cold war' The policy of non-alignment has not an accidental one but it has the expression of a complete historical process. Non alignment became the logical framework of India's foreign policy. An independent foreign policy x responded to the conscious and sub concious urges of the people impared a sense of pride and belongng and helped cement the unity of the country.⁴ Definding India's foreign policy, Jawahar Lal Nehru said, "any attempt on our part,

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1. The observation of Admiral Mohan is worth notice. He says self interest is not only a legitimate, but, a fundamental course of National Policy.
 2. Nehru, J. India's Foreign Policy/Government of India, 1962, pp. 27-28.
 3. Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1951-52, p. 329, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 1951.
 4. Dutt, V.P. India's Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, N. Delhi, p. 4.

that is, the government of the day here, to go too far in our direction would create difficulties in our own country. It would be resented and we would produce conflicts in our own country which would not be helpful to any other country¹. On October 13, 1949, Nehru said before the both houses of the US Congress "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we can not be and shall not be neutral. What we plead for and endeavour to practice in our own imperfect way is a binding faith in peace and an unfailing endeavour of thought and action to ensure it". In order to achieve it India introduced the policy of non-alignment.

Non alignment helped India to have a friendly peaceful relationship with China till the end of the fifties. 1962 war between India and China was broke out not only because of non-aligned strategy, contrary to the popular belief that China exposed our non-alignment in 1962, there was a perceptible gain from the entire episode because of our non-aligned posture and strategy. We were able to get military assistance from United States in the course of the war and from the Soviet Union after the war. The Soviet decision to assist India in the manufacture of MIG air crafts; the starting of five year defence plan by Nehru (which was continued by his successors) and the efforts during 1964-65 to secure some kind of security guarantees by the big powers, which of course failed need to be looked upon as attempts made to argument India's defence capability within the framework of non-alignment². The final and the most rewarding effort in the direction of strengthening India's national security and non-alignment came with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty on 9th August 1977. That the Treaty did

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1. Speeches at the Indian Council of World Affairs, March 22, 1949, Indias Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April, 1961, New Delhi, publication Division, p. 42-50.
 2. Jayaramu, P.S., "Jawaharlal Nehru and India's National Security", Mainstream, vol. 26, no. 33, May 28, 1988, pp. 17-20.

not mean a compromise with non-alignment is seen from the manner in which Mrs. Gandhi ensured a written commitment by the USSR about its respect for Indian non-alignment of the text of the treaty itself.¹

India did not feel constrained by the Soviet Union, in the following years, in the free conduct of its foreign policy was evident from the signing of the Simla Agreement with Pakistan in July 1972, explosion of the nuclear device in 1974, signifying our capability to produce the bomb, the need arose, and the resumption of ambassadorial relations with communist China in 1976. Needless to say, all these actions of Mrs. Gandhi not only added to the country's security and power profile but won universal acceptability for its non-alignment strategy.² Through non-aligned diplomacy India cautioned the US and USSR that while it welcomed their efforts at super power detente, the same should not result in a condominium by them over the developing nations and pleaded for an condominium by then over the developing nations and pleaded for an extension of detente to the Third World³. While it is debatable as to whether detente conferred any benefits on India, thanks to the diplomatic postures of India and other countries, the super powers were forced to exercise restraint in their policies towards the Third World. During 1976-78, India welcomed the USSR efforts at limiting their Naval presence in the Indian Ocean.⁴ The Soviet intervention in

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1. Bandhyopadhyaya, J., *The making of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1979) 2nd Edn. p. 333. For the view that the Indo-Soviet Treaty meant the death of non-alignment, Sec. J.D. Sethi, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and non-alignment", *India Quarterly*, vol. 22, No.3, July-September, 1971.
 2. Jayaramu, P.S., *Strategic Studies Journal*, vol. 4, No. 1-2, 1992.
 3. *Foreign Affairs, Record*, New Delhi, Government of India Vol. 11, No. 2, February, 1973, Satish Kumar, ed. Documents on India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi.
 4. *Indian and Foreign Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 15, 1977, p. 5.

Afghanistan and India decision to abstain in UN General assembly voting on the subject in January 1980 when more than 103 nations voted the Soviet Union calling for withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Indira Gandhi also favoured the policy of Non-alignment. In a speech on August 31, 1970, she restated basic principles of India's foreign policy. In particular she affirmed India's faith in non-alignment. There were people she said, who though non-alignment had not served India's interests; the obvious alternative was for India to be aligned. "I am sure", she said, "anybody who looks clearly at this picture will immediately come to the conclusion that it would not be in our interest to join any block. I do not think that it is an idealistic position. I think it is the only hard-headed practical path that is open to any country which wants to keep itself independent".

After Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister Morarji Desai in the first Conference held in March 24, 1977 asserted that the countries foreign policy would be properly non aligned. The Washington Post in an article published on March 26, 1977 stated :

"Mr. Desai's record and India's circumstances alive indicate that he is most likely to pursue a truer non-alignment. The history of Indo-American relations angors strongly that it is not particularly in the interest of either country to try to build a patron client relationship, India resent it".

In the conference of Foreign Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau on Non-aligned countries, held in New Delhi, from April 7, 1977, Desai assumed the members and said,

"During our recent general elections, there were many issues which were the subject of fierce controversy. But the principles on non-alignment and the essence of foreign policy were not among them. I have no hesitation in assuring your Excellencies that India will remain non-aligned in

the real sense of the term".¹

Foreign Minister Vajpaya in Janta Regime also reiterated India's commitment of non-alignment. He said, "This is a welcome opportunity for us to reiterate India's continuing adherence to the policy of non-alignment which has been the cornerstone of our foreign policy since independence ?

Rajiv Gandhi followed up this traditional policy of non-alignment and extended India's hand for co-operation to the Third World, as also to the East and the West, V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar too, did not rule out the policy of non-alignment. Prime Minister Narsimha Rao, adopted the policy of Non-Alignment and in an interview with Times said,

"If I am to..... retain any independence of judgement and action, it does not matter to me whether there are two blocks or three blocks or one block" he further added, "people are pointing out that there is only one block and my reply is "do you want me to align with it ? The answer is no because I am to remain independent and retain my independence of judgement."²

1. FAR, April, 1977, p. 55.

2. The Hindustan Times, August 25, 1992.

Civil Military Relations in India : Deterrent to Coup

The British conquered India on the strength of the Presidency Armies. The East India company, which had been granted a Charter on 31 December 1600 by queen Elizabeth I to trade across the world and permitted by Emperor Jahangir's "Firman" in January 1613 to establish a trading post at Surat (which remained the headquarters of the Company's western Indian Trade until 1687, when it was succeeded by Bombay) supplemented its protected forces in 1683 by adding to it two companies of Rajputs each 100 strong and commanded by its own Rajput officers. This small force, auxiliaries to the Bombay-European troops, though not the first Indian Soldiers of the English may be regarded in the opinion of Sir Patrick Cadell as the beginning of the Indian Army.¹ In 1752 Major Stringer Lawrance, who was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the company's forces in India, was subsequently deemed by the English as "the father of the Indian Army".

From 1776 till 1857, the Bengal Army was almost entirely recruited from among the 'Purbias' and till 1857 they were viewed as brave and manly" and were mostly Brahmins and Rajputs. After describing the "Early Beginning in his book "The Indian Army" from the 17th to the 21st century, Stan Menezes, surveyed the Presidency Armies in war before 1857', as a consequence of Plassy, the English prospered and the Dutch influence declined. Buxar (1763) supplemented Plassy by strengthening the English hold over Bengal and Bihar. By 1765, the English had subdued as far as Allahabad, Banaras, Faizabad, Lucknow and Emperor Shah Alam II sought British Protection.² In 1893 Army organisation

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1. Vohra, A.M., (Lt. General Retd.) "The Story of the Indian Army", U.S.I. Journal, January-March 1993, p.103.
 2. Menezes, S.I., The Indian Army From the seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century, Viking Penguin Books, 1993, p. 625.

commission abolished the Presidency Army System and introduced unified Indian Army system. Lord Kitchner reorganised the Army. During world war I, more than a million Indians served abroad and 60000 were killed. The First world war proved to be, as the Second World War was to prove later, both an engine and catalyst for social change, particularly for the millions who served in the Indian Army". After appointment of Auchinleck as C-in-C in India in 1941, the expansion of the Indian Army started in earnest. After the Indian Army's reverse in 1962. President Radha Krishnan remarked " War or no war, invasion or no invasion, attack or no attack, we must not be caught napping again. We must increase our strength... Military weakness has been a temptation, a little military strength may be a deterrent", and actually manpower ceiling was raised in the Indian Army thereafter.


The Civil Military Relations

The major blow to the Autonomy and influence of the military-especially to the only substantial service, the army was struck on Independence Day, August 15, 1947, when the position of Commander-in-Chief in India was abolished and three Chiefs were made responsible to the Defence Minister and were collectively, the professional military advisers to the government.¹ The ostensible reason for this drastic reduction in the relative influence of the chief of the army to promote balanced growth among services and to follow all 'modern' armed forces which have each of the three services under an independent chief.²

1. Ibid.

2. Cohen, P. Stephen, The Indian Army: Its contribution to the Development of a Nation, Mookherjee S.K., Oxford University Press, New Delhi, p. 171 from Venkateswaran, A.L., Defence Organization in India, N. Delhi, Publication Division,

Sketch 2: Indian Army: Peacetime Locations



There were also other reasons. The only challenge to the civilian authority could come from the numerically dominant army, reducing the authority of its Chief to the point where he was not even first among equals made it easier to balance off the army with the other two services.¹

The strengthening of the civil service dominated Ministry of Defence was a second critical organizational change. The military had also been under close financial scrutiny of the Ministry of Finance. Some bureaucratic change were also made in the warrant of Precedence. A secretary in the government of India ranked lower than a lieutenant-general until 1947; afterwards he was made to be ranked to a full general. The Chief Secretary of a state formerly ranked with brigadiers, after independence he was made to rank with a major general. In 1948, the Chief of the Army Staff, ranked with judges of the Supreme Court of India, but, was senior to Chief Ministers outside their states or the Secretary General of the External Affairs Ministry. In 1951, Chief of the Army Staff became junior to Chief Ministers outside.²

All these changes resulted in the reduction of the military's role in the decision making process. The military was thoroughly indoctrinated with the principle of civilian control and never protested against the reduction of its own powers. Krishna Menon's formulation of the proper relationship between the civil military relations were clear.

He asserted :

"It is wrong for the army to try to make policy, Their business is to be concerned with military

1. Ibid.

2. For an army officer's view of these changes see Brig. S.K. Sinha, Career Prospects for Officers in Armed Forces, U.S.I. Journal, LXXXVIII, No. 412, July-September, 1968, 263-269 and of Matters Military, Vision Books, 1980, p.30.

tactics. Military planning and arrangements and things of that kind must remain in the hands of the Government and even inside the Government these questions are largely conditioned by finance. I believe, the statement that was made recently, that strategy was left with the army, was due to misuse of terms. The Government is not going to say that it wants one company here or two companies there, but, the Government will certainly say we should attack Pakistan or we should not attack Pakistan "or" we should accept trainees from Indonesia and Malaysia" or things of that kind; these are all matters of policy.... of course, military matters are nearly questions of expertise, strategy includes considerations that are related to our political orientation.¹

There is an interesting postulation on the organisational matter, ". If the officer corps are originally divided into land, sea, and air elements and then is unified under the leadership of a single overall staff and military commander-in-Chief, this change will tend to increase its authority with regard to other institutions of Government. It will speak with one voice instead of three. Other groups will not be able to play off one portion of the officer corps against another.² The stature of the Armed Forces was declined after Independence both in society and state.³ The absence of any apparent threat to Indian security during at least the first decade of Independence reinforced the belief that Gandhi had shown the superiority of moral over physical force. There was, thus, a philosophic barrier to attacking undue glamour or importance to a military uniform,⁴ in independent India, a steady shrinkage of the economic content of an officer's

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1. Quoted in Brecher, Michael, India and World Politics, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 260.
 2. Samuel, P., Huntington, Soldier and State, Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 87.
 3. Kavic, J., Loren, India's Quest for Security, University of California Press, 1967, p. 211.
 4. Ibid.

emoluments also started, "Lt. Generals lost their former entitlements to gun salutes, and military officers leave and travel concessions were also terminated and reduced. During the first decade after independence the Defence portfolio seemingly carried little weight in the Cabinet.¹ In this evolving pattern of Civil military relationship, decisions on defence matters were taken depending on individual services being able to present their cases fully and frankly to the appropriate civilian officials clearly made the decision.² This arrangement, however, had a serious flaw because the ignorance of civilian officials about military matters is not complete as to be a self-evidence and in controvertible feet.

During this period a military coup took place in Pakistan in 1958 which further vitiated the atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust of the Indian military among political circles in India. This fear was natural as in some newly independent countries military rule was adopted. This view may precisely be explained in words of Kuneramangalam, He said:

'Pre-independence, our nationalist leaders, even at the height of the non-cooperation movement, never tried to involve Indian officers in national politics. This British tradition which was tactitly accepted by our political leaders, has continued... unlike our political leadership, League leaders were getting Muslim officers involved in politics immediately before and after independence. Therefore, politicisation of the Pakistani Officer cendre was there from start.... Our politicians have a very real fear of a military take-over. I had once explained this to the Defence Minister, Chavan,

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1. Kavic, J. Lorne, India's Quest for Security, University of California Press, 1967 page 147, 445, 144 & 158.
 2. Jeo Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, Staugu University Press, 1964, p. 152.

when I was vice Chief and he voiced this fear about General Chaudheri, I could not make any real headway in convincing him that he was talking nonsense. The main culprit was X. who spent most of his time keeping an eye on successive chiefs, who never thought of Coups'.¹

General Thimyya, who had taken over as the Army Chief in 1957, came in Conflict with Menon's interference in the Army promotions and his persistent misrepresentation of service views on military policy to Nehru.² Thimyya resigned and was persuaded by Nehru to take back his resignation, but the controversy did immense damage to the morale of the officer corps.

"Towards the end of his many in New Delhi who became jealous of him. One of them was a politician and the other was a soldier. Both were very influential men and both were equally ambitious particularly, the soldier. A plot was hatched by these two to pull Timmy down in Panditji's eyes and thus to lower his image generally".³

However, the plot did not work. After the setback suffered by Indian, in the hands of Chinese, Thimayya was appointed to the most prestigious national Defence Council. During another tenure, a canard was let loose that Thimayya was planning a Coup. General, S.P.P. Thorat, who was a close friend of Thimayya and who, as per the Army's expectations, should have succeeded Thimayya, recalls :

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1. Mangaloom, Kumar PP, DSO, Ex-Chief of the Army Staff, in his answer to a questionnaire for authors book Military Leadership to Present Military Coup, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986.
 2. Kavic, J. Lorne, India's Quest For Security, University of California Press, 1967, p. 157.
 3. Thorat, S.P.P., DSO in correspondence with the author Concerning his book, Military Leadership to Present Military Coup, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986.

"Yes, there was an attempt in 1960-61 against Thimayya but, it had nothing to do with Civil military relations and it was not intended to frame the General for an attempt to intervene in the country's politics. The attempt was intended to lower Timmy's image in the eyes of the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. Timmy was really a blue-eyed boy of Panditji. He was treated like a member of his house hold and a valued friend. Naturally, there were officer described that there was never any attempt by any chief to intervene militarily in the political life. A feeling of fear was created by the action of some senior officers carrying tales, maligning seniors by flasehood and lies by imaginary anti-Government mores of Seniors...This was much to the liking of certain politicians and civilian officials, who encouraged, aided and abetted such despicable activities. In 1960, a rumour was set a foot of General Thimayya staging a coup. Tanks, armoured cars and infantry from some formations near Delhi were brought to Delhi without knowledge of the chief.¹

When the country was gripped under debacle of 1962 and when General Thaper resigned, the obvious choice to succeed him was General Chaudhari, The Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri showed reluctance to appoint him as Army Chief, because he had political ambitions. Mr. L.P. Singh laid hands on the biography of Abrahams Lincoln and readout the following to General Hooker :

"I have placed you at the need of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me sufficient reason, and yet I think it best for you to know that..... I have heard in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but, inspite of it, that I have given you the

1. Sagar Moti, (Lt. General) is correspondence with author concerning his book 'Military Leadership to Present Military Coup', Lancer International, 1986.

command. Only those Generals who gain success can be set up as dictators. What I know ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship".¹

Having read the passage the Home Secretary advised the Minister for Home that first requirement was to fight Chinese and consequently General Chaudheri, has appointed Army Chief. For some time the fears of coup were accentuated after 1962. Nehru wrote to Bertrand Russell in December 1962 that the danger of the military mentality spreading in India, and the power of the Army increasing.²

In fact there is no chance of any military coup in India. General Bewoor, the chief from 1973 to 1975 observed that there is little chance to day that the Armed Forces can effect a political change by getting themselves into power. They are being used as a unified factor as the only reliable body in the country to ensure law and order and they are being wooed by the powers in the centre by meeting their needs in terms of financial and career prospects.³

India has a constitution in which there is a provision for handle almost every type of political and financial instability. From the Punjab Trouble to the Hazratbal episode, the Army has stood by the Central Government to safe guard the law and order position without any cast and creed considerations.

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1. Chibber, M.L. "Civil Military Relations in India : Its Relevance to Developing countries". A Presentation at the XIVth world congress of the International Political Science Association (IDSA) August 28 to September 1, 1988, Washington.
 2. Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. III, Allen & Unwin, London, 1959.
 3. Bewoor, G.C. in correspondence with for his book 'Military Leadership to Prevent Military Coup', Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986.

The position in other SAARC countries is different. There are no chances of any military coup in Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal as the army strength is limited. As regards to Bangladesh and Pakistan, the position is absolutely different and both the countries have come out of the military pressure in the near past but the political ambitions of the army are still alive.

The Military Balance

The comparison of conventional forces in South Asia is difficult. India and Pakistan have fundamentally different prospectives on the question of military balance. To use some of the American Terminologies used during the SALT I negotiations, Pakistan has established 'essential equivalence' with India, while India, has sought to achieve 'Equal security' taking into account the "Chinese threat" India sought merely matching capabilities with Pakistan in 1950s and early 1960s, and a slight edge between the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars. Thus following the American military aid to Pakistan under the SEATO and CENTO defence pacts forged in 1954 and 1955, India sought to offset Pakistani acquisitions of American F-86 Sabre, F-104 Starfighter and B-57 Canberra Combat aircraft and the M-47/48 Patton Tanks by purchasing British F-6 Hunters Fighters and B-1 Canberra bombers, The French Mystere IV Fighter Bombers and British Centurion and French AMX-13 tanks.¹

The Quality and quantity of Indian military procurements before the shock of the 1962 Sino-Indian war certainly did not exceed the military capabilities of Pakistan. During this time Pakistan had two armored divisions to India's one division while the total number of infantry divisions were 8 for Pakistan and 10 for India. The united States had made Pakistan the second largest recipient of Military Assistance Programme (MAP) aid, providing some \$ 650 million aid but, the admitted fact is that India's military forces are so superior to

1. Raju, G.C. Thomas, The military Balance in South Asia, Strategic Studies Journal, vol. 3, No. 102, 1990, Centre for Strategic Studies, A.M.U., Aligarh, p. 28.

those of Pakistan that even US Aid can not do any thing, other than improve Pakistan's ability, to deter Indian attacks. The position may be made clear from the table given below.

Table

	China	India	Pakistan	Bangla Desh	Mynamar
Armoured Divisions	10	3	2	0	0
Infantry Divisions	84	31	19	6	9
Armoured Brigades	14	7	7	1	0
Tanks	9000	3200	2100	90	26
Artillery Pieces	14503	4000	1620	100	267
ICVs	2803	1200	800	-	40
Combat Aircraft	4970	630	327	85	25
Submarines	94	17	6	-	-
SSBNs	1	-	-	-	-
Surface Combatants	869	68	38	39	46
Amphibians	61	9	-	1	5
Aircraft Carriers	-	2	-	-	-
Total Manpower Under Arms	3.03 million	1.26 million	0.62 million	1.06 million	0.28 million
Helicopters	400	19 SQNS	3 SQNS	3 SQNS	4 SQNS

Source : Asian Strategic Review, 1991-92 (IDSA).

It shows that Indian has a massive lead in military manpower, in military spending, and arms imports. Indian military spending has exceeded by 150% in the last few years, and India's advantage is increasing. In 1987-88 India spent 125-12 billion rupees and was four times of

Pakistan.¹ Because of the Himalayas, India faces only a limited peripheral threat from the PRC, and Bangladesh is now more a dependent ally than a threat. India has great strategic depth. Its major cities and economic facilities are far from the Pakistan's target while all of Pakistan cities, economic targets and military targets are within easy flying range of even India's shorter range attack fighters.³

The Balance of Military Manpower

India has made major reductions in its military efforts since its victory in 1971 but, still it has three times men in military than Pakistan. In 1970 Pakistan tried to maintain a large standing army, but, could not afford due to financial burden and now, had attempted to maintain a large reserve. India's para military forces are much better trained and equipped than those of Pakistan.⁴

India's superiority in army manpower is matched by its overall superiority in ground forces combat units and equipment. This is as a result of both Indias superiority in equipment and the structure and history of the Indian and Pakistani Armies. The Indian army has ^{three} two armoured divisions, one mechanized division, ³¹ 72 infantry divisions, seven mountain divisions and 19 independent brigades. The Pakistani army has two armoured division, 19 infantry

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1. Defence Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Washington, Department of Defence, September 30, 1986.
 2. Janes Defence Weekly, May 30, 1987, p. 1040.
 3. U.S. Strategic Interest, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, p. 16.
 4. Ibid., p. 18.

divisions, and 12 independent brigades. It is one third to one half of the combat and service support available to Indian forces.¹

India's advantage in the size of its army's manpower is matched by an overall superiority in the quality and quantity of its land forces. Although, India's numeric lead of 5:3 in tanks is not striking its qualitative superiority of its armor force is quite evident. Most of the Indian army equipment is of Soviet origin and is being replaced, by indigenously produced. Soviet T-72s tanks are being replaced by Vijayants² BMP-1s and BMP-23 are being placed in place of BTR-60 PB. Indian army is based on British tradition and is made up of combat elements. The active Indian army has 12,60,000 regulars selected out of the 86 million men between 18 and 30 years of age.³ India has 3200 main battle tanks to equip its armoured divisions. The Indian produced Vijayanta is said to be a weak link in Indian armor. It is light and its armor is insufficient to modern anti-tank weapons. Its chassis can not carry the needed additional armos to make the Vijayanta survivable. The T-54/55 tanks are similar to Pakistan's Chinese Type 59s but, have more modern range finders, transmissions and engine. Indians have added sheet metal to change profile of their gun barrels⁴ and are being modernized with better sights laser

1. IISS, Military Balance 1986-87, p. 153-166.

2. Department of Defence, Soviet Military Power 1986, Washington, GPO, 1986, p. 130.

3. IISS, The Military Balance 1985-1986, p. 122.

4. G. Jacob, India's Army, Asian Defence Journal, September 1985, p. 16.

range finders.¹ The Indian army is largely an infantry force with limited motor transport and is better machanized than Pakistan² and have 1360 modern MICVs and armoured personal carriers.³

India has far more artillery strength than Pakistan and can supply much larger rates of ammunition to the front and are also truck mounted 122 mm rocket launchers. India has Mark 11, 105 mm self propelled guns and 400 Bofors FH-77B 155 mm self-propelled howitzers.⁴ Indian army also has Soviet 5A launchers.⁵ Overall quality of Indian Army air defence are far better than those of Pakistan. The Pakistani Army has limited numbers of crotale missiles, it has only obsolete CS A-I heavy SAM system and does not have modern radar guided AA Guns. India has ten divisions of mountain troops.

The Pakistan Army

Pakistan feels that it has reached proportionately very close to Indian military strength. But, it fails to recognise that the modern military power primarily rests upon industrial might and this power determines the strategic importance of the country. Since Pakistan is not highly industrialised strategically, after Afghanistan

1. Ibid., p. 18.

2. IISS, Military Balance, 1986-87, pp. 153-155.

3. Jacob, op.cit. p. 20.

4. Military Balance Asia and West Pacific, Asian Defence Journal, January 1985, p. 20.

5. IISS, Military Balance 1986, 1987 p. 153.

"the US need to protect Pakistan" is much reduced, while there is a genuine prospect of a constructive American-Indian relationship" wrote political scientist Scalapino recently.¹

Pakistan has adopted a policy of offence against India. Under some misperception it has engaged itself in a more aggressive policy, including initiating war without notice. The offence-defence balance studies have been carried out in the USA in relation to containment theory. Jervis², Quester³ and Levy⁴ show that when offence is or is thought to be easy (i.e. states can expand at low cost) then national leaders worry more about security and do more to protect it. By contrasting when defence is easier (especially when it is easy to distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities) states can protect their territory with greater confidence at lower cost.⁵ In addition to direct military action, Pakistan has resorted to clandestine sub-version and propaganda. Walt in his 'Origin of Alliance' has stated that such campaigns rarely succeed, even against relatively weak governments.⁶ and India is comparatively strong nation in size, population, natural resources, political stability and

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1. Srivastava, H.K., "The India-Pakistan Strategic Debate : The Hold-off Approach", Strategic Studies Journal, vol. 5, No. 1 & 2, 1992, p. 79; Robert A. Scalapino, The US and Asia - Future Prospect, in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991-92, p. 10-40.
 2. Robert Jarvis, "Corporation under the Security Dilemma", in World Politics, No. 2, 1978, p. 167-214.
 3. George Quester, Offence and Defence in the International System, Willy, 1977.
 4. Jack S. Levy, "The offence-Defensive Balance of Military Technology", In International Studies, Quarterly, No.3, 1984, p. 219-238.
 5. Stephen Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment", International Security, Summer, 1989, pp. 5-59.
 6. Stephen Walt, "The Origin of Alliance", Ithaca, 1987.

militarily. Pakistan is using these tactics in ^Vrain and these mechanization may strike back at Pakistan ²once it is found that it has cooled off to sustain.

Pakistan Army has the same British heritage as Indian Army. The Pakistan Army of 620000 regulars is adequately supported by the population of 113.1 million.¹ The dominant ethnic group is that of Punjabi who dominate 65%. The second most prevalent group is that of Pathan tribesman. The Pakistan has also a reserve force of 500000 which are soldiers released from active service.² Some thirty thousand Pakistani soldiers are serving in the armed forces of twenty two countries ranging from Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Libiya.³ The Pakistani Army is primarily an infantry force. Twenty two regiments are equipped with roughly 1000 PRC Type 59 tanks.⁴ and have poor guns and fire control system. Pakistan has brought Chinese copies of the same artillery pieces that India bought from the Soviets. In addition Pakistan is purchasing greater number of US self-propelled artillery. The few helicopter owned by Pakistani Air Force are not capable of moving more than two battalions and are only suited for liaison duties.⁵

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1. Military Balance, Asia and West Pacific, Asian Defence Journal, January 1985, p. 40.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Hons, Carol, Pakistan to Boost its Gulf Security Force, The Christian Science Monitor, March 5, 1981, p. 1. Kaufman T., 22 Nations are availing themselves of soldiers from the Pakistan Army, New York Times, February 6, 1981, p. 4.
 4. Simon O. Dwyer-Russell, Pakistan to Arms MBTs with British arms, Janes Defence Weekly, December 28, 1985, p. 1388.
 5. IISS, Military Balance 1985-1986, Kacobs Pakistans Army, p. 18.

US intelligence experts estimate that Pakistan Army could defend against Indian invasion for a few days to a few week. This accurately reflects the numerical unbalance in sides force, strength and order of battle. Pakistan will do better in defence only.¹ Its army is though now strong but had little offensive capability. Pakistan has weak air defence forces and lacks clear strategic objectives.

The Balance of Air Force

India has such a high margin of superiority that none of the arms the US plans to ship Pakistan would do more than strengthen its deterrent capability. India possesses a 4:1 advantage over Pakistan in all-weather fighter and attack aircraft. Qualitatively, the Indian Air Force must also be considered one of the best equipped services in the third world, Indian Air Force assets are being improved as MIG-23s, MIG-27 Floggers and MIG-29, Fulcrums armed with AA-7 and AA-8 (Aphid) MIG-21 equipped with AA-2 (Atoil) AAM.² India has 31 Jaguar attack fighters, 165 MIG-27 MS and at least 40 MIG-29 Fulcrums and at least 24 French Dassault Mirage 2000 Hs. This compares with Pakistan order of 10 F-16A/Bs and roughly 100 Chinese F-5 and Xian J-7 fighters.³

Despite the addition of 46-50 F-165, Pakistan Air Force possesses a fleet of predominantly chinese furnished combat air craft, but, that are far inferior

1. Op.cit... page 26.

2. Two Squadrons of MIG-29s called Baz have been assembled at Nasik feactory, James Defence Weekly, May 30, 1987, p. 1846.

3. IISS, Military Balance 1986-87, pp. 153-155.

to India. The Chinese F-6 (MIG-19) is trouble some and need frequent repairs. This imbalance in the air is matched by the imbalance in ground based air defence systems. India has 30 battalions of SA-2 and SA-3 surface to-air missiles in addition to its 120 SA-6 fire units Pakistan only has a token surface-to-air missile force of six batteries of crotaile missiles with four fire units.¹ India's overwhelming numeric superiority can gain rapid dominance over its neighbour's smaller and antiquated airforce. Indian force is large modern with a total strength of 850 air craft. The Indian Air Force has a total active manning of 113000 men compared to only 17600 for Pakistan. This gives nearly six times Pakistan's active air force manpower. India has also the advantage of better command and control and battle management system, better sensors and more strategic depth.

Pakistan's Air Force is much smaller than the Indian Air Force and is less modern. Due to the limited strategic depth of the country, Pakistani air bases are located within striking range of India, while Pakistan has limited targets to select from the fighter range problem. Indian Air Force has a numerical and qualitative advantage over Pakistani Air Force. It is also important that F-16A and other aircraft in the Pakistan Air Force can not face MIG-21 or MIG-23 threat.²

The Balance of Naval Forces

India's Navy enjoys numeric as well qualitative superiority over Pakistan. India has conducted a large scale expansion programs. In 1971 Indo-Pakistan war,

1. IISS, Military Balance 1986-87, pp. 154-185.

2. Op.cit. p. 47.

the Indian Navy was able to carry out a successful sea blockade of Pakistan. Pakistan's inferior naval capabilities are the result of its small fleet of aging surface combatants of British and Chinese origin.

The Indian Navy is a formidable force when compared to other navies in the area. No local Navy including that of Pakistan is able to compete on the open sea with the Indian Navy. India's Navy is large. India has two air craft carriers Vikrant and Hermes. Each carrier has a capacity for 18 Sea Harriers and 4 helicopters.¹ India has 17 submarines while Pakistan has only 6. Pakistan Navy is small force India has the force to control the sea lanes to Pakistan, and Pakistan can do little to stop it. Pakistan is still dependent on foreign supplies for its military and can not afford a long war during which India can cut its ocean life-line.

Estimate

India's population and land area is almost eight times the size of Pakistan compared to the essentially equivalent population sizes of the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR). Indian Military preponderance in South Asia is precisely, the goal of Indian defence policy to maintain peace and stability in the region. According to Professor A.F.K. Organiski of University of Michigan, 'the weaker state dare not to attack, while the stronger state need not attack'. Even when wars do take place, often it occurs because the weaker state is attempting to catch up in the military balance with the stronger state. The fact that there has been no Indo-Pakistan

1. Grazebook A.W., India's mounting Military Might, Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1986, p. 18.

wars since the last in December 1971 attributes to India's military preponderance. After the creation of Bangladesh, India now appears determined to maintain its military superiority on the subcontinent.

On the eve of the 1971 war with Pakistan, the Indian army consisted of 830000 men and included one armoured division.¹ There were 13 infantry divisions and 10 mountain divisions against China along the Himalayan frontiers. Against this, Pakistan Army consisted of 365000 men including 2 armoured divisions, 12 infantry divisions. The Indian Navy consisted of 47000 men and the Pakistan Navy consisted of 10000 man, 4 smaller Italian Daphne-class submarines and 3 destroyer escorts. There is a greater quantitative imbalance in the air and at sea.² 12 armoured helicopter distributed among 50 squadrons. Indian Navy had expanded to 47000 military personal along with 2 carriers, 5 destroyers 21 frigates, 17 submarines and another 34 patrol and costal combat vessels.

Comparatively, Pakistan is consisted of 620000 man organised into 7 corps Headquarters including 17 infantry divisions, 2 armoured divisions, 12 independent armoured brigades. It had 2100 MBTs. There are 25000 men in air force equipped with 451 combat air craft organized into 12 fighter squadrons.

The Indo-Pakistan balance of military forces on the ground measured in terms of military personal is 1.26

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1. The Military Balance 1971-72 London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971.
 2. Raju, G.C. Thomas, The Military Balance in South Asia, Strategic Studies Journal, A.M.U., Aligarh, vol. 3, No. 122, 1990, p. 34.

million to 620000 (ratio 2.5:1) and measured in terms of main battle tanks is 3200 to 2100 (ratio of 1.8:1).

After twenty two years, the situation has substantially changed in South Asia. By 1992, the Indian Army consisted of approximately 1.26 million military personal in 5 regional commands and 10 corps headquarters.¹ This includes 19 infantry divisions 11 mountain divisions supplemented with 8 armoured, 7 infantry, one mountain and 3 independent artillery brigades. The Indian army carried ³²⁰⁰ 3150 main Battle Tanks organized into 5 Air Commands. Indian Air Force now comprise 115000 men and carried 836 combat air craft.

Indias naval expansion is generally unrelated to the traditional Sino-Pakistani threat.² The growth of the Indian Navy since the 1971 war has been based on a wider strategic perspective and proximate objectives to establish sea power and defend India's Trade and to protect the mineral resources within its 200 miles economic zone.³

The basic problem in South Asia is that India perceives itself as an Asian power with the need for military capabilities that reflect, its size and land boundaries, while Pakistan would like to keep India militarily on level with itself. Pakistan claims that India is

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1. The Military Balance 1989-90, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989.
 2. The Military Balance 1989-90, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989.
 3. Robert H. Bruce, Ed. The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean, Perth, Australia Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies Curtin University of Technology, 1989, pp. 105-108.

determine. to undo partition and absorb it into a greater India. India do not think in this direction . India could have done it quite readily in 1971 when it occupied East Pakistan and has poised to crush the demoralized Pakistani military forces along its borders with West Pakistan.¹

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1. Raju G.C. Thomas, The Sources of Indian Naval Expansion, A Sheley J. Tellis, Securing The Barrack; The logic, structure and Objectives of India's Naval Expansion in Robert H. Brue Ed., The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean, pp. 95-108 and pp. 5-50.

CHAPTER - VIREGIONAL PROBLEMS


(A) Terrorism in India

The Indian Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1989 in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act defines Terrorism,

'Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different section of the people or to adversely affect the public order or to cause or attempt to cause or to do or attempt to do any acts or things by using bombs, dynamitic or other explosive substances or inflammable substance or fire arms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substance (whether geological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause or it is likely to cause, death of or injuries to any person or persons or loss of, or damage to or destruction of property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such persons in order to compel the governments or any other person to do or obtain from doing any act commits a terrorist act'.

It is comprehensive definition of terrorism and includes all or most of the acts of violence. Modern terrorism draws inspiration from Nietzsche, popularised by Sartre and his disciples by identifying certain political situations which justified violent correctives.¹ The impact of Anarchists on the use of violence in society is also highlighted by some writers.² Michael Bakunin in, 'The Revolutionary Catechism', 1989, has defined 'Day and Night'

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1. Johnson, Paul, Seven Deadly Sins of Terrorism, in Benqunim Netanyahu (ed.), International Terrorism, Challenge and Response. Jerusalem, 1981, p. 16.
 2. Joseph A. Dowling, Prologumene to a Psycho-historical study in Martus H. Livingstone, et.al., International Terrorism in Contemporary World, Connecticut, 1978, pp. 224-25.



the terrorists activist must have single thought, one single purpose merciless destruction'.¹ Bakunin has justified terrorism and had said, 'Let us put our trust in the eternally creative source of life. The urge to destroy is also a creative urge'.² Walter has said 'Violence may occur without terror, but not terror without violence'.³ He has defined terrorism, the most flagrant form of defiance of the rule of law,⁴ as process of terror is a compound with three elements, the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction and the social effects.⁵ Oleg Zinam has defined terrorism as the 'use of threat of violence by individuals or by organised groups to evoke fear and submission to attain some economic political, socio-psychological or other object.'

Acts of terrorism sponsored and launched by one country against another using violence and lethal force with a view to achieving long term political or strategic objectives is a facet of modern warfare. The aim of the country which sponsors and abets terrorism and insurgency can range from destabilisation and weakening of a government or a central authority to the break up of the existing social and political order, in the targeted country. The state which sponsors terrorism or insurgency is actually waging an unconventional war which terrorists or insurgents are generally used as convenient tools, till a particular stage.⁶


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1. As cited in Robert A. Friedlander, 'Terrorism and Political Violence'.
 2. Eugene Victor Walters, Terror and Resistance : A Study of Political Violence, New York, 1969, p. 5.
 3. Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, New York, 1971, p.137.
 4. Walter, No. 1, p. 13.
 5. Oleg Zinam, Terrorism and Violence in the Light of Theory of Discontent and Frustration, in Martus Livingston, et.al. n. 5, p. 241.
 6. Karim, Afsir, Counter Terrorism : The Pakistan Factor, Lancer Papers, p. 1.

The country sponsoring terrorism or insurgency provides financial help, often through voluntary organisations or emigrants, weapons, training, safe sanctuaries and other facilities for launching operations. In fact the terrorist or insurgents have a close relationship with sponsors and are substitute for the regular and irregular enemy troops operating inside enemy territory. In words of Ifanle, 'Sponsored Terrorism' which uses surrogated warfare to unleavish a reign of terror by using force both at the moral and physical plains, meets these basic requirements and qualify as 'war', because the purpose of such actions is to break the existing physical and psychological ties that bind a country or a people together by applying various asymmetrical pressures on the targeted state'.

Terrorism in Punjab and Jammu Kashmir represents a classical manifestation of sponsored terrorism. It is beyond doubt that Pakistan has launched a well planned ,surrogate operation with far reaching political and strategical aims. Pakistan has been sponsoring and supporting terrorist and insurgent movement in these states and religious susceptibilities have been exploided to found unrest.

Before independence, Punjab stretched from New Peshwar in the North to just short of Delhi in the South, from the Indus River in the West to the Yamuna in the East. During the period prior to the British leaving, the unionist party held sway in Punjab and its leadership was vested in the hands of the big landed magnates of the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs.

After independence, the Muslim factor was removed from Punjab. The Hindus and Sikhs came face to face with the adoption of the policy of having Hindi as National language, Urdu was out. In 1949 Sachar formula was



The Times of India, New Delhi May 18, 1982

adopted and made the provision for the language of the majority to be taught. After adoption of democratic system of government, power became the goal of leaders. The Akalis have decisive on SK till 1966, but, could not come to hold power. There was a call for Punjab suba so that Akalis may come to power.

There were so many problems including the capital, boundary, river water allocation between Punjab and Haryana as ripartan states and Rajasthan. None of the issues could find amicable solution. The Akali Party left the political pressure and turned to religious agitation to garner support on these questions.


The Nahar Roko Morcha, which arose out of a lack of basic policy on the sharing of river waters, turned violent and led, to many incidents of killings. In order to cut traditional Akali leaders to size, led to the rise of sant Bhinderan wala, who became out of control soon.

Pakistan is undoubtedly trying its best to increase mischief in India and keep India occupied with slow attrition. Pakistan sponsored terrorists in every possible way. It supplied most sophisticated weapons, provided training and enlarged a line of communication to disrupt the communication links of the security line.

The area of assistance to terrorists was large enough as may be evident from the recoveries of arms made during 1986 to 1993 and the killings.

PUNJAB

Sketch - 2



Index of terrorist activity from 1986 to 1993

Deaths and Arms Recoveries

	1986-89	1990	1991	1992	1993
AK Rifle	766	646	475	479	131
Hand Guns	3125	556	789	542	79
Other Rifles	1253	405	833	1118	186
RPG-7	48	33	23	45	11
LMC/GPMG	29	50	33	26	2
Remote Control	-	11	-	-	-
Explosives	-	390	202	1604	197
Radio Sets	1	4	3	10	6
Persons killed	4937	2849	3161	1520	231
Police killed	399	506	495	251	14
Terrorist killed	1478	720	1494	2109	258

Source : Lancer Papers.

Organised assistance to Punjab terrorists by Pakistan began in April 1985. The terrorist man power came from the thousands of youths who had crossed over to Pakistan during the army operation in June-August 1989.¹

The year 1992 brought a turn around for the situation in India's troubled Punjab which had been reeked by a decade long militant movement demanding a separate nation for India's 17 million sikhs. Between the year 1986 and 1989 the situation went precipitously down hill with killings, extortion and assault becoming more and more common. By the beginning of 1990 things were desperate in the state. In December 1990 army was sent to retrieve the situation. The aborted Rakshak operation led to a

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, May 19, 1988.

resurgence of terrorism, now across the length and breath of Punjab.

The source of the Punjab terrorist movement always lay outside India. Sikhs settled in Canada helped Punjab's terrorists with motivation and money with the active collaboration of Pakistans intelligence agencies. Besides providing regular financial help to the terrorists, these foreign Sikhs have been giving fund for the purchase of arms and ammunitions. In March 1987 the Daljit Singh Sethon arrived in Pakistan from Canada with sizeable funds for buying arms for the terrorists.¹ Infiltrators apprehended by the BSF revealed that the top Sikhs extremists Gurjit Singh of AISSF, Nirwair Singh and Jagir Singh, spokesman of the Panthak Committee Malkant Singh Ajnalo of the Khalistan commando Force and Ajaib Singh of Daudami Taksal received training in Pakistan for which Pakistan has opened several training centres near border area.

The biggest achievement of Rakrhak 11 lies in the feet that not a single case of army high handedness or strocity was reported in the state. The army concentrated on winning the hearts and minds of the people through civic action.

The Army's role RAKSHAK 111 or the use of the army post RAKSHAK 11, since the installation of the Beant Singh government is likely to be a more broad based one. In the rural areas this will translate into suppressing militancy and an executive administrative load. In urban areas it will mean visible presence and a decisive say in the anti terrorist security. The action by army has changed the vernecular of the terrorism and is at setback to Pakistan

1. Times of India, New Delhi, May 19, 1988.

which was considering to built a separate nation on the lines of Bangladesh.

The situation in Punjab and J & K bear a close resentment to each other. Another element common to both is Pakistan's support and ^latetment of the terrorists. The immediate and long terms objectives and actions of terrorists in Punjab and J & K appears similar at first sight, but, these differ vastly in scope and long term objectives. The main motivation for terrorist violence in Punjab stems from an urge for vengeance. This urge singles with Vague dreams of a separate state in Kashmir the main motivation comes from religious affinity with Pakistan and a definate aim to secede from the Indian union.

(B) Kashmir Issue

The cold war came to an end by crumbling of the Berlin wall, collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and disappearance of the Soviet Union from the political map of the world. But the Kashmir question is still unresolved and is getting extra ordinary recognition as a long standing issue in the world's most volatile region of South Asia. It is the immediate cause of continuing mutual suspicions distrust and ceaseless acrimony between India and Pakistan. Both countries have a highly emotional involvement in Kashmir and the relation between India and Pakistan have become increasingly bitter as a result of the unsettled Kashmir dispute.

The present time global situation has altered while the tension resulting from Kashmir remains the same. The United States and to a certain extent, China share common interests in ensuring that the two belligerent nations of South Asia do not inadvertently stumble into a major conflagration that neither India nor Pakistan could afford, and that could even lead to the escalation of nuclear race.¹



The state of Jammu and Kashmir came into being in its modern form as a result of that ignominious "Sale deed" commonly known as the "Treaty of Amritsar". The sale deed was signed on the 16th of March, 1846, when the British Government had sold the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh for a sum of Rs. 75 million.² It is pertinent that Henry Montgomery, Lawrence who had signed the 'Sale deed' referred to it as a very questionable stroke of policy,

1. Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, University of Punjab, Lahore, p. 17.

2. Ganguly, Sumit, "Avoiding war in Kashmir", Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1990-1991, p. 57.

OUTLINE MAP OF LADAKH (ILLUSTRATION OF THE COLOMBO CONFERENCE PROPOSALS WESTERN SECTOR)

332



which had been arranged beforehand and which had brought woes innumerable on the happy Kashmiris. Eversince we handed it over to the Dongra Rajput, Gulab Singh, who paid us down at once in hard cash, which he had stolen from the Lahore Derbar'.¹

Pakistan always argued for Kashmir's economic and strategic importance for it. Prime Minister Liyakat Ali Khan asserted the Kashmir..... is like a cap on the head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap off our head than I am always at the mercy of India.² Kashmir became of even greater value for Pakistan. Zafrullah Khan once said,

"The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to the economy of India, or to the strategic security of India. On the other hand, it is vital to Pakistan, should Kashmir accede to India, Pakistan might as well from both the economic and the strategic point of view, become a feudatory of India or cease to exist as an independent sovereign state".³

Kashmir has a character of its own. Its location on the rings of Sino-Tibetan plateau, Central Asian Highland and Indo-Gangetic Plain, gives it considerable strategic significance in the South Asian Subcontinent.⁴ However, Jammu and Kashmir were the nucleus of the "Mandala" doctrine around which revolved Nehru's foreign and security

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1. Khan Zaman Mirza, "Historical, Human and Moral Dimensions of the Kashmir Issue", Muzaffarabad, Kashmir Liberation Cell, 1990, p. 4.
 2. John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go To War, London, Macmillan Ltd. 1987, p. 122.
 3. Mahnaz Z. Ispanani, Road and Rivals, The Politics of Access In The Bordeland of Asia, London : 1-B Tauris & Co. Ltd. 1989, p. 184.
 4. LI Gen (Retd.) Sardeshpande, S.C.S., Kashmir : India's test Case, Defence India, vol. 1, No. 1, October 1992.

policy and India's relations with regional and external powers of all sizes.¹ The Kashmir issue was the product of the partition and has been lingering on for the honourable solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan since 1947. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan exchanged correspondence of the issue but, the American military aid to Pakistan changed the climate of the subcontinent so much that the bilateral negotiations became unthinkable.²

The Kashmir issue is more an ideological conflict than a territorial dispute. For Pakistan, the Kashmir issue is a continuation of the Pakistan movement on the basis of two nations theory. For India, Kashmir is a reaffirmation of its commitment to secularism and democracy.³

With a sizeable Muslim population, it was but natural that the Muslim League should have the princely state of Kashmir in its character of demands for a separate Islamic state. The congress party decried such moves on the part of Jinnah and the Muslim League and stressed that the country should not be nearly divided on religious lines. History, however took a different course and the country was partitioned in 1947 amidst one of history's most tragic holocausts. It goes to the credit of Jawahar Lal Nehru for handling Kashmir issue with so much of diplomatic and political dexterity. He made it clear that India will not be a willing pawn in any body's power game.⁴

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1. Hasan A. Noor, "India's Regional Policy, Strategic and Security Dimensions", in the security of South Asia, edited by Stephen Philip Cohen, Vistar Publications, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 29, 31.
 2. Bindra, S.S., India and Her Neighbours, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, p. 44, Reproduced from The Statesman (ed.) Unfortunate Start, November 12, 1964.
 3. "Year Book On India's Foreign Policy", edited by Satish Kumar, Sage Publications, New Delhi, p. 85.
 4. Boon, No. 21, p. 24.

The wars of 1965 and 1971 succeeded in freezing the problem of Kashmir in the time frame of 1947-48. The Simla Agreement of 1972 accepted that cease-fire line of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice.¹ Pakistan continued to raise the issue of Kashmir at various international forums. In Jakarta, the two leaders, Nawaz Sharif and Nersimha Rao tried to solve the Kashmir problem and hoped to make some headway in this regard.² But, could not reach to any conclusion. In the heat and passion of political polemics and religious fanaticism, the real issue of Kashmir has been side-tracked.³ The concept of secular democracy, which is the foundation of independent India, is forgotten and Pakistan is presented as muslim majority area. This theory of religious state hood can not be accepted because the same question mark the fate of 100 million Muslims staying in India willingly and honourably. The J.K.L.F. is altogether with Pakistan and has not appreciated any move on these grounds. Hashim Qureshi, the exiled leader of JKLF has criticised the policy of Pakistan based on Islamic Fundamentalism and asserted that "This is rubbish why isn't Pakistan doing anything about Bosnia or the 400 Muslims deported from Israel or the Kurds in Turkey - whom are they trying to fool".⁴ The position in Kashmir has become more critical. A more powerful Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) has come forward and have pressed that "An attempt to impose a solution to the Kashmir problem without taking into account the aspirations of the people of Laddakh will be opposed tooth and nail by the Ladakhis".⁵

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, February 20, 1990.

2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, September 4, 1992.

3. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 23, 1992.

4. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 8, 1993.

5. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 15, 1993.

(C) The International Dimensions

The uprising in occupied Kashmir presents the first serious possibility of altering the political status quo in South Asia since the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. The Kashmir uprising, coupled with a virtual state of insurgency among the Sikhs in East Punjab, provides a situation where two regions under Indian control, both having a non-Hindu majority are in revolt.¹ The uprising in Kashmir can be viewed from three different perspectives. First Pakistanis are pleased that unlike 1965, this time around, it is a purely indigenous upsurge rooted in decades of deprivation, despotism and alienation by the rulers in Delhi.² Second, in this age of self determination, which has recently been manifested in Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union, Pakistan feels that its case for a plebiscite in Kashmir, which has the endorsement of the United Nations, is legally and morally strong. Pakistan bases its case for self determination of the people of

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1. Apart from holding joint demonstrations in places like London, supporters of the Khalistan movement and Kashmiri freedom fighters tend to derive moral and psychological sustenance from each other's struggle. When the threat of war against Pakistan was invoked early in the Kashmir uprising. The All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) passed a resolution in support for the Kashmiris while also urging Sikhs to support Pakistan in the event of a war with India". See "AISSF faction for support to Pakistan". The Times of India, March 1, 1990; Singh, Rahul". Two festering sores of India : Kashmir and Punjab back to centre stage", Dialogue, July 26, 1991.
 2. It is generally accepted that Pakistan tried and failed to foment an uprising in Kashmir in August 1965, an event that provided the curtain-raiser for India's attack on Lahore on September 6, 1954, sparking the second Pakistan-India war on Kashmir - For an appraisal of Pakistani motivations for the action in Kashmir and implications for Pakistan of the 1965 war, See : Hussain, Mushahid, Pakistan's Politics : The Zia Years, Progressive Publishers, Lahore : 1990, p. 5-11.

Jammu and Kashmir on the successive UN Resolutions calling for, "a free and impartial plebiscite". These resolutions were passed on August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, resolutions which India initially accepted but, later reversed on the plea that Pakistan, by entering into a military alliance with US, had altered the region's security environment.¹ Third, the ferment in Kashmir needs to be viewed in the context of the general unrest that is evident in the strategic "Islamic crescent of Conflict" which begins at Israel and goes through India with the Intifida in Palestine, the struggle in Lebanon and Afghanistan, the stirrings in Azerbaijan and the uprising in Kashmir. Additionally, with the unravelling of the post world war II status quo in East Europe, a similar process is underway in South Asia.² The situation in occupied

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1. In August 1953, when Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Ali met in New Delhi, it was reported that "Nehru had told Mohammad Ali that it should be possible to hold the plebiscite in Kashmir in April 1955 or at least between April and October 1955. The plebiscite administrator was to be appointed by the end of April 1954", as stated in Noorani, A.G., India, The Superpowers and the Neighbours, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi : 1985, Chapter on Nehru and his Diplomacy" p. 12; Nehru finally reneged on commitment to a plebiscite on Kashmir in a policy speech to the Indian Parliament on March 29, 1956 when he asserted that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir. On the basis of the document of accession signed by the Ruler of the State, was "legal and constitutional".
 2. For variations of this theme, see : Charles Kranthammer "This Islamic 'arc of crisis' Traces a Global Intifida" in The Washington Post reproduced in International Herald Tribune (IHT), February 17-18, 1990; Mushahid Hussain "From Israel to India : Contours of a changing world" The Nation, August 12, 1990; Pakistan's success in internationalizing Kashmir is evident from the fact that the 20th Islamic conference of foreign Ministers, meeting in Islamabad, Turkey, during August 4-8, 1991, unanimously expressed "concern at the alarming increase in the indiscriminate use of force and gross violations of human rights committed against innocent Kashmiris" and the 48 Foreign Ministers of the organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) also called for "the respect of their (Kashmir) human rights including the right of self-determination".

Kashmir today is actually "India's Bangladesh". Kashmir and the recent election in India in 1989 had no locus standi in occupied Kashmir since there was hardly a 2% turnout. Pakistan Army eventually ended up as army of occupation would behave. United States was not very helpful to the Kashmirs or to Pakistan. The US position can be summed up as follows : The US accepts that "Kashmir is a disputed territory and that Pakistan and India should resolve the issue between them as agreed in Simla in 1972"; the US had privately conveyed to Pakistan that it is opposed to raising the Kashmir issue in the UN security council or even internationalizing it via such forums as the DIC; The US even threatened during April-May 1990 to cut aid to Pakistan if, Islamabad was found to be supporting Kashmiri freedom fighters, as such Pakistani assistance, in the US view would be "aiding and abetting state terrorism".¹ In July 1991 for the first time international conference on the Kashmir issue was organised in the United States. The organisers were the Washington based Kashmiri, American council and the members of London based world Kashmir Freedom movement. The small but, affluent Kashmiri-American community, mostly enterprising professionals, were enthusiastic supporters of this conference.² The conference was

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1. For American views of Kashmir see, "US Now Opposes plebiscite in valley" by Hussain, Mushahid, The National, April 23, 1990; 'US Considers Kashmir a Time-bared Issue' by Mowahid H. Shah in The Nation, April 27, 1990, 'How to help Prevent a war between India and Pakistan by selling Harrison, originally published in, The Washington Post and reprinted in IHT, April 24, 1990; Also Text of Letters by US Ambassador Robert B. Oakley to Sardar Qayyum Khan, President Azad Kashmir, November 14, 1990.
 2. For an appraisal of the conference, See : Hussain Mushahid, "International Conference on Kashmir", The Nation, July 21, 1991, Ludwiana A. Joseph "International Conference on Kashmir", Dialogue, August 2, 1991; S.M. Koreishi, "Journey to North America", The Muslim, August 3, 1991.

not just significant because it was the first such successful gathering in US, but, it also brought into focus a new perspective and fresh insight into the Kashmir issue, with even Lord Anebury, Chairman of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Committee, suggesting that "the Kashmir issue should be placed before the UN decolonization committee."¹ An important aspect brought to light in the historical context of Kashmir was a reference to the book being written on the subject by the eminent British historian, Alastair Lamb, he said to have made two key revelations, among others, in his study. One, that the instrument of Accession, which India treated as the legal basis of its occupation of Kashmir, was signed, post dated, by the Hindu ruler of Kashmir after the Indian Army landing in Srinagar, as the Indians have always made it out to be.²

Alike, Punjab, Pakistan sponsored terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, the general mass considered Pakistan responsible for all terrorist activities in Kashmir. A international symposium on terrorism appealed to the United States to take stern action, against Pakistan in order to force it to desist from supporting terrorists in Kashmir,³ and condemned state sponsored terrorism. American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pointed out that the Pakistan's

1. Aveburey, Lord, "Kashmir : Duplicity in Diplomacy", The News, (Islamabad), August 22, 1991.

2. Alastair Lamb also provided this perspective during his presentation at the Seminar on Kashmir Organized at Oxford University on June 23-24, 1990 which was attended by participants from Pakistan, India, UK, USA and USSR. For an evaluation of Mountbatten's role, See also : Khan Zaman Mirza, "Lord Mountabattan and the Tregedy of Kashmir", The Muslim, August 4, 1991.

3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, May 19, 1992.

military intelligence used narcotics profits to fund separatist movement in India.¹ The paper asserted that Zia's two pilots used presidential aircraft to smuggle heroin - one to the United States during state visit. He did have man in his entourage who used their position to promote criminal interests including narcotics.² The CIA director testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee said - Pakistan has supported the Kashmiri and Sikhs groups, which have been waging long running insurgencies against India's central government.³ Indian government complained to the UN Commission on human rights that Pakistan was officially sponsoring terrorists and subversion in Jammu and Kashmir.

An important aspect brought to light in the historical context of Kashmir was a reference to the new book being written on the subject by the eminent British historian, Alastair Lamb he said to have made two key revelations, among others, in his study. One, that the instrument of Accession, which India treated as the legal basis of its occupation of Kashmir, was signed, post dated, by the Hindu ruler of Kashmir after the Indian Army landing in Srinagar, as the Indians have always made it out to be,⁴ alike Punjab, Pakistan sponsored terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir. General mass considered Pakistan responsible for all terrorist activities in Kashmir. A international symposium on terrorism appealed to the United States to take stern action against Pakistan in order to force it to desist from supporting terrorists in Kashmir.⁵ and condemned state

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1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, February 25, 1992.
 2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, April 23, 1992.
 3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 1, 1992.
 4. The Indian Express, New Delhi, May 19, 1992.
 5. Ibid., February 25, 1993.

sponsored terrorism . American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pointed out that Pakistan military intelligence used narcotics profits to fund separatists movement in India.¹ The paper asserted that Zia's two pilots used presidential aircraft to smuggle heroin - one to the United States during state visit. He did have man in his entourage who used their position to promote criminal interests including narcotics.² The CIA director testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee said - Pakistan has supported the Kashmiri and Sikhs groups which have been waging long - running insurgencies against India's central government.³ Indian Government complained to the UN Commission on human rights that Pakistan was officially sponsoring terrorists and subversion in Jammu and Kashmir.

The United States has changed its verdict now on Kashmir. In rejecting the Instrument of Accession, which binds the state of Jammu and Kashmir with India, Washington has come out of the closet to openly state its long cherished inclinations only the language was more courtly when secretary of State Dean Acheson asked the embassy in New Delhi in a secret message back in 1949 to convey the Indian Government that its insistence on the legal position was not serving its interests and it should be more flexible to facilitate a solution of the problem.⁴ The 'problem' as the State Department saw it, was not the withdrawal of Pakistani invaders which was the basis of New Delhi's complaint to the Security Council, but, the balancing of

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1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, February 25, 1992.
 2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, April 25, 1992.
 3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 1, 1992.
 4. Bidyut Sarker, 'Kashmir : India's Bleeding Sore', The Economic Times, New Delhi, November 6, 1993.

of claims by both countries to the former princely state. Even to this day, it is treated as a dispute about territory. Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, ambassador at the UN, advised the State Department in the mid 1950s that acceptance of the original Pakistan aggression would 'unfairly reverse situation in favour of India'.

Pakistan has reasons to feel grateful the Pakistan more than any other country subserved US interests in Afghanistan where Soviet troops had to make a retreat followed by the downfall of the Marxist regime. Pakistans past help and future usefulness hold appeal for the Security establishments of the western world which has sought special exemption for it from the list of terrorist states. The frightening aspect of its regular army firing machine guns into Somali demonstrators and killing 23 people in the name of UN Peace keeping force is unforgettable.

The consistency of US policy on Kashmir over the years may no longer be justified in the present circumstances. The facts narrated by Alastair Lamb in the Seminar about instrument of accession on June 23-24, 1990 at Oxford University have no legal bearing, after 46 years of accession of state in India, the instrument can not be challenged.


(D) The Siachen Glacier Dispute

The Siachen Glacier boundary dispute was added to the roster of major issues in Indo-Pakistan relations for the first time in April 1984, (i) The name of Siachen signifies, 'A robe of garden'. The area which is an ideal mountaineering ground, is the largest glacier region in the world out side the polar region.²

The Siachen glacier is hemmed in by the Saltoro Ridge line, an offshoot of the Kara Korams, to the West and the main Karakoram range to the West and the main Karakoram range to the East. The Saltoro ridge line originates from Sia Kaugri at a high of 24500 feet and has an attitude bracket of 19,000 to 24,000 feet. The major passes on this line are Siala at 20,000 feet and Bilefond La at 18,500 feet. It forms a watershed and is the focal point of the current conflict in the area. The Siachen glacier is 76.4 km long. It is the second largest glacier in the world. It originates from India Col. The Nubre river originates from its snout and flows south till it meets the Shyok river. To the West of the Saltoro Ridge line lies Pak occupied Baltistan sprawling in the Karakoram under whose shadow lie the Gilgit and Skardu areas. In the North East lies the Shakesgam Valley, an area of 5,000 sq.km. ceded illegally by Pakistan to China in 1963. To the East of Karakorams. lies Aksai chin under Chinese control.

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1. For details see. Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistans Security under Zia, 1977-1988, The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State, New York, St. Martin's Press 1991.
 2. Ahalwat, S.S., The Siachen Impasse, Indian Defence Review, July 1988, Lancer International, New Delhi, p. 44.


MAP 1. JAMMU & KASHMIR



The root cause of

of the problem is the non-demarcation of the line of control (LC). After the Karachi Agreement in 1949, the Cease Fire Line was demarcated only to N/9842. Pakistan claims the LC to be in a direct straight line joining N/9842 to Karakoram Pass North of the Indian Dault Bag Ouldi outpost. The Indian understanding of the LC is based on Terrain Configuration which runs along saltoro Ridge Line upto Sia Kaugri. India claimed that its resort to military action had been prompted by intelligence reports of an imminent move by Pakistan army.¹ Logistical operations mounted under conditions virtually without precedent anywhere in the world, were a constant nightmare for both countries.² The struggle over Siachen was linked with long fastering conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The first war over the territory had culminated in July 1949. Karachi Agreement providing for the establishment of UN supervised cease fire line drawn between the two armies. The controversy later erupted over the wording of the agreement, specifically over the nebulous statement that the CFL from the last named location (Khor) given in the summary. Verbal description of it, moved "thence North to the Glaciers."³ Pakistan rejected this version and held

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1. Chibber, M.L., Siachen - The Untold Story 'A Personal Account, Indian Defence Review, 1990, p. 150.
 2. Pakistan's Forward Lines were accessible, hence its logistics were easier. Pakistan's Army Chief reported in 1989 that the cost of supporting India's Troops on the Siachen was 9 or 10 times as great as Pakistan's. The Muslim, Karachi, September 14, 1989, See also A run chacks, The High Price of Siachen, The Indian Express, New Delhi, July 2, 1989.
 3. Agreement Between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the establishment of a cease-fire Line in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, 27 July 1949 (S/AC12/TC4) in K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.). The Kashmir Questions; Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan, Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966, p. 229.



Area of detailed map The Slachen Glacier and the surrounding areas.

that 1949 delimitation agreement contained no reference to to the CFL beyond No. 9842. Neither of the two wars that India and Pakistan faught in 1965 and 1971 resolved the issue, but, resorted to force of arms in 1980's.¹ The two countries are involved in more complicate question of boundary dispute and none is ready to take smallest step towards settlement of the Siachen sector boundary conflict and the question has involved the Kashmir problem as a whole.

From January 1986 and June 1989, India and Pakistan held many rounds of talks over Siachen Glacier. The talks were started when Rajiv Gandhi was in power on Indian side and Zia ul Haq was on Pakistan's side. In India, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated and in Pakistan Zia had been killed in an air crash but, the problem could not be solved. The face to face talks of the two on 17 December 1985 but, could not reach to definate results except the regions first nuclear confidence-building measure - not to attack each others nuclear installation.

The talks held in this connection could not prove fruitful. But, both India and Pakistan reached to the conclusion that the costs on continued military confronation on the Glacier outstripped the pulative benifits of possession and expect to reach some emicable solution.

1. The Tashkent negotiation resulted in an agreement by the two sides to withdraw all armed forces to the position both countries held in before outbreak of hostilities, thus reaffirming CFL. The July 1972 Simla Agreement following in 1971 conflict, did not reaffirm the 1949 CFL. Accordingly a New Line of control was drawn up on a series of maps and were signed by Senior military representatives of the two countries on 11 December, 1972. Because there were no troops beyond No. 9842, the line was not further draqn.

(E) The Canal Water Dispute

The water dispute between India and Pakistan arose after the partition of India. Sir Radcliffe's award was basically responsible for it. The Indus-water system has six rivers, the Indus, the Jhelu, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. Five of the six rivers have their upper reaches in India. Radcliff line cuts across the Sutlej and the Ravi while the boundary between Pakistan and Kashmir crosses the remaining three. Indus is reached by the remaining five at Punjab in West Pakistan. These rivers are so interlinked with each other by a series of canals that in case there is shortage of water in one, a main link canal can draw water from another. Before the partition, the irrigation system was treated as a whole. In 1947, when the line dividing the former province of Punjab was drawn it cut right across this system and India was given control over the headworks of the canals. The Ferozpur weir on the Sutlej river from which the Dipalpur canal takes its start is on the border in Indian territory. The sulemanki weir in the Montgomery district has its important eastern training works in Ferozpur. The headworks of the upper Bari Doab canal which irrigates both Indians and Pakistani soil are with India at Madhopur on the river Ravi.¹ The dispute over the distribution of water arose when after the partition, India desired that the Government of Pakistan should use river water by building link canals from the western rivers. Pakistan did not like the suggestion of India and was not prepared to agree to any diminution of supplies from these and claimed her right as the lower riparian under international law.

1. Khan Hafez ur Rehman, "Indo Pakistan Water Dispute", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XII, No. 4, December 1959, pp. 323-24.

An agreement was reached between India and Pakistan in May 1948 under which in due course Pakistan was to tap alternative source for the waters of the eastern rivers. Pakistan considered the canal waters dispute more graver than that about Kashmir, because it involved the possibility that splendidly fertile large portion of West Pakistan would be reconverted to desert and her industrious cultivators made beggars.

On April 1, 1948 India decided to close the canals crossing the border between the two countries Keith Callard described except malice.¹ While discussing the impact of the dispute on the Indo-Pak relations Eugens R. Black President of the World Bank wrote that the relations between the two along the border intermittently throughout the decade that followed Five Years after partition India and Pakistan troops were still facing each other behind sand bags and barbed wire at irrigation head-works along the frontier..... this was most likely to lead to all out war.²

1. Keith Callard, *Pakistan : A Political Study* (London, 1957) p. 312. Also see, *No war Declaration and Canal Water Dispute; Correspondence Between the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan*, Karachi; Government of Pakistan, n.d., For the Indian case, see *Indus-Water dispute : Facts and Figure*, New Delhi, Government of India, July 1954.

2. See for more details Choudhury, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India*, op.cit., pp. 128-133, Jawed Tufail, "The world Bank and the Indus Water Treaty-111" *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. XIX, No. 2, 1966, Rushbrook Williams, "The significance of Indus water Treaty", *Asian Review*, vol. LVII, 1961, pp. 164-170.

A group of experts studied the problem after a tour of the Indus basin and submitted a plan in 1954. After six years of hard work the World Bank succeeded in convincing the two countries to accept a draft treaty. It was formally signed on September 19, 1960 at Rawalpindi by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. The crux of the agreement was that India should for irrigation purposes use the three easterly stream in the basin Sutlej Beas and Ravi and Pakistan the three westerly - Chenab, Jhelum and Indus.¹

Both the countries had made various attempts to solve the problem of the construction of a barrage by India at Farrakka. The matter is still alive.

1. Eugene R. Black, The Indus : Moral for Nations,,
New York Times Magazine, December 1, 1960, Also see,
David E. Lilenthal, "Another Korea in the Making",
Collier, August 1951.

(F) The Ganges Water Dispute

The countries of the South Asian region share the same ecology, governed by the mighty Himalayan and same life style originating from the same cultural heritage. Based on ethnic, religions, political and other factors, the political map of the countries of this region has been drawn, but ecology remained the same. Therefore, development activities of every single division of this unit which are done on the basis of their own need is bound to put their relationship. Bangladesh, situated in a delicate region is the lower riparian of the common rivers, like deforestation and their impact on the environment, agriculture and economy of Bangladesh very much determine the relationship among the co-riparian states. It has an area of 35.85 million acres, of which about 22.85 million acres (65.77%) are cultivable. The population exceeds 110 million which makes Bangladesh one of the most densely populated regions of the world.¹

The river Ganga has highly seasonable flows. Eighty per cent of its annual flow takes place during the four months of July to October. Nearly 82% of the rainfall in the Ganges plain also occurs from June to September. Therefore, the monsoon flow is enough to meet the requirements of both the riparian. More acute problem is faced during the dry season when the flow is insufficient to meet the need of both the countries. Hence any major harnessing of the Ganges water during dry season upsets its natural equilibrium and bring about a whole chain of important and interrelated recerucussion. The problem has become critical after

1. Islam, Mahid, "The Ganga Water Dispute : Environmental and Related Impacts on Bangladesh", BISS Journal, vol. 12, No. 3, 1991, p. 272.

the diversion of its water by India from Farakka. The Farakka Barrage Project, sanctioned by the Indian government in April 1960, was to divert the water of Ganges through a feeder canal into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river for the improvement of navigation for Calcutta port. Siltation of the Hooghly river has always been a headache for the Indian government. But, the experts, international as well as national, never considered the project a solution to this problem. M. Abbas, an expert on Ganges-water problem said, that the real purpose of the barrage is to control the river for supplying Ganges water to the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The barrage also provides a communication link across the river. More important factor is that the barrage offers to India, a political leverage in her dealings with Bangladesh.²

By 1970, the construction of the Farakka barrage was complete except the feeder canal. After the liberation war and independence of Bangladesh, some positive developments took place, viz., the creation of 'Indo-Bangladesh joint river commission' to develop the waters of the common rivers but not the question of water. Sharing and a joint declaration at the Ministerial level to augment the dry season flow, became ready for operation of Ganges by 1974 the feeder canal of the barrage.

In November, 1977, the parties entered into an interim agreement on the sharing of the Ganges dry season flow at Farakka as a short term solution to the dispute. The 1977 agreement expired on November 1982. In October 1982, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between

1. Abbas, B.M., Op.cit. p. 14.

2. Nurul Islam Nazem and Mohammad Humayun Kabir, "Indo-Bangladesh common Rivers and water Diplomacy", BISS Papers No. 5, December 1986, p. 11.

the countries as an interim arrangement for the sharing of the Ganges water for the next two dry seasons instead of renewing of 1977 agreement. The MOU also expired in May 1984. India and Bangladesh signed a fresh accord in 1985¹ and reiterated that the basic problems of inadequate flows of water in the Ganga/Ganges available at Farakka during the dry season imposes sacrificed on both countries and that the long term solution lies in augmenting these flows.² However, the agreement was asserted by both countries.³ India and Bangladesh again had talks on sharing water of the four main rivers. Bangladesh made it clear that an enormous amount of good political will was required to resolve the vexed problem.⁴ The present position is that there has been a deadlock. In pursuance of the provision of the 1977 agreement, both India and Bangladesh came up with their respective versions of long term solution of the problem, neither of which is acceptable to the other. Bangladesh rejected India's proposal on the ground that the link canal would divide Bangladesh, it would take away much of her precious land and also dislocate and disrupt a huge population and the life and will also cause a damage to the ecological balance of the country. A huge chunk of the land will be isolated from the main land since both the ends of the link canal will be within the territory of India. On the other hand, India rejected the Bangladesh proposal on the ground that India, as a matter of policy, would not accept the inclusion of third party in this case, Nepal.⁵

1. The Holiday, November 29, 1985.

2. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, November 11, 1985, Holiday November 21, 1985.

3. The Times of India, New Delhi, November 22, 1985, Dawn Karachi, October 19, 1985 and National Herald (New Delhi, October 19, 1985.

4. The Indian Express, New Delhi, February 3, 1992.

5. Nurul Islam Nazem and Humayun Kabir, op.cit. Cit, p.17.

Impacts

On Environment :

Change in hydrology : Due to the diversion of the Ganges there has been a change in hydrology in Bangladesh. The water level of Hardenge Bridge fell below the minimum ever recorded, i.e. 23,000 cusecs as compared to a historical average of 64,430 cusecs.¹ The water level registered at 17 feet compared to 22 feet while the ground water level fell by 5 feet.² The off take of the river Gorai, the main distributory of the Ganges is at the point of extinction due to heavy siltation.³

Flood : Apart from deforestation and melting of ice in the upper region, the barrage contributed to a great extent to the flood in Bangladesh. Diversion of the silt free water into the upstream pushes a large volume of silt into the rivers down stream, thereby decrease the carrying capacity of the rivers. It has been shown in a study that 30% of the country is subject to flood due to spill over from major rivers while the flood small rivers cover about 40% area of the country.⁴

On Socio-Political Life :

Ganges issue always played an important role in socio-political life of Bangladesh. The issue has political implication too. Government's failure to resolve the problem with India is always a matter of public resentment. Solution of Farakka barrage problem is one of the common issues in the political activities in Bangladesh.

1. Begum, Khurshida, Tension Over The Farakka Barrage : A Techno-Political Tangle In South Asia, UPL, Dhaka, 1987, p. 131.

2. Ibid.

3. See for detail, Begum, Khurshida, op.cit. p. 131-135.


4. Huda, M. and Choudhary, J.U., "Flood and Erosion" Paper presented at a Regional Conference on Floods and Erosion, Dhaka September 7-10, 1989, p. 9.

(G) The Boundary Dispute

"Nothing in my long political career" wrote Prime Minister Nehru to Premier Chou En-lai on October 27, 1962 "has hurt and grieved me more than the fact that the hopes and aspirations for peaceful and friendly neighbourly relations which we entertained and to promote which my colleagues in the Government of India and myself worked so hard, ever since the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China, should have been shattered by the hostile and unfriendly twist given on India-China relations during the past two years". India was astonished on the sudden unfriendly action of China to whom it went out of way to plead the cause of China in the United Nations and all along opposed all parts which were set up to isolate China.

On January 23, 1959, Chou En-lai wrote to Nehru about the 50,000 square miles of Indian territory and claim it. In 1954, when Indian Prime Minister visited China, he mentioned to Chinese leaders that he has seen some maps showing wrong boundary between the two countries. The Chinese Prime Minister took it easy but, in 1956 when he visited India, accepted the Mc Mohon Line as the border between India and China (Map No. 4). But, on January 23, 1959 Chou En-lai wrote to Nehru, "It was true that the border question was not raised in 1954. When negotiations were being held between Chinese and Indian sides for the agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet region of China and India. This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement". In fact China obtained effective control over Tibet by that time and Chinese army was well entrenched across the border of India. China waited till his incursions into remote areas occupied parts of Indian territory. In 1957 China constructed a road across the Aksai Chin area of India and stopped

356



India patrolling in the occupied areas. In view of the deterioration in relations between two countries India wrote to Chou En-lai on February 8, 1960 suggesting a meeting between the two. The meeting held on April 1960 only confirmed serious differences, but, could not be of much value.

In 1962 Chinese troops stepped up their forward patrolling in the Western sectors. In July 1962, Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan Valley. Suddenly on September 8, 1962, Chinese troops marched across the Eastern sector which followed on October 20, 1962 by massive attack by China on western and Eastern sectors of the border, overwhelming the limited Indian Frontier Posts. Chinese attack was preplanned. Klaus Mehnert has asserted, "we must assume that the C.C. Senior also approved the plan for attacking India in Himalayas, for on October 20, 1962, less than a month after its conclusion, war broke out on the Sino-Indian border".¹ The decision to use against India was taken at the highest level. Peoples daily came out within a week of Chinese action justifying the military action.² India considered China like an aggressive power determined to humiliate its neighbour, while for China, "India was a deserter from the anti Imperialist Camp".³ On October 24, Premier Chou En-lai put forward his three point proposal for cease fire and disengagement. However,

1. Klaus Mehnert : Peking and Moscow, Pulnain, New York, 1963, p. 429.

2. More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question", Peking Review, No. 2, 1962.

3. New Times, November 14, 1951. O. Ovestove "The Parliamentary Elections in India "Bol'shaik March 1952. Soviet Press Translation, April 15, 1952.

the net result of the Chinese invasion was a serious blow to what Soviet had gained in India. It was obvious that she (China) lost the sympathy even of the Asian people. The attack on China's newly emerging friendship with Pakistan. Her neighbour (Pakistan) a member of the aggressive SEATO pact. But with this appendage of the capitalists the CPR is now negotiating pact of friendship.¹ Dramatically, on November 21, 1962 they announced their unilateral cease fire and withdraw 20 k.m. behind the Mc Mahon Line "the 1959 Line of actual control" in Eastern sector and 20 km. behind the line of their latest aggression in Ladakh which called "1959 line of actual control" in Western sector. The Chinese took illegal possession of 14500 sq.miles in Indian territory. Speaking about the Sino-Indian war Harold Hinton said, "India precipitated war with stronger enemy on whose disposition it had no adequate intelligence, and who had evidently made considerable effort from the autumn of 1959 to the spring of 1962 to avoid hostilities, but, who had watched the steady advance of India troops in the Western sector with growing concern".² Professor John K. Galbraith took a similar view of Chinese action and said, "During the proceeding summer, there had been evidence of increasing pressure and support from various sources in India for military action do more the Chinese out of the area which they claimed. In the light of this, one can imagine the

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1. It should be interesting to end this appraisal of the Sino-Indian border war with the following reflections by Galbraith on its consequence for India relations with the out side world "As a result of this episode, there has been a radical change in Indian foreign policy".

This greater cautions has inevitably resulted in a considerable loss of influence. The Indians in the future will be a good deal more popular but, a good deal less powerful. Bulletin, pp. 3-4.

2. Dawn, October 3, 1959.

Chinese coming up with the notion of a major military demonstration to show the Indian that this kind of military policy had no future.¹

In order to break the stalemate and to provide a basis for agreed cease-fire arrangements, the representative of the six Afro-Asian countries (Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, UAR and Ghana) met at Colombo between 10th and 12th December 1962 and adopted, "That these proposal which could help in consolidating the cease-fire, once implemented should pave the way for discussion between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the cease-fire position. India accepted the proposal in toto but, China placed reservations. Nevertheless, some progress was made in 1989 in the boundary dispute when both sides agreed in the joint communique to create a favourable climate and condition for a fair and reasonable settlement through peaceful and friendly co-operation."² A joint working group was set up at Vice Ministerial level which met for first time in 1989 and it was resolved, "Not to dwell on past differences but to look to the future in a practice, workman like and realistic manner in order to reach a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. Peace and Tranquility should be main aim. Need for confidence building was recognised."³

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1. Alexeyev, A. "The Political Situation in India", New Times, October 31, 1951.
 2. Lal, John, India and China : Need for give and Take", The Times of India, January 9, 1989.
 3. Ministry of External Affair, Annual Report, 1989-90, p. 18.

After an interval of nearly 31 years, India and China agreed on September 7, 1993 on reduction of military forces along the border and leaving it to their experts to determine the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) wherever, there were differences. The agreement which laid down the framework for maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC said the "extent, depth, timing and nature of reduction of military forces will be worked out through mutual consultations". It further asserted that "India and China will continue their search for a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundry question."¹

1. The Indian Express, September 8, 1993.

CHAPTER - VII

THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OF
SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

[A] Economic Resources and Defence Expenditure of South Asian Countries

(a) Economic Resources

When man first of all armed himself with specially selected sticks and stones, the economics of defence was born. For thousands of years providing the fighting, equipments have remained the primary economic costs of defence. Early fighting equipments were simple. One produced the sword, spear or bow, etc. lasted for a long time, required little maintenance and could be replaced with comparative ease. Hence, their cost or economy was almost negligible. In ancient time, it was true that the conquest of a territory meant a tangible advantage to the conqueror, it meant the exploitation of the conquered territory by the conquering state itself to the advantage of that state and its citizens. It frequently meant the enslavement of the conquered people and the acquisition of wealth in the form of slaves as a direct result of conquering war. In medieval times, a war of conquest means at least immediate tangible booty. More recently, in colonisation period, newly discovered land and pre-emption of such territory by one particular nation secured an advantage for the citizens of that nation, it is that its over flowing population found homes in conditions that were preferably to the social or political conditions imposed by the alien nations.¹ The application of new inventions and manufacturing techniques to inmition of war made man more efficient killer. Development of rifles, guns, missiles, bombs, nuclear bombs, ships and planes, chemical and biological weapons and ABM, IRBM, ICBM tremendously increased the weight of defence economy.

1. Jai Narain, K. Kumar Datta, Economics of Defence, Lancers Books, New Delhi, 1989, p. 11.

The old fations about the defeated to pay for the conquerer disappeared during the 1914-18 war. The Versailles Treaty 1919 only assumed that the Vanquished would pay the cost and preferably a bit more. In 1945 it was again established that it was not possible for the defeated nations to pay reparations, with the result that economic advantages from war disappeared to some extent while the cost of defence increased to a great extent.

The tyranny of fate is that in the past the weak countries had to suffer while in the present days the under-developed or specifically the developing countries are suffering most due to heavy pressures on their economic calculus. Some recent economists have explained that the basic problem of developed countries is the problem of affluence "rather than scarcity". These countries have won over the problem of scarcity and poverty, but, are facing the problems created by affluence and growth of problems of mental tensions, optimum use of leisure, luxury and longevity etc.¹

Today even, two-third of the world is lying in povert . The per capita income of South Asian countries is so low that the majority of them is lining at the subsistence or near subsistence level.

(a) India

India is the worlds largest and most populous democracy and largest developing country with a democratic system. It represents one of the most interesting cases of firms, states and authoritative civilian control of the military. It is remarkable but the appalling problems of

1. For details See Galbraith, J.K., The Affluent society, London, Hamilton, 1958.

low economic developments sharp differences in income, mass poverty, over population, illiteracy, ethnic antagonism, absence of any linguistic unity, cultural fragmentation, social diversities, and a complex class system do not seem to hinder civilian control of the Indian military. The two neighbours of India-Pakistan and Bangladesh are comparative or closely matched to her in a number of ways yet display divergent patterns of civil military relations.¹

India occupies a dominating position in Indian Ocean and projects southward to Western Asia and the rice producing lands in South-West Asia. India's physical location is sea frontage.² In an evaluation of the geographical locations that are advantageous to nations, frontage on the sea receives first consideration, because the sea expedites a lively exchange of goods and ideas. India's central position on the main trade route between Europe and the Far East via Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the straits of Malacca provides favourable commercial connexion with the rest of the world. India is encircled by countries currently in political spot-light. Both in the West and East Pakistan maintains a common boundary with India.

India occupies a central position in Southern Asia. Finally, India's significance in the geopolitics of Europe and Asia (and indirectly of the whole world) is considerable. Its locational relationship to Europe is such that under certain political conditions it could assume a decisive position in the strategy of world control. India need

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1. Stephen P. Cohen, Civilian Control of the Military in India's case, Claude E. Jr. Welch (ed) : Civilian Control of the Military : Theory and Cases From Developing Country, Albany State University of New York Press; 1976, pp. 43-64.
 2. India has 3300 miles of sea frontiers as compared to about 8,200 miles of land frontier.

not rely upon a strategic position for political importance. The adequate size and compact form of the country is favourable and optimum for purposes of defence as well as effective policy. The larger a state is, the greater is the probability of its containing a large population (man-power) and a rich array of natural resources, and therefore, the greater is its likelihood of being politically strong and economically wealthy. Power today tends to accompany states of large or gigantic size. Glorious size, however, is costly, luxury and a dense transportation pattern is needed to weld the country into one political whole for building a strong state.

The compact areal form of India has created its own set of environmental conditions. In general, compactness has increased unity and has greatly facilitated the development of the country as a whole, and is partly responsible for its political and economic unity and strength. Relief features are also used as criteria for measuring the potentialities of a political area. The relief pattern and geological structure determines the land utilization and mineral potentialities of a country and is key to the development of its national economy. The surface characteristics determine penetrability during war time and accessibility, usability and a real cohesion during peace time. This unique geographic periphery of India has facilitated defence. Flanked on the north by the world's highest mountains, the country is also protected from the winter cold of the north.

Fortunately, a large portion of Northern India is planewell suited topographically to agriculture. Fortunately also much of this area is favoured by a moist climate. Within this northern plain is the greatest concentration of people in all India, and also contains the political

nucleus or core area' in which the nation was germinated and nurtured. Much of the economic vitality centres in this zone. The coasts of India have not in modern times lent themselves to the development of a maritime nation. The West coast of India is essentially the result of submergence and in the north, Konkan, has good harbours of the ria type; in the South, Malabar has several lagoons and roadsteads protected by submarine mud-banks. Surat and Goa in the age of Renaissance discoveries and Bombay and Cochin in modern times testify to the maritime traditions in Konkan and Malabar. The East coast of India is not so well provided with harbours. Yet from the East coast the Hindu emigrants brought civilization to Burma, Cambodia, and the East Indies and even founded powerful empires. During the middle of the 14th century Majapahit set up a powerful Sea-state, and the flowering of Indian culture in Java at this period represents the supreme achievement of the Hindus in South-East Asia.¹ Her long Sea-frontage and central position in the Indian Ocean, as already stated, is of permanent political and economic significance. The political and cultural pattern has been less directly affected by the terrain, but even here the importance of the two historical frontier-zones the Aravalli hills, and the Satpura hills and their continuation upto Chota Nagpur is evident.² The total inventory of physical resources possessed by India includes minerals, water, soil and natural vegetation. In total quantity many times, such as millions of tones of coal reserves or thousands of square miles of arable land,

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1. For the general theme, See K. Panikar, K.M., India and the Indian Ocean (1945). It is suggested that Panikar regards South-East Asia synonymous with further thinks in terms of former maritime expansion.
 2. For a fuller discussion of some effects of India's build Sea. W. Gordon East and O.H.K. Spate (Editors), The Changing Map of Asia, A Political Geography (1950), pp. 121-124.

sound impressive, in terms of per capita. Although India is not so rich in economic minerals as the U.S.A. It is by no means deficient. This country is indeed the world's dominant source of at least two minerals, mica and ilmenite; it shares with Russia in being the world's main producer of manganese, and possesses perhaps the world largest reserves of high-grade iron ore. In addition, there are adequate reserves available of many other minerals such as aluminium, magnesium, titanium, etc. Our reserves of refractory minerals are especially satisfactory; they are both considerable and varied-chromite; kyanite, fire-clays, magnesite, dolomite, silica and bauxite bricks. India's shortcoming comprise mainly the non-ferrous metals. India's coal reserves are not large but they are sufficient for some time to come. In oil, a commodity as necessary to the nation as blood to the individual, India holds much less hope, but the possibility of making synthetic gasoline brightens the picture. To sum up, excepting for a few minerals, India's mineral position is, on the whole satisfactory.¹

The water resources of India are immense for the development of irrigation and hydro-electric energy. It has been estimated that out of the total quantity of 1,350 million acre feet of water available in the country, only about six per cent has been utilized so far, rest running waste to the sea. The irrigated area represents 13.5 per cent of the culturable land and 21 per cent of the land actually under cultivation. The potential water power resources of India are of the order of 35 to 40 million KW of which only 0.5 million KW has been developed so far.

1. For India's mineral resources See Dunn, J.A., Ores and Minerals in India : Present and Future Position. Transactions of the National Institute of Science of India, vol. II, No. 8, pp. 377-82 (1947).

More than three-fourths of the people of India look to the soil for their sustenance. For countless generations, the cultivation of arable land has been the chief means of supporting hundreds of millions of people of this country. Floods, droughts, excessive pressure on land and primitive conditions of agriculture combine to prevent the emergence of India as a strong modern power. With a population of over 841.1 million and with a per capita income of Rs. 5471.00.¹ In 1955, the United Nations World Economic Survey, listed 55 countries ahead of India in terms of per capita income while in 1977 she was behind 110 out of the list of 128 countries.² While India's per capita income is 310, Pakistan's 365, Sri Lanka 510, Maldives 470 and that of Bangladesh and Bhutan 208, 160 dollars respectively.

Since independence in 1947, India has been one of the most inward-looking, protected economies in the world : For many years, foreign trade was insignificant and foreign investment was actively discouraged. Many of the country's industries were state-owned, inefficient and loss-making. A comprehensive system of industrial licensing throttled the private sector. Between 1965 and 1980, the Indian economy grew at an annual average of 3.6 per cent, a rate that compares favourably to historical experience. In 1984, Rajiv Gandhi began a moderate and pragmatic effort to liberalize the economy. The program attempted to modify import-substitution policies, bolster capital markets, and establish a less burdensome licensing system, giving business greater latitude in determining their production volumes. Exports were encouraged through a more competitive

1. Manorma Year Book 1993, Mammen Mathew, Kerala, India, p. 405.

2. United Nations, World Economic Survey, New York, 1987.

exchange rate. High marginal tax rates were lowered to a degree. Their main effect was to encourage the development of a growing urban middle class, increasing support for reform among some educated professionals, but lowering it among the populist opposition. This crisis promoted India to implement a new round of reforms under a minority government formed by Narasimha Rao after the June 1991 elections. The new reform initiatives included interest rate liberalization, encouragement of private industry, abolishment of export subsidies, and elimination of import licensing. Foreign investors were allowed to own up to 51% of most local firms. The industrial licensing system was abolished for all but 18 industries. Only 8 lines of business compared with dozens before, were reserved exclusively for state-owned firms. The rupee was made partly convertible in February 1992. Trade liberalization was approached very timidly, however, quantitative import controls were removed for many types of capital goods, but remain in effect for consumer goods. Import tariffs were lowered, but the top rate remained at 11% (down from 15%).

(b) Pakistan

Pakistan was emerged on the basis of religion and was a geographical absurdity and led to its further partition in 1971. Lord Mountbatten predicted in the very beginning that the eastern wing of Pakistan would break away from Pakistan in the quarter of a century.¹ In fact British wanted to break up India, into several sovereign

1. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1975, p. 162.

states, thinking that the resultant weak states would remain tied to British as independent dominions.¹

S.D. Muni also expressed that 'the British in decision, conscious or otherwise regarding the states of princely states of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir added significantly to the conflict potential inherent in the Indo-Pakistan relationship'.² Jawahar Lal Nehru rightly observed that 'the question of Indo-Pakistan relationship was a psychological thing resulting from the way, the sub-continent was divided between India and Pakistan. There was a complete emotional upset of the people in India and Pakistan because of this. Expressing his views on future of Pakistan he commented that "in this way we shall reach that United India sooner than otherwise."³ Sardar Patel was optimistic and went further to say that 'sooner than later we shall be united in common allegiance of our country'.⁴ Mohd. Ali Jinnah reacted sharply on these views of Indian leaders and said that 'it is very unfortunate that vigorous propaganda has been going on that Pakistan is nearly a temporary madness and the Pakistan will have to come into the Union as a partinent, rependent, erroring

1. The point became clear in the British Cabinet Committee paper transmitted by Lord Ismay to Lord Marutbattas in the Telegram, no. 6043, May 9, 1947, pp. 723-728. The transfer of power, vol. X quoted in Jasjit Singh (ed) India and Pakistan : Crisis of Relationship, Lancer Publishers, Private Ltd. New Delhi, 1990, pp. 117-118.
2. Muni, S.D., South Asia, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, p. 40.
3. Quoted in Menon, V.P., Transfer of Power in India, Calcutta, 1957, p. 139.
4. Quoted in Burke, M.S., Pakistan's Foreign Policy : A Historical Analysis, London, 1973, p. 9.

son.¹ India's involvement in Pakistan's Eastern wing and emergence of Bangladesh strengthened the feeling of Pakistan that 'India has plans to destroy or weaken Pakistan in order to dominate it'.²

When composite India was divided, Pakistan's share was about one fifth of the area and the highways, about one sixth of the population and rail lines, about one seventh of the cultivated land, a tenth of the army, a segment of big land lords, a minority of the educational middle class, very few of the shopkeepers, traders professional classes and artisans, only a few thousand industrial workers almost none of the minerals, fraction of industrial equipment, mills for her three fourth of the jute crop and only one major port Karachi and another port at Chittagong (now in Bangladesh).³

Pakistan has three of the largest countries as its neighbours. China with a population of over one billion, or a quarter of the entire world population, India with 730 million people and the Soviet Union (before disintegration) with a population of 267 million. Add the population of Iran (210 million), Afghanistan (19 million), Pakistan (100 million), to this region and it has half of the world population in its bosom. Three of world's four largest armed forces belong to Pakistan's neighbours. Russia (363,000), China (43,25,000), and India (11,20,000). The one missing great military power is the United States of America

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1. Quoted in Chopra, Surendra article, Indo-Pak Relations, in Pandav Nayak (ed) Pakistan : Society and Politics, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, p. 37.
 2. Forence, A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region : The Balance of Power, The Free Press, New York, 1976, p. 46.
 3. Bindra, S.S., India and Her Neighbours, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, p. 22 extract quoted from J.E. Spencer and W.H. Thomas, Asia East by South : A Cultural Geography, New York, 1971, p. 332.

(20,68,000). America does not enjoy the distinction of being Pakistan's neighbour but has nevertheless great interest in the area because of its proximity to the Gulf. All the four great military powers of the world are involved in the area. India claims, proudly enough, to be the world's largest democracy.

Pakistan has very close religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural link with her muslim neighbours. In fact same tribes straddle the borders between the countries. The pathans are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. They constitute 40% of the Afghan population, and are akin to some 8 million pathans living in Pakistan. Similarly, Bluchis live in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Since their independence in 1947, Pakistan, and India have fought three wars, the last being in 1971, in which Pakistan was, as the Indians put it, 'cut to size'.

Pakistan is bounded to the West by Iran, to the north by Afghanistan and the USSR to the Northern by China, to the East and South by India and to the South by the Arabian Sea. The territory has an area of 796095 sq.km. and its population is 11,31,63,000 with per capita income of 365.¹

On economic front Pakistan started off well. It included the extremely rich agricultural areas of Punjab and a potentially more homogeneous population. Punjab and Sindh which are about 75 per cent of the rural population, produce more than 90 per cent of the countries. Wheat, more than 95 per cent of the rice, and 100 per cent of its cotton. The remaining two provinces Baluchistan

1. Manorma Year Book 1992-93 and The Statesman Year Book 1992-93, Mac Millan Press Ltd., 1993, pp. 954-955.

and the North West Frontier Provinces are by comparison, poor. The majority of the population lives in villages, the urban population is 28.3 per cent.

Economically, Pakistan is one of the poorest in the world. The grow rate of GNP is 6.1% per annum as is the growth rate of industry agriculture and exports. But, from the strategic variables and sectors through which growth is sustained over time seem to show declining trend. Government pronouncements in the Press suggests a sense of satisfaction at the level and growth of domestic investment. The real growth rate in Gross Domestic Investment followed a declining trend from 5.8 per cent in 1976-77 to 3.4 per cent in 1983-84 percentages of GNP declined from 17.6 per cent in 1976-77 to 13.9 in 1983-84 and now 10.95 per cent and the public sector investment declined from 12 per cent to 8.6 per cent in the 1983-84.

The foreign exchanges earnings of the country are based not on a sustainable export of goods but, on the uncertain remittances from Pakistani workers in Middle East. The growing debt servicing burden is indicated by the fact that in the year 1977 as much as 44 per cent of gross disbursement were returned in the form of debt servicing of old loans. By 1987, this figure increased to 87 per cent.¹ Several studies have highlighted the problem of paucity in Pakistan. According to Naseem's Sindy the poverty time in the urban sector is specified as less than Rs. 375 per year.² But, the rural poverty indicates that the number of people below poverty line did not decrease these days.

1. Pakistan Economic Survey, 1985-86, Islamabad Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Advisors Wing, pp. 25-27.

2. I. Naseem, S.M., "Mass Poverty in Pakistan : Some Preliminary Findings", The Pakistan Development Review, 1975.

All the available evidence suggests that with a low domestic saving rate and rapidly increasing reliance on foreign aid the economy of Pakistan is entering a period over the next decade when it may be faced with the grain choice of stagnation in per capita income or a very high debt servicing burden.

c (C) Bangladesh

Bangladesh is located in the delta of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers in the north eastern part of the Indian sub-continent. Until 1971 it was part of Pakistan. It has an area of 55,126 square miles (142776 sq.km.) and is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. In about 4 per cent of the total area density exceeds 2000 persons per square mile. The total population was 100.6 million in 1987¹ and at present is 143-999.²

The people of Bangladesh are among the poorest in the world. Overwhelmingly, dependent on backward agriculture. Income, per capita in 1987 was US \$ 150³ but at present is US \$ 209.⁴ The combined effect of situation, soil erosion, decreased level of surface water and increased salinity is so grave for Bangladesh that stability of the country is

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- II. Allaudin, Talat, "Mass Poverty in Pakistan. A Further Study", The Pakistan Development Review, 1975.
- III. Hussain Akmal, Report on Rural Population Estimates. Study for the National Human Settlement Policy, Government of Pakistan Environment and Urban Affairs, 1983.
- IV. Mujahid, G.B.S., A Note on Measurement of Poverty and Income Inequalities in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review, 1978.
- 1. The World Development Report 1987, New York Oxford University Press, Published for World Bank, 1987, p.202.
- 2. Manorma Year Book, 1993.
- 3. Ibid.
- 4. Manorma Year Book, op.cit. p. 186.

at risk. Sectors like agriculture, industry of navigation, aquaculture of the northern as well as south western part of Bangladesh has been suffering serious setbacks. The total net crop area of 6.85 million acres. Out of which 1.57 million acres is partly or fully effected. This amount to 22.92% of the net cropped area.¹ In 1988-89 total area effected for shortage of water was 38449 hectares² and is increasing day by day.

With too little money available for food, it is not surprising that few other consumption goods are available to remove the monotony of the life. In 1969-70 the consumption in textile was estimated at 7.5 yards per head. In 1972-73 had dropped to 5 yards per head and apparently has remained at that level since well below 9 yards.³

(d) Bhutan

Along the lofty ridges of the eastern Himalayas lies the kingdom of Bhutan. With an area of about 18,000 square miles. Bhutan is larger than Switzerland. Its location between the Assam-Bengal plain of India to the south and the Chinese occupied Tibetan Plateau to the north gives it considerable geopolitical significance.

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1. A. Hanan, Impact of Reduced Low Flow of the Ganges, a paper presented at a Seminar organized by the Department of Water Resources Engineering BUET, August 23, 1980, p. 11.
 2. Information received from the office of Bangladesh Water Development Board BWDB.
 3. The Bangladesh Economic Review, vol.11, No.1, January 1974, Dacca, The Quarterly Journal of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Economics, pp. 737-91.

Bhutan's undefined traditional boundary with Tibet follows for the most part the crest of the Great Himalayan Range. Chinese maps show parts of Bhutan territory within China, and occasional minor incursions of Chinese troops have been reported along with the border. Bhutan's boundary with India lies to the south of the Himalayan Range in the Duars plan. The Indo-Bhutan boundary evolved as a result of the British annexation of a major portion of the Duars region of Bhutan adjoining Assam and Bengal between 1841 and 1864. To the north east borders Arunachal Pradesh, and to the south-west it borders the Indian state of Sikkim, south of the Chumbi valley is Tibet. Despite its great beauty, Bhutan remained one of the 5th poorest nation in the world, with an estimated per capita annual income of about \$ 160.

Although the planned economic development began only in 1961, under the father of the present king Jigme Singye Wangchuk Bhutan officials have hesitated at moving out too quickly in their ancient land. Part of their concern stems from the fact that what they see as outside influences could damage Bhutan's identity as an independent nation with its own distinct culture.

The one major advantage, Bhutan enjoyed earlier was the fact that with its very small population (1.3 million) there was not the same pressure of population as in agriculture till it opened out in development work. Money economy changed the entire economic balance. The country being entirely mountaineous, agricultural potential was obviously even today. Geological surveys so far show no encouraging prospect of substantial and high value minerals except dolomite, gypsum, lime stone and some poor quality coal deposits. Its only economic potential is in hydro-electric power, if developed properly. Bhutan's economic

constraints, therefore, are obvious. With hardly anything to export to the outside world and dependent almost totally for its basic imports, its economic growth has to have a limited perspective. Dependence on outside labour and technical skills further limits its options.

(d) Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is situated at the southern extremity of the Indian sub-continent separated from it at the narrowest point by only 22 miles of Sea, called the Palk strait. It lies between 6° and 10° north of Equator, and on longitude of 79° to 81° east. In size Sri Lanka is one of the medium-sized islands in the world, being 270 miles long and 140 miles wide. In area, it is 25,332 square miles (16.2 million acres) almost the size of Ireland or Tasmania.

The Island has a mountainous terrain in the central part with an average elevation of 3700 feet surrounded by an upland area ranging between 1000 to 3000 feet. The rest of the country comprises a coastal plain broad and narrowing in the east, west and the south. There is an abundance of rivers, all starting in the central hills and flowing outwards to the Indian ocean. More than three quarters of the area is arable and the climate is admirably suited for most tropical crops.

According to 1981 census, Sri Lanka had a population of 14.9 million an increase is 17 per cent since 1971. Its per capita income is \$ 420. A striking feature of Sri Lanka's demographic structure has been the high proportion of children under the 15 years of age - 43 per cent of the total population. In the developed countries, this group is not more than 22 to 30 per cent of the population. Also the geographical distribution of population in

Sri Lanka is very uneven. Nearly 70 per cent live in about 30 per cent of the land in the so-called wet zone. In the dry zone, the Jaffna Peninsula in the north has the greatest concentration with more than two thirds of those who inhabit this zone.

The vast majority of the people - some 11.5 of the 14.9 million people, live in the rural areas. Although the standards of living in the rural areas is very low, there has not been any marked migration to the urban areas. The economy of Sri Lanka depends largely upon three agricultural export commodities, two of which have developed significantly only within the past hundred years tea, rubber and coconut. The income derived from these exports is hardly sufficient to buy food, which Ceylon does not produce in sufficient quantities to feed herself. Tea, however, now covers most of synthetics.

Sri Lanka is having a hard time economically. Like other developing countries she is trying to modern industrial dynamism. Meanwhile, there are menacing and dangerous strains : tremendous population growth, decreased world demand for Ceylon's money crops, failure of the country to be self supporting, political unrest, labour troubles and destruction of crops. The country is too much dependent on foreign aid and its own earning power is diminishing. The export products are subject to severe fluctuations in the world market prices as well as to the influence of other factors beyond national control, such as the development of substitutes, changes in manufacturing practices etc. This has also entailed considerable risk. In the words of many economists argue that what is needed is not just a tightening of fiscal management, important though this is. But also a redirection of government resources into more productive areas of the economy. To compensate

the outcome, one major advance that the government made in 1984 was to devise a viable investment plan for turning round Sri Lanka's much neglected three estate crops sector (tea, rubber and coconut).

(C) Maldives

Maldives island is a chain of coral atolls on a rise in the Indian Ocean stretching north to south, lie to south-west of Sri Lanka. The total length of the chain is 550 miles, and it consists of 17 groups, distributed politically into 13 and embracing a total of twelve hundred Islands. All of these are very small in area and less than 200 are inhabited. Male, residence of the native President and centre of trade, is but one mile long by three quarters of a mile wide. The population of the whole chain was 200,000 in 1984. The people resembles with Sinhalese in their personal appearance and speak a language closely akin to Sinhalese. The Island are covered with coconut palms and yield millet and fruit as well as coconut produce. The economy is based on fishing industry along with tourism. Shipping and coconut processing. The per capita income was US \$ 400 estimated in 1982 which is fairly high in this region. At present it is \$ 470.¹

The rapid growth in gross national product (GNP) achieved in the first half of the 1980s estimated at 10 per cent annually, on average-stemmed mainly from the expansion of fisheries and tourism sector. The output in fisheries sector was more than double between 1982 and 1985 owing to the rapid increase in the number of mechanized fishing boats and the establishment of improved fuel distribution

1. Manorma Year Book, 1983, p. 192.

and fish collection system. But the development in shipping sector, another mainstay of the Maldivian economy, are not favourable. Maldives had developed a thriving maritime industry, expanding its fleet of ocean going vessels to 41 in 1981; the fleet's total earning in that year reached \$ 43.5 million, almost equal to country's GNP. The international recession that began in 1982 led to a set back in the shipping industry from which it never recovered. With mounting losses totalling \$ 14 million during 1982-84, the shipping industry had to be reorganized under different management with a substantially reduced fleet size and level of operations.

Although agriculture and manufacturing have not been important to the overall economy owing to their limited potential and small domestic market, the recent emphasis on improving their linkage with the tourism sector may spur significant growth in those sectors. To overcome labour shortage, educational and training facilities are being improved, and operations in sectors are being mechanized to reduced labour demand. Overall, the Maldivian economy can be expected to achieve 6-7 per cent growth rate over the medium term without encountering balance of payments difficulties. Outstanding debt service levels are projected to rise only moderately, implying a continuing decline in debt to GDP as well as debt service ratio.

Throughout these countries, agriculture continues to be the dominant branch of production. Productivity in agriculture, in contrast to those parts of the world where agriculture embraces a smaller share of population and production, is the main determinant of national levels of income and living. Moreover, there are narrow limits to the extent to which imports can be relied on to feed an

increasing population; and since any increase in income per head from present low levels will also considerably increase the demand for food, the manland ratio, together with the utilisation of land and of the labour available to work it, is of crucial importance for the prospects of development and in problems of planning for development. The problems of population and labour utilisation, here, are commonly known as over population, unemployment, under-employment, semi or seasonal employment. A huge disparity is supposed to exist between agricultural resources and the man power stocked up in agriculture. Because the land is over-crowded, much of the available labour supply is unemployed or is employed at a very low level of productivity, often assumed to be zero at the margin and, indeed, for inside the margin. The corollary is that the main requirement for achieving higher over all productivity, which is the aim of economic development, must be to reduce the agrarian density by "skimming off" the redundant man power in the villages. The problems of labour utilization and population are central to the economic development, of these countries. The following table show the per capita income of these countries :

Table

Name of the country	Per capital income (US \$) 1986	Per capita income (US \$) 1993
Bangla Desh	160	208
Bhutan	150	160
India	290	310
Maldives	400	470
Nepal	150	160
Pakistan	350	365
Sri Lanka	400	420

Source : World Bank Report.

The highest per capita income is of Maldives followed by Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Maldives is a group of tiny Islands having a total population of 200,000 its impact is insignificant. They have nothing at the stake as far as defence and economic calculations are concerned. The figures about Pakistan are highly misleading. The increase in income is dependent on the regular flow of money from Gulf countries which is decreasing day by day. Their economy is not self-sufficient. Sri Lanka again is a small country having a population of 14.9 million. Its economy is badly effected by growing terrorism in that country. As President Jayewardene has aptly warned, "Development will be close chapter, if we do not curb terrorism certainly it is practically a closed chapter in the north already. The bulk of humanity lives in India, Bangla Desh, Nepal and Bhutan which are having income from \$ 260 to 150. If we compare this per capita income to other seven richest countries of the world, the difference alone speaks about itself and does not need any comments."

[B] Defence Expenditure of the SAARC countries

Various historians from Gibbon to Toynbee have analysed the underlying causes of a nations rise to greatness and its fall thereafter. Two recent authors Correlli Barnett and Paul Kennedy, have done a similar study in their thesis. The collapse of the British Powers and The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Both studies bring out a growing dependence of such nations on military power to meet all threats to their interests in various parts of the globe. Which get acquire during growth of their economy and which later on, became a milestone round their necks, dragging that economy into a regressive mode of an unaffordable defence burden.

There is a competing trade of elements in a nations economy which according to Kennedy, demands a careful balance at all times. These are 'defence' 'development' and 'domestic consumption'. Excessive attention to one implies ignoring one or both of the other two. India's defence expenditure which has not exceeded 4% of its GNP, is not excessive. India has some major achievements, such as Green Revolution, doubling of life expectancy since 1947, splitting of the Atom, and sending the statelite into space, not to mention leadership of the Non-aligned Movement, these weaknesses of the Indian economy appear in explicable. However, Eighth Plan is likely to aim high percentage of growth from 5.5 per cent to 8 per cent.

India's defence expenditure has accounted for 15 to 18 paise in every rupee that has been spent by Central Government. It is a large sum for a developing country, but, India's defence is to be matched with that of Pakistan and China. The developed world is no longer to engage in a hot war but, to deter one from occurring. Till that time India's defence preparedness has to be in a state of readiness.¹

The Finance Commissions background paper, reproduced had assessed the GDP for the Eighth Plan period as Rs. 30,52,498 crore. Defence get 4 per cent of this GDP and the army's share remain at 44 per cent of the defence allocation. The acquisition of 155 mm Howitzers alone carried a cost of Rs. 1400 crore in foreign exchange.² India, though had made a beginning launch a defence industry at home prior to the Sino-Indian conflict, but, the urgency to

1. Pendise, K.S., A Calculus for India's Regional Power Status, Indian Defence Review, January 1989, p. 102.
2. Financial Express, New Delhi, May 4, 1988.

repair the damage caused by earlier neglect of the defence services came into operation after the conflict. The growing dependence for military hardware of foreign sources, whether eastern or western, has created ideal conditions for India to enter the debt-trap, baited with soft loans and long-period of repayment¹ to match those given to Pakistan by USA rehing. The Indian economy is perilously close to such an event. The Institute of International Finance, Washington, DC, USA has assessed that India's external debt has exceed Rs. 100000 crore by the end of 1989-90 and the internal debt is above Rs. 1,60,000 crores.² India's defence spending at 3 to 4 per cent³ of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as compared to Chinas 10 per cent for a number of years or Pakistan's 7 per cent year after year.⁴

Forty years after independence, the Indian ~~and~~ forces have to remain constantly alert all along the borders and in their cantonments, ever ready to repeat an operation Trident, like mobilization that because necessary during early 1987 before Exercise Brass Tacks could be exercised, Indian Army has to care its 15600 km borders with a limited strength of 1.1 million soldiers which China had a force of 2,300,000 soldiers for 21.000 km border and Pakistan 4,50,000 army man for a small border of 6480 km. at the ratio of 70.1, 109.1 and 69.1 soldier, km of border

1. Swaminathan, S.A. Siyar, How Much Do We Owe ?
Indian Express, March 16, 1989.

2. Ibid.

3. News Report, Indian Express, November 14, 1988.

4. K.S. Pendix, India's Defence Budget - A Case for better planning, Digest, Lancer Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, vol. 1, p. 56.

ratio.¹ The Indian Navy have also 7600 km long coast line and 2 million sq.km. of the exclusive economic zone to keep free from intruders, besides ensuring security of 300-odd Island possessions and of the Sea-laws for normal trade and commerce. For the Air Force, whose 45 squadron strength has remained unchanged for long and had to work in the change circumstances.

India's defence expenditure was Rs. 168.48 crores in 1949-50, a mere bagatelle compared to Rs. 13,000 crores proposed four decades later in 1989-90 and Rs. in 1992-93. The value of rupee is 12.2 paisa against its purchasing power in 1960. Figures of India's defence spending for 1960, 1970 and 1980 and 1990 are in Appendix A.² and graphical comparison is in Annexure 1 to the appendix. It will reveal that India has not spent at any stage at that of Pakistan and China. Those who suggest that in view of universal disarmament policy Indian economy growth to defence is sluggishness, fail to realize that a future conflict may erupt violently with hardly any substantial warning period. K. Subrahmanyam has rightly expressed -

'In the current international strategic environment, India has no option but to keep up a certain basic level of defence preparedness. The highly dubious argument that this defence effort is costing the country a great deal of development has to be challenged. While our defence effort has remained at a constant level around 3.5

1. The Military Balance, 1987-88.

2. Raju C. Thoms, Defence of India, Annex 4, p. 215. Quoted in India's Defence Budget - A Case for better planning, Digest Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, vol. 1, p. 68, 69.

to 3.7 per cent of GDP, our saving and investment rates have gone up from around 11 per cent in the early 1960s to nearly double that figure in the early 1980s. It has not resulted in commensurate increase in growth rate, and if our capital ratio has come down, one has to look for reasons elsewhere and not seek easy explanations in defence expenditure. It is quite likely that reducing the defence efforts by 1 to 1.5 per cent will not lead to any more increase in the pace of development than what stepping up by 10 to 11 per cent has done in the last two decades.¹

Ross H. Munro, writing in cover story on India in *Time International* of 3 April 1989 mentioned that India there is surprising little debate about security issue. For most part, the public, according to him is not aware of the military balance in the sub-continent.² Peter Druker advised rightly that services need is not to be mere business like, but, to be more effective.³

Presently, the theatre of war has shifted from the industrialised world to the developing nations. Out of the 170 conflicts, that has taken place since second world war, over 160 have occurred in the developing world, engaging 165 nations. The global military expenditure on defence has reached to one thousand billion dollars. Nearly 25

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1. Subrahmanyam, A Conceptual Framework for Peaceful Co-existence In India And Its Neighbours, Lancer International, New Delhi, p. 133.
 2. Munro, H. Ross, Superpower Rising, *Time International*, April 3, 1989.
 3. Peter F. Druker, Management - Tasks Responsibilities Practice, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, September 1978.

developing countries are responsible for 80 per cent of military expenditure in the developing world.¹

During the Rajiv Gandhi years (1984-89) defence was paid more serious attention. Infact the defence expenditure during this period in absolute terms registered the sharpest increase as compared to any other period. Since India's independence. Some significant alternations were also made in the defence budget accounting. Defence pensions were delinked from the Defence Service Estimates. A significant development in defence budgeting during the Rajiv years was that for the first time the defence expenditure was taken into account by the Planning Commission. The seventh plan document projecting eht total expenditure at Rs. 45000 crores i.e. 4% of the than GNP. During his five years tenure defence expenditure increased from 6661 crores to in 1984-85 to Rs. 14500 crores in 1989-90. Showing a increase of 19.8%.

The total defence expenditure during the Rajiv Gandhi period was as given below.

Appendix A

INDIA'S DEFENCE BUDGETS SINCE THE SIXTIES (Rs. Cr.)

Year	Defence Budget	Central Budget	% of Defence Budget to Total Central Expenditure
<u>Sixties</u>			
1961-62	312.49	2,027.18	15.4
1962-63	473.91	2,513.13	17.0
1963-64	816.12	3,167,21	32.4
1964-65	805.80	3,527,40	22.8
1965-66	884.75	3,915.95	22.6

Contd..

1. Subrahmanyam, K., Peace and the Arms Race, op.cit. p. 1155.

1966-67	908.59	4,618.94	19.7
1967-68	970.14	4,599.59	21.1
1968-69	1,015.26	4,700.46	19.5

Seventies

1970-71	1,183.60	5,726.00	20.5
1971-72	1,411.00	7,053.00	20.0
1972-73	1,600.00	7,867.00	20.4
1973-74	1,753.00	8,438.00	20.8
1974-75	2,157.00	10,107.00	21.3
1975-76	2,410.00	12,643.00	19.0
1976-77	2,615.00	14,184.00	18.4
1977-78	2,752.00	15,568.00	17.7
1978-79	2,945.00	18,417.00	16.0
1979-80	3,373.00	19,324.00	17.4

Eighties

1980-81	3,800.00	22,808.00	17.3
1981-82	4,600.00	26,554.00	17.3
1982-83	5,350.00	34,241.00	15.6
1983-84	6,633.30	34,836.00	16.2
1984-85	6,671.00	43,879.00	15.2
1985-86	7,987.00	53,112.00	15.0
1986-87	10,477.00	64,426.00	16.2
1987-88	12,000.00	67,640.00	17.7
1988-89	13,200.00	75,783.00	17.4
1989-90	13,000.00	82,161.00	15.8

The share of the three services in revenue expenditure in 1984-85 was 671, 8.6 and 24.3% for Army, Navy and Air force respectively. In 1988-89 and 1989-90

the share of the Army came down marginally to 72.3% and 72.5% per cent respectively but, the share of Navy and Air force was increased. The comparative figures are given as below :

Appendix - B

DEFENCE BUDGETS : 1987 to 1990 (Rs cr)

Revenue Expenditure	1987-88	1988-89 BE	1988-89 RE	1989-90
Army				
Pay and				
Allowances	2,408.75	2,344.99	2,629.25	2,358.97
Stores	2,655.47	2,655.00	2,717.52	2,664.26
Works	371.48	380.50	374.50	368.18
Others	1,042.17	1,216.61	1,126.13	1,125.30
Navy				
Pay and				
Allowances	135.00	140.00	150.00	157.86
Stores	367.70	428.83	386.00	371.43
Works	47.00	50.00	60.00	60.36
Others	133.30	136.00	178.00	167.14
Air Force				
Pay and				
Allowances	386.15	370.38	412.20	378.69
Stores	1,035.76	1,082.00	1,074.80	1,145.52
Works	120.00	120.00	138.00	130.00
Others	113.76	134.07	155.35	145.19
Capital outlay				
Land	37.50	60.70	35.80	50.05

Contd..

Revenue Expenditure	1987-88	1988-89 BE	1988-89 RE	1989-90
Construction				
Army	259.12	260.00	284.00	278.57
Navy	100.00	103.00	105.00	102.14
Air Force	80.60	82.50	98.70	104.04
Aircraft & Aeroengines				
Army	1008.00	20.00	17.45	18.57
Navy	261.60	441.17	406.00	332.43
Air Force	920.48	1,040.30	1,054.00	976.86
Heavy & Medium Vehicles	45.82	59.51	113.93	101.74
Other equipment				
Army	505.17	700.00	564.79	772.67
Navy	3.50	8.00	5.00	4.64
Air Force	66.93	149.24	94.93	95.72
Naval Fleet	397.80	378.00	412.50	473.57
Ordnance Factories	254.00	338.00	311.00	361.91
R & D	81.14	120.40	123.35	125.83
Others	106.05	172.00	100.26	108.17

NOTE : RE = Revised Estimate

BE = Budget Estimate

C O N C L U S I O N

Thanks to the series of summit meetings that took place between Soviet Union and the American leaders during the closing year of 1980's - while the INF Treaty eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons¹, the Conventional Forces Reduction Treaty envisaged the elimination of certain levels of Conventional Weapons from Europe² - the 1990's, began heralding the dawn of wars, has come to be fashionably described as the post cold war era in world politics. Not only Soviet-American relations improved substantially, but, the map of Europe undergone significant changes with re-unification of Germany, the virtual disintegration of Warsaw Pact and the survival of NATO as a large political alliance. The feeling of the 'dejure' in the West about its military and ideological victory is manifested in such pronouncements as the "End of the History".³ It is not easy to say that the end of the cold war brought the end of the power rivalries between the major powers. The retreat of Soviet Union from the world politics and the emergence^{of} a "uni-polar world"⁴ with the United States as the only surviving superpower, posed vital new challenges to our decision-makers.

The Soviet Union is now, more inclined towards Europe and United States than Third World countries. Soviet Union, has been urging India to resolve its problems with China and

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1. For details see, Mehrotra, O.N., "The INF Treaty : A Step toward Nuclear Arms Reduction", Strategic Analysis, vol. 11, No. 12, March, 1988.
 2. For details, See, The Times of India, November 11, 1990.
 3. See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of the History", The National Interest, Summer 1989 quoted as R. Jayaramu, P.S., Trends in World Politics and the Challenges to Indian Foreign Policy, Political Science, The Indian Political Science Association, p. 5.
 4. For the new that the World may not really be uni-polar See Raja Mohana, G., "The New World Orders : Myth of American It edge money, The Times of India, March 18, 1991.

Pakistan peacefully and bipaterally¹ with the emerging new world order in the post-Gulf war period, the world has witnessed numerous spectacular developments and adjustments in the domain and scope of international relations. There is a new kind of security environment in which the nation-states are most likely inclined to enlarge their conception of security in a world becoming increasingly inter-dependent. In a larger, frame work, the subject of security has come to involve the whole paraphernalia of protecting and promoting vital national interests and perennial core values in the changing world, implying the absence of real or potential threats whether posed by external sources or internal turmoils.

More significantly, their security concensus are broadening to encompass the economic issues, the ecological degradation and other non military threats. The debt problem of the developing nations has received increased attention though the steps taken so far fall very much short of what is needed. There is still a considerable flow of recourses from the South to the developed world, culminating in further recession of economy of the former. The debt trap worsens the developmental process and ultimately endangers security. As regards ecological dimention of non-military threats, there is a perceptible sensitisation in all parts of the planet earth about the grave dangers of the environmental degradation due to the continued emission of carbondioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the emission of chloro-fluorocarbons gradually depleting the ozone layer. As a result narco terrorism has crossed national dimentions. Terrorism, both anti-state and state-sponsored, is also flaring up,

1. During his visit to India in 1988 in reply to Question from press, Gorbachev said that he favoured Indian and China resolving their disputes peacefully and bilaterally.

mostly coupled with religious, ethnic, ideological, separatist and related tendencies. It has given rise to indiscriminate and selective use of violence or threat to use violence, including murder, sabotage and subversion, the destruction of public property and records and in some cases the hijacking of airlines and ships, holding passengers as hostages, the capture of the holy places, kidnapping government officials, diplomats and business executives.

It is altogether appropriate to revisit the South Asian countries relations in this "security" frame of reference. Asian security issues are based on the regional countries pursuits. Global, regional and domestic compulsion add to these complex, set of threats.

South Asia and New World Order

With the rupture of the bipolar system and the emergence of new centres of power, and like any other region in the world, South Asia has started experiencing the realities of a new polycentric world. In the new polycentric world, South Asian countries would be guided by new paradigms and parameters as compared to what we have been used to in the past. South Asia is one such region in which the variables of regional security problems are autonomous and indigenous but the inclination of extra-regional powers for increasing interdependence and cooperation in various fields would pave the way of stability and socio-economic development, ultimately leading to the peace and tranquillity in the whole region. However, a polycentre international order would undoubtedly make interstate relations in this region more complicated, because all the seven nation states of South Asia - India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives are developing countries and are passing through different stages of development and nation-state building. Certain speculations are being made by a number of scholars and nation security-oriented experts on the possible paradigms of international

regional and national security in a polycentric world.¹

There is a deep-seated element of contention between the largest but, continental power, India and its smaller neighbours. India is motivated by both its historical impulses and contemporary perceptions to continue its drive for hegemony to maintain peace in the region. As a response, the smaller powers would naturally make efforts to ensure their survival as a sovereign states. While other countries of the region are too weak economically and militarily to stand up to India. Pakistan is the one regional power which has persisted in resisting the Indian drive for hegemony. Notwithstanding the India pressure by itself, Pakistan has had to conduct an active diplomacy, and also entered into an alliance relationship with the west at the height of the cold war, not so much out of a genuine fear of communist expansion, as out of a desire to political and military leverage in the face of Indian threat. Pakistan's fears in this regard are imaginary for Strategic analysis in India make no secret of their new that Pakistan constitutes that one obstacle to what they consider to be India's natural and destined rise to the position of paramount power in the region.²

Despite the creditable beginning of SAARC and the Indo-Pak commission, it is evident that the enormous difference in size and power between India and the other constituents of South Asia give rise to misgivings among its neighbours. Pakistan finds, it difficult to reconcile itself to India's pre-eminence in South Asia; its policy makers emphasize that Pakistan can never accept such a situation.

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1. Singh, Jagjit, "India-China - Cooperation or Confrontation". Indian Defence Review, January 1991, p. 24.
 2. Bhatt, Maqbool Ahmed, "Strategic Balance in South Asia", Strategic Studies, A quarterly journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, vol. XIV, No. 4, Summer 1992.

"The India draws from history the strength and will needed to full fill his graved design... The Indians regard themselves as the inheritors of the glory of British India.... Mrs. Gandhi is hostile to any power that refuses to accept India's preeminent position, and in this the Chief culprit is Pakistan, about whom the Indian Prime Minister has a fixation bordering on the pathological. It was Indira Gandhi who was the architect of the upheaval of 1971..... which culminated in the disintegration of Pakistan".¹

Pakistan's stances to the Indian approach and its over all foreign policy outlook can be seen at two specific levels - that dealing with problems of the region and the other with its relations with the super powers. Speaking of the key factors in Pakistan's external relations Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan stated "Islamabad's policy on Afghanistan and vis-a-vis India and within that framework its ties with the super powers, now constitutes, the most important area of countries foreign policy."² At the regional level Pakistan considers Shimla Agreement to be equivalent to a No War Pact³ and the problem of Jammu and Kashmir to be a problem of continuing concern which should be solved on the basis of Simla Agreement and the relevant U.N. Resolutions.⁴

Intra-regional Dimensions of South Asian Security Issues

India and Pakistan still remain trapped in the nightmare of enmity and tension.

The two countries could have settled down to good neighbourly co-existence with commonalities of languages and cultures fostering mutual sympathy, trust and understanding. The important thing is that since 1947, India and Pakistan

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1. Akram, A.I., "Shadows over South Asia", The Muslims, Islamabad, January 1984.
 2. Keshiqs Contemporary Achieves, June 13, 1981, Col. 30919, The Times of India, Bombay, November 19, 1981.
 3. India Lok Sabha, Debate No. 16, Col. 343.
 4. India Rajya Sabha, Debate, No. 16, Col. 35.

have not only saddled with bitter and mutually antagonistic postures against each other but have also fought three wars. Among the disputes and major issues that have incessantly aggravated their security concerns are the bitter legacy of the past, Kashmir dispute alongwith linked issues of Siachin, Wullur Lake Barrage, communalism and the ethnic disturbances, intermittent domestic problems the indulgence of extra-regional powers, nuclear question and the current Kashmiri turmoil and the terrorist activities.

Pakistani leaders every now and then harp on the Kashmir issue; The internal policy of Pakistan demands that this issue be kept alive. No party or government, civil or military can afford to forget Kashmir at this stage in the evolution of Pakistan. Pakistan consider Kashmir 'A cap on the head' while India needs it from the strategic point of view.

A plethora of literature on these claims and counter claims has been written and is available.¹ U.S.A. and the European Economic Community have urged both India and Pakistan to resolve their outstanding problems bilaterally within the framework of the Simla Agreement, China, another important actor in the polycentric world order, wants that both India and Pakistan should find a "just solution" to Kashmir dispute through bilateral peaceful negotiations. As regards India's ties with Pakistan, though the two countries have been able to

1. Gupta Sisier, Kashmir : A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, Bombay, 1967; Lt.Gen. K.K. Nanda, "The Kashmir Problem", Defence Seminar, vol. 1, No. 2, August, September 1991, Kashmir Dispute : Myth and Reality an official release of the Government of Pakistan, January, 1991; Ms Fahmida Ashraf's answers to a set of questionnaire on "Kashmir Dispute and the Indo-Pak Relations", received from the Institute of Strategic studies, Islamabad, November 28, 1990; Pervaiz I. Cheema, "Security in South Asia", South Asia Journal, vol. 4, No. 3, January-March, 1991; Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Kashmir Key Issue", The Hindustan Times, The Hindu, November 30, 1991, Kuldeep Nayar, "Kashmir : A Way Out", The Hindustan Times, July 15, 1991.

initiate an agreement on the non-attack of each others nuclear and other key installations, the bilateral relations have generally suffered because of the growing help to terrorist. Some of the pronouncements of Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sherif that his government would continue to support terrorist activities in Kashmir and Punjab have contributed to a deterioration of Indo-Pak relations.

Another major factor aggravating Indo-Pak security concern is the nuclear issue. With China being a nuclear power and Pakistan crossing the nuclear threshold, India has not closed its nuclear option. Public evidence indicates that both states are within easy reach of nuclear device. Indeed the present ambiguous situation seems to suit the interests and pocket books of both countries. A Pakistani bomb would mean the loss of American financial and military support and would be followed by a much larger Indian programme. An Indian bomb might led to greater prestige in the developing world but, it too would be followed by a Pakistani equalizer and might endanger India's access to western high technology.¹

While advocating international peace and disarmament, India has sustained a thorny arms race with Pakistan which has created ever higher degree of insecurity for both. This is a fallacy. It is imperative connectedness of security policy with defence preparedness to multidimensional approach to security. At the diplomatic level, it calls for a shift towards political techniques of conflict resolution and confidence building measures. As a matter of fact, India has brought almost all south Asian nation - states except Pakistan within the confines of her informal regional security framework. In the case of Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, formal treaties,

1. Cohen, Stephen Philip, Conclusion, The Security of South Asia, (ed.) Vistar Publications, New Delhi, p. 226.

accords and agreements have connected these countries with the regional security framework of India. Most significantly, even though Nepal might have strived to balance China against India in the diplomatic game, Nepal could not, but follow the Indian line on all security issues affecting South Asia in a polycentric world order. India had for more than two decades been persuading Nepal to agree to a common endeavour on water resources development and proceeding with hyde/multipurpose projects on common rivers.

As regards Bhutan, it is worth mentioning that the way in which Bhutan finds accommodation in the security framework of the South Asian sub-system is still marked largely by the strategic perceptions of the past and the China factor. Bhutan agreed, to be guided by the advice of the Government of India with respect to its foreign relations. Under Article VI of the Treaty 1949, Bhutan could procure military hardware and other defence items, through India, only with the support and approval of India.

Like other South Asian nation - states, Bhutan also faces the problems of development and nation - state building. At the same time, the ethonic Nepalese factor in the southern Bhutan constitutes an emerging threat to its internal stability and security. Bhutan's King Jigme Singye Wangchuk elaborated his country's security concern in the following manner, "our people in the minotiry. Second, they felt that Sri Lankan Tamils are going to win and Sri Lanka is going to be split, in Nepal the peoples movement has been successful, and India has the Kashmir problem as also in Assam and Punjab. So the time was conducive to revolt against the government".¹

Turning towards Indo-Sri Lanka scenario, it can be speculated that the strategic and political dimensions of

1. Chadha, Kumkum, "We are not fighting for the throne", an interview of Bhutan King J.S. Wangchuk, published in The Hindustan Times, November 17, 1981.

their security framework have been rapidly changing on the basis of emerging patterns of relations between them over the recent years. India's perception of Sri Lanka factor has been compounded by an ensemble of many considerations. There has been, firstly, the influence of Tamils on the domestic politics of both Colombo as well as New Delhi. Secondly, there has been serious threats to India's security due to the influx of refugees of Sri Lankan Tamil origin as the fall-out of the escalating Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka since July, 1983 and evidently, India's approach and direction to the management and resolution of this crisis. There have also been, thirdly, some irritants in the Indo-Sri Lanka relations that related to the political and diplomatic behaviour of Sri Lanka Government towards India. Furthermore, Geo-political and geo-strategic and responses to Sri Lanka turmoil.

The intensification of the ethnic turmoil since 1983 onwards created a situation in which Sri Lankan Government had to sign the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1988 which not only enabled the Indian forces to enter Sri Lanka with the specific goal of restoring peace and tranquillity in its strife-torn areas but also prevented Sri Lanka to make its Trincomèbe port available for military use by any country in a manner deleterious to India's maritime and other interests. Initially, the Indo-Sri Lanka accord brought Sri Lanka into the fold of mutual security system and also strengthened Indo-Sri Lanka relations. India resolve to pursue the strategy that if external support was needed to meet the domestic upheaval in any neighbouring country of South Asia.

As regards Bangladesh, it can be stressed that its major security concerns are the product of its domestic vulnerabilities, the challenges of nation - building, the tribal sub-nationalism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the environmental challenges, the high population growth rate and its divergent perception and position on the issues of mutual interest

vis-a-vis India.¹ A section of the public opinion in Bangladesh, including the government circle itself, subscribes to the view that the Indian factor overshadows the rest of external threats to the security of Bangladesh.² Negotiations on eastern water settlement and the transfer of Tin Bigha through the Indo-Bangladesh Agreement of 1974 have been striking examples. As the Supreme Court has decided in favour of the transfer of Tin Bigha to Bangladesh and transfer has taken place, this should be followed to remove the last hurdle in enforcing the 1974 Agreement. This would certainly open fresh avenues of mutual trust and cooperation in other fields, B.G. Verghese has rightly observed that "India has much to gain from Bangladesh than a few additional cusecs of water in the lean season or some mud flats in the Sunderbans and there could be a whole host of mutually beneficial trade between them. The idea does not appear to have crossed the mind of policy makers. Hereto, diplomacy could secure development, communication, national integration and security in what is one of the most vulnerable parts of the country".³

As regards Maldives, it can be visualised that for all practical purposes, its political stability and interests be protected and promoted within the framework of the SAARC, and India should be more inclined to do so as a consequence of the commonalities of interests in the Indian Ocean. Maldives was already indebted to India for its ready support to foil a coup by Elat on November 3, 1988. Equally, notably is the fact that the SAARC Heads of State or Government not only condemned the attempt to destabilise the Maldivian

1. Karim, M. Iqbal, "Security perceptions of Bangladesh", Strategic Analysis, vol. XIII, No. 11, Feb., 1991, pp. 1275-96.

2. Ibid.

3. Verghese, B.G., n. 9, p. 33.

Government, but also strongly criticised, "These acts of violence which disrupted the peace and security of a member state", and extended their full solidarity with the Government of Maldives.¹ Indian support to foil the coup attempt in Maldives has sent some wrong signals abroad, particularly in Australia.²

Taken as a whole in the intra-regional perspective, it can be speculated that South Asia is an Indo-Centric region to the extent that India is capable of playing as the central actor in this region on account of its tangible elements of power and performance. The Indian objectives have not only been to strengthen defence preparedness for traditional military roles but also to support the cause of "non-interference" and "non-aggression" in the region. India's South Asian neighbours on the contrary "avoid any public commitment to the Indian security system, but their own security policies are based upon the assumption of an Indian guarantee against extra-regional aggression".³ India now faces greater threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty and development from domestic turmoils which are thriving rather than slowing down.

Counting the external dimensions of threats, the point can be made that India still has disputed borders, and bears the responsibility of protecting her long coastline and off-shore interests and scattered island territories. In such situations, India needs to maintain a certain level of 'military built up' for larger security role. It requires a formidable base of strategic, political, economic, scientific

1. See Joint Press Release, Fourth SAARC Summit, Islamabad, 1988.

2. Ali, Mujtaba, and Vanghen Bruce, "Asian-Pacific and South Asia Security Dilemma", Mainstream, vol. XXX, No. 7, December 7, 1991, pp. 18 and 21.

3. Leo E. Rose, n. 5, p. 381.

and technological strengths to get rid of harmful threats.

An Approach to Security in the Post Cold War Era

In the context of the overall security environment and underlying perceptions of actual and potential threats, the point can be made that a significant regional, and perhaps global role awaits India that incapable of adjusting her policies to the emerging situations. India being drawn systematically into the security dialogues process now evolving gradually in the broader framework of the Asia-Pacific region. It implies that no nation-state can be free from "harmful threats".

In view of the security environment and underlying perceptions of actual and potential threats, the point can be made that a significant regional, and perhaps global role awaits India and admittedly India is a regional power. Despite, all the plus points said above, some scholars have put their views in a different way. Kimit Israni and Haku Israni has depicted that 'India being rich in resources and having a big land area and a large population could have become a superpower after independence but, did not mainly of the two reasons given below :

1. "India has almost never had the right people in the seats of political power.
2. The wrong people in the seats of political power, of course, could not take the right approaches to solve the countries problems and lead the country in the right direction".

So far making India a great nation they emphasized that "the need to prepare an exceedingly bold and imaginative blue print. Hence, let us lay down the policies and programs that we are going to follow in various pheres of national life over the next twelve years".¹ Speaking

1. Israni, Kimit and Haku Israni, India a Superpower ?, Lancer International, New Delhi, pp. 2-3.

about India's education level, they have the reasons to say that the literacy picture on all India level is even more dismal. The level of literacy as revealed by the 1981 census, was only 36 per cent for the country as a whole. The constitution of India provided for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years within a period of 10 years. But, in 1980, only 65% of the children in the age group of 6-11 attended schools and the percentage decreased to 42 per cent in respect of the age group of 11-14 years. These scholars have a cause to say that :

"It means that as many as 500 million, or about the population of America and Russia put together, are hardly making any contribution to the enrichment of the country. These 500 million constitute two-thirds of our 'human resources' that we can not afford to neglect. It is really mind-boggling to think as to what India can not achieve, given the additional backing of these 500 million people with the power of literacy to guide them. At present these 500 million are a kind of permanent drag on India's economic resources".¹

Speaking about the energy crisis in India, they have vehemently commented that :

"It is a matter of great shame that even though India is endowed with very rich energy sources from solar through water to nuclear, the country suffers not only from acute shortage of power but, power is costly and its supply is faulty. This hopeless state of affairs, in the area of power supply in the country is attributable to various causes".²

Michael Holdonty, former President of the American Association of Petroleum, Geologists, while addressing 4500 petroleum industry officials in September 1979 said :

1. Ibid, p. 6.

2. Op.cit. No. , p. 10.

"The world probably has as much undiscovered fuel under ground as has been discovered so far and as such there is great urgency to search for and find new oil reserves. During the 1990s, half of the worlds production will come from fields not yet found and that the largest undiscovered fields are thought to be in Asia".

India after independence has not yet been able to explore sufficient oil resources. According to the Western Chart Saturn is Sextile to Neptune which shows the country's abundance in oil.¹

In the field of water power, the total annual supply of water in Indian Rivers is estimated to be 25 million cusecs. Of this hardly 10 per cent is utilized and the rest runs to waste. In the Second World War Germany and Japan were defeated. Japan also had to bear the burnt of two atomic bombs. Both the countries were in complete ruins when the war ended. But, the surprising post-war economic growth in Japan and West Germany followed by similar economic miracles in Taiwan, South Korea and tiny Singapur are trying to tell us something important which India has failed to follow.

Dr. Shashi Gadgil, Professor of Managerial Sciences at Long Island University, New York said :

"India needs creative juices of thousands of entrepreneurs to pull up its economy by its boot straps. Don't tell them what they can not do, but, what they can do - what they are free to do. Let them build. Let them manufacture and market in a free market economy and they will create jobs by the millions. Even the zealot par excellence - the Peoples Republic of China has turned to individual entrepreneurship and the free market. Let us accept the fact that a socialist pattern of society and centralized planning has failed".

1. Sreeramamurthy, A., India's Horoscope, Astrological Magazine pp. 556-57.

Anon pointed out that any cause is a lost cause in India, without a reduction in population. Today about 75 per cent of the world's population lives in the under-developed countries. About 50 per cent live in extreme poverty. In addition, the less developed nations, including India have the highest birth rates in the world. It is reported that a person born in the rich industrialized countries will consume during his life time about thirty times as much as a person born in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The root of the problem is that the population does not increase in arithmetical progression, i.e. by simple consecutive addition (1,2,3,4 etc) but, in geometrical progression i.e. by exponential growth or multiplication 1,2,4,16 etc. This exponential growth rate for population is a great potential danger for India. The growth rate which was 5.75% in 1911, 84.25% in 1961 has reached to 254.00% in 1991 and is 843.93 million.¹

As regards India's defence these scholars have their own thinking. On the basis of 'Force Ratio'² India stands at No. 16 maintaining 1.6% Pakistan at No. 11 having 5.2% and Israel 46.2%, which is the highest in the world military power. General MacArthur describing about failures of armies once said :

"The History of failure in war can be summed up in two words : Too Late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy, too late in realizing the mortal danger, too late in preparedness : too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance, too late in standing with one's trends".

India has a very bitter experience of suffering Ignoble defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. In spite of heavy cost of defence, India is not in a state of

1. Manorama Year Book 1993, Kollayam Kozhikode, Kochi, p. 394.

2. A Nations Force Ratio is the number of its full-time active-duty military personnel per 1000 population.

continuous alert Far Eastern Economic Review mentioned that 'money is spent in India but, it is spent badly'.

Lyndon H. Laronche, Jr. and other US experts by using advanced computer projections in a program entitled 'The Industrialization of India' 1980-2020 from backwardness to industrial power in 40 years have predicted that India could emerge as a super power next only to the USA and Russia if, it finds answers to its economic problems".

In this 'Comment' I attempt an overview and an analysis of India's emerging status as regional super power. Tracing the history of India's emergence as a regional power the first and formidable indicator was Indo-Pak war of 1971 which led to the splintering of Pakistan and emergence of an independent Bangladesh. It was a great victory at arms for India and power prestige of the Indian army. The second such indicator appeared in April 1984 when Indian troops as a consequence of Pakistan's intrusions moved shiftly in Siachen Glacier area and occupied key areas on the high Saltoro ridge line. The third opportunity arose in the summer of 1985 when Indian troops as 'the forward policy' penetrated into hitherto unoccupied territory along the India-China border to check Pakistan's movement. The fourth indicator of India's emergence as a super power appeared in the winter of 1986-87 when India organized "Exercise Brass Tacks" involving about 150000 troops. In July 1987 Sri Lanka came the fifth indicator when India entered with Sri Lanka into "Indo-Sri Lanka Accord".

India has the fourth largest armed forces in the world. The first in South Asia. It has the military leadership and combat power potential to fight a war on two fronts and its Air Force to support the land forces. The Air force has a strategic airlift capacity making airborne and air transported operations. The Indian Navy is gradually emerging as a formidable blue nations and is sixth in the world.

India's expansion and modernization of her armed forces place it in a unchallengable position. There is no doubt that India's size, population, her strategic location in the Indian ocean region, between the South-West and South-East Asia, her powerful industrial and technological potential, her economic viability make her the dominant nation of South Asia.

On political grounds India marks the history of uninterrupted constitutional government, devoted to the principles of democracy, secularism and non-alignment. There may be differences of opinion between North-South, Hindus-Muslims, problems may arise between states to states but, all citizens howsoever divided, stand unitedly when the nationalism is challenged. In a balance sheet of non-alignment, the friendly relations that India built up and maintained with most of the countries, the economic help and technical assistance she received from countries of both blocks and important role she could play in the world affairs particularly in contributing to the lessening of tensions are matters that need to be included on the credit side.

The national power is a function of material assets e.g. (a) geographical size and location, (b) size of population, (c) economic strength and development of science, technology and industry, social and political organisations and institutions and (e) military capability including the size and structure of armed forces, quality and quantity of weapons system, doctrines and strategics of employment of military forces - the five determinants are considered important for national power.¹

In concluding, I would like to restate the parameters within which the arguments in this study have been presented

1. Srivastava, H.K. "The India-Pakistan Strategic Debate : The Hold-Off Approach, Strategic Studies Journal, vol. 5, No.1 & 2, AMU, Aligarh, p. 78.

and the assumptions have been made. South Asia has some unique features. The ratio of population to resources is very unfavourable and some of the poorest nations in the world belong to this region. Nearly fifth of the world population live in South Asia, which is 2.7 per cent of the world's land surface and half of its area is unfit for agriculture. The manufacturing sector is still in infancy. The size of population is massive and the size of economy of South Asia is very small. The GPD is only one fourth of Germany and 1/4 times of Netherland. The per capita income is lowest in the world and is less developed.¹

India has the largest area, the highest population, the profounding natural resources and commandable strong army to protect its borders, a navy to safe guard its ports and trade and no other country of South Asia can standby India in industrial developments. It is only India which has the capacity to act as a check to extra-regional powers from interference in the region. India is a guarantee of peace to small neighbour, a treasure of resources to needy neighbours and a ray of hope in the region. It is the best out of the good neighbours, economically more sound than any other SAARC country, militarily more strong than any other country in South Asia and politically more realistic than six nations. The study reveals undoubtedly, "the emergence of India as regional power".

1. Ahmed Emajuddin, "Regional Cooperation in South Asia and India's Role", IDSA Journal, January-March 1983, p. 407.

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